faithful in what they declared they had | received from God. In all distant places, and on many different occasions, there still appeared an exact harmony of doctrine, and a constant union in promoting the same cause; so that the same Spirit of truth appeared to direct them all, as they had all received the same spirit of power. Their hearts and lives were under the constant direction and influence of the power and spirit of real religion. As they had all received the same miraculous gifts of the Holy Ghost, they were all animated with the same just and regular zeal. ' All shewed the same firmness of mind, tempered with the same modesty, meekness, and humility. Their own religion gave them the noblest supports under the many and great sufferings they endured; and that no proof of their sincerity and faithfulness might be wanting, they sealed the truth of the doctrines they taught with their blood, and gave up their own lives to the hopes of that future happiness they proposed in the name of their Master to others.

And lastly, as truth and religion stand in no need of artifice and violence, the apostles openly renounced all such methods of propagating the religion of Christ, directing men to hold the mystery of faith in a pure conscience. They imposed on no man's judgment, they openly disclaimed all dominion over their faith and consciences, they reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, and instead of forcing their own interpretations upon them, commended them for searching the Scriptures whether the things were so. With all the authority their commission gave them, confirmed by many signs and wonders, they yet appealed to the judgments of men by fair arguments, and aimed at persuading the conscience by the conviction of reason, not to overbear it by the force of authority.

It was indeed highly fit and necessary, that when they had approved the religion they taught to men's consciences, and their own authority and commission by sufficient evidence, they, as the ministers and apostles of Christ, should both command and exhort in his name, and publish the rules of his religion as his commands, of binding obligation and authority; for this reason, that he is the lawgiver of the Church. Thus the apostles acted. When they had first proved the truth of their doctrine by fair reason and argument, and their own commission by the demonstration of the Spirit and of power; that the faith of the Church should not stand on the wisdom of men, but on the power of God, it was necessary that they who were to publish Christ's religion, should teach whatever he commanded them, and themselves command and exhort obedience to them.

These were the methods the apostles of Christ used in teaching his religion, and it

accordingly met with success beyond human expectation. And though the prevalence of an opinion is no sure argument of truth, yet when principles contrary to men's inclinations and interests make their way only by evidence, and the force of reason and argument, against all methods of long and violent opposition, it is a very strong presumption of their truth, and that such success must be owing to the power of God attending it. And to suppose that such a religion as Christianity should prevail as it did, and by such means, without a miracle, would itself, in reality, be one of the greatest of miracles.

XI. From these arguments and evidences I cannot but be convinced that Jesus was a person sent from God, and that his apostles acted by his commission and authority, and that therefore the whole Christian religion, as contained in the New Testament, is a revelation from God.

As to the difficulties and objections that may be urged against its divine authority, I think they are far from carrying in them any evidence or proof. For as to those which are of greatest weight, they do not affect the truth of the facts recorded, nor destroy at all the credibility of them. There have never been any objections offered that render it unlikely or improbable, that Jesus Christ lived an holy life, taught excellent doctrines, did many great miracles, died on the cross, rose again from the dead, ascended into heaven, and poured down his Spirit on his apostles. And, therefore, whilst these facts which support the credit of Christianity, stand upon this sure foundation of certainty, I must necessarily believe the divine authority of the Christian revelation, though the difficulties pretended were much greater than they are.

Some of them may arise either from not knowing some particular circumstances and customs referred to, from the shortness of the accounts which are delivered, or from some lesser errors that may have cast some obscurity on those accounts. But from whencesoever they arise, they cannot invalidate the proof which arises from real and well attested facts, nor make me doubt of things that stand upon the strongest foundation of evidence.

I find, indeed, that many things, which have appeared for a long while to wise and thoughtful men as difficulties of great weight, have at length been fully cleared up, and set in a very plain and rational view; and I therefore please myself with the hope, that in the course of Providence, those things which still remain dark and perplexed, may be explained and set in a just light, and made appear as easy and consistent as they are now obscure and intricate.

Besides, these difficulties which are pre

tended, do not in the least affect the main and substantial parts of Christianity; they do not cast any obscurity over the precepts, and promises, and principles of the gospel, and of consequence do not affect my duty or my happiness. Notwithstanding all the objections that can be urged, I still find that the directions to serve God, and obey Christ, and secure my eternal salvation, are very obvious and plain, and therefore I am not under any pain or fear upon account of things I do not understand, or cannot explain. But what is of more importance, is, that the principal objections that are urged against the divine authority of the Christian religion, are fairly to be answered, so as to give satisfaction to any impartial and unprejudiced mind. It hath been objected against the prophecies relating to Christ, that they are to be interpreted of him only in an allegorical and mystical sense, and that they are in their nature obscure, and do not so plainly point out the Messiah as might be expected and desired. Whereas the truth is, that though there may be a difficulty in interpreting some of them, yet there are others which are exceeding plain and clear, have an evident reference to Christ, do agree to the circumstances of no other person, are accomplished in him, and in him only. And if there are any prophecies, originally relating to other persons and things, applied to Christ, and the circumstances of his appearance and kingdom, they are never cited as originally belonging to Christ, but only as applicable to him in their proper meaning, and the times and events to which they are referred.

When it is objected against the miracles of Christ, that they were the effect of magic, this appears to be absolutely impossible; for it was never yet heard of, that magicians could raise the dead, and do the other wonderful works that Jesus did. Besides, the end of his miracles was so great and good, as a wicked impostor and magician can never be supposed to have in view; and till it can be shewn that the Christian religion is a wicked religion, I must believe that the miracles recorded in the New Testament were wrought by an holy and good person, under the immediate influence of God."

If it be objected, that some of the miracles recorded are attended with some very absurd and improbable circumstances, I think this charge hath not, and cannot be proved. And from the unsuccessful attempts that have been made this way, I have reason to believe that the more the miracles of Christ and his apostles are considered, they will appear more and more wonderful in themselves, and more worthy the interposition and assistance of God.

If it be objected, that there is no sufficient evidence or proof that these miracles were

ever wrought, I apprehend this objection to be of little weight; because as there is the same ground of certainty for these, as there is for any other ancient facts which obtain universal belief, they deserve to be equally credited; and I think nothing can be more unreasonable and unfair than to allow the same evidence to be sufficient as to some facts, and to deny the sufficiency of it as to others, which are equally possible in themselves, consistent with all the perfections of God, and designed to answer the most valuable ends and purposes amongst men.

If it be said, that miracles are in their nature impossible, I think this can never be allowed but upon the supposition that all things are governed by, or rather subjected to an absolute and unalterable fatality. Because, if the supreme and eternal Cause of all things be possessed of liberty and power, the miracles recorded in the sacred writings are as possible to him as any other actions whatsoever, and according to my conception, much more casily performed than the work of creation, which is a much higher exertion of power, and is by all sober deists ascribed to the will and agency of God; and of consequence I can never allow the impossibility of miracles, because such a notion appears to me destructive of the being and perfections of God.

As to the doctrines of Christ, if it be urged that some of them are unintelligible and mysterious, I have this to satisfy myself, that it is not much wonder if they should be so, because many of them relate to God, whom

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none by searching can find out to perfection ;" and that this is no more than may be objected against many of the most certain truths of natural religion. For whoever will enter into the consideration of the immensity and eternity of God, attributes which certainly belong to him, will find himself lost in the infinite and boundless subject. As far as they are mysterious and incapable of being understood, I am sure that my acceptance with God doth not depend on my understanding them; and as far as they are intelligible, they increase my adoration, reverence, and love of God; awaken and excite me to the care and practice of godliness and virtue; and thus help me on in my preparation for heaven and happiness.

If it be objected, that any of the doctrines of Christianity are irrational and absurd, I apprehend this hath never been proved by any of the enemies of the Christian revelation. Many principles which they have endeavoured to expose to ridicule, have not been the doctrines of the gospel, but either their own mistakes, or the corrupt additions of weak and designing men to the simplicity of the truth of Christ. Other doctrines that have been excepted against, have not been

revealed in their full extent and compass, and, therefore, can never be proved absurd by any particular inferences drawn from them; because those very inferences may themselves appear false and absurd when the doctrines are placed in their full light, and men are rendered capable of clearly discerning and fully understanding them. As to others which have been excepted against, they have stood their ground both against ridicule and malice, and the objections that have been urged have had no other effect than to expose their own weakness, and to render the principles of the gospel of Christ more evident and convincing.

If it should be objected, that the very possibility of revelation itself may be questioned, I answer, that this must be upon one or other of these suppositions, either that God himself, who hath established the order and course of nature, cannot vary from it; or else, that it is not to be conceived how he should discover himself to any person, so as that he shall be sure it is God and no other.

If the former be asserted, that God himself cannot alter and vary from the course of nature, which he himself hath fixed, it will follow that he was obliged, by some external necessity, to form all things as they are, or else by a fitness of things absolutely independent upon his own pleasure and will.

If the first be asserted, that God was obliged by some external necessity, or the agency of some being prior and superior to himself, this is to assert eternity to be prior to itself, and infinite wisdom and power capable of being controlled by wisdom and power more than infinite, which is absurd.

or

If the latter be asserted, that God was obliged by a fitness of things independent upon his own pleasure and will, this will appear equally absurd; because, if he was under no external necessity to constitute the present frame, and consequently the present fitness of things, the actual constitution of the one and the other can be owing to no other cause or reason, but what is in God himself, and which, therefore, cannot be independent upon God; which cause reason can be no other than the will of God, directed by the dictates of his own wisdom and goodness. And of consequence, the present frame of things, with the fitness that results from it, is owing to the good pleasure and free choice of God, directed by the perfections of his own mind; which perfections do not destroy any natural power of acting or not acting; but only direct to the wisest and best use of it. The very essence of liberty doth indeed consist in wisdom to direct and power to execute.

Hence it follows, that if the present frame f things be the result of the most perfect freedom and choice in God, the same free

choice will and must take place, in every other circumstance to which perfect wisdom and goodness do direct. And, therefore, if it be agreeable to the dictates of such perfections in God, to vouchsafe an external revelation to mankind, in the case of an universal ignorance and degeneracy, such a revelation is as possible as the original constitution of things, and may be accounted for upon the very same foundation of reason.

But if it be said, that it cannot be conceived how God can so discover himself to any person, as that he shall be sure it is God and no other, I answer, that supposing we are not able to describe the method by which God makes himself known to men, it will by no means follow, that it is impossible for God to do so, unless our conceptions are the measure of all possibilities. If God be the universal Creator, he is surely the Creator of the souls of men, and hath implanted in them all their perceptive and reasonable powers and faculties; and of consequence, being the former of spirits, he must be capable of acting on them, which sufficiently proves the possibility of revelation.

Besides, if, as the whole visible creation around us shews the possibility and great probability of, there are reasonable spirits of natures, orders, and powers superior to us; I suppose they will not be thought to be incapable of converse, and of communicating their ideas to each other: for this would be to suppose spirits less happy than men and if created spirits can thus convey their minds to each other, so as that they shall be absolutely sure who it is they converse with, can it be imagined that God the infinite Spirit should not be able to convey his will to spirits and reasonable beings, so as that they shall be sure that it is God who converses with them?

Nothing is more certain than that God, who is an absolute Spirit, acts on the material world; and yet we cannot tell the manner how God acts upon it: and it is very wonderful to consider how one nature, absolutely distinct, and of quite different attributes and properties from another, should thus continually act upon and influence it. But that spiritual beings, between whose natures, as spiritual, there is a necessary likeness and conformity, should act upon each other, and be capable of conversing with, and communicating their ideas to each other, is a much more easy and rational supposition, and as probable, as that body should act upon body, of which the whole frame of the material world is an absolute, constant proof.

The account which reveiation itself gives of the manner in which God conveyed his mind to men, is, either by an audible voice, attended with an appearance of visible glory, or else by making certain very clear and

strong impressions on their minds. As to the former way, it is as reasonable to think that the voice and presence of God may be of so very peculiar a nature, as to be as well known, and as certainly distinguished, as the voice and countenance of a friend. And as to the latter, it appears to me extremely probable, that impressions made on the mind may be attended with such peculiar circumstances, which may as truly and certainly discover God, as a friend may be known by his resemblance and image, or as though we were mere spirits, and God was conversing with us as such.

I very

If it be allowed that revelation is possible, it may be denied that it is necessary, because the natural reason of men's minds is abundantly sufficient to demonstrate to them whatever God requires of them. readily grant, that the reasonable powers and faculties of men's minds are very capable of leading them into the knowledge of some of the most important truths that we are concerned to know, and duties we are obliged to perform; and that men are criminal in the sight of God, if they run into ignorance and vice, through a neglect to improve those excellent faculties of reason, which God hath given them.

But then it ought to be considered, that the powers of all men are not alike capable, nd that though truths of importance when offered to them may be discerned and approved by them, yet that the generality would scarce ever have been able, by a long course of argument and inference, to have reasoned themselves into a clear knowledge of all those principles which are necessary to be known, effectually to support the interest of true religion, and the practice of virtue; especially if we consider them as wholly taken up with the affairs of the present life, educated with strong prejudices in favour of superstition and error, and trained up from infancy in idolatrous practices, and criminal courses. In such circumstances, what reason may be capable of doing, I know not. But that it hath not in fact led men to the knowledge of all the necessary principles and truths of religion, is evident from the history of almost all nations, who have been destitute of revelation. And, therefore, to argue against the necessity of revelation, because possibly men's own reason might have been sufficient without it, when in reality they did need it, is to set up mere supposition against positive fact, and to reason from possibilities against experience and certainty.

Reason, that is, men's reasonable powers, are unquestionably capable of great improvements, and of making very considerable discoveries, with proper assistance and cultivation. But without suitable helps and means of information, I apprehend that no man can

affirm they would lead him into the knowledge of all the necessary principles of religion. Cicero, the greatest genius of the age in which he lived, did not owe his superior knowledge and wisdom to himself only. He had the writings of Rome and Greece to instruct and inform him. From these he understood the principles of the several sects of philosophers that were before him, the arguments with which they confirmed their respective sentiments, and the objections that were urged by some against the schemes and principles of others. Upon this foundation it was easy to reason, and in whatever respects his sentiments were nobler than others, they were not properly the mere discoveries of his own mind, but inferences from, or the improvements of the discoveries and principles of others. And I cannot help thinking, that if any men are now capable of forming to themselves a complete scheme of rational religion and morals, they owe it to the discoveries of the gospel revelation, though they assume the glory of it entirely to their reason.

Besides, though reason might possibly discover the duties of religion and virtue without any revelation, it cannot, in the nature of things, certainly discover what the rewards of being religious and virtuous shall be. Reason will indeed inform us, that a being perfectly virtuous, and who constantly acts agreeably to the reason and nature of things, without any deviation from it, cannot be finally miserable, but must be in some measure happy in the divine approbation and acceptance. But of what degree and duration that happiness shall be, depends wholly on the good pleasure of God. Being itself is the voluntary gift of the Supreme Cause, and of consequence, the continuance of being must depend on his will who first gave it. And though perfect virtue will always be entitled to a proportionable reward from God, yet tha such a being, and the happiness consequent upon his virtue, shall and must be of a everlasting continuance, can never be proved from the reason and nature of things, and of consequence, the knowledge of it can be derived from nothing but the voluntary discoveries of God himself.

This I think is plain, upon the supposition of a being perfectly virtuous. But if any reasonable beings deviate from the law of their creation, and act contrary to that fitness of things which reason assures them ought to be the rule of their actions; in such a case reasor will be so far from giving any positive assurances of a reward, that it will rather lead men to the expectations and fears of punishment there being as natural a connection between vice and punishment, as there is between virtue and a reward. Whether God wil pardon, and upon what conditions; whether repentance, and a sincere amendment for the

ature, shall entitle to happiness, and especially the same happiness as would have been the reward of perfect virtue, here reason can never determine. And of consequence, if the certain knowledge of these important articles be in any sense necessary to encourage the repentance and reformation of men, it is in the same sense absolutely necessary they should have a revelation from God concerning them.

If it be said, that supposing a revelation actually given, such revelation can be nothing but a revival of the principles and duties of natural religion, because men's acceptance with God can depend on nothing but their acting agreeable to the law of their reason and nature. I answer, that if by the principles and duties of natural religion be meant such principles and duties which, when discovered, appear reasonable to the minds of men, it may be allowed, that revelation doth not, and cannot place the happiness and acceptance of men with God, upon any thing that is not reasonable and fit for them to know and do, and of which they cannot, in some measure, discern the reasonableness and fitness; for then one certain mark of the truth of revelation would be plainly wanting, which is its placing the happiness of men upon such a foundation as appears reasonable in itself, and, therefore, worthy of God; because I cannot believe that to be worthy of God which by reason I cannot in some measure plainly discern to be so.

But if by the principles and duties of natural religion, be meant such principles and duties which natural reason, without any divine revelation, will lead men to the certain knowledge of, then the assertion is evidently false, that revelation can contain nothing but the principles and duties of natural religion; because, as hath been observed, one great end of revelation is to give men certainty of such important principles as natural reason is never able to do.

If we consider men in circumstances of degeneracy, and as having acted contrary to the law of reason, a revelation merely to revive the law of nature would evidently be insufficient for their peace and happiness. For though this would be a direction of their future conduct, it would be no security to them against the punishment due to them for their past transgressions, which would prove the highest discouragement to their obedience for the time to come. And of consequence, a revelation from God, vouchsafed to mankind in such circumstances, must contain more than the mere law of nature, namely, the method and conditions of God's extending his forgiveness to his sinful creatures; without which it would want one essential mark of its being from God, namely, its suitableness to the wants and necessities of mankind.

Besides, if God hath given men a revela tion of his will, attended with sufficient evidence and proof, the belief of such a revelation is a moral duty, and a necessary instance of respect and reverence due to God; it being as reasonable and fit that I should attend to the voice and will of the supreme being in external revelation, as that I should submit to the voice and will of God by reason or internal revelation.

Upon this foundation depends that command of Jesus Christ, "Ye believe in God, believe also in me." It is possible in hypothesis, that men may govern their passions, and act well in society, who do not believe the being of a God. But yet to "believe that God is, and that he is a rewarder of those who seek him," is a principle of natural religion; and, as I imagine, necessary to every man's happiness in the divine acceptance. And by consequence, if it be the will of God that I should believe in Christ, and if there be evidence to convince me of the reasonableness of believing in him, it doth not seem more unreasonable that God should require me to believe in Christ, than it doth that he should require me to believe in himself, in order to my receiving a reward of grace and favour from him; because, if the sufficiency of evidence be a reason for God's requiring belief in any case, it is a reason that will hold good in every one without exception.

Besides, if the observance of the religion and law of nature be allowed to dispose and prepare men for happiness in the favour of God, and though revelation cannot set aside the obligations of the one or other, but is principally designed to recover men to the knowledge of, and a conformity to the original fitness of things; yet I apprehend that revelation may enforce the practice of them by such considerations, and motives, and special precepts, as have no certain foundation in natural reason and light, -- that is, which men's reason would never have led them to have thought of, without a divine direction and command.

If the religion of nature be of God's constitution and appointment, and results from those relations which he himself hath been pleased to order and fix, I apprehend that such positive institutions, which have a direct tendency to establish and promote men's regard to and observance of it, may be ordained of God, and thereby become obligatory upon men. Because, if the law of nature itself necessarily and universally obliges mankind, and their happiness depends on the observation of it; such institutions which render the observation of it more easy and practicable, however voluntary and positive in themselves, are consistent with all our notions of the divine perfections, and ought

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