of territory, or of trade; the misfortunes or accidental weakness of a neighbouring or rival nation.

There are two lessons of rational and sober policy, which, if it were possible to inculcate them into the councils of princes, would exclude many of the motives of war, and allay that restless ambition which is constantly stirring up one part of mankind against another.

The first of these lessons admonishes princes to "place their glory and their emulation, not in extent of territory, but in raising the greatest quantity of happiness out of a given territory." The enlargement of territory by conquest is not only not a just object of war, but in the greater part of the instances in which it is attempted, not even desirable. It is certainly not desirable where it adds nothing to the numbers, the enjoyments, or the security, of the conquerors. What commonly is gained to a nation, by the annexing of new dependencies, or the subjugation of other countries to its dominion, but a wider frontier to defend; more interfering claims to vindicate; more quarrels, more enemies, more rebellions, to encounter; a greater force to keep up by sea and

the consciences of sovereigns,) not from their in- | federacy of states, be strong enough to overwhelm ternal reasonableness or justice, for many of them the rest. The objects of just war, are, precaution, are perfectly arbitrary, nor yet from the authority defence, or reparation. In a larger sense, every by which they were established, for the greater just war is a defensive war, inasmuch as every part have grown insensibly into usage, without just war supposes an injury perpetrated, atany public compact, formal acknowledgment, or tempted, or feared. even known original; but simply from the fact of The insufficient causes or unjustifiable motheir being established, and the general duty of tives of war, are the family alliances, the personal conforming to established rules upon questions, friendships, or the personal quarrels, of princes; and between parties, where nothing but positive the internal disputes which are carried on in other regulations can prevent disputes, and where dis-nations; the justice of other wars; the extension putes are followed by such destructive consequences. The first of the instances which we have just now enumerated, may be selected for the illustration of this remark. The nations of Europe consider the sovereignty of newly-discovered countries as belonging to the prince or state whose subject makes the discovery: and in pursuance of this rule, it is usual for a navigator, who falls upon an unknown shore, to take possession of it, in the name of his sovereign at home, by erecting his standard, or displaying his flag upon a desert coast. Now nothing can be more fanciful, or less substantiated by any considerations of reason or justice, than the right which such discovery, or the transient occupation and idle ceremony that accompany it, confer upon the country of the discoverer. Nor can any stipulation be produced, by which the rest of the world have bound themselves to submit to this pretension. Yet when we reflect that the claims to newly-discovered countries can hardly be settled, between the different nations which frequent them, without some positive rule or other; that such claims, if left unsettled, would prove sources of ruinous and fatal contentions; that the rule already proposed, how-land; more services to provide for, and more ever arbitrary, possesses one principal quality of a rule, determination and certainty: above all, that it is acquiesced in, and that no one has power to substitute another, however he might contrive a better, in its place: when we reflect upon these properties of the rule, or rather upon these consequences of rejecting its authority, we are led to ascribe to it the virtue and obligation of a precept of natural justice, because we perceive in it that which is the foundation of justice itself, public importance and utility. And a prince who should dispute this rule, for the want of regularity in its formation, or of intelligible justice in its principle, and by such disputes should disturb the tranquillity of nations, and at the same time lay the foundation of future disturbances, would be little less criminal than he who breaks the public peace, by a violation of engagements to which he had himself consented, or by an attack upon those national rights which are founded immediately in the law of nature, and in the first perceptions of equity. The same thing may be repeated of the rules which the law of nations prescribes in the other instances that were mentioned, namely, that the obscurity of their origin, or the arbitrariness of their principle, subtracts nothing from the respect that is due to them, when once established.

War may be considered with a view to its causes and its conduct.

The justifying causes of war, are, deliberate invasions of right, and the necessity of maintaining such a balance of power amongst neighDuring nations, as that no single state, or con

establishments to pay? And, in order to draw from these acquisitions something that may make up for the charge of keeping them, a revenue is to be extorted, or a monopoly to be enforced and watched, at an expense which costs half their produce. Thus the provinces are oppressed, in order to pay for being ill-governed; and the original state is exhausted in maintaining a feeble authority over discontented subjects. No assignable portion of country is benefited by the change; and if the sovereign appear to himself to be enriched or strengthened, when every part of his dominion is made poorer and weaker than it was, it is probable that he is deceived by apppearances. Or were it true that the grandeur of the prince is magnified by those exploits; the glory which is purchased, and the ambition which is gratified, by the distress of one country without adding to the happiness of another, which at the same time enslaves the new and impoverishes the ancient part of the empire, by whatever names it may be known or flattered, ought to be an object of universal execration; and oftentimes not more so to the vanquished, than to the very people whose armies or whose treasures have achieved the victory.

There are, indeed, two cases in which the extension of territory may be of real advantage, and to both parties. The first is, where an empire thereby reaches to the natural boundaries which divide it from the rest of the world. Thus we account the British Channel the natural boundary which separates the nations of England and France; and if France possessed any countries on this, or England any cities or provinces on that, side of the sea, recovery of such towns and districts

suit of honour, when set loose from the admonitions of prudence, becomes in kings a wild and romantic passion: eager to engage, and gathering fury in its progress, it is checked by no difficulties, repelled by no dangers; it forgets or despises those considera tions of safety, ease, wealth, and plenty, which, in the eye of true public wisdom, compose the objects to which the renown of arms, the fame of victory, are only instrumental and subordinate. The pursuit of interest, on the other hand, is a sober principle; computes costs and consequences; is cautious of entering into war; stops in time: when regulated by those universal maxims of relative justice which belong to the affairs of communities as well as of private persons, it is the right principle for nations to proceed by: even when it trespasses upon these regulations, it is much less dangerous, because much more temperate than the other.

to what may be called their natural sovereign, though it may not be a just reason for commencing war, would be a proper use to make of victory. The other case is, where neighbouring states, being severally too small and weak to defend themselves against the dangers that surround them, can only be safe by a strict and constant junction of their strength: here conquest will affect the purposes of confederation and alliance; and the union which it produces is often more close and permanent than that which results from voluntary association. Thus, if the heptarchy had continued in England, the different kingdoms of it might have separately fallen a prey to foreign invasion: and although the interest and danger of one part of the island were in truth common to every other part, it might have been difficult to have circulated this persuasion amongst independent nations, or to have united them in any regular or steady opposition II. The conduct of war.-If the cause and end to their continental enemies, had not the valour of war be justifiable; all the means that appear and fortune of an enterprising prince incorporated necessary to the end, are justifiable also. This the whole into a single monarchy. Here, the con- is the principle which defends those extremities quered gained as much by the revolution, as the to which the violence of war usually proceeds: for conquerors. In like manner, and for the same since war is a contest by force between parties who reason, when the two royal families of Spain acknowledge no common superior, and since it were met together in one race of princes, and the includes not in its idea the supposition of any conseveral provinces of France had devolved into the vention which should place limits to the operapossession of a single sovereign, it became unsafe tions of force, it has naturally no boundary but for the inhabitants of Great Britain any longer to that in which force terminates, the destruction remain under separate governments. The union of the life against which the force is directed. Let of England and Scotland, which transformed two it be observed, however, that the license of war auquarrelsome neighbours into one powerful empire, thorises no acts of hostility but what are necessary and which was first brought about by the course or conducive to the end and object of the war. of succession, and afterwards completed by amica-Gratuitous barbarities borrow no excuse from this ble convention, would have been a fortunate con- plea: of which kind is every cruelty and every inclusion of hostilities, had it been effected by the sult that serves only to exasperate the sufferings, operations of war.-These two cases being ad- or to incense the hatred, of an enemy, without mitted, namely, the obtaining of natural bounda-weakening his strength, or in any manner tending ries and barriers, and the including under the same government those who have a common danger and a common enemy to guard against; I know not whether a third can be thought of, in which the extension of empire by conquest is useful even to the conquerors.

to procure his submission; such as the slaughter of captives, the subjecting of them to indignities or torture, the violation of women, the profanation of temples, the demolition of public buildings, libraries, statues, and in general the destruction or defacing of works that conduce nothing to annoyance or defence. These enormities are prohibited not only by the practice of civilized nations, but by the law of nature itself; as having no proper tendency to accelerate the termination, or accomplish the object of the war; and as containing that which in peace and war is equally unjustifiable,— ultimate and gratuitous mischief.

The second rule of prudence which ought to be recommended to those who conduct the affairs of nations, is, "never to pursue national honour as distinct from national interest." This rule acknowledges that it is often necessary to assert the honour of a nation for the sake of its interest. The spirit and courage of a people are supported by flattering their pride. Concessions which betray There are other restrictions imposed upon the too much of fear or weakness, though they relate conduct of war, not by the law of nature primarily, to points of mere ceremony, invite demands and but by the laws of war, first, and by the law of attacks of more serious importance. Our rule nature as seconding and ratifying the laws war. allows all this; and only directs that, when points The laws of war are part of the law of nations; of honour become subjects of contention between and founded, as to their authority, upon the same sovereigns, or are likely to be made the occasion of principle with the rest of that code, namely, upon war, they be estimated with a reference to utility, the fact of their being established, no matter when and not by themselves. "The dignity of his crown, or by whom; upon the expectation of their being the honour of his flag, the glory of his arms," in mutually observed, in consequence of that estathe mouth of a prince, are stately and imposing blishment; and upon the general utility which terms; but the ideas they inspire, are insatiable. results from such observance. The binding force It may be always glorious to conquer, whatever of these rules is the greater, because the regard be the justice of the war, or the price of the vic- that is paid to them must be universal or none. tory. The dignity of a sovereign may not permit The breach of the rule can only be punished by the him to recede from claims of homage and respect, subversion of the rule itself: on which account, the at whatever expense of national peace and happi- whole mischief that ensues from the laws of those ness they are to be maintained; however unjust salutary restrictions which such rules prescribe, is they may have been in their original, or in their justly chargeable upon the first aggressor. To continuance however useless to the possessor, or this consideration may be referred the duty of remortifying and vexatious to other states. The pur-fraining in war from poison and from assassina

may sustain a defensive or a flying war agains regular troops: it is also true that any service, which keeps soldiers for a while together, and inures them by little and little to the habits of war and the dangers of action, transforms them in effect into a standing army. But upon this plan it may be necessary for almost a whole nation to go out to war to repel an invader; beside that a people so unprepared must always have the seat, and with it the miseries, of war at home, being utterly incapable of carrying their operations into a foreign country.

tion. If the law of nature simply be consulted, | excess of numbers, and a ready supply of recruits it may be difficult to distinguish between these and other methods of destruction, which are practised without scruple by nations at war. If it be lawful to kill an enemy at all, it seems lawful to do so by one mode of death as well as by another; by a dose of poison, as by the point of a sword; by the hand of an assassin, as by the attack of an army: for if it be said that one species of assault leaves to an enemy the power of defending itself against it, and that the other two does not; it may be answered, that we possess at least the same right to cut off an enemy's defence, that we have to seek his destruction. In this manner might the ques- From the acknowledged superiority of standing tion be debated, if there existed no rule or law of armies, it follows, not only that it is unsafe for a war upon the subject. But when we observe that nation to disband its regular troops, whilst neighsuch practices are at present excluded by the usage bouring kingdoms retain theirs; but also that and opinions of civilized nations; that the first re-regular troops provide for the public service at the course to them would be followed by instant re-least possible expense. I suppose a certain quantaliation; that the mutual license which such tity of military strength to be necessary, and I say attempts must introduce, would fill both sides with that a standing army costs the community less the misery of continual dread and suspicion, with- than any other establishment which presents out adding to the strength or success of either; to an enemy the same force. The constant that when the example came to be more generally drudgery of low employments is not only incomimitated, which it soon would be, after the sentí-patible with any great degree of perfection or exment that condemns it had been once broken in pertness in the profession of a soldier, but the proupon, it would greatly aggravate the horrors and fession of a soldier almost always unfits men for calamities of war, yet procure no superiority to the business of regular occupations. Of three inany of the nations engaged in it; when we view habitants of a village, it is better that one should these effects, we join in the public reprobation of addict himself entirely to arms, and the other two such fatal expedients, as of the admission amongst stay constantly at home to cultivate the ground, mankind of new and enormous evils without ne- than that all three should mix the avocations of a cessity or advantage. The law of nature, we see camp, with the business of husbandry. By the at length, forbids these innovations, as so many former arrangement, the country gains one comtransgressions of a beneficial general rule actually plete soldier, and two industrious husbandmen; subsisting. from the latter it receives three raw militia-men, who are at the same time three idle and profligate peasants. It should be considered also, that the emergencies of war wait not for seasons. Where there is no standing army ready for immediate service, it may be necessary to call the reaper from the fields in harvest, or the ploughman in seed time; and the provision of a whole year may perish by the interruption of one month's labour. A standing army, therefore, is not only a more effectual, but a cheaper, method of providing for the public safety, than any other, because it adds more than any other to the common strength, and takes less from that which composes the wealth of a nation,-its stock of productive industry.

The license of war then acknowledges two limitations: it authorises no hostilities which have not an apparent tendency to effectuate the object of the war; it respects those positive laws which the custom of nations hath sanctified, and which whilst they are mutually conformed to, mitigate the calamities of war, without weakening its operations, or diminishing the power or safety of belligerent states.

Long and various experience seems to have convinced the nations of Europe, that nothing but a standing army can oppose a standing army, There is yet another distinction between standwhere the numbers on each side bear any mode- ing armies and militias, which deserves a more atrate proportion to one another. The first stand- tentive consideration than any that has been ing army that appeared in Europe after the fall of mentioned. When the state relies, for its defence, the Roman legion, was that which was erected in upon a militia, it is necessary that arms be put France, by Charles VII. about the middle of the into the hands of the people at large. The mififteenth century: and that the institution hath litia itself must be numerous, in proportion to the since become general, can only be attributed to the want or inferiority of its discipline, and the imbesuperiority and success which are every where obcilities or defects of its constitution. Moreover, as served to attend it. The truth is, the closeness, such a militia must be supplied by rotation, allotregularity, and quickness, of their movements; the ment, or some mode of succession whereby they unreserved, instantaneous, and almost mechanical, who have served a certain time are replaced by obedience to orders; the sense of personal honour, fresh drafts from the country; a much greater and the familiarity with danger, which belong to number will be instructed in the use of arms, and a disciplined, veteran, and embodied soldiery, give will have been occasionally embodied together, such firmness and intrepidity to their approach, than are actually employed, or than are supposed such weight and execution to their attack, as are to be wanted, at the same time. Now what not to be withstood by loose ranks of occasional and effects upon the civil condition of the country may newly-levied troops, who are liable by their inex-be looked for from this general diffusion of the perience to disorder and confusion, and in whom fear is constantly augmented by novelty and surprisc. It is possible that a militia, with a great

military character, becomes an inquiry of great importance and delicacy. To me it appears doubtful whether any government can be long secure,

where the people are acquainted with the use of ours, if the direction and officering of the army arms, and accustomed to resort to them. Every were placed in the hands of the democratic part of faction will find itself at the head of an army; the constitution, this power, added to what they every disgust will excite commotion, and every already possess, would so overbalance all that commotion become a civil war. Nothing, perhaps, would be left of regal prerogative, that little would can govern a nation of armed citizens but that remain of monarchy in the constitution, but the which governs an army,-despotism. I do not name and expense; nor would these probably mean that a regular government would become remain long. despotic by training up its subjects to the knowledge and exercise of arms, but that it would ere long be forced to give way to despotism in some other shape; and that the country would be liable to what is even worse than a settled and constitutional despotism-to perpetual rebellions, and to perpetual revolutions; to short and violent usurpations; to the successive tyranny of governors, rendered cruel and jealous by the danger and instability of their situation.

Whilst we describe, however, the advantages of standing armies, we must not conceal the danger. These properties of their constitution,-the soldiery being separated in a great degree from the rest of the community, their being closely linked amongst themselves by habits of society and subordination, and the dependency of the whole chain upon the will and favour of the prince,however essential they may be to the purposes for which armies are kept up, give them an aspect in The same purposes of strength and efficacy no wise favourable to public liberty. The danger, which make a standing army necessary at all, however, is diminished, by maintaining, on all make it necessary in mixed governments, that occasions, as much alliance of interest, and as this army be submitted to the management and much intercourse of sentiment, between the milidirection of the prince: for however well a popular tary part of the nation and the other orders of the council may be qualified for the offices of legisla- people, as are consistent with the union and distion, it is altogether unfit for the conduct of war: cipline of an army. For which purpose, officers in which, success usually depends upon vigour of the army, upon whose disposition towards the and enterprise; upon secrecy, dispatch, and una- commonwealth a great deal may depend, should nimity; upon a quick perception of opportunities, be taken from the principal families of the country, and the power of seizing every opportunity and at the same time also be encouraged to esta immediately. It is likewise necessary that the blish in it families of their own, as well as be adobedience of an army be as prompt and active as mitted to seats in the senate, to hereditary distincpossible; for which reason it ought to be made an tions, and to all the civil honours and privileges obedience of will and emulation. Upon this con- that are compatible with their profession: which sideration is founded the expediency of leaving to circumstances of connexion and situation will give the prince not only the government and destina- them such a share in the general rights of the tion of the army, but the appointment and pro- people, and so engage their inclinations on the motion of its officers: because a design is then side of public liberty, as to afford a reasonable sealone likely to be executed with zeal and fidelity curity that they cannot be brought, by any promises when the person who issues the order, chooses of personal aggrandizement, to assist, in the exethe instruments, and rewards the service. To cution of measures which might enslave their which we may subjoin, that, in governments like posterity, their kindred, and their country.

HORE PAULINE:

OR,

THE TRUTH

OF

THE SCRIPTURE HISTORY OF ST. PAUL EVINCED.

TO THE RIGHT REVEREND JOHN LAW, D. D.

LORD BISHOP OF KILLALA AND ACHONRY,

As a testimony of esteem for his virtues and learning, and of gratitude for the long and faithful friendship with which the Author has been honoured by him, this attempt to confirm the Evidence of the Christian History is inscribed, by his affectionate and most obliged Servant,

W. PALEY.

CHAPTER I.

Exposition of the Argument.

3. The history and letters may have been founded upon some authority common to both; as upon reports and traditions which prevailed in the age in which they were composed, or upon some ancient record now lost, which both writers consulted; in which case also, the letters, without being genuine, may exhibit marks of conformity with the history; and the history, without being true, may agree with the letters.

THE volume of Christian Scriptures contains thirteen letters purporting to be written by St Paul: it contains also a book, which, amongst other things, professes to deliver the history, or rather memoirs of the history, of this same person. By assuming the genuineness of the letters, we may prove the substantial truth of the history: or, Agreement, therefore, or conformity, is only to by assuming the truth of the history, we may ar- be relied upon so far as we can exclude these strongly in support of the genuineness of the several suppositions. Now the point to be noticed fetters. But I assume neither one nor the other. is, that in the three cases above enumerated, conThe reader is at liberty to suppose these writings formity must be the effect of design. Where the to have been lately discovered in the library of the history is compiled from the letters, which is the Escurial, and to come to our hands destitute of any first case, the design and composition of the work extrinsic or collateral evidence whatever; and the are in general so confessed, or made so evident by argument I am about to offer is calculated to show, comparison, as to leave us in no danger of conthat a comparison of the different writings would, even under these circumstances, afford good reason to believe the persons and transactions to have been real, the letters authentic, and the narration in the main to be true.

founding the production with original history, or of mistaking it for an independent authority. The agreement, it is probable, will be close and uniform, and will easily be perceived to result from the intention of the author, and from the plan and conAgreement or conformity between letters bear- duct of his work.-Where the letters are fabriing the name of an ancient author, and a received cated from the history, which is the second case, history of that author's life, does not necessarily it is always for the purpose of imposing a forgery establish the credit of either; because, upon the public; and in order to give colour and 1. The history may, like Middleton's Life of probability to the fraud, names, places, and cirCicero, or Jortin's Life of Erasmus, have been cumstances, found in the history, may be stuwholly, or in part, compiled from the letters; in diously introduced into the letters, as well as a genwhich case it is manifest that the history adds no-eral consistency be endeavoured to be maintained. thing to the evidence already afforded by the letters; or,

2. The letters may have been fabricated out of the history; a species of imposture which is certainly practicable; and which, without any accession of proof or authority, would necessarily produce the appearance of consistency and agree ment; or,

But here it is manifest that whatever congruity appears, is the consequence of meditation, artifice, and design.-The third case is that wherein the history and the letters, without any direct privity or communication with each other, derive their materials from the same source; and, by reason of their common original, furnish instances of accordance and correspondency. This is a situation

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