unite their force, and, for this end, to refign themfelves to the direction of a common will; and yet it may be true, that that will is often actuated by criminal motives, and often determined to deftructive purposes. Hence, although the origin of wars be afcribed in fcripture to the operation of lawless and malignant paffions * and though war itself be enumerated amongst the foreft calamities with which a land can be vifited, the profeffion of a foldier is no where forbidden or condemned. When the foldiers demanded of John the Baptist what they should do, he faid unto them, "do violence to no man, "neither accufe any falfely, and be content with your wages." In which anfwer we do not find that in order to prepare themselves for the reception of the kingdom of God, it was required of foldiers to relinquish their profeffion, but only that they fhould beware of the vices, of which that profeffion was accused. The precept which follows, "be content with your wages," fuppofed them to continue in their fituation. It was of a Roman centurion that Chrift pronounced that memorable. eulogy, "I have not found fo great faith, no not in Ifrael." The first gentile convert who was received into the Chriftian church, and to whom the gospel was imparted by the immediate and efpecial direction of Heaven, held the fame ftation: and in the hiftory of this tranfaction, we difcover not the smallest intimation, that Cornelius, upon becoming a Chriftian, quitted the fervice of the Ronan legion; that his profeffion was objected to, or his continuance in it confidered as, in any wife, inconfiftent with his new character..

In applying the principles of morality to the affairs of nations, the difficulty which meets us arifes from hence, that the particular confequence, "fometimes, appears to exceed the value of the general rule." In this circumftance is founded the

* James iv. 1. t Luke iii. 14. Luke vii. 9. § Acts x. 1. M m only.

only diftinction that exists between the cafe of inde pendent ftates, and of independent individuals. In the tranfactions of private perfons, no advantage, that refults from the breach of a general law of juf tice, can compenfate to the public for the violation of the law in the concerns of empire, this may fometimes be doubted. Thus, that the faith of promifes ought to be maintained, as far as is lawful, and as far as was intended by the parties, whatevèr inconveniency either of them may fuffer by his fideli ty, in the intercourfe of private life is feldom dif puted ; because it is evident to almost every man who reflects upon the fubject, that the common happinefs gains more by the prefervation of the rule, than it could do by the removal of the inconveniBut when the adherence to a public treaty ency. would enflave a whole people, would block up feas, rivers, or harbours, depopulate cities, condemn fertile regions to eternal defolation, cut off a country from its fources of provifion, or deprive it of those commercial advantages, to which its climate, produce, or fituation naturally entitle it; the magnitude of the particular evil indaçes us to call in queftion the obligation of the general rule. Moral philofophy furnishes no precife folution to these doubts. She cannot pronounce that any rule of morality is fo rigid as to bend to no exceptions; nor, on the other hand, can fhe comprise these exceptions within any previous defcription. She confeffes that the obligation of every law depends upon its ultimate utility; that this utility having a finite and determinate value, fituations may be feigned, and confequently may poffibly arife, in which the general tendency is outweighed by the enormity of the particular mifchief: but the recalls, at the fame time, to the confideration of the inquirer, the almost ineftimable importance, as of other general rules of relative juftice, fo especially of national and perfonal fidelity; the unfeen, if not unbounded extent of the mischief, which must fol

low

low from the want of it; the danger of leaving it to the fufferer to decide upon the comparison of particular and general confequences, and the ftill greater danger of fuch decifions being drawn into future precedents. If treaties, for inftance, be no longer binding than whilst they are convenient, or until the inconveniency afcend to a certain point, which point must be fixed by the judgment, or rather by the feelings of the complaining party; or if fuch an opinion, after being authorized by a few examples, come at length to prevail; one and almost the only method of averting or clofing the calamities of war, of either preventing, or putting a flop to the deftruction of mankind, is loft to the world for ever. We do not fay that no evil can exceed this, nor any poffible advantage compenfate it; but we fay that a lofs, which affects all, will fcarcely be made up to the common stock of human happiness, by any benefit that can be procured to a fingle nation, which, however refpectable when compared with any other fingle nation, bears an inconfiderable proportion to the whole. Thefe, however, are the principles upon which the calculation is to be formed. It is enough, in this place, to remark the cause which produces the hesitation that we fometimes feel, in applying rules of perfonal probity to the conduct of nations.

As between individuals it is found impoffible to ascertain every duty by an immediate reference to public utility, not only because fuch reference is of tentimes too remote for the direction of private confciences, but because a multitude of cafes arife, in which it is indifferent to the general intereft by what rule men act, though it be abfolutely neceffary that they act by fome conftant and known rule or other; and as for these reasons certain pofitive conftitutions are wont to be established, in every fociety, which when eftablished, become as obligatory as the original principles of natural juftice themfelves; fo, likewife, it is between independent communities. Toge M m 2

'ther

ther with thofe maxims of univerfal equity which are common to ftates and to individuals, and by which the rights and conduct of the one as well as of the other ought to be adjusted, when they fall within the scope and application of fuch maxims; there exifts alfo amongit fovereigns a fyftem of artificial jurifpädence, under the name of the law of nations. In this code are found the rules which determine the right to vacant or newly difcovered countries; those which relate to the protection of fugitives, the pri vileges of ambaffadors, the conditions and duties of ncutrality, the immunities of neutral fhips, ports, and coafts, the diftance from fhore to which thefe immunities extend, the diftinction between free and contraband goods, and a variety of fubjects of the fame kind. Concerning which examples, and indeed the principal part of what is called the jus gentium, it may be obferved, that the rules derive their moral force, by which I mean the regard that ought to be paid to them by the confciences of fovereigns, not from their internal reasonableness or juftice, for many of them are perfectly arbitrary; nor yet from the authority by which they were establifhed, for the greater part have grown infenfibly into ufage, without any public compact, formal acknowledgement, or even known original; but fimply from the fact of their being established, and the general duty of conforming to established rules upon queftions, and between parties, where nothing but pofitive regulations can prevent difputes, and where difputes are followed by fuch deftructive confequences. The firft of the inftances, which we have just now enumerated, may be felected for the illuftration of this remark. The nations of Europe confider the fovereignty of newly difcovered countries as belonging to the prince or ftate whofe fubject makes the difcovery; and, in purfuance of this rule, it is ufual for a navigator who falls upon an unknown fhore, to take poffeflion of it, in the name of his fovereign at home, by erecting his ftandard, or difplaying

difplaying his flag upon a defert coaft. Now nothing can be more fanciful, or lefs fubftantiated by any confiderations of reason or justice, than the right which fuch difcovery, or the tranfient occupation and idle ceremony that accompany it, confer upon the country of the difcoverer. Nor can any stipulation be produced, by which the reft of the world have bound themselves to fubmit to this pretenfion. Yet when we reflect that the claims to newly difcovered countries can hardly be fettled, between the different nations which frequent them, without fome pofitive rule or other; that fuch claims, if left unfettled, would prove fources of ruinous and fatal contentions; that the rule already propofed, however arbitrary, poffeffes one principal quality of a rule-determination and certainty; above all, that it is acquiefced in, and that no one has power to substitute another, however he might contrive a better in its place: when we reflect upon thefe properties of the rule, or rather upon thefe confequences of rejecting its authority, we are led to afcribe to it the virtue and obligation of a precept of natural juftice, because we perceive in it, that which is the foundation of juftice itself, public importance and utility. And a prince who fhould difpute this rule, for the want of regularity in its formation, or of intelligible juftice in its principle, and by fuch disputes fhould disturb the tranquility of nations, and at the fame time lay the foundation of future disturbances, would be little lefs criminal, than he who breaks the public peace by a violation of engagements to which he had himself consented, or by an attack upon thofe national rights, which are founded immediately in the law of nature, and in the first perceptions of equity. The fame thing may be repeated of the rules which the law of nations prefcribes in the other inftances that were mentioned, namely, that the obfcurity of their origin, or the arbitrarinefs of their principle, fubftracts nothing