parties, form no part or condition of the contract; and therefore ought to have the fame effect as if no contract at all had been made, for none was made with refpect to them) that is, ought to fall upon the

HERE exifts no reafon in the law of nature, why a man should not be paid for the lending of his money, as well as of any other property into which the money might be converted.

The fcruples that have been entertained upon this head, and upon the foundation of which, the receiving of intereft or ufury (for they formerly meant the fame thing) was once prohibited in almoft all Chriftian countries, arofe from a paffage in the law of MOSES, Deuteronomy xxiii. 19, 20, "Thou shalt not "lend upon ufury to thy brother; ufury of money, "ufury of victuals, ufury of any thing, that is lent "upon ufury: unto a stranger thou mayft lend upon ufury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon ufury."

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*By a ftatute of JAMES the Firft, intereft above eight pounds per cent. was prohibited, (and confequently under that rate allowed) with this fage provifion; That this ftatute shall not be conArued or expounded to allow the practice of ufury in point of religion or confcience.

This prohibition is now generally understood to have been intended for the Jews alone, as part of the civil or political law of that nation, and calculated to preferve amongst themselves that diftribution of property, to which of their inftitutions were fubmany fervient; as the marriage of an heiress within her own tribe; of a widow, who was left childlefs, to her husband's brother; the year of jubilee, when alienated eftates reverted to the family of the original proprietor-regulations, which were never thought to be binding upon any but the commonwealth of Ifrael.

This interpretation is confirmed, I think, beyond all controverfy, by the diftinction made in the law, between a Jew and a foreigner, "unto a ftranger "thou mayeft lend upon ufury, but unto thy brother, thou mayeft not lend upon ufury," a diftinction, which could hardly have been admitted into a law, which the Divine Author intended to be of moral and of univerfal obligation.

The rate of intereft has in moft countries been regulated by law. The Roman law allowed of twelve pounds per cent. which Juftinian reduced at one ftroke to four pounds. A ftatute of the thirteenth year of Queen Elizabeth, which was the first that tolerated the receiving of intereft in England at all, restrained it to ten pounds per cent.; a ftatute of James the First to eight pounds; of Charles the Second, to fix pounds; of Queen Anne, to five pounds, on pain of forfeiture of treble value of the money lent; at which rate and penalty the matter now flands. The policy of thefe regulations is, to check the power of accumulating wealth without industry; to give encouragement to trade, by enabling adventurers in it to borrow money at a moderate price; and of late years, to enable the ftate to borrow the fubject's money itself.

Compound intereft, though forbidden by the law of England, is agreeable enough to natural equity;

for

for intereft detained after it is due, becomes, to all intents and purposes, part of the fum lent.

It is a question which fometimes occurs, how money borrowed in one country ought to be paid in another, where the relative value of the precious metals is not the fame. For example, suppose I borrow a hundred guineas in London, where each guinea is worth one and twenty fhillings, and meet my creditor in the Eaft Indies, where a guinea is worth no more perhaps than nineteen, is it a fatisfaction of the debt to return a hundred guineas? or muft I make up fo many times one and twenty fhillings? I fhould think the latter: for it must be prefumed, that my creditor, had he not lent me his guineas, would have difpofed of them in fuch a manner, as to have now had, in the place of them, fo many one and twenty fhillings; and the queftion fuppofes, that he neither intended, nor ought to be a fufferer, by parting with the poffeffion of his money to me.

When the relative value of coin is altered by an act of the ftate, if the alteration would have extended to the identical pieces which were lent, it is enough to return an equal number of pieces of the fame denomination, or their prefent value in any other. As if guineas were reduced by act of parliament to twenty fhillings, fo many twenty fhillings, as I borrowed guineas, would be a juft repayment. It would be otherwife, if the reduction was owing to a debasement of the coin; for then refpect ought to be had to the comparative value of the old guinea and

the new.

Whoever borrows money is bound in confcience to repay it. This every man can fee; but every man cannot fee, or does not however reflect, that he is, in confequence, alfo bound to ufe the means ne ceffary to enable himself to repay it. "If he pay "the money when he has it, or has it to fpare, he "does all that an honeft man can do," and all, he imagines, that is required of him; whilft the previ

ous measures, which are neceffary to furnish him with the money, he makes no part of his care, nor obferves to be as much his duty as the other; fuch as felling a family feat, or a family estate, contracting his plan of expence, laying down his equipage, reducing the number of his fervants, or any of those humiliating facrifices, which juftice requires of a man in debt, the moment he perceives that he has no reafonable profpect of paying his debts without them. An expectation, which depends upon the continuance of his own life, will not fatisfy an honeft man, if a better provifion be in his power: for it is a breach of faith to fubject a creditor, when we can help it, to the risk of our life, be the event what it will; that not being the security to which credit was given.

I know few fubjects which have been more mifunderstood than the law which authorizes the imprifonment, of infolvent debtors. It has been reprefented as a gratuitous cruelty, which contributed nothing to the reparation of the creditor's lofs, or to the advantage of the community. This prejudice arifes principally from confidering the fending of a debtor to jail, as an act of private fatisfaction to the creditor, inftead of a public punishment. As an act of fatisfaction or revenge, it is always wrong in the motive, and often intemperate and undistinguishing in the exercife. Confider it as a public punishment, founded upon the fame reason, and fubject to the fame rules, as other punifhments; and the juftice of it, together with the degree to which it fhould be extended, and the objects upon whom it may be inflicted, will be apparent. There are frauds relating to infolvency, against which it is as neceffary to provide punishment, as for any public crimes whatever : as where a man gets your money into his poffeffion, and forthwith runs away with it; or, what is little better, fquanders it in vicious expences; or ftakes it at the gaming table; in the alley; or upon wild ad

ventures

ventures in trade; or is confcious at the time he bor rows it, that he can never repay it; or wilfully puts it out of his power by profufe living; or conceals his effects, or transfers them by collufion to another not to mention the obftinacy of fome debtors, who had rather rot in a jail, than deliver up their ef tates; for, to fay the truth, the firft abfurdity is in the law itself, which leaves it in a debtor's power to withhold any part of his property from the claim of his creditors. The only queftion is, whether the punishment be properly placed in the hands of an exafperated creditor; for which it may be faid, that thefe frauds are fo fubtile and verfatile, that nothing but a difcretionary power can overtake them; and that no difcretion is likely to be fo well informed, fo vigilant, or fo active, as that of the creditor.

It must be remembered, however, that the confinement of a debtor in jail is a punishment; and that every punishment fuppofes a crime. To pursue therefore with the extremity of legal rigour, a fufferer whom the fraud or failure of others, his own want of capacity, or the disappointments and mifcarriages to which all human affairs are fubject, have reduced to ruin, merely because we are provoked by our lofs, and feek to relieve the pain we feel by that which we inflict, is repugnant not only to humanity, but to juftice; for it is to pervert a provifion of law, defigned for a different and a falutary purpofe, to the gratification of private fpleen and refentment. Any alteration in thefe laws, which could diftinguish the degrees of guilt, or convert the fervice of the infolvent debtor to fome public profit, might be an improvement; but any confiderable mitigation of their rigour, under colour of relieving the poor, would increase their hardships. For whatever deprives the creditor of his power of coer

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