JAPAN: Marquis Kimmochi Saionji, former Prime Minister; Baron Nobuaki Makino, Member of Diplomatic Council; Vicomte Sutemi Chinda, Ambassador to Great Britain; Keisheiro Matsui, Ambassador to France; M. Ijuin, Ambassador to Italy. BELGIUM: M. Hymans, Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Van Den Huvel, Minister to Vatican; M. Vandervelde, Minister of Justice. BRAZIL: M. Epitacio Pessoa, Senator, former Minister of Justice; M. Olyntho do Magalhaes, Minister to France, former Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Pandia Calogeras, Deputy, former Minister of Finance. : SERBIA M. Pachitch, Prime Minister; M. Trumbitch, Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Vesnitch, Minister to France. CHINA: M. Lou Tseng Tsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Chengting Thomas Wang. GREECE: M. Eleftherios Venizelos, Prime Minister; M. Nicolas Politis, Minister of Foreign Affairs. HEDJAZ: S. A. L. Emir Feisal, M. Rustem Haidar. POLAND: M. Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee; name of other delegate not on record. PORTUGAL: Dr. Egas Moniz, Deputy, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Arthur Vilella. ROUMANIA: M. Jean J. C. Bratiano, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Nicolas Misu, Minister to England. SIAM: Prince Charoon, Minister to France; Phya Bidadh Kosha, Minister to Italy. CZECHO-SLOVAKS: M. Charles Kramar, Prime Minister; M. Edouard Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs. BOLIVIA: M. Ismael Montes, Minister to France. CUBA: M. Antonio Sanchez Bustamante (provisionally replaced by M. Rafael Martinez, Minister to France). ECUADOR: M. Dorn de Alsua, Minister to France. NICARAGUA: One delegate. Name not on record. PANAMA: M. Antonio Burcos, Minister of the Republic of Panama in Spain. PERU: Don Francisco Garcia Calderon, Peruvian Minister to Belgium. URUGUAY: M. Juan Carlos Blanco, Minister of Uruguay to Paris. TWO TREATIES OF PARIS As we watch with absorbing interest the last step of the war drama at Paris, our minds naturally turn to that other negotiation at Paris just over a century ago which, followed by the Congress of Vienna, likewise wound up an era. As to method or as to substance, has it anything to teach us now? The Peace of Paris, signed May 30, 1814, consisted of treaties, nearly identical, between France under Louis XVIII and Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria, Sweden and Spain. The preamble, as given in English by Hertslet in his Map of Europe by Treaty, reads as follows: Animated by an equal desire to terminate the long agitations of Europe, and the sufferings of mankind, by a permanent Peace, founded upon a just repartition of force between its States, and containing in its Stipulations the pledge of its durability; and His Britannic Majesty, together with his Allies, being unwilling to require of France, now that, replaced under the paternal Government of Her Kings, she offers the assurance of security and stability to Europe, the conditions and guarantees which they had with regret demanded from her former Government, have named Plenipotentiaries to discuss, settle and sign a Treaty of Peace and Amity. Can we in the same generous way assume that the will-o'-the wisp republics of Austria and Germany and Russia assure security and stability to Europe? I trow not. Nor did the Allies in 1814 altogether make good their profession of trust in France. For an additional and secret article provided that: The disposal of the territories given up by His Most Christian Majesty, under the Third Article of the Public Treaty, and the relations from whence a system of real and permanent Balance of Power in Europe is to be derived, shall be regulated at the Congress upon the principles determined upon by the Allied Powers among themselves, and according to the general principles contained in the following articles. Thus the Allies proposed, but Talleyrand disposed. As one writer says: "But in fact at the Congress of Vienna, the adroit audacity of Talleyrand and the disagreement of the Allies between themselves secured for France a considerable amount of influence." The Congress to which this peace of Paris was a curtain-raiser lasted nearly eight months, being disturbed by Napoleon's escape from Elba and the great adventure of the hundred days. The Congress of Vienna was a meeting of dictators for arranging the affairs of Europe according to their arbitrary views, and in effect required the smaller powers to submit to their decrees, without a share in their deliberations. If such a Congress attempts to be a really deliberative body it becomes a bear garden. Some small group must control it, and who has a better call than those who have borne the heat and burden of the day. The equality of States does not mean equality of influence. Eight powers were represented at Vienna and one of them refused to sign. The settlement at Vienna was one dictated by autocracy and had no lasting value. "To perfect the arrangements which appear in the final act, a multitude of special compacts had to be made, some of which were annexed to that instrument and declared to be a part of it." In point of fact there were fifteen such. The treaty itself comprised one hundred and twenty-one articles. They ranged in importance from the creation of a German Confederation to the neutralization of Cracow. They opened the Rhine and the Scheldt to free navigation. At Paris most of the captured French colonies had been restored and the French ships in continental ports were apportioned. The precedence of diplomatic agents was regulated. The language of the treaty was French but expressly declared not to be a precedent. Territorial changes were based upon prior ownerships, not upon racialties or a people's wishes. There is example, there is also warning, for us to-day in the settlements of Paris and Vienna. A new German Confederation may be created. If it includes German-Austria, thus weakening relatively the power of Prussia, will that be a factor of strength or of weakness in the future? Partitioned Poland, after its tragic history, may be once again a powerful state with a sea coast, but will its political life be any more harmonious than its past gives reason to expect? Unless Russia is reassembled, will not the development of her parts, her commercial future, be darkened? We may rejoice in Italy's recovery of her Irredenta, yet deprecate her greed to absorb the Adriatic littoral. There is plenty of room for mutual jealousies; is any Talleyrand in sight to play upon them? The territorial adjustments at Vienna were based upon a return to the status quo of 1792 in the main, but "compensations" were demanded in addition. Russia also was determined upon the possession of Warsaw, while Prussia claimed Saxony, which had adhered to Napoleon. These demands split the solidarity of the four leading Powers. France came in with Austria and Great Britain, consequently to keep the other two in check, and worked for a return to arms which was avoided by yielding in part to Russia's and Prussia's insistence. In this we see the tendency of a coalition which has won its war to fall apart. The cementing influence disappears and other earlier causes of friction revive. For the purification of national character, which, according to some, war brings about, does not abolish national selfishness. The situation at Vienna was comparatively simple, however. An autocratic shuffling of the stakes and a redistribution on the line of least resistance satisfied the parties. But to-day we have a more complicated set of problems and a more exacting and critical gallery, because it is a democratic body responsible to many peoples. The territorial adjustments which are demanded are fairly revolutionary, setting up certain new states, shearing certain old ones, combining, effacing, protecting, repairing the crimes of past ages. Moreover, the principles by which the powers profess to be guided are obscure and ill defined. Take one of the simplest cases, that of Alsace-Lorraine. Mr. Wilson's reference to this in his fourteen pointed address said that the wrong of 1871 should be righted. He has also adhered to the principle of self-determination for small peoples. Well, then, are Alsace-Lorraine to go back to France as the result of a plebiscite if restored at all, or not? On this we may be sure Germany will be vociferous. Or consider the respective claims of Italy and the new and greater Servia to Illyria as far as Fiume. What settlement of this problem can be worked out which will not sow the seeds of future trouble? How shall Constantinople and the Straits and Palestine be treated? But besides the difficult territorial problems are others even more apt to cause difference, and of a nature which the diplomats at Vienna could not have conceived. Punishment for war crimes; how shall they be tried and how shall they be punished, yet unless tried and punished, the laws of war are no better than a dead letter! Reparation for illegal ship sinkings, particularly of neutral owners; how can this be obtained when there are not German ships and German money enough to give reparation? What is freedom of the seas; and if it means a weakening of the naval arm can it and should it be demanded of that British fleet which has saved civilization from German domination? A league to enforce peace; something which everybody wants but no one is quite sure how it is to be brought about. The question of disarmament, the abolition of conscription in its old form, without which we shall see a return to the race for armaments and the impoverishment of all peoples. How is this reconcilable with our demand for a great navy as "big as anyone's, say the sponsors of the plan. And then there is the tremendous problem of finding amongst our enemies that responsibility and that sovereignty with which alone we can deal. The catalogue is long enough to point my moral. When you have a number of intricate and controversial questions to discuss; when the debaters are many and governed by a variety of motives, from greed to altruism, from sense to sentimentality; when the peoples of the world, watching each move in the game, are governed by unbridled democracy as never before; how can you get results? Only, as it seems to the writer, by limiting the topics; by postponing the most controversial ones; by strenuous efforts to do justice; by establishing control in a few hands, which shall be dictatorial; and by taking to heart the warning of Vienna. THEODORE S. WOOLSEY. |