2 (2 June). Rodney, through ill-health and undue care for St Eustatius, was below his best: a prompter move to Tobago must have caught the French troops unprotected,1 and he failed to keep close touch with de Grasse who sailed early in July to Cap François in San Domingo to find emphatic and urgent appeals for immediate help awaiting him from Washington. De Grasse, who had been deliberately refusing battle to keep his fleet intact for some such occasion as this, started promptly for the American coast with every available ship and soldier, refusing to detach any ships to convoy the homewardbound "trade" which he ordered to remain at Cap François, a step on which no British admiral would have ventured for political reasons. His move was not unexpected, but both Clinton and Germain looked for Rodney to follow de Grasse closely enough to make the British position secure. Still, it was for New York Clinton expected de Grasse to make,3 and Washington had at first intended attacking there. He moved down from the Highlands to Dobb's Ferry, was joined by Rochambeau (6 July), and skirmished ineffectually with Clinton's outposts. Then, learning (14 August) that de Grasse was making for the Chesapeake, he decided, by some accounts at Rochambeau's prompting, to march thither and fall on Cornwallis, whose position and force were far weaker than Clinton's. On 21 August the allies started their southward march. Not for a fortnight could Clinton discover (2 September) their destination, and as yet he had no news of de Grasse. A French squadron was known to be at sea but it was only the Newport ships under de Barras, who, taking with him the French siege-train, had slipped out (27 August), because Graves, Arbuthnot's successor, had gone to Boston to intercept a French convoy. To deal with de Barras Graves sailed again from Sandy Hook for the Chesapeake (31 August) with nineteen of the line, including Hood's squadron, which had arrived three days earlier from the West Indies. Hood had brought only fourteen ships against de Grasse's twenty-eight, because Rodney, who had gone home sick, had taken four ships with him to escort "the trade" and sent two on convoy duty to Jamaica, where Sir Peter Parker detained them. When, on 5 September, Graves arrived off Cape Henry he at first mistook de Grasse, of whose arrival he was ignorant, for de Barras. However, despite de Grasse's numbers, he never hesitated but bore down to engage. He had the wind; the French, who were in no order, had to stand out to sea to form line ahead, and had he immediately attacked their leading ships, using his centre and rear to fend off those still to leeward, de Grasse might have found it hard to utilise his superiority. But Graves not only failed to close promptly with the French van, he hove to, so that the two fleets might get into line opposite each other, and when he attacked he hoisted conflicting 1 N.R.S. ш, 20, XXXII, 98. a Stevens, II, 43 and 55. 3 Ibid. 11, 122. THE CHESAPEAKE AND YORKTOWN 755 signals which completely puzzled Hood and the rear division.1 Graves had recently served in the Channel fleet where, under Kempenfelt's auspices, new signals and new tactics were being tried2 with which his subordinates were unfamiliar, and the result was misunderstanding; ultimately after a partial engagement the French drew off, leaving Graves with several cripples. For some days both fleets remained outside the Chesapeake, de Grasse despite his superiority making no attempt to attack when he had the wind. Hood begged Graves to enter the Chesapeake and occupy de Grasse's anchorage, thereby opening communications with Cornwallis who might have been embarked if necessary. Hood was to accomplish a similar feat against the same opponent a few months later and might well have baffled de Grasse now, but Graves would not risk it; on 12 September de Grasse, having successfully covered de Barras' entry, went into the Chesapeake, and Graves could only retire to New York to refit and obtain reinforcements. Three days later Washington joined Lafayette at Williamsburg and on 21 September Cornwallis and his 7000 men, including 2000 sick, were invested in Yorktown by 8000 Frenchmen and rather more Americans. Cornwallis's inactivity since de Grasse's arrival is puzzling. A prompt attack on Lafayette and the troops from the West Indies, in which the quality and numbers of his troops would have favoured him3, would have taken his enemies in detail: the expedient of a retreat into Carolina, which was still open when he heard of Washington's arrival at Baltimore, would have involved sacrificing sick and baggage, but would have been preferable to losing the whole force. Apparently he expected speedy relief, though Clinton's promise had been conditional on the naval situation.5 What is harder to explain is his evacuation (29 September) of his outer works which were stronger than the inner defences and certainly commanded them. The French engineers and artillerymen made good use of this ground, opened the bombardment on 9 October, and maintained it with such effect that on 19 October Cornwallis capitulated. That very day Clinton left Sandy Hook with 5000 men escorted by twenty-five of the line. Arriving off the Chesapeake on 24 October he found himself too late, so promptly returned to New York, against which he expected Washington to turn his arms. Washington wanted to do this, but could not persuade de Grasse to join in any further enterprises in America: he was itching to return to the West Indies to complete the conquest of the British islands. With his departure (5 November) serious operations in America ended: Washington dared not venture to attack New York, Canada remained unmolested, 1 N.R.S. ш, 32, 45-7. 3 Tarleton, p. 268. • Tarleton, p. 274. 2 Ibid. xxxv, 54-8. 4 Stevens, II, 206. 7 Lacour-Gayet, p. 513. Ibid. II, 153. and, even in the south, Greene, after getting slightly the worst of a sharp encounter at Eutaw Springs (8 September), contented himself with confining the British to the outskirts of Charleston and Savannah and left East Florida unmolested. West Florida had already passed into Spanish hands, vastly superior forces having descended on Pensacola and compelled Campbell to capitulate (May 1781). In Europe and the East and West Indies, however, hostilities were far from over. The East Indies indeed only became really involved in the main war in 1782. Heavy fighting had been going on in India since the outbreak in 1775 of war with the Marathas, but, though Hastings had always been nervous of French intervention, the weak French squadron in Indian waters had retired to Mauritius in August 1778, leaving their settlements to be reduced by the British. The capture of one of these, Mahé, had contributed to embroil the British with Hyder Ali of Mysore, but in January 1781 though a French squadron made an ineffective appearance off the Carnatic, in the campaign in which Coote thrice defeated Hyder and restored the situation so gravely imperilled by Baillie's disaster at Perambakam (September 1780), the British command of the sea was unchallenged and a potent assistance to the army. Up to the end of 1781 only one King's regiment had as yet reinforced the Company's troops, but early in 1781 four battalions were despatched to India, escorted by a squadron under Commodore Johnstone. This force was to have captured the Cape of Good Hope, but was baulked by Suffren and the squadron which had left Brest with de Grasse that March. Coming upon Johnstone in a neutral harbour in the Cape Verde Islands Suffren promptly attacked (16 April) and, though beaten off, inflicted damages which prevented Johnstone reaching the Cape before him. Johnstone, therefore, abandoned the design but carried his troops on to Bombay unmolested by Suffren. Suffren's arrival in Indian waters (February 1782) altered the situation completely. He never really defeated his stout-hearted opponent, Hughes, in any of the severe actions which they fought, four in 1782, one in 1783, but his presence seriously hampered the British forces in the Carnatic who depended largely on the fleet for their power to move. Still, great as were the perils through which Hastings and Coote successfully steered the British power in India between 1778 and 1783, the East Indies were only a backwater, absorbing too little of the belligerents' resources to influence the main struggle appreciably. After Darby's relief of Gibraltar the French had contemplated uniting the Dutch and Spaniards with the Brest fleet to cover an invasion of England, but the Dutch would not risk the voyage down Channel: their main squadron, when taking a convoy to the Baltic, fell in off the Dogger Bank (3 August) with Hyde Parker, who with eight worn-out ships was escorting a homeward-bound convoy. A 1 MINORCA AND ST CHRISTOPHER 757 desperate contest ended in Parker bringing in his charge safely while the Dutch convoy abandoned its voyage. In August a combined fleet of forty-nine sail including thirty-one Spaniards appeared at the mouth of the Channel, compelling Darby who had only thirty to take refuge in Torbay; its commander, Cordova, would not venture to attack him there and the Spaniards soon departed for Cadiz (5 September). The sole use they had made of their naval superiority was to despatch to Minorca an expedition from Cadiz (August 1781), subsequently reinforced by 4000 Frenchmen. Minorca had only a tiny garrison under Murray, one of Wolfe's Quebec brigadiers, but it resisted stubbornly for seven months, succumbing (February 1782) to scurvy rather than to its besiegers. Harder to relieve than Gibraltar because farther away, Minorca might well have been evacuated when Rodney relieved it: its retention had not served, as did that of Gibraltar, to distract the naval forces of France and Spain from their true objective. More influential than the fate of Minorca was that of a convoy laden with troops and stores for the West Indies, which left Brest in December 1781, escorted by de Guichen with nineteen of the line. To intercept it Kempenfelt was sent out, though only twelve of the line could be found for him; for the lack of timber and other naval stores, both from New England and the Baltic lands, was by this time severely crippling the Navy.1 However, on encountering de Guichen (12 December), he found himself with the wind in his favour while de Guichen, who had negligently fallen to leeward, was impotent when Kempenfelt's prompt attack dispersed the convoy, taking fifteen ships with 1000 soldiers. Most of the rest returned to Brest with de Guichen, very few ever reaching their destination. It was a masterly stroke and deprived de Grasse of urgently needed stores. De Grasse had been back in the West Indies by 26 November, and, finding himself in considerable superiority, started operations against the British islands. De Bouillé had already recovered St Eustatius and was anxious to attack Barbados, but the French found it hard to beat to windward, so, changing their quarry, they descended upon St Christopher (9 January 1782). The little British garrison resisted stoutly at Brimstone Hill, and Hood, though he had only twenty-two of the line to de Grasse's twenty-nine, hurried to its help. By brilliant seamanship and daring tactics he drew de Grasse out of Basse Terre roads, and, going boldly in, took up an anchorage (25 January). He thus interposed between de Grasse and the French troops and could land a relieving force. But although considerable reinforcements had reached the West Indies in 1780 they had been scattered over the islands, and an unusually sickly season had thinned their numbers: Hood could oppose only 2400 men to de Bouillé's 6000, and they 1 N.R.S. xxxп, 351 seqq. and xxxvш, 75-6; Albion, R. G., Forests and Sea Power, chap. vii. were powerless to avert the garrison's surrender (23 February), whereupon Hood, who had repulsed several attacks on his anchored line, slipped out by night as neatly as he had got in. If he had not saved St Christopher's, his skill and daring had restored the confidence of his fleet.1 De Grasse had soon cause to regret his failure to crush Hood. On 19 February Rodney reached Barbados from England with twelve of the line, and though he failed to prevent an important convoy from Brest reaching Martinique with 6000 troops (20 March), he maintained a close watch on Fort Royal from St Lucia. Thus when, on 8 April, de Grasse put to sea with a large convoy for Cap François, there to unite with a Spanish contingent to attack Jamaica, nearly as much coveted by the Spaniards as Gibraltar, Rodney was after him at once. Hampered by his transports de Grasse could not give Rodney the slip, and on 9 April the fleets were in contact. A partial action followed; the French had a chance of catching the British van unsupported, but they played their usual game of avoiding close action, due partly to a well-grounded respect for British gunnery.1 Two days later Rodney got his chance (12 April). To save a ship crippled in a collision de Grasse had to close, and as the fleets were passing on opposite tacks near the Saints, some islets near Dominica, the British being to leeward, a sudden shift of wind enabled them to break through the French line in two places and get to windward. Rodney's "breaking the line" was probably unpremeditated, indeed, the suggestion was almost certainly pressed upon him by Douglas, his flag-captain, but it was most effective. The French were separated into three disordered groups and suffered terribly from the British guns. De Grasse himself was taken with four other ships, and if Rodney's over-caution, so remorselessly criticised by Hood," allowed the rest to make Cap François with little further loss, when another dozen prizes must have rewarded a vigorous pursuit, the battle had shattered the nerve of the French and restored the British reputation, thus achieving decisive results. By the end of May the French had rallied twenty-five of the line at Cap François and recovered touch with their convoy, while fifteen Spaniards with 12,000 troops had joined them: however, recollections of 12 April deterred them from venturing to attack Jamaica, and in July the French fleet went off to the American coast to avoid the hurricanes, the British fleet also proceeding to New York. In November Carleton, who had replaced Clinton in May, decided to evacuate Charleston in order that the garrison might secure Jamaica against the expected transfer of Rochambeau's troops to the West Indies. Peace, however, came |