that any action of his, with refpect to the public, must be inconfiderable: fo alfo is the agent. If his crime produce but a small effect upon the univerfal intereft, his punishment or deftruction bears a fmall proportion to the fum of happiness and mifery in the creation.

CHA P. IX.

OF RIGHT.

IGHT and obligation are reciprocal; that is, wherever there is a right in one perfon, there is a correfponding obligation upon others. If one man has a right" to an eftate; others are "obliged to abftain from it :-If parents have a right" to reverence from their children; children are obliged" to reverence their parents; and fo in all other inftances.

Now, because moral obligation depends, as we have seen, upon the will of God, right, which is correlative to it, muft depend upon the fame. Right therefore fignifies, confiftency with the will of God.

But if the divine will determine the diftinction of right and wrong, what elfe is it but an identical propofition, to fay of God, that he acts right, or how is it poffible even to conceive that he fhould act wrong? yet these affertions are intelligible and fignificant. The cafe is this: by virtue of the two principles, that God wills the happiness of his creatures, and that the will of God is the measure of right

right and wrong, we arrive at certaiu conclufions; which conclufions become rules, and we foon learn to pronounce actions right or wrong, according as they agree or difagree with our rules, without looking any farther: and when the habit is once eftabiifhed of ftopping at the rules, we can go back and compare with thefe rules even the divine conduct itself, and yet it may be true (only not obferved by us at the time) that the rules themselves are deduced from' the divine will.

Right is a quality of perfons or of actions.

to allegi

Of perfons; as when we fay, fuch a one has a "right" to this eftate; parents have a "right" to reverence from their children; the king ance from his fubjects; mafters have a right" to their fervants labour; a man has not a over his own life.

right"

Of actions; as in fuch expreffions as the following: it is "right" to punish murder with death; his behaviour on that occafion was "right;" it is not "right," right," to fend an unfortunate debtor to jail; he did or acted "right," who gave up his place, rather than vote againft his judgment.

In this latter fet of expreffions, you may fubftitute the definition of right above given for the term itself, v. g. it is "confiftent with the will of "God" to punish murder with death-his behaviour on that occafion, was "confiftent with the will " of God"-it is not "confiftent with the will of "God" to fend an unfortunate debtor to jail-he did, or acted "confiftently with the will of God," who gave up his place, rather than vote against his judgment.

In the former fet, you must vary the phrafe a little, when you introduce the definition inftead of the term. Such a one has a "right" to this eftate, that is, it is "confiftent with the will of God," that fuch a one fhould have it-parents have a right" to reverence from their children,

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that is,

it is "confiftent with the will of God," that children fhould reverence their parents; and the fame of the reft.

CHA P. X.

THE DIVISION OF RIGHT S.

IGHTS, when applied to perfons, are

Natural or adventitious.

Alienable or unalienable.

Perfect or imperfect.

I. Rights are natural or adventitious. Natural rights are fuch as would belong to a man, although there fubfifted in the world no civil government whatever.

Adventitious rights are fuch as would not.

Natural rights are, a man's right to his life, limbs, and liberty; his right to the produce of his perfonal labour; to the ufe, in common with others, of air, light, water. If a thoufand different perfons, from a thoufand different corners of the world, were caft together upon a defert island, they would from the first be every one entitled to these rights.

Adventitious rights are, the right of a King over his fubjects; of a General over his foldiers; of a Judge over the life and liberty of a prifoner; a right to elect or appoint magiftrates, to impofe taxes, decide difputes, direct the defcent or difpofition oi property; a right, in a word, in any one man, or particular

particular body of men, to make laws and regulations for the reft: For none of these rights would exift in the newly inhabited ifland.

And here it will be afked how adventitious rights are created; or, which is the fame thing, how any new rights can accrue, from the eftablishment of civil fociety; as rights of all kinds, we remember, depend upon the will of God, and civil fociety is but the ordinance and inftitution of man. For the folution of this difficulty, we muft return to our firft principles. God wills the happiness of mankind, and the existence of civil fociety, as conducive to that happinefs. Confequently, many things, which are useful for the fupport of civil fociety in general, or for the conduct and confervation of particular focieties already established, are, for that reafon, "confiftent with the will of God," or right," which, without that reafon, i. e. without the eftablifhment of civil fociety, would not have been fo.

From whence alfo it appears, that adventitious rights, though immediately derived from human appointment, are not, for that reason, less facred than natural rights, nor the obligation to refpect them lefs cogent. They both ultimately rely upon the fame authority, the will of God. Such a man claims a right to a particular eftate. He can fhew, it is true, nothing for his right, but a rule of the civil community to which he belongs; and this rule may be arbitrary, capricious, and abfurd. Notwithstanding all this, there would be the fame fin in difpoffeffing the man of his eftate by craft or violence, as if it had been affigned to him, like the partition of the country amongst the twelve tribes, by the immediate defignation and appointment of

heaven.

II. Rights are alienable or unalienable.
Which terms explain themselves.

The

The right we have to moft of those things, which we call property, as houses, lands, money, &c. is alienable.

The right of a prince over his people, of a huf band over his wife, of a mafter over his fervant, is generally and naturally unalienable.

The diftinction depends upon the mode of acquiring the right. If the right originate from a contract; and be limited to the perfon by the express terms of the contract, or by the common interpretation of fuch contracts (which is equivalent to an exprefs ftipulation), or by a perfonal condition annexed to the right, then it is unalienable. In all other cafes it is alienable.

The right to civil liberty is alienable; though in the vehemence of men's zeal for it, and in the language of fome political remonftrances, it has often been pronounced to be an unalienable right. The true reason why mankind hold in deteftation the me of those who have fold their liberty to a tymory rant, is, that together with their own, they fold commonly, or endangered, the liberty of others; which certainly they had no right to difpofe of.

III. Rights are perfect or imperfect.

Perfect rights may be afferted by force, or, what in civil fociety comes into the place of private force, by course of law.

Imperfect rights may not.

Examples of perfect rights. A man's right to his life, perfon, houfe; for if these be attacked, he may repel the attack by inftant violence, or punifh the aggreffor by law; a man's right to his eftate, furniture, clothes, money, and to all ordinary articles of property; for if they be injuriously taken from him, he may compel the author of the injury to make reftitution or fatisfaction.

Examples of imperfect rights. In elections or appointments to offices, where the qualifications are prefcribed, the best qualified candidate has a right