LORD HOWE THWARTS D'ESTAING 739 disorder from two successive positions. Reinforcements from their main body enabled them to rally on rising ground behind a marsh and as his troops were exhausted by the great heat-more men died from heatstroke than from wounds-Clinton decided not to press the attack. Accordingly he drew back to the first position captured, where he maintained himself with little difficulty till 10 p.m. when he marched off by moonlight unmolested to rejoin Knyphausen, who had made practically unimpeded progress.1 Both sides returned about 350 casualties, the British losses including sixty deaths from heat-stroke, but Clinton, who had achieved his object and secured his retreat to Sandy Hook, had better reason for satisfaction than Washington, who had missed a promising chance. Washington was furious with Lee, accusing him of cowardice and incompetence, but Lee had at least detained Clinton and given the American main body time to get into action. 3 Clinton reached New York only just in time. That very day (8 July) thirteen ships of the line from Toulon under d'Estaing had arrived in the Delaware. The British Government had had warnings of the preparations in time to have intercepted d'Estaing at Gibraltar, but though in March Sandwich had alleged that thirty-five of the line were ready, not even twelve could be got to sea in time, even by stripping the others, and on 18 May d'Estaing passed the Straits unhindered. Delayed by the bad sailing of his ships and the need for practising manoeuvres, he spent another seven weeks crossing the Atlantic, and Howe had cleared the Delaware with ten days to spare. D'Estaing followed promptly to Sandy Hook, arriving on 22 July. He was greatly superior to Howe, whose squadron, being intended for service in the shallow coastal waters, contained nothing larger than sixty-four-gun ships.5 "On our side all was at stake", wrote one Englishman. "Had the men-of-war been defeated, the transports and victuallers must have been destroyed and the Army of course must have fallen with us." Had d'Estaing dared to risk the difficulties of the navigation, he might have anticipated by three years what de Grasse achieved at Yorktown. But though personally brave, d'Estaing lacked enterprise and resolution, and Howe's masterly dispositions increased the risks of an attack. The tradition in the French Navy discouraged risking ships and incurring losses to gain a decision, and d'Estaing sheered off to Rhode Island where 6000 men under Pigot were facing 10,000 Americans under Sullivan. Pigot had delayed Sullivan's preparations by several successful raids,' but could not prevent d'Estaing from passing into the Bay to support the 1 Clinton to Germain, 5 July, C.O. v, 96. 2 Corresp. of George III, m, 380 seqq. and iv, 90, 113. * N.R.Ś. XXXII, p. xxvii; George III's Letters (ed. Donne), II, 173, 176; Parl. Hist. xix, 1153 seqq. 4 Lacour-Gayet, pp. 149 seqq. 5 Castle Howard MSS, pp. 383 seqq. Castex, Les Idées Militaires de la Marine Française au XVIIIme Siècle, p. 238. 'Pigot to Clinton, 27 May, C.O. v, 96. attack (8 August). Realising that Rhode Island would make the French a splendid base, Howe, though still weaker than d'Estaing, despite reinforcements, hastened to Pigot's help. His appearance brought the French out of the Bay at once (10 August). By clever manœuvres he avoided an unequal action but lured d'Estaing out to sea, hoping to catch him between himself and Byron's squadron, then daily expected from England. On 11 August, however, a gale scattered both fleets, dismasting several vessels and preventing a battle.1 Howe returned to Sandy Hook for repairs; d'Estaing, whose crippled flagship narrowly escaped capture by a British "fifty", regained Newport (19 August), but only to inform Sullivan, who had meanwhile begun siege operations against Pigot's lines, that he must retire to Boston to refit. His departure (22 August) compelled Sullivan to quit the island, not without some difficulty in keeping off Pigot's pursuit (29 August),* and two days later Howe arrived, bringing Clinton and 5000 men. Having missed catching Sullivan, Clinton raided the noted privateer rendezvous of Bedford successfully, destroying sixteen ships, while Howe followed d'Estaing to Boston. A fortnight later Byron reinforced the blockading squadron: notorious for his bad luck as "Foul weather Jack", Byron must have caught d'Estaing off Newport had not the gale of 11 August dispersed his fleet, and in November another gale drove him away from Boston. This allowed d'Estaing to leave for the West Indies, for which 5000 British troops under Grant sailed the same day (4 November) escorted by a squadron under Commodore Hotham. D'Estaing left his allies disappointed and furious. The honours certainly were with Howe, whose achievement in foiling every move of d'Estaing's much superior force is "unsurpassed in the annals of naval defensive warfare". The credit is wholly his, for the Admiralty had neither reinforced him adequately nor penned the French up in their home ports. Mainly through administrative shortcomings Byron's start had been delayed till 9 June, while the Channel Fleet, which Keppel took to sea on 12 June, only mustered twenty of the line and had to put back for reinforcements on discovering that d'Orvilliers at Brest had nearer thirty. D'Orvilliers, therefore, got to sea unwatched (8 July), but was still within 100 miles of Ushant when Keppel, making for the "Western Squadron's" traditional cruising grounds, sighted him (23 July). Several days of clever fencing ended with an encounter (27 July) in which the fleets passed on opposite tacks, the French to windward. Much damage was done: the British firing at the hulls inflicted heavy casualties, the French firing at 1 Hist. MSS Comm., Cornwallis MSS, p. 317. 2 Pigot to Clinton, 31 Aug., C.O. v, 96. 3 Castle Howard MSS, p. 388. Mahan, in Clowes, W. L., History of the British Navy, m, 411; Cornwallis MSS, p. 317. 5 Corresp. of George III, IV, 130 seqq. • Ibid. IV, 206. KEPPEL'S ACTION OFF USHANT 741 the masts crippled their enemy's power of movement. After passing d'Orvilliers wore, hoping to cut off some disabled British ships, but thereby surrendered the weather gage to Keppel who interposed to cover his cripples and would have closed with the French had not his rear division under Palliser failed to support him. D'Orvilliers, however, made no attempt to renew the action, drawing off in the night and regaining Brest, rather pleased to have fought the old enemy and escaped a Quiberon. Keppel raged against Palliser's backwardness which had spoilt his chance of a victory, and a court martial followed.1 This, to the general surprise, resulted in Palliser's acquittal, for if Palliser justified himself by alleging that Keppel's orders were inconsistent with the necessity for keeping "the line", personal and party rancour evidently had their share in his inactivity. But Ushant, if usually reckoned "indecisive", was negatively important for the British failure to establish naval supremacy. Six of d'Orvilliers' ships were with de Grasse off Yorktown. Had Sandwich and Palliser allowed Keppel to make Ushant a victory, would the war have lasted till September 1781? Both fleets were at sea again within a month but did not meet,3 and with the winter the chief centre of activity shifted to the West Indies. That archipelago's great economic importance made the mastery of its waters a vital issue, and while the Americans were determined not to let the French recover Canada, their treaty stipulated that France might acquire any of the British West Indies. France had begun well by capturing the weakly-garrisoned Dominica (September 1778), Barrington and the small British squadron on the station being expressly tied down to the defence of Barbados. It was not because Barrington lacked enterprise that Dominica had gone: directly Grant and Hotham arrived from New York (10 December) he dashed at St Lucia and landed the troops who stormed the hills which overlook the main anchorages (12 December). It was a risky stroke, for d'Estaing, who had reached Martinique on 9 December, promptly hastened to St Lucia but found Barrington's seven battleships so skilfully posted across the harbour mouth that after what Grant called a "flimsy" attack he bore off. Then, landing his 9000 troops, he hurled them at Grant's positions covering the harbours (18 December). Success would have involved Barrington's capture, but Grant's troops triumphantly repulsed the assault, inflicting 1600 casualties to their own 170. D'Estaing thereupon retired discomfited to Martinique leaving St Lucia in British keeping. Its capture was a model of naval and military co-operation and had considerable value, as from St Lucia the British could "look into the harbour of Martinique", the French naval headquarters. 1 Ibid. IV, 225 seqq. Hist. MSS Comm., Pembroke MSS, p. 382. 3 Castle Howard MSS, pp. 370-1. 4 Grant to Germain, C.O. v, 318. 5 Ibid. This brilliant stroke was not, however, followed up. The French islands were more strongly garrisoned than Germain's information showed and the naval superiority so indispensable to further activities against them was less well assured than Grant had been told to calculate. Byron reached St Lucia on 6 January 1779 with ten of the line, but d'Estaing avoided action till reinforced (19 February) by an equal number, while two smaller detachments arrived later, one in April, one in June. Byron's failure to intercept them was severely criticised, but the calls on his squadron were heavy, and he was greatly handicapped by lack of men through sickness. He is described as having "met with every neglect from home”, having “a fleet to equip without stores, to victual without provisions, to man without men": indeed, he had to seek Grant's help in manning his ships.3 Grant had been obdurate in refusing demands to detach battalions to different islands, feeling convinced that the true policy was to concentrate his troops at St Lucia in readiness to strike: he wrote to Governor Burt of St Christopher, "while we remain together we are formidable to our neighbours, but, once divided, we should be weak in every part". Byron's request was another thing: "assisting the fleet", he wrote to Germain (10 October), “was the most effectual method I could think of for protecting the islands". In June Byron had to escort to St Christopher a great homewardbound convoy which he could not detain longer, "both for the sake of public credit" and to avoid complaints from the merchants. D'Estaing took the opportunity to capture St Vincent (18 June) and then on 2 July appeared off Georgetown, Grenada, with twenty-five of the line and 6000 troops, forcing the little garrison to capitulate just before Byron could arrive (6 July). Byron had only twenty-one of the line, but, seeing the French clustered together in the harbour he promptly attacked, hoping to catch them while still disordered. The French stood out to sea, forming line as they went, and Byron's attack, delivered precipitately and piece-meal, resulted in his leading ships engaging d'Estaing's whole fleet unsupported, so that four of them were crippled and might have been cut off. However, several ships had been beaten out of d'Estaing's line by the British gunnery and instead of pressing his advantage he stood away to rejoin them, breaking off the fight. He had 950 casualties to Byron's 550 but had secured his captures. Further operations were impossible as the "hurricane season" was approaching, indeed d'Estaing was preparing to sail for France when an urgent appeal reached him from America. D'Estaing's departure from the American coast had left the British free to move anywhere along it, and, besides sending Grant to St Lucia, Clinton had despatched 3500 men under Colonel Archibald 2 Pembroke MSS, p. 384. ▲ Ibid. 1 N.R.S. XXXII, 47. 3 C.O. v, 318. 743 THE CAPTURE AND DEFENCE OF SAVANNAH Campbell to Georgia where, as usual, Germain expected wonders from Loyalist assistance. Since the failure against Charleston in 1776 the only fighting in the south had been a desultory warfare along the borders of East Florida, where the British cause was being successfully maintained by Colonel Prevost. Germain had originally ordered Campbell's force to the south because he feared for Florida in the likely event of Spanish intervention, but if detachments must be made, it was better to use them offensively than to lock them up in a passive defence. Campbell, a capable and enterprising officer, got quickly to work. Without waiting for Prevost he promptly attacked and took Savannah (29 December), capturing 500 of the defenders and inflicting heavy losses with under thirty casualties, while on Prevost's arrival with 1100 men all Georgia was soon reduced to subjection.1 Lincoln with 6000 men attempted its recovery but was repulsed, being cleverly beaten at Briar's Creek (3 March). Prevost countered a second advance by a daring move against Charleston (May) which brought Lincoln back post haste, though Prevost evaded him and inflicted a sharp reverse on him at Stono Ferry (20 June). Prevost's success and his own fears for South Carolina drove Washington to appeal to d'Estaing, who reached the coast early in September bringing with him 6000 troops. With these and Lincoln's men he proceeded to attack Savannah. His superiority to the British squadron in American waters rendered Clinton impotent to help, but Prevost and his garrison defended themselves splendidly, finally repulsing a vigorous assault so decisively (9 October) that d'Estaing raised the siege and, detaching ten of the line to the West Indies, returned home. Suffren said, "Had he only been as good a sailor as he was brave!" but it was lack of resolution and enterprise rather than of seamanship which made his campaign so ineffective. In another quarter the same hesitation and reluctance to run risks had been even more conspicuous. In June 1779 Spain had definitely ranged herself against England, and her intervention decidedly increased the strain on the already well-burdened British Navy, for the Spanish Navy, though inferior to the French in organisation and efficiency, was formidable in numbers, mustering sixty sail of the line. Gibraltar and Minorca, for whose recovery Spain had mainly entered the war, were sure to be attacked, and their defence would ultimately depend on the Navy's ability to maintain communications with them. Moreover, with most of the British army already overseas, the incentive to attempt an invasion of Great Britain was stronger than usual. In the summer of 1779 there were at home, including eight in Ireland, only twenty-one old battalions of the line, many of them recently back as skeletons from foreign service and still ineffective. 1 Campbell to Carlisle, Castle Howard MSS, p. 413. |