mission was known as Société Suisse de Surveillance Économique (S. S. S.), and on the part of the Central Powers Schweizerische Treuhandstelle (S. T. S.).

The war had placed the country, as has been already mentioned, in a condition of extraordinary economic difficulty, a difficulty or a series of difficulties immensely enhanced by the fact that the opposing belligerents were determined to carry on a warfare of economic as well as of a military and naval character. Switzerland's position utterly forbade it to disregard either the wishes or necessities of either belligerent group. The government was compelled, therefore, to recognize not merely Swiss necessities but those of the surrounding belligerent territory; all sales of materials on the part of the belligerent Powers and their importation into Switzerland were consequently made subject to certain principles of reciprocity as well as to real or imaginary belligerent advantage, while, on the other hand, looking further afield the Swiss Government was compelled anxiously to watch its opportunity of securing transoceanic supplies through the French ports of Bordeaux and Cette, the latter port being on the Mediterranean and destined to rise through war conditions to a posi tion of importance unknown to it for many centuries. Carriage via Rotterdam and the Rhine was soon seen to be impracticable, for international law, freely allowing commerce between neutral countries, has been obliged in the present war nevertheless, as on earlier occasions, to warrant the stoppage of supplies whose destination was only apparently neutral and in reality belligerent. Now Rotterdam was for all practical purposes a German seaport, and commerce in ascending the Rhine, after leaving Holland, necessarily passed through German territory before reaching Swiss borders. Switzerland, therefore, could only rely upon food supplies from beyond sea coming to her through Bordeaux, Cette, or the Italian port of Genoa. Again, it was not to the interest of the belligerent Powers surrounding Switzerland that raw material of any description should cross Swiss borders by way of importation from the territory of one belligerent to be subsequently either sold to another and opposing government, or converted through process of manufacture into merchandise useful in war to the opponent. Starting from such premises, Germany

insisted on severe conditions touching all material imported by the Swiss, none of which in any form, original or converted, should reach Entente territory. In addition to these more or less reasonable requirements there were added on Germany's part a series of demands for compensation, that is to say, if German coal, iron and steel, for example, were supplied to Swiss importers, Switzerland should guarantee to Germany permission to import needed agricultural and other supplies in certain proportional amounts annually. With respect to the Allies, the regulations of the Swiss Surveillance Society expressly laid it down that permission to export might be given where there was no question of warlike use in the manufactured articles derived from the raw materials supplied by importations across the French border. Germany, however, went further and insisted that no German coal be used in any Swiss industry producing munitions of war exported to the Entente, and laid down these principles in a series of formal treaties. The seat of the Surveillance Society was in the federal capital of Berne; that of the German Trust Organization, S. T. S., at Zurich. The Swiss Government organized a special commission which might receive from the German authorities permission to import when the details had been satisfactorily passed upon by the Trust Office (S. T. S.) at Zurich. With the close of hostilities these complicated arrangements, never functioning without much friction, will now become things of the past. In theory and practice they were of course quite outside of the constitutional order, and were an emanation from the unrestricted executive authority given to the Federal Council on August 3, 1914.

Equally outside of constitutional provisions were the long series of measures devised by the Council as the war progressed, to secure the actual provisioning of the country and to relieve the serious questions arising between debtor and creditor. To assure an adequate supply of provisions, the government found itself compelled to sequester and in effect monopolize stocks on hand and to be imported of the principal foodstuffs; this process was ultimately extended to the milk, cheese and butter production, an equitable and necessary supply of these latter being found ultimately possible only

through direct aid extended by the government, which itself appropriates sufficient funds to meet the cost to the consumer in fixed proportions, so that all may be fed, and fed at a price which every class is found fairly able to pay.

The innumerable problems arising from the relation of debtor and creditor by reason of the stress produced by the war forced the government at the very outset to call to public assistance the institution of the moratorium and kindred measures. If we understand by the term moratorium a measure whose effect is to postpone maturities fixed by law or agreement, there were found, save in the case of registration of patents and industrial designs, few occasions for the enforcement of this institution, although allied measures of protection were numerous enough, and notably in the respite granted to mortgagors, including the railways, against a too severely abrupt realization of creditors' claims. In the category of those granted relief against a stress produced wholly by the war should be included the numerous company of hotel proprietors who found themselves in a peculiarly trying situation for the reason that many of the most noted Swiss resorts are leased only by those operating them, and these lessees, in the absence of pleasure travel, were quite unable to meet the demands of their landlords.

As the war progressed the extra-constitutional powers conferred upon the Federal Council began to seem oppressive to some and to others more or less in conflict with the traditions of Swiss self-government. It was found also that so constant were the demands of the country's necessities upon the Council that it perforce neglected to bring up before Parliament and the people for a final decision at the polls a series of constitutional reforms proposed by popular initiative, and received by the Council though not acted upon within the term of one year as contemplated by the constitution. Among these reforms is an initiative petition signed by over 100,000 voters and seeking to compel Parliament to submit national treaties for ratification by referendum vote; another measure would abolish public gaming. The treaty initiative took its rise in the conclusion of a convention by the Federal Council in 1909 with Germany and Italy renewing the earlier agreement under which the international St.

Gotthard Railway line was built. The treaty was ratified by Parliament, but it conceded, in the estimation of many voters, a series of far too important privileges and was in derogation of Swiss national interests. It is beyond doubt that with the ceasing of the war pressure upon the country's political and economic life, these and other constitutional measures will be brought up for popular determination. Indeed it is proposed, as these lines are being written, somewhat to curtail though not wholly abolish the Federal Council's unlimited powers, while a distinct movement is on foot to revise the national constitution in the interest of those social, as contrasted with merely political, aims which post-war days seem urgently to demand. We need not fear, however, that either a too great centralization of governmental control or a weakening of government itself in the interest of purely socialistic views will abrogate or greatly diminish traditions of fortitude, independence and free government which the Swiss have preserved through centuries of trial, and which they will hand down to their descendants as a bright example in the far future, as in the present, to all countries seeking to develop the highest ideals in personal and national life.1

GORDON E. SHERMAN.

1 Authorities: in La Suisse Pendant La Guerre, Professor Max Thurman, of Fribourg, has given an excellent outline of Red Cross and economic features; La Suisse Neutre et Vigilante collects all official documents of permanent utility and will prove invaluable as a work of reference; the Federal Council's reports to Parliament (Rapports du Conseil Fédéral à l'Assemblée Fédérale sur les mesures prises par lui en vertu de l'arrêté fédéral du 3 août 1914), of which eleven have been issued, are indispensable; some fifteen documents have been translated and published by the United States Naval War College in its International Law Topics for 1916 and its International Law Documents for 1917 under the care of Professor George Grafton Wilson of Harvard University.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TREATIES

THE framers of the American Constitution did not anticipate or desire the conclusion of many treaties. For this reason they made the process of treaty conclusion difficult, requiring that the President act only with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present, some even wishing to require adhesion of the House of Representatives or a two-thirds majority of the entire Senate.*

This hope, however, has scarcely been realized. With a total of 595 treaties from its foundation to August, 1914, the United States has averaged more than four a year, and for the twentieth century fifteen a year, or a treaty ratified every three weeks. Along with the

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1 In the Federal Convention, Gouverneur Morris "Was not solicitous to multiply and facilitate treaties," and Madison "observed that it had been too easy in the present Congress to make treaties, although nine States were required for that purpose." Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, 2: 393, 548. See also Jefferson, Manual of Congressional Practice, sec. 52, and letter to Madison, March 23, 1815, Moore, International Law Digest, 5: 162, 310.

2 Under the Articles of Confederation, the treaty-making power was vested in a majority of nine States in Congress (Art. IX), and in some of the early drafts of the Constitution it was vested in Congress (Farrand, 2: 143), later in the Senate (ibid., 2: 169, 183), and the President was finally added on the argument that treaty-making was properly an executive function (ibid., 2: 297), and that a national agency was necessary as an offset to the especial State interest of the Senate. (Ibid., 2: 392.)

3 Pennsylvania especially desired this. G. Morris of that State wanted to add "but no treaty shall be binding on the United States which is not ratified by a law" (Farrand, 2: 297, 392. Later, Wilson of Pennsylvania proposed to add "and House of Representatives," saying that "as treaties are to have the operation of laws they ought to have the sanction of laws also." On vote, Pennsylvania alone supported the motion. (Ibid., 2: 538). This is the vote referred to by Washington in his celebrated message on the Jay Treaty where he refused to recognize the claim of the House of Representatives to participate in treatymaking. (Ibid., 8: 371; Annals of Congress, 4th Cong., 1st sess. p. 761). 4 Farrand, 2: 549.

By 25 year periods, treaties have been concluded as follows: 1778-1799, 21; 1800-1824, 20; 1825-1849, 63; 1850-1874, 141; 1875-1899, 142; 1900-1914, 208. This is in accord with the official enumeration of treaties (excluding Indian