The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century. Edited by Sir Augustus Oakes, C. B., lately of the Foreign Office, and R. B. Mowat, M.A., Fellow and Assistant Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; with an Introduction by Sir H. Earle Richards, K.C.S.I., K.C., B.C.L., M.A., Fellow of All Souls College and Chichele Professor of International Law and Diplomacy in the University of Oxford, Associate of the Institute of International Law. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1918, pp. xii, 403. $3.40 This book may be described as a Hertslet in miniature-no small praise, indeed, for the monumental Map of Europe by Treaty is the indispensable starting-point for all who seek to know of the territorial changes in Europe during the past century. The authors give the texts of the principal political treaties, beginning with that of Vienna, to that of Bucharest, more than a score in all, nearly all of them as given by Hertslet. Documents other than treaties are also given, e. g., the Constitution of the German Empire and the Anglo-Belgian military conversations of 1906. The treaties and conventions are arranged under the following topics: "The Restoration of Europe," "The Independence of Greece," "The Kingdom of Belgium, Turkey and the Powers of Europe," "The Danish Duchies," "The Union of Italy, Austria and Prussia," "The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg," "The Franco-Prussian War," "Turkey, Russia and the Balkan States," and "The Triple Alliance." In an appendix appears "The Treaty of San Stefano." It will thus be observed that the purely law-making treaties have been omitted. Under each topic is a succinct, careful, and uniformly temperate account of the diplomacy leading up to and following each treaty. Prefixed to the whole is an excellent chapter on the conclusion of treaties.

The atmosphere of the book is throughout one of dependability. The proof has been carefully read and few errors are observable. The date of the founding of Odessa is given once (p. 102) as 1790, and again (p. 164) as 1794, the latter being correct. To state baldly that Luxemburg is bound by the Salic law (without noting the exception provided by the Nassau family arrangement of 1783) is confusing to the casual reader, who might find it difficult to account for the tenure of the present and previous grand duchesses. To say (p. 247) that "Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Cassel threw in their lot with Austria" in 1866 is, of course, literally correct, especially in view of King George's protestations of neutrality, but the

statement leaves one in the dark as to Hanover and Nassau, titles to which Prussia successfully maintained as founded upon conquest. The narrative might also have been made more clear as to the attitude of Great Britain upon the question of the Danish Duchies following Earl Russell's circular of 1865, to the effect that by the Convention of Gastein "the dominion of Force is the sole power acknowledged and regarded." Russell's earlier fortiter in modo and suaviter in re toward Russia no doubt led Bismarck rightly to believe that Great Britain would not actively interfere against the schemes of Prussia by which were laid the foundations of German sea-power.

Considering the compression and self-restraint of the narrative and the generally excellent choice of treaties presented, one will hardly cavil at omissions, but surely the book would not have been unduly extended had it included the Treaty of Lausanne of 1912. To have clauses III, IV, and VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty as renewed in 1903 (the text appeared in the London Times for June 1, 1915) is, however, some compensation. There are ten full-page maps to illustrate the text.

In his introduction, Professor Richards elaborates the general proposition that treaties are terminated by war. The exceptions, however, are so numerous that the statement of the so-called general rule avails little. Many will share with Professor Richards his dislike of the terms transitory and dispositive as applied to treaties, yet not all lawyers will agree that the suggested substitute (executed treaties) is quite synonymous with the former adjectives.

The aim of the authors "to present an historical summary of the international position at the time of each treaty; to state the points at issue and the contentions of the parties, and so to make readily accessible the materials on which international lawyers have to work," has been successfully achieved notwithstanding the limitations of space. The result is an extremely useful and reliable book.

J. S. REEVES

The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. By Coleman Phillipson and Noel Buxton. London: Stevens & Haynes. 1917, pp. 264. 12/6.

World politics is fast becoming a fascinating study to every wideawake man of today. Questions of which he had never heard and places which formerly seemed as remote as the moon, are now the daily

By the Act of Congress of April 28, 1904, c. 1758, § 2, 33 Stat. 429, temporary powers of government over the Canal Zone were vested in such persons, and were to be exercised in such manner as the President should direct. An executive order of the President, addressed to the Secretary of War on May 9, 1904, directed that the power of the Isthmian Commission should be exercised under the Secretary's direction. The order contained this passage: "The laws of the land, with which the inhabitants are familiar, and which were in force on February 26, 1904, will continue in force in the Canal Zone... until altered or annulled by the said commission;" with power to the Commission to legislate, subject to approval by the Secretary. This was construed to keep in force the Civil Code of the Republic of Panama, which was translated into English and published by the Isthmian Canal Commission in 1905. By the Act of Congress of August 24, 1912, c. 390, § 2, 37 Stat. 560, 561, “All laws, orders, regulations, and ordinances adopted and promulgated in the Canal Zone by order of the President for the government and sanitation of the Canal Zone and the construction of the Panama Canal are hereby ratified and confirmed as valid and binding until Congress shall otherwise provide." On these facts it is argued that the defendant's liability is governed by the Civil Code alone as it would be construed in countries where the civil law prevails, and that so construed the code does not sanction the application of the rule respondeat superior to the present case.

But there are other facts to be taken into account before a decision can be reached. On December 5, 1912, acting under the authority of the before-mentioned Act of August 24, 1912, § 3, the President declared all the land within the limits of the Canal Zone to be necessary for the construction, etc., of the Panama Canal and directed the Chairman of the Isthmian Commission to take possession of it, with provisions for the extinguishment of all adverse claims and titles. It is admitted by the plaintiff in error that the Canal Zone at the present time is peopled only by the employees of the Canal, the Panama Railroad, and the steamship lines and oil companies permitted to do business in the Zone under license. If it be true that the Civil Code would have been construed to exclude the defendant's liability in the present case if the Zone had remained within the jurisdiction of Colombia, it does not follow that the liabilty is no greater as things stand now. The President's order continuing the

law then in force was merely the embodiment of the rule that a change of sovereignty does not put an end to existing private law, and the ratification of that order by the Act of August 24, 1912, no more fastened upon the Zone a specific interpretation of the former Civil Code than does a statute adopting the common law fasten upon a territory a specific doctrine of the English courts. Wear v. Kansas, 245 U. S. 154, 157. Probably the general ratification did no more than to supply any power that by accident might have been wanting. Honolulu Rapid Transit & Land Co. v. Wilder, 211 U. S. 137, 142. In the matter of personal relations and duties of the kind now before us the supposed interpretation would not be a law with which the present "inhabitants are familiar," in the language of the President's order, but on the contrary an exotic imposition of a rule opposed to the common understanding of men. For whatever may be thought of the unqualified principle that a master must answer for the torts of his servant committed within the scope of his employment, probably there are few rules of the common law so familiar to all, educated and uneducated alike.

As early as 1910 the Supreme Court of the Canal Zone announced that it would look to the common law in the construction of the Colombia statutes, Kung Ching Chong v. Wing Chong, 2 Canal Zone Sup. Ct. Rep. 25, 30; and following that announcement, in January, 1913, held that "at least so far as the impresarios of railroads are concerned" the liability of master for servant would be maintained in the Zone to the same extent as recognized by the common law. Fitzpatrick v. Panama R. R. Co., id., 111, 121, 128. The principle certainly was not overthrown by the Act of 1912. It is not necessary to dwell upon the drift toward the common-law doctrine noticeable in some civil-law jurisdictions at least, or to consider how far we should go if the language of the Civil Code were not clearer than it is. It is enough that the language is not necessarily inconsistent with the common-law rule. By Art. 2341, in the before-mentioned translation, "He who shall have been guilty of an offense or fault, which has caused another damage, is obliged to repair it, without prejudice to the principal penalty which the law imposes By Art. 2347,

"Every person is liable not only for his own acts for the purpose of the indemnity of damage, but also for the acts of those who may be under his care," illustrating by the cases of father, tutor, husband, etc. By Art. 2349, "Masters shall be responsible for the damage

caused by their domestics or servants, on the occasion of a service rendered by the latter to the former; but they shall not be responsible if it be proved or appear that on such occasion the domestics or servants conducted themselves in an improper manner, which the masters had no means to foresee or prevent by the employment of ordinary care and the competent authority; in such case all responsibility for the damage shall fall upon said domestics or servants." The qualification in this last article may be taken to refer to acts oustide the scope of the employment. It can not refer to all torts, for that would empty the first part of meaning. A master must be taken to foresee that sooner or later a servant driving a motor will be likely to have a collision, which a jury may hold to have been due to his negligence, whatever care has been used in the employment of the man.

We are satisfied that it would be a sacrifice of substance to form if we should reverse a decision, the principle of which has been accepted by all the judges accustomed to deal with the locality, in deference to the possibility that a different interpretation might have been reached if the Civil Code had continued to regulate a native population and to be construed by native courts. It may be that they would not have distinguished between a negligent act done in the performance of the master's business and a malicious one in which the servant went outside of the scope of that for which he was employed. But we are by no means sure that they would not have decided as we decide. At all events, we are of opinion that the ruling was correct. As we do not rely for our conclusion upon a Colombia act specially concerning the impresarios of railroads, we do not discuss a suggestion, made only, it is said, to show that the act is inapplicable, to the effect that the charter of the Railroad Company did not grant the power to operate the omnibus line. The company was acting under the authority and direction of General Goethals and we do not understand that the defense of ultra vires is set up or could prevail.

In view of our conclusion upon the main point but little need be said with regard to allowing pain to be considered in fixing the damages. It cannot be said with certainty that the Supreme Court of the Zone was wrong in holding that under the Civil Code damages. ought to be allowed for physical pain. Fitzpatrick v. Panama R. R. Co., 2 Canal Zone Sup. Ct. Rep. 111, 129, 130; McKenzie v. McClintic