solution of a free port seems to the writer quite inadequate, for it places the door of a state's commerce in hostile hands and limits the rights of what aspires to be a great independent nation.

The use of the plebiscite as a condition subsequent in the disposition of the coal of the Saar Valley should also be mentioned. Here, unlike North Schleswig, a time limit is said to have been set. Nevertheless, it may be questioned whether the suspended sovereignty will not give rise to more trouble than absolute cession, viewing the latter as direct and specific reparation for the wanton destruction of the Lens mines and their machinery.

Let us try to apply to the self-determination principle, both historical example and the rule of reason.

When the river traffic of our trans-Allegheny country was its only commercial outlet, New Orleans was in foreign hands. The right of free transshipment was granted by the treaty with Spain in 1795. Then came the Louisiana Purchase, a chief motive for it being the desire to possess the lower Mississippi, for the free port privilege did not satisfy the West. Now suppose the self-determination principle to have been applied to New Orleans in limitation of the Louisiana Purchase, whereby the Spanish and French population by its vote could prevent the cession of the port and lower river. Could the whole of our people consent to have its development, its dignity, its continuity, so limited? Clearly the little principle must yield to the big interest.

Or to take a different kind of parallel. Can one think complacently of an Ireland independent of Great Britain, and of an Ulster independent of Ireland.

What is the theory of self-determination founded upon? Upon the doctrine of popular sovereignty.

What is its object? To avoid subjecting a people to alien control against its will.

What size of unit answers to the description of a people? Such as is otherwise capable of independent existence.

Does the multiplication of small political units make for peace and stability? On the contrary, it makes for instability and invites aggression, since defensive power is lacking.

Has self-determination worked well in the past? In a few minor cases it may be said to have succeeded; in others it has been the cause and the result of intrigue, or has been inoperative.

My conclusion, then, from the standpoint of historical precedent and of theoretical analysis, is that the self-determination principle is comparatively new and untested; that it should be applied, if at all, with due regard to the balancing of results good and bad, rather than with relentless disregard of consequences; that there must be a limit set to the size of the unit to which it is applicable; that we would deprecate its application to ourselves.

It may be worth saying, in conclusion, that however Fiume is apportioned, apparently the old sovereign, Austria, will be shut out from the Adriatic. She, what is left of her, will therefore be forced to face northward, driven into eventual union with Germany. THEODORE S. WOOLSEY.

INTERNATIONAL INTERMEDIARY INSTITUTE AT THE HAGUE

The JOURNAL has received the following announcement by the courtesy of His Excellency, J. T. Cremer, the Minister of The Netherlands to the United States. It is happy to give to it the publicity which he requests. ACTING EDITOR IN CHIEF.

In January, 1918, a group of influential Hollanders, with various international relations, established an "International Intermediary Institute," designed to render international service of an impartial and useful nature. This institution which is purely and exclusively of a Netherland character, will make it its special business to furnish gratuitously all over the world scientific, practical and complete information on any subject of private and public international law and of international economics. The institution has its office at 3 Oude Scheveningsche weg, The Hague, opposite the Peace Palace, in which the formal opening of the Institute took place. The first year has been spent in preparatory work; a first bulletin will appear this year. The institution hopes as soon as more normal conditions prevail in Europe to satisfy a need—often so strongly felt of a central distribution point of international intelligence. As its American correspondents the institution has appointed Mr. Ham. Vreeland, Jr., LL.B., Ph.D., Department of State, Washington, D. C.; Mr. H. A. van Coenen Torchiana, Consul General of the Netherlands, San Francisco, Cal.; and Mr. Edward R. Whittingham, A.B., LL.B., Attorney, 49 Wall Street, New York City.

CONCERNING THE RECOGNITION OF NEW GOVERNMENTS BY THE

UNITED STATES

Before the beginning of the nineteenth century, Jefferson, as is well known, declared it to be in accord with American principles "to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared." He perceived both the continuity of state life in spite of governmental changes, and also the reasonableness of entering into formal relations with whatever party ultimately gained the ascendency. It was the fact of control rather than any other circumstance which appeared to be regarded by him as the decisive test. He announced that "the will of the nation" was "the only thing essential to be regarded," whether a "king, convention, assembly, committee, president, or anything else” might be chosen as the organ through which intercourse with foreign nations was to be had.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, and until the Civil War, the theory of Jefferson seems to have been simply applied by the United States. When a monarchical government overthrew a republican, the result was reckoned with without regard to the domestic legitimacy of the transaction, and recognition duly accorded. Irrespective of the nature or method of any change, the United States was not disposed to concern itself with more than the fact that a particular party was in actual control. Secretary Seward in 1861, and likewise his successors for some years following, pursued a different course. They announced in substance that a revolutionary government in a republican state, and defiant of an existing constitution and gaining control by sheer force of arms, ought not to be recognized by the United States until it was assured that the change was adopted by the people rather than imposed upon them against their will. Thus the will of the nation was deemed to be inseparable from or identical with that of the people. This idea found expression in American state papers for several decades, although the forms of utterance lacked uniformity. In the meantime American instructions gradually began to emphasize the significance of another consideration—the ability of any new government with respect to foreign obligations of the state. In 1899, Secretary Hay evinced a readiness to authorize the recognition of a new government merely when it appeared "to be estab

lished in control of the machinery of administration and in a position to fulfill its international obligations." Under such circumstances recognition was speedily accorded, and without apparent concern as to any other consideration.

In more recent years there has been a return to a position resembling that taken by Secretary Seward and followed by his immediate successors. Without failing to require assurance of the competency of a new government to perform its international obligations, importance has been attached to its respect for constitutional requirements. At the present time the United States is believed to be reluctant to recognize a new government as such, if it has attained the ascendency by force and in defiance of a local constitution declaratory of popular rights, in the absence of convincing proof that the change is supported by the will of the people. Such a view was expressed in connection with the recognition of the government of General Estrada in Nicaragua in 1911, and in the withholding of it from that of General Huerta in Mexico in 1913 and 1914, and later from the Tinoco government in Costa Rica. Doubtless American recognition must be ultimately given where a government, however obnoxious to the people who are compelled to yield obedience, maintains itself indefinitely, and enforces locally complete submission to its will.

The United States now appears to take the stand that normally a government which by force has won apparent control in opposition to the will of the people, and with contempt for their rights assured by a local constitution, is internationally a menace, because its very supremacy sows seeds of discord bound to ripen into a conflict which, however localized, may fairly be deemed hurtful to the maintenance of the general peace. It is doubtless also believed that a government of such a character will lack those moral qualifications which are found to be essential to enable the agencies of a state to perform scrupulously its obligations to the outside world.

The soundness of these principles is now being tested by conditions in Russia where, according to the speech of Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons on April 16th last, "the Bolshevist government has committed crimes against the Allied subjects, and has made it impossible to recognize it even as a civilized government." It is believed to be reasonable for enlightened states to discourage the activities of arbitrary and essentially unpopular aspirants to governmental control when their methods are heedless of the laws of God or man.

In such case the according of recognition may be fairly delayed as long as possible, and moral support thus given the opposition. It may be urged that such action constitutes direct interference in the domestic affairs of a foreign state, and may be unjustly applied at the caprice of interested Powers for political ends. It should be observed, however, that there is no legal duty imposed upon a state to accord recognition at any particular time. The right to withhold it indefinitely is not wrongful. The influence exerted upon the outcome of a domestic conflict, through the exercise of the right to postpone recognition of a particular party until it becomes highly inexpedient longer to withhold it, does not resemble in kind those affirmative acts of opposition which are deemed to restrain political independence and to constitute intervention.

If in the interest of the society of nations the members thereof should habitually manifest extreme reluctance in recognizing as a new government one which acquired power in the teeth of popular opposition and by inhuman methods, evidence both of popular support and of abstinence from arbitrary procedure, would be commonly if not invariably offered by a party demanding recognition, as a necessary means of preventing indefinite delay.

CHARLES CHENEY HYDE.

THE NEUTRALITY BOARD

Upon the outbreak of the War of 1914, the United States, which had been pursuing the paths of peace, found itself suddenly brought face to face with the problems which inevitably confront a neutral, and as the distance of the United States from the scene of military operations made it likely that our country would be more affected by the operations of belligerents upon the ocean separating the new from the older world than by military operations upon land, a special board was created within a fortnight of the beginning of the war, known as the Joint State and Navy Neutrality Board, to handle such matters as the Department of State, on its own behalf or on behalf of other departments of the Government, might care to refer to it for examination and report. Because of the nature of the problems, it was decided to restrict the membership of the Board, so that, having the benefit of discussion and different points of view, its membership should not be so large as to prevent the rapid for