tience of diftrefs, of which the greateft is that
which prompts to acts of fuicide: Confider him
"that endureth fuch contradiction of finners againft
himself, left ye be wearied and faint in your
"minds." I would offer my comment upon this
paffage in these two queries; firft, whether a Chrif-
tian convert, who had been impelled by the continu-
ance and urgency of his fufferings, to deftroy his
own life, would not have been thought by the au-
thor of this text," to have been weary," "to have
"to
"fainted in his mind,' to have fallen off from that
example, which is here proposed to the meditation
of Chriftians in diftrefs? And yet, fecondly, whether
fuch an act would not have been attended with all
the circumstances of mitigation, which can excufe
or extenuate fuicide at this day?

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3. The conduct of the Apostles, and of the Chrif tians of the apoftolic age, affords no obfcure indication of their fentiments upon this point. They lived, we are fure, in a confirmed perfuafion of the existence, as well as of the happiness, of a future ftate. They experienced in this world every extremity of external injury and diftrefs. To die was gain. The change which death brought with it was, in their expectation, infinitely beneficial. Yet it never, that we can find, entered into the intention of one of them, to haften this change by an act of fuicide: from which it is difficult to fay, what motive could have fo univerfally withheld them, except an apprehenfion of fome unlawfulnefs in the expedient.

Having ftated what we have been able to collect, in oppofition to the lawfulness of fuicide, by way of direct proof, it feems unneceffary to open a separate controverfy with all the arguments which are made use of to defend it; which would only lead us into a repetition of what has been offered already. The following argument, however, being fomewhat more artificial and impofing than the reft, as well as dif

1

tinct from the general confideration of the fubject, cannot fo properly be paffed over If we deny to the individual a right over his own life, it feems impoffible, it is faid, to reconcile with the law of nature that right which the ftate claims and exercifes over the lives of its fubjects, when it ordains or inflicts capital punishments. For this right, like all other juft authority in the ftate, can only be derived from the compact and virtual confent of the citizens which compofe the ftate; and it feems felf-evident, if any principle in morality be fo, that no one, by his confent, can transfer to another a right which he does not poffefs himfelf. It will be equally difficult to account for the power of the ftate to commit its fubjects to the dangers of war, and to expose their lives without fcruple in the field of battle; efpecial ly in offenfive hoftilities, in which the privileges of felf-defence cannot be pleaded with any appearance of truth and ftill more difficult to explain, how in fuch, or in any circumftances, prodigality of life can be a virtue, if the prefervation of it be a duty of our nature.

This whole reafoning fets out from one error, namely, that the ftate acquires its right over the life of the fubject from the fubject's own confent, as a part of what originally and perfonally belonged to himfelf, and which he has made over to his governors. The truth is, the ftate derives this right, neither from the confent of the fubject, nor through the medium of that confent, but, as I may fay, immediately from the donation of the Deity. Finding that fuch a power in the fovereign of the community is expedient, if not neceffary for the community itfelf, it is juftly prefamed to be the will of God, that the fovereign fhould poffefs and exercife it. It is this presumption which conftitutes the right; it is the fame indeed which conftitutes every other; and if there were the like reafons to authorize the prefumption in the cafe of private perfons, fuicide would

be

be as juftifiable as war, or capital executions. But until it can be fhown, that the power over human life may be converted to the fame advantage in the hands of individuals over their own, as in thofe of the state over the lives of its fubjects, and that it may be entrusted with equal fafety to both, there is no room for arguing from the existence of fuch a right in the latter, to the toleration of it in the former.

MORAL

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

воок V.

DUTIES TOWARDS GOD.

CHAP. I.

IN

DIVISION OF THESE DUTIES.

N one sense, every duty is a duty towards God, fince it is his will which makes it a duty: but a there are fome duties of which God is the object, as well as the author; and these are peculiarly, and in a more appropriated fense called duties towards

God.

That filent piety, which confifts in a habit of tracing out the Creator's wifdom and goodness in the objects around us, or in the hiftory of his dispenfations; of referring the bleffings we enjoy to his bounty, and of reforting in our diftreffes to his

fuccour,

fuccour, may poffibly be more acceptable to the

Deity, than any vifible expreffions of devotion whatever. Yet thefe latter, which, although they may be excelled, are not fuperfeded by the former, compose the only part of the fubject which admits of direction or difquifition from a moralift.

Our duty towards God, fo far as it is external, is divided into worship and reverence. God is the immediate object of both: and the difference between them is, that the one confifts in action, the other in forbearance. When we go to church on the Lord's day, led thither by a fenfe of duty towards God, we perform an act of worship: when, from the fame motive, we reft in a journey upon that day, we discharge a duty of reverence.

Divine worship is made up of adoration, thankfgiving, and prayer. But, as what we have to offer concerning the two former may be obferved of prayer, we fhall make that the title of the following chapters, and the direct fubject of our confideration.

CHAP.