opposition to them without a secret remorse of conscience. But this remorse may be borne with: and if the sinner choose to bear with it, for the sake of the pleasure or the profit which he expects from his wickedness; or finds the pleasure of the sin to exceed the remorse of conscience, of which he alone is the judge, and concerning which, when he feels them both together, he can hardly be mistaken, the moral instinct man, so far as I can understand, has nothing more to offer.

For if he allege that these instincts are so many indications of the will of God, and consequently presages of what we are to look for hereafter, this, I answer, is to retort a rule and a motive ulterior to the instincts themselves, and at which rule and motive we shall by-and-by arrive by a surer road; -I say surer, so long as there remains a controversy, whether there be any instinctive maxims at all, or any difficulty in ascertaining what maxims are instinctive.

This celebrated question, therefore, becomes in our system a question of pure curiosity; and as such, we dimiss it to the determination of those who are more inquisitive than we are con cerned to be, about the natural history and constitution of the human species.

CHAPTER VI.

HUMAN HAPPINESS.

THE word happy is a relative term; that is, when we call a man happy, we mean that he is happier than some others, with. whom we compare him, than the generality of others; or, than he himself was in some other situation :-Thus speaking of one who has just compassed the object of a long pursuit, "Now," we say, "he is happy;" and in a like comparative sense, compared, that is, with the general lot of mankind, we call a man happy who possesses health and competency.

In strictness, any condition may be denominated happy, in which the amount or aggregate of pleasure exceeds that of pain; and the degree of happiness depends upon the quantity of this

excess.

And the greatest quantity of it ordinarily attainable in human

life, is what we mean by happiness, when we inquire or pronounce what human happiness consists in.*

In which inquiry I will omit much usual declamation on the dignity and capacity of our nature; the superiority of the soul to the body, of the rational to the animal part of our constitution; upon the worthiness, refinement, and delicacy of some satisfac tions, or the meanness, grossness, and sensuality of others; because I hold that pleasures differ in nothing but in continuance and intensity: from a just computation of which, confirmed by what we observe of the apparent cheerfulness, tranquillity, and contentment of men of different tastes, tempers, stations, and pursuits, every question concerning human happiness must receive its decision.

It will be our business to show, if we can,

I. What human happiness does not consist in.

II. What it does consist in.

FIRST, then, Happiness does not consist in the pleasures of sense, in whatever profusion or variety they be enjoyed. By the pleasures of sense, I mean, as well the animal gratifications of eating, drinking, and that by which the species is continued, as the more refined pleasures of music, painting, architecture, gardening, splendid shows, theatric exhibitions; and the pleasures,

* If any positive signification, distinct from what we mean by pleasure, can be affixed to the term "happiness," I should take it to denote a certain state of the nervous system in that part of the human frame in which we feel joy and grief, passions and affections. Whether this part be the heart, which the turn of most language, would lead us to believe, or the diaphragm, as Buffon, or the upper orifice of the stomach, as Van Helmont thought; or rather be a kind of fine net work, lining the whole region of the præcordia, as others have imagin ed, it is possible, not only that each painful sensation may violently shake and disturb the fibres at the time, but that a series of such may at length so derange the very texture of the system, as to produce a perpetual irritation, which will show itself by fretfulness, impatience, and restlessness. It is possible, also, on the other hand, that a succession of pleasurable sensations may have such an effect upon this subtile organization, as to cause the fibres to relax, and return into their place and order, and thereby to recover, or, if not lost, to preserve that harmonious confirmation which gives to the mind its sense of complacency and satisfaction. This state may be denominated happiness, and is so far distinguishable from pleasure, that it does not refer to any particular object of enjoyment, or consist, like pleasure, in the gratification of one or more of the senses, but is rather the secondary effect. which such objects and gratifications produce upon the nervous system, or the state in which they leave it. These conjectures belong not, however, to our province. The comparative sense, in which we have explained the term happiness, is more popular, and is sufficient for the purpose of the present chapter..

lastly, of active sports, as of hunting, shooting, fishing, &c. For, 1st, These pleasures continue but a little while at a time. This is true of them all, especially of the grosser sort. Laying aside the preparation, and the expectation, and computing strictly the actual sensation, we shall be surprised to find how inconsiderable a portion of our time they occupy, how few hours in the fourand-twenty they are able to fill up.

2dly, These pleasures, by repetition, lose their relish. It is a property of the machine, for which we know no remedy, that the organs by which we perceive pleasure, are blunted and benumbed by being frequently exercised, in the same way. There is hardly any one who has not found the difference between a gratification, when new, and when familiar, or any pleasure which does not become indifferent as it grows habitual.

3dly, The eagerness for high.and intense delights takes away the relish from all others; and as such delights fall rarely in our way, the greater part of our time becomes, from this cause, empty and uneasy.

There is hardly any delusion by which men are greater sufferers in their happiness, than by their expecting too much from what is called pleasure; that is, from those intense delights which vulgarly engross the name of pleasure. The very expectation spoils them. When they do come, we are often engaged in taking pains to persuade ourselves how much we are pleased, rather than enjoying any pleasure which springs naturally out of the object. And whenever we depend upon being vastly delighted, we always go home secretly grieved at missing our aim. Likewise, as has been observed just now, when this humour of being prodigiously delighted has once taken hold of the imagination, it hinders us from providing for, or acquiescing in, those gently soothing engagements, the due variety and succession of which, are the only things that supply a continued stream of happiness.

What I have been able to observe of that part of mankind, whose professed pursuit is pleasure, and who are withheld in the pursuit by no restraints of fortune, or scruples of conscience, corresponds sufficiently with this account. I have commonly remarked in such men, a restless and inextinguishable passion for variety; a great part of their time to be vacant, and so much of it irksome; and that, with whatever eagerness and expectation they set out, they become, by degrees, fastidious in their choice of pleasure, fanguid in the enjoyment, yet miserable under the want of it.

The truth seems to be, that there is a limit at which these plea sures soon arrive, and from which they ever afterwards decline. They are by necessity of short duration, as the organs cannot hold on their emotions beyond a certain length of time; and if you endeavour to compensate for this imperfection in their nature, by the frequency with which you repeat them, you lose more than you gain, by the fatigue of the faculties, and the diminution of sensibility.

We have said nothing in this account, of the loss of opportunities, or the decay of faculties, which, whenever they happen leave the voluptuary destitute and desperate; teased by desires that can never be gratified, and the memory of pleasures which must return no more.

It will also be allowed by those who have experienced it, and perhaps by those alone, that pleasure which is purchased by the encumbrance of our fortune, is purchased too dear; the pleasure never compensating for the perpetual irritation of embarrassed circumstances.

These pleasures, after all, have their value; and as the young are always too eager in their pursuit of them, the old are sometimes too remiss; that is, too studious of their ease, to be at the pains for them which they really deserve.

SECONDLY, Neither does happiness consist in an exemption from pain, labour, care, buisness, suspense, molestation, and "those evils which are without;" such a state being usually attended, not with ease, but with depression of spirits, a tastelessness in all our ideas, imaginary anxieties, and the whole train of hypochondriacal affections.

For which reason, it seldom answers the expectations of those who retire from their shops and counting-houses to enjoy the remainder of their days in leisure and tranquillity; much less, of such as, in a fit of chagrin, shut themselves up in cloisters and hermitages, or quit the world and their stations in it, for solitude and repose.

Where there exists a known external cause of uneasiness, the cause may be removed, and the uneasiness will cease. But those imaginary distresses which men feel for want of real ones, (and which are equally tormenting, and so far equally real) as they depend upon no single or assignable subject of uneasiness, admit oftentimes of no application or relief.

Hence a moderate pain, upon which the attention may fasten

and spend itself, is to many a refreshment; as a fit of the gout will sometimes cure the spleen. And the same of any moderate agitation of the mind, as a literary controversy, a law-suit, a contested election, and, above all. gaming; the passion for which, in men of fortune and liberal minds, is only to be accounted for on this principle.

THIRDLY, neither does happiness consist in greatness, rank, or elevated station.

Were it true, that all superiority afforded pleasure, it would follow, that by how much we were the greater, that is, the more persons we were superior to, in the same proportion, so far as depended upon this cause, we should be the happier; but so it is, that no superiority yields any satisfaction, save that which we possess or obtain over those with whom we immediately compare ourselves. The shepherd perceives no pleasure in his superiority over his dog; the farmer, in his superiority over the shepherd; the lord, in his superiority over the farmer; nor the king, lastly, in his superiority over the lord. Superiority, where there is no competition, is seldom contemplated; what most men, indeed, are quite unconscious of.

But if the same shepherd can run, fight, or wrestle, better than the peasants of his village; if the farmer can show better cattle, if he keep a better horse, or be supposed to have a longer purse than any farmer in the hundred; if the lord have more interest in an election, greater favour at court, a better house, or larger estate, than any nobleman in the county; if the king possess a more extensive territory, a more powerful fleet or army, a more splendid establishment, more loyal subjects, or more weight and authority in adjusting the affairs of nations, than any prince in Europe: in all these cases the parties feel an actual satisfaction in their superiority.

Now, the conclusion that follows from hence is this, that the pleasures of ambition, which are supposed to be peculiar to high stations are, in reality, common to all conditions. The farrier who shoes a horse better, and who is in greater request for his skill than any man within ten miles of him, possesses, for all that I can see, the delight of distinction and of excelling, as truly and substantially as the statesman, the soldier, and the scholar, who have filled Europe with the reputation of their wisdom, their va lour, or their knowledge.

No superiority appears to be of any account, but superiority