On the other hand, I do not conceive, that these prohibitions were intended to interfere with the punishment or profecution of public offenders. In the eighteenth chapter of St. Matthew, our Saviour tells his difciples, "if thy brother who has trefpaffed "against thee, neglect to hear the church, let him "be unto thee as an heathen man, and a publican." Immediately after this, when St. Feter afked him, "how oft fhall my brother fin against me, and I forgive him? till feven times?" Chrift replied, "I fay not unto thee until seven times; but until feventy times feven;" that is, as often as he repeats the offence. From thefe two adjoining paffages compared together, we are authorized to conclude that the forgivenefs of an enemy is not inconfiftent with the proceeding againft him as a public offender; and that the difcipline established in religious or civil focieties, for the reftraint or punishment of criminals, ought to be upheld.

If the magiftrate be not tied down by these prohibitions from the execution of his office, neither is the profecutor; for the office of the profecutor is as neceffary as that of the magiftrate.

Nor by parity of reason, are private perfons withheld from the correction of vice, when it is in their power to exercise it; provided they be affured that it is the guilt which provokes them, and not the injury; and that their motives are pure from all mixture and every particle of that fpirit which delights and triumphs in the humiliation of an adverfary.

Thus it is no breach of Christian charity, to withdraw our company or civility, when the fame tends to discountenance any vicious practice. This is one branch of that extrajudicial difcipline, which fupplies the defects and the remiffnefs of law; and is exprefsly authorized by St. Paul, (1 Cor. v. 11.) "But now I have written unto you, not to keep company, if any man, that is called a brother, "be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner; with

fuch

"fuch an one no not to eat." The use of this afsociation against vice continues to be experienced in one remarkable inftance, and might be extended with good effect to others. The confederacy amongst women of character, to exclude from their fociety kept miftreffes and prostitutes, contributes more perhaps to difcourage that condition of life, and prevents greater numbers from entering into it, than all the confiderations of prudence and religion put together.

We are likewise allowed to practise so much caution, as not to put ourselves in the way of injury, or invite the repetition of it. If a fervant or tradesman has cheated us, we are not bound to trust him again; for this is to encourage him in his dishonest practices, which is doing him much harm.

Where a benefit can be conferred only upon one or few, and the choice of the perfon, upon whom it is conferred, is a proper object of favour, we are at liberty to prefer thofe who have not offended us to those who have; the contrary being no where required.

Chrift, who, as hath been well demonstrated, * estimated virtues by their folid utility, and not by their fashion or popularity, prefers this of the forgiveness of injuries to every other. He enjoins it oftener; with more earnestnefs; under a greater variety of forms; and with this weighty and peculiar circumftance, that the forgiveness of others is the condition, upon which alone we are to expect, or even afk, from God, forgiveness for ourselves. And this preference is juftified by the fuperior importance of the virtue itfelf. The feuds and animofities in families and between neighbours, which disturb the intercourfe of human life, and collectively compofe half the mifery of it, have their foundation in the want of a forgiving temper, and

* See a View of the internal Evidence of the Chriftian Religion.

can

can never cease, but by the exercife of this virtue, on one fide, or on both.

CHAP. IX.

DUELLING.

UELLING as a punishment is abfurd; because it is an equal chance, whether the punishment fall upon the offender, or the perfon offended. Nor is it much better as a reparation; it being difficult to explain in what the fatisfaction confists, or how it tends to undo the injury, or to afford a compenfation for the damage already sustained.

The truth is, it is not confidered as either. A law of honour having annexed the imputation of cowardice to patience under an affront, challenges are given and accepted with no other defign than to prevent or wipe off this fufpicion; without malice against the adverfary, generally without a wifh to destroy him, or any concern but to preserve the duellift's own reputation and reception in the world.

The unreasonablenefs of this rule of manners is one confideration; the duty and conduct of individuals, whilft fuch a rule exifts, is another.

As to which, the proper and fingle queftion is this, whether a regard for our own reputation is or is not fufficient to juftify the taking away the life of another?

Murder is forbidden; and wherever human life is deliberately taken away, otherwife than by public authority, there is murder. The value and fecurity of human life make this rule neceffary; for I do not fee what other idea or definition of murder

сав

can be admitted, which will not let in fo much private violence, as to render fociety a fcene of peril and bloodshed.

If unauthorized laws of honour be allowed to create exceptions to divine prohibitions, there is an end of all morality as founded in the will of the Deity; and the obligation of every duty may at one time or other be discharged by the caprice and fluctuations of fashion.

.

"But a fenfe of fhame is fo much torture; and no relief presents itself otherwife than by an at"tempt upon the life of our adverfary." What then? The diftrefs which men fuffer by the want of money is oftentimes extreme, and no refource can be discovered but that of removing a life, which ftands between the diftreffed perfon and his inheritance. The motive in this cafe is as urgent, and the means are much the fame, as in the former: yet this cafe finds no advocates.

Take away the circumftance of the duellift's expofing his own life, and it becomes affaffination: add this circumftance, and what difference does it make? none but this, that fewer perhaps will imitate the example, and human life will be fomewhat more fafe, when it cannot be attacked without equal danger to the aggreffor's own. Experience, however, proves that there is fortitude enough in moft men to undertake this hazard; and were it otherwife, the defence, at best, would be only that which a highwayman or houfebreaker might plead, whofe attempt had been fo daring and defperate, that few were likely to repeat the fame.

In expoftulating with the duellift I all along fuppose his adversary to fall. Which fuppofition I am at liberty to make, because, if he have no right to kill his adversary, he has none to attempt it.

In return, I forbear from applying to the cafe of duelling the Chriftian principle of the forgivenefs of injuries; because it is poffible to fuppofe the injury to be forgiven, and the duellift to act entirely from

a con

a concern for his own reputation: where this is not the cafe, the guilt of duelling is manifeft, and greater. In this view it feems unneceffary to diftinguifh between him who gives, and him who accepts a challenge: for they incur an equal hazard of destroying life; and both act upon the fame perfuafion, that what they do is neceffary in order to recover or preferve the good opinion of the world.

Public opinion is not eafily controlled by civil inftitutions for which reafon I queftion whether any regulations can be contrived of fufficient force to fupprefs or change the rule of honour which stigmatizes all fcruples about duelling with the reproach of cow. ardice.

The infufficiency of the redrefs which the law of the land affords, for thofe injuries which chiefly af fect a man in his fenfibility and reputation, tempts many to redrefs themfelves. Profecutions for fuch offences, by the trifling damages that are recovered, ferve only to make the fufferer more ridiculous, This ought to be remedied.

For the army, where the point of honour is cultivated with exquifite attention and refinement, I would establish a Court of Honour, with a power of awarding those fubmiffions and acknowledgments, which it is generally the purpose of a challenge to obtain; and it might grow into fashion, with perfons of rank of all profeffions, to refer their quarrels to the fame tribunal.

Duelling, as the law now ftands, can feldom be overtaken by legal punishment. The challenge, appointment, and other previous circumftances, which indicate the intention with which the combatants met, being fuppreffed, nothing appears to a court of juftice, but the actual rencounter. And if a person be flain when actually fighting with his adverfary, the law deems his death nothing more than manflaughter.

CHAP