taught by sectaries, but which has no warrant of Holy Scripture. Even St. Paul felt the need of constant active work for his Christian life (cf. 1 Cor. ix. 27, with 2 Tim. iv. 8). Athanasian Creed. Vide CREEDS and QUICUMQUE VULT. Atheism, from a and @éos, is the denial of the existence of a personal GOD. It thus includes pantheism, which teaches that everything is GOD. Atheism must be carefully distinguished from skepticism, which simply doubts, and from infidelity, which is the rejection of an organized faith or form of religion. Nor does it include the godlessness of savage tribes, if there be such, whose intellectual development is too low to form a conception of GOD. Avowed and consistent atheism is exceedingly rare, and is always individual, no sect or system having ever been willing to establish itself upon this basis. Even the positivism of Comte stops short of avowed atheism, content with holding the futility of all speculation beyond the data of positive experience. The charge of atheism has always been most abhorrent to those, even, who might be practical atheists. Among the Greeks and Romans it was punished with death, those convicted of it being regarded by the law as hostes humani generis,-enemies to the human race. A little thought will reveal the grounds of this universal repugnance. First, it is the deliberate rejection of the suggestions of consciousness, no argument being ever required to establish a belief in GOD, while atheism is always the result of some process of thought. Then the mind naturally recoils from what is contrary to reason, and atheism is so because it necessitates the recognition of effect without cause, of design without a designer, of law without a lawgiver, and of life without a source. A slight elaboration of the last two points may be sufficient for illustration. One of the first results of observation and experience is the necessary recognition of laws by which natural processes are governed, and which man can neither understand nor control. The recurrence of the seasons, the germination of seed, the reproduction of plants and animals each after its kind, with many more instances which will readily occur, are seen to be regular, systematic, and permanent. Man finds them neces sary to his life, while he can neither alter nor restrain them, but he may rely upon them, and does rely upon them, with the absolute certainty of not being disappointed. Reason tells him that there must be a Mind greater than his to conceive laws which he cannot comprehend, and a Power greater than his to enforce them. This Mind and this Power he always finds greater than the grasp of his mind and power, and this supreme intelligent force is GOD. Again, man recognizes the fact and the phenomena of life, but finds no origin for them within his experience. But reason demands an origin, which must necessarily be beyond his experience. He finds, too, in close connection with life the phenomenon of death, and soon discovers that it is abnormal. There ought to be no death; by the very nature of life the machines which it quickens should be permanent. But they are not so, and that systematically. Reason demands for this a controlling Will which restrains, as it originates, the phenomena of life. That originating and controlling will is GOD. Thus the rejecting of the existence of GOD is contrary to reason, and, therefore, abhorrent to human intellect. We sometimes meet the phrase "scientific atheism," but there can be no such thing as scientific atheism, because nothing could be more unscientific than to deny the existence of that which is undemonstrable. But the existence of a personal GOD is undemonstrable by science because science deals necessarily with finite data and causes; but finite causes must lead to finite results, and GoD is of necessity infinite. Hence science can neither prove nor disprove the existence of GOD, because it must work with data which cannot lead beyond human experience, while GOD is beyond human experience. But to assume that which we cannot know is contrary to science, and therefore there can be no scientific atheism. Finally, atheism is repugnant to reason because it is illogical, logic being the perfection of the processes of reason. For logic is essentially the necessary sequence of cause and effect, and therefore to deny to any effect an antecedent cause is illogical. But the human mind must necessarily confine its processes to sequences, beginning within its own experience, and the ultimate attainment of human experience is always manifestly an effect. But atheism denies any antecedent cause beyond the possible attainment of human experience, and there fore atheism is illogical, and consequently repugnant to reason. Thus we may read ily account for the abhorrence always manifested by individuals to the charge of atheism. But it is equally repugnant to morality, and consequently to the welfare of society, because it destroys the strongest and highest incentive to the control and restraint of those natural appetites and passions which in their unbridled indulgence are hostile to the interests of society. The first element of social order and welfare is the restriction of individual liberty for the common good, and the restraint within permitted limits of those dispositions and desires which are common to all animal nature. But the fear of human punishment and the desire of the good of others have never been found sufficient to accomplish these ends, unless aided and supported by a sense of responsibility and accountability unto a higher Power, whose vigilance cannot be escaped and whose authority cannot be defied, or whose love and kindness excites to reverence and obedience. But atheism destroys alike this fear and this reverence, and by removing all sense of danger beyond this life, or of compensating reward hereafter, directly fosters the commission of acts contrary to the common welfare. Hence society has ever regarded atheism as hostile to its best interests and subversive of its fundamental principles, and has punished it as a crime or made it a bar to social privileges and respect. The refusal to accept the oath of an atheist in a court of justice is a brand of disgrace, and the assertion of a distrust by his fellowcitizens, from which every man must shrink with horror. It is a powerful proof of the healthy tone of public sentiment upon this vital matter, that there is probably not a single society in the country organized for mutual benefits of any kind into which an avowed atheist could obtain admission. Among those who have been classed as atheists are the Peripatetic and Epicurean philosophers of ancient times, and Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Spinoza, Blount, Vanini, and others in the modern period. We must remember, however, how inaccurate was the language and how intolerant the views of theological writers only a few years ago. Few, if any, of those named can be properly called atheists under the exact terminology and discriminating classifications of more recent philosophy, though most of them, wandering in the misty regions of metaphysical speculation, have trodden dangerously near to the fatal verge, and there are few minds strong enough to follow their teachings with safety. REV. ROBERT WILSON, D.D. Atonement. This word, as applied to the great work of CHRIST, has been used in two senses, differing according to the view taken of the Person of CHRIST and of His relation to the process of man's salvation. Those who deny the divinity of our LORD JESUS CHRIST Commonly regard the Atonement as a mere restoration of friendly feeling between two alienated parties. It is, to use their own favorite etymology, an "at-onement,"'—a reconciliation of the CREATOR and creature to each other. From this point of view, inasmuch as the CREATOR cannot be supposed to have contributed to the alienation,-and is not supposed to have raised any barrier to the restoration of the original amicable relations between Himself and His creature, inasmuch, therefore, as both the original departure and the continued separation are exclusively on the part of the creature, the Atonement is regarded as a process not for reconciling the CREATOR to the creature, or the law to the offender, but only for reconciling the creature to the CREATOR. According to this view the work of CHRIST is reduced to the exercise of a mere persuasory influence upon the creature. First, persuading him to desire reconciliation, and then persuading him to take the steps of moral and spiritual reform necessary for the restoration of harmony. But in all this there is nothing of the nature of expiation or of satisfaction rendered for the offense. But the Holy Catholic Church, while including this persuasory process in her idea of the Atonement, and understanding the language of St. Paul (2 Cor. v. 20) as expressing it, has, from the first, included much more. She holds that the fitness of things, their accurate adjustment, the eternal principles of justice and truth, and the permanent well-being of the universe demand that where law has been broken some adequate satisfaction for the offense shall be rendered, especially where a penalty has been attached beforehand to the infraction and made known to those under its authority. 1st. It is contrary to justice, to the essential fitness of things, and to the dignity of all law that the infraction of any law should have no evil consequences for the infringer; that the results of disobedience should be to him the same as those of obedience. Law is something more than a mere indication or suggestion of action. It is an obligatory rule of action, imposing respect for itself upon all; not only binding the person governed but existing as an authority in the universe, the maintenance of which becomes of universal obligation and interest. To be law in this sense it must be an enforced rule of action. 2d. The controlling power of law,-its value as an effective regulator of action is sacrificed when disobedience goes unpunished. Wherefore, when law is violated, its regulating efficiency, which is impaired by the violation, must be restored by some expiatory penalty. It is for the benefit of all for whom law is made, the law-breaker himself included, that the law shall not be rendered ineffective and contemptible by permitting its infraction with impunity. This becomes more evident when the nature of Sin is considered: 1st. "Sin is transgression of Law." 2d. Sin is always the responsible act of a free agent. No being is responsible for what he cannot help. Therefore sinfulness is our common inherited nature. But Sin itself involves freedom of action,-action performed not by compulsionhowever induced through the persuasive influence of motives,—but not the less free because the result of such persuasion. Hence the rationale and the importance of offsetting all temptation to law-breaking by corresponding penalty. This is an absolutely rational arrangement, and one of universal application,-in all worlds and forms of responsible existence, one adapted to the nature of free agents, who, because they are free, must therefore be able to break the law, and who are therefore to be hindered from doing so not by compulsion, but by the persuasory power of motives. These motives may be of different sorts. They may be found in the love of the right, or in the love of the lawmaker. But these motives may be legitimately and effectively supported by another, viz., the apprehension of the evil consequences of breaking the law. The attachment of a penalty to law-breaking is therefore more than a measure of justice. It is a positive measure of mercy, since it supplies an additional protection of the universe against the disturbing influences of temptation and sin by protecting the free agent against himself. It is, therefore, also as much a measure of mercy for the law-breaker as for the lawkeeper. But in order that a penalty may have any useful effect its enforcement must be assured. This is equally as the other, and for the same reasons-a measure of true mercy as well as of justice,-and for all-for the lawbreaker as well as for the law-keeper. And all that might be said of the protective power of an enforced penalty in the case of a first offense would apply to all subsequent offenses. The rationale is the same. But where a particular penalty has been beforehand attached to the breach of a law the veracity of the law-maker is also involved in its enforcement. It is of course conceivable that the terms of the penalty may be that the law-breaker shall only be liable to certain consequences. But whatever the actual terms of the penalty, the veracity of the law-maker requires that those terms be enforced. A positive threat is only a promise | in another form. And it is a promise not only to the possible law-breaker, made with the merciful intent to deter him from the crime, but it is a promise to the rest of the universe also, whose peace is more or less endangered by any infraction of law. The actual enforcement of the penalty becomes, therefore, an obligation of justice, of mercy, and of veracity. When man was placed in probation he was told that if he sinned he should die. It was a promise on the part of the Divine Law-maker, and, as made by Divine wisdom, one which must be held to have been in just proportion to the offense. Having been made, its fulfillment was required by the principles of absolute justice,—by the interests of the universe, those of the law-breaking race included, and by the veracity of the Creator. It was necessary, therefore, from all these points of view, that man's offense should be punished by the actual infliction, in some way, of the promised penalty. And it must be observed that the penalty promised was a positive and punitive one. There was something more than a mere separation from GOD as a simple effect or resulting fact,—a fact which could be neutralized or extinguished by another simple fact, viz., by a mere bringing together again of the separated parties, an at-one-ment. The penalty was not only consequential, but was also positively punitive, and was therefore something more than the offender could himself remove by simply returning.__The offender could not reinstate himself. He must needs be reinstated. But inasmuch as it was due to absolute justice, as well as to the interests of the universe, that no reinstatement should take effect which should leave the sin unpunished or the broken influence of the law unrepaired or uncompensated, some adequate compensation, or satisfaction, or expiation was necessary, that the lawbreaking might be properly offset or balanced, and the shattered influence of the law itself repaired. Could the human lawbreaker make this expiation for himself either by subsequent obedience or by suffering? He could not do this by subsequent obedience, inasmuch as there was still due from him to his CREATOR a perpetually perfect service. All that he could do, therefore, at the best, would be not to break the law again. There could be no room or possibility for a superabundant or superfluous service or obedience. But not to offend again would offer no satisfaction for the breach already committed; nothing but suffering in such case could answer the purpose of expiation; and had the offender risen from his first fault to a continuously perfect obedience thereafter, it is conceivable that by his sufferings justice could have been satisfied and the law vindicated, and its influence sustained. But, unfortunately for him, his sin not only subjected him to punishment, but brought in a depravation of his nature. So that from the first he has gone on increasing in place of diminishing the fatal record against himself. Manifestly, therefore, he, being a continuous offender, could make no expiation for himself, either by obedience or by suffering. At the same time it was not consistent with justice that the penalty should be borne by one absolutely unconnected with the offense. Besides which, the penalty having been denounced specifically upon the offender himself, the veracity of the Law maker was pledged for its infliction upon him. How, then, could expiation be made, or the reinstatement of the offender accomplished, if neither one himself an offender, nor one unconnected with the offense, could make it? His Just here an important fact must be noticed. Adam represented the race of man, and his act was a representative act. offense was a race-offense, and so the penalty was a race-penalty. That this is so is evident from two facts, not to speak of others: 1st. The whole race, as a race, have inherited the taint of Adam's sin. The case is not one of a multitude of individual sinners, but one of a race or stock of sinners, in whom the sinfulness in the stock is congenital. There is absolutely never an exception. 2d. The penalty of mortality is equally universal and congenital. There is no exception in respect to it. It is, therefore, a race-punishment. But here again another fact must be borne in mind, viz., that the human family is, after all, in a very real sense, only one continuous person. As the branches of a tree is accounted the equivalent of that of many private individuals. Natural reason accepts this as a principle. But GOD, the SON, by taking humanity did not put off His own Divinity. And so in standing proxy to justice for the human race, His value as an example or substitute for others was infinitely multiplied. By how much a Divine victim was of more value than a human one by so much the more did His suffer are a part of the one tree, and as, no matter how long the life of the tree, its continuity is preserved, so that it is, after all, but one and the same tree, and its latest branches are only a continuation of the wood which was in it as a sapling a hundred years before, so with the human stock. It has not been a series of successive creations; it has been but one continuous, uninterrupted individual, at least so far as body and brain are concerned, and so far as we may holding exceed in value that of any merely that mental and moral qualities are inherited, we may include the mind with the body in this statement (the will is perhaps the only separable part of the man). The child begins by being a living part of its parents before it sets out on its own independent career of will. There has never been a break or an interval in this human continuity, and so, in point of fact, there has been literally but one ever-developing, continuous human being. Its many branches, however separated after a time from the parent stem, are in their start as identical with the original stock as are the branches of a tree with its trunk. This great, continuous, self-involving human being, now as many years old as have elapsed since the creation, sinned as a whole, was sentenced as a whole, and as a whole now lies under the penalty of the law. In this fact we find the beginning of the solution of our difficulty. To complete it another fact is necessary. The Most High GOD, the SON, by causing Himself to be born of the Virgin Mary, entered into the human race and became a part of the same. Having thus become part of the human stock, He could, in His human nature, rightfully represent that stock in any transaction with Divine Justice. Punishment inflicted upon Him in His human nature would be punishment inflicted upon the human race. And as the pain inflicted upon any part of a human body is inflicted upon that body as a whole, so the penalty inflicted upon an individual of a race is inflicted upon the race. Thus, one person might become proxy for his race to the avenging law. Yet a continuously sinful member of the race could not thus stand as proxy, seeing that he would have his own offenses to answer for. But one who had incurred no individual penalty might thus, by suffering, atone-according to his measure-for the offense of his race, so that in him his race might be punished. But could any one person adequately atone for a whole race? Could the majesty of the law be thus sufficiently vindicated, the necessities of justice be maintained, the veracity of the law-maker be preserved, and the interests of the universe be sufficiently guarded? When in human warfare a body of men having become liable to punishment certain of their number are selected as representatives of the rest, the punishment of a leader human victim in supplying a suitable satis- Atonement, then, in the sense in which it is applied by the Holy Catholic Church to the work of CHRIST, is the expiation offered in the Person of the Divine man whereby He put Himself in the place of the rest of the condemned human race and suffered in its stead. As man, He paid the penalty adjudged against man; as GOD, He gave value to the substitution of Himself for the whole race. Thus the Atonement, while including the idea of reconciliation or "at-one-ment," and indeed involving all the subsequent processes of reconciliation whereby the offender is brought to a better mind and into harmony again with the Divine will, yet contains also the principle of a satisfaction rendered for the breach of the law; and so a ransom paid for the deliverance of the offender. In this sense the ancient sacrifices were measures of atonement. They were satisfactions or ransoms rendered, and being antetypes of the Atonement of CHRIST, imperfect themselves, they were said to effect an atonement through Him for those who of fered them. Thus (to select one out of many passages) in Lev. iv. 35, it is said with respect to any one of the people who should sin and bring a sacrifice, "The priest shall make an atonement for his sin that he hath committed, and it shall be forgiven him." And so of the sacrifice of our LORD JESUS CHRIST, it is said (Rom. v. 11), " By Him we have received the atonement." That His Atonement was not a mere process of reconciliation, but an expiation by suffering, is evident from Eph. i. 7, et al.: whom we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins." In Correspondent to this view of the Atonement was the language of the Fathers. St. Clement of Rome (a contemporary of the Apostles), 1 Epist. vii.: "Let us look steadfastly to the blood of CHRIST. shed for our salvation." Epist. St. Barnabas (a very early document), ch. v.: "The remission of sins which is effected by His blood of sprinkling." Ignatius ad Smyrn., vi.: "If they believe not in the blood of CHRIST (they) shall incur condemnation." Epist. ad Diognetum, ix.: "He (GOD) took on Him the burden of our iniquities; He gave His SON to be a ransom for us. Justin Martyr, Dial. Tryph., Ixiii., speaks of CHRIST as "delivered over to death by GOD for the transgressions of the people." The above are only a few specimens of the vast mass of patristic testimony to the doctrine held by the Holy Catholic Church upon this subject and confirmatory of the view we have presented. Attributes of God. Those characteristics by which we can recognize Him and His dealing with us. "His property is always to have Mercy;" Justice is another; Love is more properly Himself. Holiness, Compassion, Omnipotence, Omnipresence, are attributes. In short, in the Divine nature, since we cannot comprehend it in itself, we can only recognize attributes. These may be grouped into those relating to His nature absolutely, and those displayed towards us. Of the first we may recite His Omnipotence, His Omniscience, His Omnipresence, His Wisdom, His Truth. Of the second, we may recite His Justice, His Mercy, His Love, His Compassion. These are evidently part of the Divine Essence. They coexist in Him and are inseparable from Him, but they are all cognizable by us, and in our own unaided speculations concerning the Divine nature are forced upon our recognition because there is some faint counterpart in our own human nature. They are so many cords to draw us to the Divine nature. Yet while they coexist and are inseparable from His Essence, it is something more, as our soul is an essence known to us by our capacities, yet it is something more. Therefore these several attributes that inhere in the very nature of GOD and belong to any conception we can form of Him yet do not describe His full nature. Attrition. An attempt by the schoolmen to give an analysis of repentance led to a too curious and untenable series of subdivisions. Attrition is defined to be the first step towards repentance. It is akin to the worldly sorrow which worketh death; not a sorrow that arises from a hatred of sin, but a sorrow from the consequences of the act. It is a step towards true repentance which yet may never be attained. As a preliminary part to the series of acts in the heart of the sinner leading to a true hearty repentance, the distinction is useful enough for the theologian, but it is a very dangerous suggestion to the imperfectly taught layman, more especially since the Council of Trent (Sess. xiv. c. 4, de pœnit.) taught that contrition, confession, and satisfaction were sufficient, making contrition consist in the terrors of a stricken conscience, and a faith that the sins of the penitent are forgiven by CHRIST. It is evident that this is but a partial statement made more fully and accurately elsewhere, but certainly (as this is a canon complete in itself) very mistakenly here, since the other teaching would be lowered to this, not this lifted up to meet the truer definition. Autocephali. Those Metropolitans who were not under a Patriarch were called Autocephali. Such were the Archbishop of Cyprus by the express recognition of the General Council of Ephesus, 431 A.D., and the Archbishops of Bulgaria and Georgia. The British Archbishop of Caerleon-uponUsk was also autocephalous. Ave Maria. The salutation of the Angel Gabriel to the Virgin Mary at the Annunciation (St. Luke i. 28). The words of the angel were simply "Hail! thou that art highly favored, the LORD is with thee. Blessed art thou among women." "" The modern Roman invocation following the Vulgate reads, "Hail Mary! full of grace," then adds from the salutation of St. Elizabeth, "blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb." The first part came into use about 1196 A.D., as is seen from the injunctions of Odo, Bishop of Paris, at that date. Its universal use was ordered by Urban IV. (1261 A.D.), together with the addition of Elizabeth's salutation. Later yet a precatory, "Holy Mary, mother of GOD, pray for us now and at the hour of our death," was added and ordered to be used, in the Breviary of Pius V. (1566 A.D.). The first clause was in use in England, but not the second, till nearly the date of the Reformation, and the precatory addition never. And in the "Institution of a Christian Man," 1530 A.D., the preachers were enjoined to teach that it was no prayer, but that it was a laud and thanksgiving for our LORD's birth, with a remembrance that the Virgin humbly submitted and believed. Azyme. (Unleavened bread.) The controversy between the Greek and Roman Churches upon the use by the latter of unleavened bread in the Eucharist. The earliest use was that of unleavened bread, and was so for several centuries (vide OBLATIONS), but the Roman Church gradually fell from the use of leavened bread after the close of the ninth century. The Greek Church has always used leavened bread. When, then, the various causes of division came to a focus about 1054 A.D., this use of unleavened bread became a bitter part of the furious disputes which raged over the differences and wrongs of the two Churches, and it continued to be a serious subject of controversy for a long time. (Vide Neale's Introduction to the History of the Eastern Church, vol. ii.; Scudamore's Notitia Eucharistica, pp. 749-65.) |