rified, and disturb the public content with com plaints, which no wisdom or benevolence of gover

ment can remove.

It will not be thought extraordinary, that an ide, which occurs fo much oftener as the fubject of pa negyric and careless declamation, than of just re foning or correct knowledge, fhould be attended with uncertainty and confufion; or that it fhould be found impoffible to contrive a definition, which may include the numerous, unfettled, and ever varying fignifications, which the term is made to ftand for and at the fame time accord with the condition and experience of social life.

Of the two ideas that have been stated of civil liberty, whichever we affume, and whatever reasoning we found upon them, concerning its extent, na ture, value and preservation, this is the conclufionthat that people, government, and conftitution, is the freeft, which makes the best provifion for the enacting of expedient and falutary laws.

CHAP.

СНАР. VI.

OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT,

AS a feries of appeals must be finite, there ne

ceffarily exifts in every government a power From which the conftitution has provided no appeal; and which power, for that reafon, may be ermed abfolute, omnipotent, uncontrollable, arbirary, defpotic; and is alike fo in all countries.

The perfon, or affembly, in whom this power refides, is called the fovereign, or the fupreme power of the state.

Since to the fame power univerfally appertains the office of establishing public laws, it is called also the legislature of the state.

A government receives its denomination from the form of the legiflature; which form is likewise what we commonly mean by the conftitution of a country,

Political writers enumerate three principal forms of government, which, however, are to be regarded rather as the fimple forms, by fome combination and intermixture of which all actual governments are compofed, than as any where exifting in a pure and elementary ftate. These forms are,

I. Defpotifm, or abfolute MONARCHY, where the legiflature is in a single perfon.

II. An ARISTOCRACY, where the legislature is in a felect affembly, the members of which, either fill up by election the vacancies in their own body, of fucceed to their places in it by inheritance, proper

17, tenure of certain lands, or in refpect of fore perfonal right, or qualification.

pee

III. A REPUBLIC, or democracy, where the ple at large, either collectively or by representation, conftitute the legislature.

The feparate advantage of MONARCHY, are un ty of council, activity, decifion, fecrecy, difpatch; the military ftrength and energy which refult from thefe qualities of government; the exclufion of popular and ariftocratical contentions; the preventing, by a known rule of fucceffion, of all competition for the fupreme power; and thereby re preffing the hopes, intrigues, and dangerous ambi tion of afpiring citizens.

The mifchiefs, or rather the dangers of MONAR CHY, are tyranny, expence, exaction, military doination; unneceffary wars waged to gratify the paffions of an individual; rifk of the character of the reigning prince; ignorance in the governors of the interefts and accommodation of the people, and a confequent deficiency of falutary regulations; want of conftancy and uniformity in the rules of government, and, proceeding from thence, infecu rity of perfon and property.

The feparate advantage of an ARISTOCRACY confifts in the wifdom which may be expected from experience and education-a permanent council naturally poffeffes experience; and the members, who fucceed to their places in it by inheritance, will, probably, be trained and educated with a view to the ftatious, which they are deftined by their birth to occupy.

The mifchiefs of an ARISTOCRACY are, diffenfions in the ruling orders of the fiate, which, from the want of a common fuperior, are liable to proreed to the moft defperate extremities; oppreffion of the lower orders by the privileges of the higher, and by laws partial to the feparate interefis of the daw makers.

The

The advantages of a REPUBLIC are, liberty, or xemption from needlefs reftrictions; equal laws; egulations adapted to the wants and circumftances of the people; public fpirit, frugality, averfencfs o war; the opportunities which democratic affemlies afford to men of every defcription, of producing their abilities and counfels to public obervation, and the exciting thereby, and calling forth o the fervice of the commonwealth, the faculties of ts beft citizens.

The evils of a REPUBLIC are, diffentions, tunults, faction; the attempts of powerful citizens to poffefs themselves of the empire; the confufion, age, and clamour which are the inevitable confe quences of affembling multitudes, and of propounding queftions of ftate to the difcuffion of the people; the delay and difclofure of public councils and defigns; and the imbecility of meafures retarded by the neceffity of obtaining the confent of numbers: laftly, the oppreffion of the provinces which are not admitted to a participation in the legiflative

power.

A mixed government is compofed by the combi nation of two or more of the fimple forms of government above defcribed-and, in whatever proportion each form enters into the conftitution of a government, in the fame proportion may both the advantages and evils, which we have attributed to that form, be expected; that is, those are the ufes to be maintained and cultivated in each part of the conftitution, and thefe are the dangers to be provided against in each. Thus, if fecrecy and dispatch be truly enumerated amongst the feparate excellencies of regal government; then a mixed government, which retains monarchy in one part of its conftitution, fhould be careful that the other eftates of the empire do not, by an officious and inquifitive interference with the executive functions, which are, or ought to be, referved to the admi

niftration

niftration of the prince, interpofe delays, or div what it is expedient to conceal. On the other h if profufion, exaction, military domination, needlefs wars, be justly accounted natural proper of monarchy, in its fimple unqualified form; are thefe the objects to which, in a mixed gover ment, the aristocratic and popular parts of the c ftitution ought to direct their vigilance; the dang against which they fhould raife and fortify their riers these are departments of fovereignty, o which a power of infpection and control ought to depofited with the people.

The fame obfervation may be repeated of all other advantages and inconveniencies which h been afcribed to the feveral fimple forms of gover ment; and affords a rule whereby to direct the at ftruction, improvement and adminiftration of m ed governments, fubjected however to this rem that a quality fometimes refults from the conjunc of two fimple forms of government, which belon not to the feparate exiftence of either: thus corn tion, which has no place in an abfolute monarch and little in a pure republic, is fure to gain ad fion into a conftitution, which divides the fupre power between an executive magiftrate and a po lar council.

An hereditary MONARCHY is univerfally to be p ferred to an elective monarchy. The confeffiona every writer upon the fubject of civil governme the experience of ages, the example of Folan and of the papal dominions feem to place this mongft the few indubitable maxims which the f ence of politics admits of. A crown is two fplend a prize to be conferred upon merit. The paff or interefts of the electors exclude all confiderati of the qualities of the competitors. The fame fervation holds concerning the appointment to 2 office which is attended with a great fhare of po