ject are infeparable even in imagination, and as neceffarily accompany each other as any correlative ideas whatever: that is, in plainer terms, if we be prompted by nature to the approbation of particular actions, we must have received alfo from nature a diftin&t conception of the action we are thus prompted to approve; which we certainly have not received. But as this argument bears alike against all inftincts, and against their exiftence in brutes as well as in men, it will hardly, I fuppofe, produce conviction, though it may be difficult to find an anfwer to it. Upon the whole, it feems to me, either that there exift no fuch inftincts as compofe what is called the moral fenfe, or that they are not now to be diftinguifhed from prejudices and habits; on which account they cannot be depended upon in moral reafoning: I mean that it is not a fafe way of arguing, to affume certain principles as fo many dietates, impulfes, and inftincts of nature, and then to draw conclufions from these principles, as to the rectitude or wrongnefs of actions, independent of the tendency of fuch actions, or of any other confideration what ever. Ariftotle lays down, as a fundamental and felfevident maxim, that nature intended barbarians to be flaves; and proceeds to deduce from this maxim a train of conclufions, calculated to juftify the policy which then prevailed. And I queftion whether the fame maxim be not ftill felfevident to the company of merchants trading to the coaft of Africa. Nothing is fo foon made as a maxim; and it appears from the example of Ariftotle, that authority and convenience, education, prejudice, and general practice, have no fmall fhare in the making of them; and that the laws of cuftom are very very apt to be mistaken for the order of na ture. For which reafon, I fufpect that a fyftem of morality, built upon inftincts, will only find out reafons and excufes for opinions and practices already established-will feldom correct or reform either. But farther, fuppofe we admit the existence of these inftincts, what, it may be asked, is their authority? No man, you fay, can act in deliberate oppofition to them, without a fecret remorse of confcience.- -But this remorfe may be borne with and if the finner choose to bear with it, for the fake of the pleasure or profit which he expects from his wickednefs; or finds the pleasure of the fin to exceed the remorfe of confcience, of which he alone is the judge, and concerning which, when he feels them both together, he can hardly be, miftaken, the moral-inftiuct-man, so far as I can understand, has nothing more to offer. For, if he alledge, that thefe inftincts are fo many indications of the will of God, and confequently prefages of what we are to look for hereafter, this, I answer, is to refort to a rule and a motive, ulterior to the inftincts themselves, and at which rule motive we shall by and by arrive by a furer roadI fay furer, fo long as there remains a controverfy whether there be any inftinctive maxims at all; or any difficulty in afcertaining what maxims are inftinctive. This celebrated question therefore becomes in our fyftem a queftion of pure curiofity; and as fuch we difmifs it to the determination of those who are more inquifitive, than we are concerned to be, about the natural history and conftitution of the human fpecies. CHA TH HE word happy is a relative term; that is, when we call a man happy, we mean that he is happier than fome others, with whom we compare him; than the generality of others; or than he himself was in fome other fituation: thus, fpeaking of one who has juft compaffed the object of a long purfuit, "now," we fay, we fay, "he is happy;" and in a like comparative fenfe, compared, that is, with the general lot of mankind, we call a man happy who poffeffes health and competency. In ftrictness, any condition may be denominated happy, in which the amount or aggregate of pleafure exceeds that of pain; and the degree of happinefs depends upon the quantity of this excefs. And the greateft quantity of it ordinarily attainable in human life, is what we mean by happiness, when we enquire or pronounce what human happiness confifts in.* In *If any positive fignification, diftinct from what we mean by pleasure, can be affixed to the term "happiness," I fhould take it to denote a certain ftate of the nervous fyftem in that part of the human frame in which we feel joy and grief, paffions and affections. Whether this part be the heart, which the turn of moft languages would lead us to believe, or the diaphragm, as Buffon, or the upper orifice of the ftomach, as Van Helmont thought; or rather be a kind of fine net-work, lining the whole region of the præcordia, as others have imagined; it is poffible, not only that each painful fenfation may violently fhake and difturb the fibres at the time, but that a feries of fuch may at length to derange the very texture of the fyftem, as to produce a perpetual irritation, which will fhew itself by fretfulness, impatience, and refleffnefs. It is poffible alfo, on the other hand, that a fucceffion of pleafurable fenfations may have fuch an In which inquiry I will omit much ufual declamation upon the dignity and capacity of our nature; the fuperiority of the foul to the body, of the rational to the animal part of our conftitution; upon the worthiness, refinement, and delicacy of fome fatisfactions, or the meannefs, groffuefs, and fenfuality of others becaufe I hold that pleafures differ in nothing, but in continuance and intenfity; fron a juft computation of which, confirmed by what we obferve of the apparent cheerfulnefs, tranquillity, and contentment of men of different taftes, tempers, ftations, and purfuits, every queftion concerning human happiness must receive its' de ifion. It will be our business to fhow, if we can, I. What Human Happinefs does not confift in: FIRST then, Happinefs does not confift in the pleasures of fenfe, in whatever profufion or variety they be enjoyed-By the pleafures of fenfe I mean, as well the animal gratifications of eating, drinking, and that by which the fpecies is continued, as the more refined pleafures of mufic, painting, architecture, gardening, fplendid fhews, theatric exhibitions, and the pleafures, laftly, of active fports, as of hunting, fhooting, fishing, &c. For, ft, Thefe pleafures continue but a little while at a time. This is true of them all, efpecially of the groffer sort of them. Laying afide the preparation, an effect upon this fubtile organization, as to caufe the fibres to relax, and return into their place and order, and thereby to recover, or, if not loft, to preferve that harmonious conformation which gives to the mind its fenfe of complacency and fatisfaction. This ftate may be denominated happiness, and is fo far diftinguishable from pleafnre, that it does not refer to any particular object of enjoyment, or confift, like pleasure, in the gratification of one or more of the fenfes, but is rather the fecondary effect which fuch objects and gratifications produce upon the nervous fyftem, or the ftate in which they leave it Thefe conjectures belong not, however, to our province. The comparative fenfe, in which we have explained the term happiness, is more popular, and is fufficient for the purpofe of the prefent chapter. and the expectation, and computing strictly the actual fenfation, we shall be surprized to find, how inconfiderable a portion of our time they occupy, how few hours in the four and twenty they are able to fill up. 2dly, Thefe pleafures, by repetition, lofe their relifh. It is a property of the machine, for which we know no remedy, that the organs, by which we perceive pleasure, are blunted and benumbed, by being frequently exercifed in the fame way. There is hardly any one who has not found the difference between a gratification, when new, and when familiar; or any pleasure which does not become indifferent as it grows habitual. 3dly, The eagernefs for high and intenfe delights takes away the relifh from all others; and as fuch delights fall rarely in our way, the greater part of our time becomes from this caufe empty and uneafy. There is hardly any delufion by which men are greater fufferers in their happiness, than by their expecting too much from what is called pleafure; that is, from thofe intenfe delights, which vulgarly engross the name of pleafure. The very expectation fpoils them. When they do come, we are often engaged in taking pains to perfuade ourfelves how much we are pleased, rather than enjoying any pleasure, which fprings naturally out of the object. And whenever we depend upon being vaftly delighted, we always go home fecretly grieved at miffing our aim. Likewife, as hath been obferved juft now, when this humour of being prodigiously delighted has once taken hold of the imagination, it hinders us from providing for, or acquiefcing in, thofe gently foothing engagements, the due variety and fucceffion of which, are the only things that fupply a continued ftream of happiness. What I have been able to obferve of that part of mankind, whofe profeffed purfuit is pleasure, and who are withheld in the purfuit by no reftraints of fortune |