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"Sect. 6. If a miracle proves a doctrine to be revealed from God, and consequently true, a miracle can never be wrought for a contrary doctrine. The facts are therefore as incompatible as the doctrines.

"I could wish your friend had not denominated me an infidel writer, on account of ten or twelve pages which seem to him to have that tendency; while I have wrote so many volumes on history, literature, politics, trade, morals, which, in that particular at least, are entirely inoffensive. Is a man to be called a drunkard because he has been seen fuddled once in his lifetime?

"Having said so much to your friend, who is certainly a very ingenious man, though a little too zealous for a philosopher; permit me also the freedom of saying a word to yourself. Whenever I have had the pleasure to be in your company, if the discourse turned upon any common subject of literature or reasoning, I always parted from you both entertained and instructed. But when the conversation was diverted by you from this channel towards the subject of your profession, though I doubt not but your intentions were very friendly towards me, I own I never received the same satisfaction-I was apt to be tired, and you to be angry. I would therefore wish for the future, wherever my good fortune throws me in your way, that these topics should be forborne between us. I have, long since, done with all inquiries on such subjects, and am become incapable of instruction, though I own no one is more capable of conveying it than yourself.

After having given you the liberty of communicating to your friend what part of this letter you think proper, I remain, In

SIR,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

DAVID HUME."

It may not be improper, in order as much as possible to prevent misapprehension, to add, that though I know that judge. In any event, he will, I persuade myself, do me the justice to own, that I have not weakened my adversary's plea by my manner of stating it. To avoid this, I have kept as close to the objector's own words as I could properly, without naming and quoting him. Beside these observations, I hardly find any thing in the letter, having the appearance of argument, which affects my reasoning.

several pieces on the same subject have been published since the first edition of my Dissertation, I have not had the good fortune to see any of them, except one printed along with other tracts by the late learned and accurate Dr Price. There is one in particular by Dr Farmer, which I have oftener than once inquired about, but have not yet been lucky enough to meet with. This, perhaps, is imputable to the lateness of my inquiries; for I acknowledge that I was so much engrossed by other studies at the time of its first appearing, that I did not think of reading more on that article, till an application to myself, for a new edition of the Dissertation, suggested the propriety of consulting what may have been written by learned men on the subject posterior to the first edition. From some other works I have read of Dr Farmer's, I have reason to believe that the piece alluded to is both ingenious and acute; and from some account of it, which I remember to have perused in a Review, I have ground to suspect that his principles and mine on that subject do not in all things correspond. At the same time, I recollect to have thought, when reading the account, that, on some points, the difference between us was more in expression than in sentiment. My only reason for mentioning this circumstance here, is to prevent the misconstruction of my silence in regard to him and other writers on the same subject, whose sentiments may either coincide with mine or stand in opposition to them. My silence in such cases proceeds neither from contempt nor from policy. They will come nearer the truth, and do me more justice, who shall ascribe it to ignorance.

I shall only add, with respect to the gentleman who did me the honour to translate my Dissertation into French, that though, upon the whole, he has acquitted himself admirably of the task he had undertaken, and has, in many things, improved upon his original, there are a few places in which he seems not perfectly to have apprehended my meaning. The cause of his mistake I find to have sometimes been an ambiguity or obscurity in the English expression I had employed. In such cases I have endeavoured to correct the fault in this edition, and give to the diction all the perspicuity possible. There is no quality in style more important, whatever be the subject; but in argu mentative writings it is indispensable.

ADVERTISEMENT.

Ir is not the only, nor even the chief design of these sheets, to refute the reasoning and objections of Mr Hume, with regard to miracles: the chief design of them is, to set the principal argument for Christianity in its proper light. On a subject that has been so often treated, it is impossible to avoid saying many things which have been said before. It may, however, with reason, be affirmed, that there still remains, on this subject, great scope for new observations. Besides, it ought to be remembered, that the evidence of any complex argument depends very much on the order into which the material circumstances are digested, and the manner in which they are displayed.

The Essay on Miracles deserves to be considered as one of the most dangerous attacks that have been made on our religion. The danger results not solely from the merit of the piece: it results much more from that of the author. The piece itself, like every other work of Mr Hume, is ingenious; but its merit is more of the oratorial kind than of the philosophical. The merit of the author, I acknowledge, is great. The many useful volumes he has published of history, as well as on criticism, politics, and trade, have justly procured him, with all persons of taste and discernment, the highest reputation as a writer. What pity is it that this reputation should have been sullied by attempts to undermine the foundations both of natural religion and of revealed!

For my own part, I think it a piece of justice in me to acknowledge the obligations I owe the author before I enter on the proposed examination. I have not only been much entertained and instructed by his works, but, if I am possessed of any talent in abstract reasoning, I am not a little indebted to what he has written on Human Nature, for the improvement of that talent. If, therefore, in this tract, I have refuted Mr Hume's Essay, the greater share of the merit is perhaps to be ascribed to Mr Hume himself. The compliment which the

Russian monarch, after the famous battle of Poltowa, paid the Swedish generals, when he gave them the honourable appellation of his "masters in the art of war," I may, with great sincerity, pay my acute and ingenious adversary.

I shall add a few things concerning the occasion and form of the following dissertation.

Some of the principal topics here discussed were more briefly treated in a sermon preached before the synod of Aberdeen, and are now made public at their desire. To the end that an argument of so great importance might be more fully and freely canvassed, than it could have been, with propriety, in a sermon, it was judged necessary to new-model the discourse, and to give it that form in which it now appears.

The edition of Mr Hume's Essays to which I always refer in this work, is that printed at London, in duodecimo, 1750, entitled, Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding. I have, since finishing this tract, seen a later edition, în which there are a few variations. None of them appeared to me so material as to give ground for altering the quotations and references here used. There is, indeed, one alteration, which candour required that I should mention: I have accordingly mentioned it in a note.*

The arguments of the Essayist I have endeavoured to refute by argument. Mere declamation I know no way of refuting but by analysing it; nor do I conceive how inconsistencies can be answered otherwise than by exposing them. In such analysis and exposition, which, I own, I have attempted without ceremony or reserve, an air of ridicule is unavoidable; but this ridicule, I am well aware, if founded in misrepresentation, will at last rebound upon myself. It is possible that, in some things, I have mistaken the author's meaning; I am conscious that I have not, in any thing, designedly misrepresented it.

Part II. Sect. 5.

A DISSERTATION

ON

MIRACLES.

INTRODUCTION.

"CHRISTIANITY," it has been said, "is not founded in argument." If it were only meant, by these words, that the religion of Jesus could not, by the single aid of reasoning, produce its full effect upon the heart, every true Christian would cheerfully subscribe to them. No arguments, unaccompanied by the influences of the Holy Spirit, can convert the soul from sin to God; though even to such conversion, arguments are, by the agency of the Spirit, rendered subservient. Again, if we were to understand by this aphorism, that the principles of our religion could never have been discovered by the natural and unassisted faculties of man; this position, I presume, would be as little disputed as the former. But if, on the contrary, under the cover of an ambiguous expression, it is intended to insinuate, that those principles, from their very nature, can admit no rational evidence of their truth, (and this, by the way, is the only meaning which can avail our antagonists,) the gospel, as well as common sense, loudly reclaims against it.

The Lord Jesus Christ, the author of our religion, often argued, both with his disciples and with his adversaries, as with reasonable men, on the principles of reason. Without

this faculty, he well knew, they could not be susceptible either of religion or of law. He rgued from prophecy, and the conformity of the event to the prediction. He argued from the testimony of John the Baptist, who was generally acknowledged to be a prophet.2 He argued from the miracles which he himself performed,3 as incontrovertible evidences that God Almighty operated by him, and had sent him. He expostulates with his enemies for not using their reason on this subject. "Why," says he, "even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?" In like manner we are called upon by the apostles of our Lord, to act the part of wise men, and judge impartially of what they say.5 Those who do so,

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are highly commended for the candour and prudence they discover in an affair of so great consequence.6 We are even commanded to be "always ready to give an answer to every man that asketh us a reason of our hope;" "in meekness to instruct them that oppose themselves ;" and "earnestly to contend for the faith which was once delivered to the saints." God has neither in natural nor revealed religion, "left himself without a witness;" but has in both given moral and external evidence, sufficient to convince the impartial, to silence the gainsayer, and to render inexcusable the atheist and the unbeliever. This evidence it is our duty to attend to, and candidly to examine. We must "prove all things," as we are expressly enjoined in holy writ, if we would ever hope to "hold fast that which is good."10

Thus much I thought proper to premise, not to serve as an apology for the design of this tract, (the design surely needs no apology, whatever the world may judge of the execution,) but to expose the shallowness of that pretext, under which the advocates for infidelity in this age commonly take shelter. Whilst therefore, we enforce an argument, which, in support of our religion, was so frequently insisted on by its divine founder, we will not dread the reproachful titles of dangerous friends, or disguised enemies of revelation. Such are the titles which the writer, whose sentiments we propose in these papers to canvass, has bestowed on his antagonists; not, I believe, through malice against them, but as a sort of excuse for himself, or at least a handle for introducing a very strange and unmeaning compliment to the religion of his country, after a very bold attempt to undermine it. We will, however, do him the justice to own, that he has put it out of our power to retort the charge. No intelligent person who has carefully perused the Essay on Miracles, will impute to the author either of those ignominious characters.

My primary intention in undertaking an answer to the aforesaid essay, has invariably been, to contribute all in my power to the

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defence of a religion which I esteem the greatest blessing conferred by Heaven on the sons of men. It is at the same time a secondary motive, of considerable weight, to vindicate philosophy, at least that most important branch of it which ascertains the rules of reasoning, from those absurd consequences which this author's theory naturally leads us to. The theme is arduous. The adversary is both subtle and powerful.

With such an adversary, I should on very unequal terms enter the lists, had I not the advantage of being on the side of truth. And an eminent advantage this doubtless is. It requires but moderate abilities to speak in defence of a good cause. A good cause demands but a distinct exposition and a fair hearing; and we may say with great propriety, it will speak for itself. But to adorn error with the semblance of truth, and make the worse appear the better reason, requires all the arts of ingenuity and invention; arts in which few or none have been more expert than Mr Hume. It is much to be regretted, that on some occasions he has so ill applied them.

PART FIRST.

MIRACLES ARE CAPABLE OF PROOF FROM TESTIMONY, AND RELIGIOUS MIRACLES ARE NOT LESS CAPABLE OF THIS EVIDENCE THAN OTHERS.

SECTION I.

MR HUME'S FAVOURITE ARGUMENT IS FOUNDED ON A FALSE HYPOTHESIS.

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It is not the aim of this author to evince, that miracles, if admitted to be true, would not be a sufficient evidence of a divine mission. His design is solely to prove, that miracles which have not been the objects of our own senses, at least such as are said to have been performed in attestation of any religious system, cannot reasonably be adınitted by us, or believed on the testimony of others. "A miracle," says he, “ supported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than of argument." Again, in the conclusion of his essay, Upon the whole, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof." Here he concludes against all miracles. Any kind of miracle" are his express words. He seems, however, immediately sensible, that in asserting this, he has gone too far; and therefore, in the end of the same paragraph, retracts part of what he had advanced in the beginning. "We may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force, as to prove a miracle, and make it a

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just foundation for any system of religion." In the note on this passage, he has these words: "I beg the limitation here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind, as to admit of proof from human testimony."

So much for that cardinal point, which the essayist labours so strenuously to evince; and which, if true, will not only be subversive of revelation, as received by us, on the testimony of the apostles, and prophets, and martyrs, but will directly lead to this general conclusion, "That it is impossible for God Almighty to give a revelation, attended with such evidence, that it can be reasonably believed in after ages, or even in the same age, by any person who has not been an eye-witness of the miracles by which it is supported."

Now by what wonderful process of reasoning is this strange conclusion made out? Several topics have been employed for the purpose by this subtle disputant. Among these there is one principal argument, which he is at great pains to set off to the best advantage. Here indeed he claims a particular concern, having discovered it himself. His title to the honour of the discovery, it is not my business to controvert; I confine myself entirely to the consideration of its importance. To this end I shall now lay before the reader the unanswerable argument, as he flatters himself it will be found; taking the freedom, for brevity's sake, to compendize the reasoning, and to omit whatever is said merely for illustration. To do otherwise would lay me under the necessity of transcribing the greater part of the essay.

"Experience," says he, "is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact. Experience is in some things variable, in some things uniform. A variable experience gives rise only to probability; a uniform experience amounts to a proof. Probability always supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence proportioned to the superiority. In such cases we must balance the opposite experiments, and deduct the lesser number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence. Our belief or assurance of any fact from the report of eye-witnesses, is derived from no other principle than experience; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Now, if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two oppo

site experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance, against the fact which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority. Farther, if the fact affirmed by the witnesses, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; if, besides, the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire, as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. And if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle, therefore, however attested, can never be rendered credible, even in the lowest degree." This, in my apprehension, is the sum of the argument, on which my ingenious opponent rests the strength of his cause.

In answer to this, I propose first to prove, ..at the whole is built upon a false hypothesis. That the evidence of testimony is derived solely from experience, which seems to be an axiom of this writer, is at least not so incontestable a truth as he supposes it; that, on the contrary, testimony has a natural and original influence on belief, antecedent to experience, will, I imagine, easily be evinced. For this purpose, let it be remarked, that the earliest assent which is given to testimony by children, and which is previous to all experience, is in fact the most unlimited; that by a gradual experience of mankind, it is gradually contracted, and reduced to narrower bounds. To say, therefore, that our diffidence in testimony is the result of experience, is more philosophical, because more consonant to truth, than to say that our faith in testimony has this foundation. Accordingly, youth, which is inexperienced, is credulous; age, on the contrary, is distrustful. Exactly the reverse would be the case, were this author's doctrine just.

Perhaps it will be said, if experience is allowed to be the only measure of a logical or reasonable faith in testimony, the question, "Whether the influence of testimony on belief be original or derived?" if it is not merely verbal, is at least of no importance in the present controversy. But I maintain it

is of the greatest importance. The difference between us is by no means so inconsiderable, as to a careless view it may appear. According to his philosophy, the presumption is against the testimony, or (which amounts to the same thing) there is not the smallest presumption in its favour, till properly supported by experience. According to the explication given above, there is the strongest presumption in favour of the testimony, till properly refuted by experience.

If it be objected by the author, that such a faith in testimony as is prior to experience must be unreasonable and unphilosophical, because unaccountable; I should reply, that there are, and must be, in human nature some original grounds of belief, beyond which our researches cannot proceed, and of which, therefore, it is in vain to attempt a rational account. I should desire the objector to give a reasonable account of his faith in this principle, that "similar causes always produce similar effects;" or in this, that "the course of nature will be the same to-morrow that it was yesterday, and is to-day;" principles which, he himself acknowledges, are neither intuitively evident, nor deduced from premises; and which nevertheless we are under a necessity of presupposing, in all our reasonings from experience. I should desire him to give a reasonable account of his faith in the clearest informations of his memory, which he will find it alike impossible either to doubt or to explain. Indeed, memory bears nearly the same relation to experience, that testimony does. Certain it is, that the defects and misrepresentations of memory are often corrected by experience. Yet, should any person hence infer that memory derives all its evidence from experience, he would fall into a manifest absurdity. For, on the contrary, experience derives its origin solely from memory, and is nothing else but the general maxims or conclusions we have formed, from the comparison of particular facts remembered. If we had not previously given an implicit faith to memory, we had never been able to acquire experience. When, therefore, we say that memory, which gives birth to experience, may nevertheless, in some instances, be corrected by experience, no more is implied, but that the inferences formed from the most lively and perspicuous reports of memory, sometimes serve to rectify the mistakes which arise from such reports of this faculty as are most languid and confused. Thus memory, in these instances, may be said to correct itself. The case is often much the same with experience and testimony, as will appear more clearly in the second section, where I shall consider the ambiguity of the word experience, as used by this author.

But how, says Mr Hume, is testimony ther 1 Sceptical Doubts, Part 2.

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