HOWE'S MOVE AGAINST PHILADELPHIA 729 start had been delayed by difficulties in providing transport and by want of camp equipment which only arrived at the end of May.1 Before sailing he had advanced (12 June) towards Quibbletown, hoping that Washington might fight, but the Americans would not abandon their defensive, and Howe, thinking their position too strong to attack, withdrew towards Amboy. The move lured Washington from the security of his hills, and Howe, turning about, marched rapidly back in hopes of a battle. He narrowly missed success: Cornwallis routed Stirling's division, taking three guns, but Washington managed to evade an outflanking movement and the great heat soon forced Howe to abandon the pursuit, whereupon, withdrawing to Staten Island, he started embarking (29 June). For all the enunciations of sound doctrine which fill his despatches he had again failed to follow his own precepts and force on a general action, though by obliging Washington to concentrate he had prevented him from detaching troops to oppose Burgoyne or to impede a landing in Pennsylvania. The claim that Washington had outmanœuvred Howe and prevented an overland march to Philadelphia is refuted by the documentary evidence that Howe had notified Germain in April that he would move by sea. It was not till 25 August, however, that Howe disembarked at the Head of Elk in Chesapeake Bay. He had left 9000 troops at New York and 3000 at Rhode Island, and had 16,000 men with him.4 Foul winds had delayed the transports and then the naval officers pronounced Delaware Bay, where Howe had intended landing, unsuitable for disembarkation, whereupon the fleet spent nearly three weeks working against unfavourable winds to make the Chesapeake. All the advantage of surprise which an "amphibious" operation should have given was thus lost: Washington, whom Howe's movements had greatly puzzled, had ample time to reach Pennsylvania, much relieved by the direction Howe had taken and confident in New England's ability to cope with Burgoyne. That general had some 7000 regulars, half British, half German, but his hopes of substantial support from the Canadians had been disappointed, for barely 250 presented themselves. He had also the questionable advantage of the assistance of a large Indian contingent. He had himself written characteristically of "desiring to keep up their terror and avoid their cruelties",5 and it is doubtful whether either side ever derived the least benefit from their services. In a pitched battle they were useless, in partisan warfare they met their match in the backwoodsmen, while the atrocities they could not be prevented from perpetrating inflamed feeling and provoked retaliation. 1 Howe to Germain, 3 June, C.O. v, 94; Corresp. of George III, m, 451. 2 Howe to Germain, 5 July, C.O. v, 94. 3 Knox MSS, p. 132; Corresp. of George III, m, 462. 4 "States" given in C.O. v, 94. Burgoyne to Howe, 6 Aug. 1777, C.O. v, 94. Burgoyne's appointment was a virtual censure on Carleton. If criticisms of Carleton's want of enterprise had not been confined to Germain and his friends,1 personal hostility of old-standing undoubtedly made the Secretary of State exaggerate Carleton's culpability for the disappointing results achieved in 1776 and make it an excuse for giving him instructions almost insultingly precise and detailed. He was left with under 4000 men and confined to the task of supporting Burgoyne. This duty, however, he performed with such energy and zeal3 that Burgoyne could start operations on 20 June and reach Ticonderoga ten days later. That place had been strongly garrisoned, but Phillips, one of Burgoyne's brigadiers, detected a weak spot in the position and by planting guns on it he rendered the place untenable. On 6 July the garrison evacuated it, but retiring hastily on Castleton were overtaken and routed by Burgoyne's advance guard in a sharp-fought action at Hubbardtown (7 July), while the British flotilla caught up and destroyed the boats in which they were trying to remove their stores. By 10 July Burgoyne's main body had reached Skenesborough, little over twenty miles from the Hudson. On the map success seemed almost assured: Germain wrote exultantly of "Burgoyne's rapid progress" and "the fair prospect of an earlier junction": in practice these twenty miles were miles of trackless forest, intersected by numerous watercourses which needed bridging before Burgoyne's boats and heavy guns could be got forward, and it took three weeks' incessant toil to reach the Hudson at Fort Edward (30 July), forty miles above Albany.1 In face of such difficulties this was no mean achievement, but before Burgoyne could push on he must collect adequate supplies, and an attempt to raid an American depôt at Bennington, twenty miles south-east of Saratoga, ended in disaster (16 August), attributed by many to the employment on this errand of Germans, whose equipment and training were ill-suited to forest warfare. Shortly afterwards news came in of the failure of St Leger's diversion in the Mohawk Valley, mainly due to the misconduct of the Indians who provided half his force. Burgoyne could now appreciate the difficulties of his task more accurately than when in Germain's optimistic company, and, as he declared later, had his orders been less precise, he would not have ventured on a forward movement and might even have retired. However, feeling convinced that his orders, “both in the letter and spirit", left him "no latitude", and that his corps was "intended to be hazarded for the purpose of forcing a junction or at least of making a powerful diversion" in Howe's favour by making Washington detach troops,5 he advanced on 19 September against 1 Corresp. of George III, m, 403, 406. 2 Knox MSS, p. 132; George III's Letters to Lord North (ed. Donne), ¤, 45. 5 Royal Institution MSS, 1, 140. BURGOYNE IN DIFFICULTIES 731 the well-entrenched American position at Stillwater, ten miles south of Saratoga. Burgoyne had little over 5000 effectives while his opponent Gates, who had recently secured the command by intrigue rather than merit, had nearer 14,000, for as Burgoyne advanced, the New England militia hastened to turn out to oppose him, and the militia of the Green Mountain and the "Hampshire Grants" (which later became Vermont) were "as good as any of their troops". Moreover, in Arnold, Gates had a subordinate far abler than himself, but for whose leadership and tactical skill Burgoyne's attack might have turned his position. Thus, although the gallantry and devotion of Burgoyne's British battalions, who bore the brunt of the fighting, left them in possession of the stubbornly-defended Bemis Heights, it was a Pyrrhic victory and increased Burgoyne's difficulties by saddling him with wounded.2 The Americans could far better afford their 1200 casualties than Burgoyne his 400,3 and he could only entrench himself on Bemis Heights and hold on. Germain's comment was "the best wish I can form is that he may have returned to Ticonderoga. What alarms me is that he thinks that his orders to go to Albany to force a junction with Sir W. Howe are so positive that he must attempt it at all costs".4 Burgoyne had certainly notified Germain that he knew of Howe's departure for Philadelphia, but apparently he was nevertheless relying unduly on Howe's guarded promise of 5 April to try to have a corps on the Lower Hudson which 'might act in favour of the Northern Army". But Howe had left Clinton too weak to respond effectively to Burgoyne's urgent appeals, though directly the arrival of drafts from England (at the end of September) let him he collected 3000 men to attack Forts Clinton and Montgomery which commanded the passage of the Hudson. The attack was well conducted and highly successful (7 October); both forts were taken, the American flotilla was destroyed, their casualties came to over 400, and the British ships ascended the Hudson to Esopus, sixty miles below Albany, where more batteries were stormed and more shipping and stores destroyed. 66 These operations were too late and on too small a scale for Burgoyne's needs. On 9 October Clinton received a message stating that Burgoyne could retain his position till the middle of October if certain of being in touch with Clinton by then: otherwise he must retire before the ice set in. Even at this last Burgoyne was too optimistic. As Clinton's men were storming Fort Montgomery, Burgoyne's were moving out in the forlorn hope of extricating themselves by dislodging Gates. The odds against them were stupendous; they were forced back to their entrenchments and after desperate fighting had 1 Rayal Institution MSS, 1, 143. 2 Howe to Germain, 31 Oct., C.O. v, 94. 3 Burgoyne to Clinton, 27 Sept. ibid. 4 Knox MSS, p. 140. 5 Ibid. • Clinton to Howe, 9 Oct., C.O. v, 94; and his letters in Rockingham Memoirs, 1, 334 seqq. to withdraw under cover of night to Saratoga (8 October). But the Americans were already between them and Fort Edward, and though Burgoyne wrote to Howe, "Had all my troops been British I believe I should have made my way through Mr. Gates' army", his Germans were already showing a strong disposition to surrender. "It was notorious that they meant to have given one fire and then clubbed their muskets".1 The end came on 17 October, when Gates signed a convention by which Burgoyne's starving men, 4880 all told, capitulated on condition that they should proceed to Boston for shipment to England but should not serve again in America during the war. The terms were more favourable than Burgoyne's situation entitled him to expect, though the effect of Clinton's operations on Gates's mind must not be forgotten, and Congress was naturally furious with Gates for having conceded them, but there is no excuse whatever for the ill-faith with which on various pretexts it evaded the execution of the convention, detained officers and men in captivity, refused even to exchange them, endeavoured to seduce the men into joining their ranks and failed to carry out the stipulations for their feeding, housing and clothing. The responsibility for Burgoyne's disaster is not one man's only. That Burgoyne either failed to realise how greatly Howe's change of plan had aggravated his own difficulties or gambled on the doubtful chance of effective assistance from Clinton is arguable. Yet, despite the disclaimers of Howe and Germain, Burgoyne's orders certainly were precise and unconditional, and clearly he regarded his errand as "a forlorn hope". He should perhaps never have advanced beyond Fort Edward when he discovered how serious the transport and supply questions were: a prompt retreat after 19 September would have been justifiable and possibly successful, but one cannot better Sir J. W. Fortescue's description of what he and his men did as the "most honourable attempt to achieve the impossible on record". Howe's responsibility is much heavier: it is easier to follow his shifting schemes than to understand his motives. He was certainly disappointed in the numbers placed at his disposal;3 that he thought a direct attack on Philadelphia the shortest road to the decisive battle he desired is his main defence: but he over-estimated the extent to which it would divert opposition from Burgoyne, not realising that the New Englander would bestir himself far more for his own country than for Pennsylvania. His estimate of the time Burgoyne would take to reach Albany was fairly correct, and probably he did not wish to risk an unsupported advance up the Hudson or to condemn the main force to virtual inactivity by waiting till Burgoyne drew near. Perhaps he thought that on sanctioning his change of 1 Royal Institution MSS, 1, 140. Howe to Germain, 2 April 1777, C.O. v, 94. 2 Ibid. 1, 143. Corresp. of George III, ш, 507. HOWE'S SUCCESS AT THE BRANDYWINE 733 plan Germain would alter Burgoyne's instructions, but it is difficult to acquit him of having violated the elementary principle of concentration of effort. Still Howe can plead that Burgoyne was not under his orders and that the co-ordination of the different forces was the minister's task not his. Certainly the heaviest responsibility is Germain's: having approved of Howe's proposal to attack Philadelphia he should have realised how vitally Burgoyne's situation was thereby affected. Germain had been a soldier, yet no inexperienced civilian ignorant of strategy ever surpassed the folly of Germain's idea that the attack on Philadelphia, which he had just authorised,1 might be executed in time for Howe to co-operate with Burgoyne. Howe had received that letter when approaching the Head of Elk: his reply (30 August)2 reveals him as already disillusioned about the expected Loyalist support, one of his main motives for moving to Pennsylvania:3 he could not, he declared, act up to the King's expectations in returning to the Hudson, since his progress, apart from the enemy's army, "must be greatly impeded by the prevailing hostile disposition of the inhabitants". His progress was certainly leisurely: having landed on 25 August he did not really begin his advance till 3 September or approach Washington's army, strongly posted behind the Brandywine Creek at Chad's Ford, twenty-five miles south-west of Philadelphia, till 10 September. He was slightly weaker than Washington, but boldly despatched half his army under Cornwallis round by some fords twelve miles upstream, to turn Washington's right, while the remainder under the Hessian Knyphausen advanced straight against Chad's Ford. By 11 a.m. Knyphausen had reached the creek after hard fighting with Washington's advanced troops in which he repulsed an American counter-stroke. But Cornwallis was still miles away and nearly five hours elapsed before he began to press in upon Sullivan, whom Washington, undeterred by the demonstrations to which Knyphausen had till then to confine himself, had shifted to cover his threatened flank. By 4p.m. Cornwallis was attacking with great vigour, though his men had already covered eighteen miles since daybreak: before long he had driven Sullivan headlong from his first position and was nearing Dilworth, behind Washington's right. Here, however, Washington interposed his reserve to cover Sullivan's retreat eastward and to prevent Cornwallis cutting off Knyphausen's opponents. Knyphausen had at last attacked in earnest, but though Grant's brigade forded the creek and stormed the battery which commanded the passage, it was too late for close action, and covered by the darkness and the woods the Americans escaped, though with the loss of a dozen guns, 400 prisoners and 1000 casualties. Howe's tactics have 1 Germain to Howe, 18 May, C.O. v, 94. 2 C.O. V, 94. |