-that I fuppofed, with many authors whom I had read, that to be obliged to do a thing, was very different from being induced only to do it; and that the obligation to practife virtue, to do what is right, juft, &c. was quite another thing, and of another kind, than the obligation which a foldier is under to obey his officer, a fervant his mafter, or any of the civil and ordinary obligations of human life. Whereas, from what has been faid it appears, that moral obligation is like all other obligations; and that all obligation is nothing more than an inducement of fufficient ftrength, and resulting in some way, from the command of another.

There is always understood to be a difference between an act of prudence and an act of duty. Thus, if I distrusted a man who owed me a fum of money, I fhould reckon it an act of prudence to get another perfon bound with him; but I fhould hardly call it an act of duty. On the other hand, it would be thought a very unusual and loofe kind of language, to fay, that, as I had made fuch a promise, it was prudent to perform it; or that as my friend, when he went abroad, placed a box of jewels in my hands, it would be prudent in me to preferve it for him till he returned.

Now, in what, you will afk, does the difference confift? Inafmuch, as according to our account of the matter, both in the one cafe and the other, in acts of duty as well as acts of prudence, we confider folely what we ourselves fhall gain or lofe by the

act?

The difference, and the only difference, is this; that in the one cafe we confider what we fhall gain or lofe in the prefent world, in the other cafe, we confider alfo what we shall gain or lofe in the world

to come.

Those who would eftablish a fyftem of morality, independent of a future ftate, muft look out for fome different idea of moral obligation; unless they can fhew that virtue conducts the poffeffor to cer

tain

tain happiness in this life, or to a much greater fhare of it than he could attain by a different behaviour.

To us there are two great questions:

I. Will there be after this life any distribution of rewards and punishments at all?

II. If there be, what actions will be rewarded, and what will be punished?

The first queftion comprises the credibility of the Chriftian religion, together with the prefumptive proofs of a future retribution from the light of nature. The fecond queftion comprifes the province of morality. Both questions are too much for one work. The affirmative, therefore of the firft, although we confefs that it is the foundation upon which the whole fabric refts, muft in this treatise be taken for granted.

CHA P. IV.

A

THE WILL OF GOD.

S the will of God is our rule, to inquire what is our duty, or what we are obliged to do, in any inftance, is, in effect, to inquire, what is the will of God in that inftance? which confequently becomes the whole bufinefs of morality.

Now there are two methods of coming at the will of God on any point.

I. By his exprefs declarations, when they are to be had; and which must be fought for in Scrip

ture.

E

II By

42

THE WILL OF GOD.

II. By what we can difcover of his defigns and difpofition from his works, or, as we ufually call it, the light of nature.

And here we may obferve the abfurdity of fepa. rating natural and revealed religion from each other. The object of both is the fame-to discover the will of God-and, provided we do but difcover it, it matters nothing by what means.

An ambaffador, judging by what he knows of his fovereign's difpofition, and arguing from what he has obferved of his conduct, or is acquainted with of his defigns, may take his measures in many cafes with fafety; and prefume with great probability how his mafter would have him act on moft occafions that arife: but if he has his commiffion and inftructions in his pocket, it would be strange not to look into them. He will naturally conduct himfelf by both rules when his inftructions are clear and pofitive, there is an end of all farther deliberation (unless indeed he suspect their authenticity): where his inftructions are filent or dubious, he will endeavour to fupply or explain them, by what he has been able to collect from other quarters of his mafter's general inclination or intentions.

Mr. HUME, in his fourth appendix to his Principles of Morals, has been pleafed to complain of the modern fcheme of uniting Ethics with the Chriftian Theology. They who find themselves difposed to join in this complaint will do well to obferve what Mr. HUME himfelf has been able to make of morality without this union. And for that purpofe, let them read the fecond part of the ninth fection of the above effay; which part contains the practical application of the whole treatife--a treatife, which Mr. HUME declares to be " incomparably the best he ever wrote." When they have

*

read

read it over, motives there propofed are likely to be found fufficient to withhold men from the gratification of luft, revenge, envy, ambition, avarice, or to prevent the existence of thefe paffions. Ualefs they rife up from this celebrated effay, with ftronger impreffions upon their minds, than it ever left upon, mine, they will acknowledge the neceffity of additional fanctions. But the neceffity of thefe fancti ons is not now the question. If they be in fat ef tablished, if the rewards and punishments held forth in the gospel will actually come to pafs, they must be confidered. Such as reject the Chriftian religion are to make the beft fhift they can to build up a fyftem, and lay the foundations of morality without it. But it appears to me a great inconfiftency in those who receive Chriftianity, and expect fomething to come of it, to endeavour to keep all fach expectations out of fight, in their reasonings concerning human duty.

let them confider, whether any

The method of coming at the will of God concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of the action to pro"mote or diminish the general happiness." This rule proceeds upon the prefumption, that God Almighty wills and wifhes the happiness of his creatures; and confequently, that thofe actions, which promote that will and wifh, muft be agreeable to him; and the contrary.

As this prefumption is the foundation of our whole fyftem, it becomes neceffary to explain the reafons upon which it refts.

СНАР. V.

TITE DIVINE BENEVOLENCI.

WHE

WHEN God created the human fpecies, either: he wished their happiness, or he wished their mifery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned

about both.

If he had wished our milery, he might have made fure of his purpose, by forming our senses to be as many fores and pains to us, as they are now inftruments of gratification and enjoyment; or by placing us amidst objects fo ill fuited to our perceptions, as to have continually offended us, inftead of miniftering to our refreshment and delight. He might. have made, for example, every thing we tafted bitter; every thing we faw loathfome; every thing we touched a fting; every fmell a ftench; and every found a difcord.

If he had been indifferent about our happiness or mifery, we muft impute to our good fortune, (as alt defign by this fuppofition is excluded) both the capacity of our fenfes to receive pleasure, and the fupply of external objects fitted to produce it.

But either of thefe, and ftill more both of them, being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but the firft fuppofition, that God, when he created the human fpecies, wifhed their happiness; and made for them the provifion which he has made, with that view, and for that purpose.

The fame argument may be propofed in different terms, thus: Contrivance proves defign; and the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicates the difpofition of the defigner. The world abounds with contrivances; and all the contrivances which

we