Behaviour and Rationality in Corporate Governance
Corporate scandals due to bad accounting happen far too frequently for a system of corporate governance to be deemed effective. This book tells why the safeguards designed to prevent bad accounting so often fail. By studying why the auditors and members of a board of directors regularly fail to deliver the truth about a company‘s financ
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