weakly garrisoned, did not join the insurgents, and in Nova Scotia and the Floridas British authority remained unshaken. Gage's situation was highly unsatisfactory.1 Though his communications by sea were open, the inadequacy of the squadron on the station and the inertness of its admiral, Samuel Graves, 2 allowed the privateers who soon swarmed out from every New England fishing village to become a serious menace, while he had let the Americans anticipate him in fortifying the dominating heights south and west of Boston harbour. To the north, the Charleston peninsula projected into the harbour and from it artillery could command both town and anchorage. Gage, therefore, decided to seize it, but the Americans discovered his intention and during the night of 16–17 June they occupied the peninsula and started entrenching themselves on Breed's Hill. This rash venture should have been signally punished had Gage only landed troops in rear of the entrenchment and used his light-draught warships to co-operate in intercepting the American retreat. But he plunged headlong into a frontal attack, which gave every chance to the already well-entrenched American marksmen, and only succeeded at a third attempt after two had been bloodily repulsed, with 1200 British casualties, amounting to nearly half the force engaged." "Bunker's Hill", as the action is usually known, ranks among the finest achievements of British infantry and largely explains the Americans' reluctance to endeavour to dislodge the garrison of Boston by direct attack. Nevertheless it showed clearly that any attempt to raise the blockade by assaulting the investing lines would be prohibitively costly, and Gage resigned himself to an inert defensive which depressed and disgusted the troops. Howe, who replaced him in September, realised that even if he could storm the enemy's lines, want of land transport would render that success barren. The true road to the repression of the rebellion was to him the capture of New York as a preliminary to isolating New England, the heart of the insurrection, by securing the line of the Hudson. This he thought would be greatly facilitated if combined with an advance from Canada by Lake Champlain.5 But at the moment it was doubtful whether Canada, like New York, would not first need to be recaptured. The Canadians, though little disposed to bestir themselves for the Crown, had no sympathy for the thirteen colonies and their attitude had emboldened Sir Guy Carleton, the governor, to spare several battalions to reinforce Gage. Canada was ill-prepared, therefore, for the vigorous attack delivered in the autumn of 1775 along the Lake 1 Corresp. of George III, m, 215 seqq. Hist. MSS Comm., Stopford-Sackville MSS, 11, 2, 6; cf. James, W. M., The British Navy in Adversity, p. 27. 3 Hist. MSS Comm., Rutland MSS, m, 2; Corresp. of George III, ш, 220–5. 5 Stopford-Sackville MSS, п, 9; Corresp. of George III, m, 242–4. Champlain route by a force under Richard Montgomery.1 Though held up by the stout defence of St John's, by capturing Chambly Montgomery obtained enough ammunition and supplies to reduce St John's also (3 November); whereupon he pushed on to Montreal which Carleton had hastily to evacuate. Quebec, meanwhile, was seriously threatened by another force under Arnold which had appeared before its walls on 13 November after an adventurous march through a wilderness of mountains and forests in Maine, though fortunately for Carleton a regiment recently raised from Highland settlers had arrived at Quebec just before Arnold. Montgomery joined Arnold early in December, but on 31 December their assault on Quebec was decisively repulsed, Montgomery being killed and Arnold disabled. The Americans maintained a blockade till May, but disease and desertion so thinned their ranks that Carleton had little cause for further anxiety.2 The year 1775 had gone better for the insurgents than for the British because the ministry, being quite unprepared for war, could not despatch a really strong force to America directly they heard of Lexington, and thereby missed all chance of nipping the insurrection in the bud, besides giving the Americans a year for their preparations. With a home establishment, including Ireland, of 30,000, from which the Boston garrison had already been drawn, and recruiting none too good3 except in Scotland, North had to fall back on hiring mercenaries. An effort to obtain Russians failed, but treaties were concluded with Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, Waldeck and Anspach for 18,000 men, though none of these contingents could start till the spring of 1776. Had Gage had 20,000 men by August 1775 success would have been within his reach. If the most persistent error of North's ministry was to base its plans on expectations of help from Loyalists who were never as numerous or as ready to run risks for the royal cause as Whitehall imagined, the zealous partisans of independence were in a minority outside New England and Virginia, and the New England militia, though formidable when fighting under conditions that favoured them, had the defects of their qualities and entirely lacked discipline and organisation. George Washington, who was appointed to command the "Continental Army" on 15 June, had a gigantic task in making an efficient army out of some excellent but very raw material. He had to contend against ridiculously short terms of enlistment, inter-colonial jealousies-the New Englanders criticised his partiality for Virginians-deficiencies of equipment, insubordination both of officers and men, and indifferent administrative arrangements. Supplies were cheap and plentiful, but the troops 1 Hist. MSS Comm., Dartmouth MSS, 1, 395. 2 Ibid. 1, 405-7. Corresp. of George III, m, 249. Ibid. 111, 268, 276; Hist. MSS Comm., Royal Institution MSS, 1, 7. 5 Stopford-Sackville MSS, 11, 13–16. BOSTON EVACUATED 721 suffered nearly as much from eating too much meat as from bad sanitation and the want of camp discipline.1 Men came and went practically as they liked, showed little readiness to re-enlist when time-expired and resented all efforts to establish proper subordination. If Ticonderoga had provided the insurgents with ample artillery, ammunition was exceedingly scarce, hardly any was manufactured in the country, and a vigorous attack could hardly have been withstood for want of cartridges.2 The royal troops, however, were in scarcely better case, and the ubiquitous American privateers assisted Washington appreciably by intercepting Howe's storeships. The critical situation at Quebec had been accentuated by the capture of a brig carrying ordnance stores3 and the troops suffered severely from the loss of a ship laden with warm clothing. For these losses and for failing to prevent the importation of munitions from the French West Indies Graves was generally blamed, but it was difficult to suppress the privateers without troops to attack their bases,5 and troops Howe did not feel able to provide. Moreover, the Admiralty's failure to reinforce his squadron handicapped him severely, and was the more serious error because the fishing and trading interests of the colonies rendered them peculiarly susceptible to vigorous and systematic naval action. Some people, indeed, including Lord Barrington, the Secretary at War, were so impressed with this idea that they would have relied mainly on naval pressure to reduce the colonists to obedience, though an effective naval blockade would have required the assistance of troops not only against the harbours which served the colonists as bases, but for the protection of the Navy's own bases along the coast. 6 The winter thus passed away without material change at Boston, but on 5 March 1776 the Americans secured a commanding position by occupying Dorchester Neck. Bad weather prevented an immediate counter-attack and allowed them to complete their entrenchments, so there was no alternative to evacuating the city forthwith. This was the more difficult through shortage of tonnage and the necessity for removing Loyalists, but it was accomplished without molestation (17 March). Howe would have preferred to attack New York at once, but shortage of supplies and the crowding of his transports forced him to make for Halifax, where his troops had to remain from 2 April till 11 June, awaiting supplies and reinforcements. Of the latter six battalions had been diverted, despite Howe's vigorous protests, to North Carolina to co-operate with the local Loyalists, 1 Stopford-Sackville MSS, 11, 13-16. 9 2 Stephenson, O. W., "Ammunition in 1776", Am. H.R. xxx. 3 Evelyn, W. G., Memoir and Letters, p. 74; Stopford-Sackville MSS, 11, 20. ▲ Ibid. 11, 10; Hist. MSS Comm., Knox MSS, p. 121. 5 Howe to Dartmouth, 13 Dec. 1775, C.O. v, 93. • Stuart, pp. 76–80. 8 Howe to Germain, 7 May, C.O. v, 93. 'Howe, Narrative, p. 3. 9 Howe to Dartmouth, 16 Jan., C.O. v, 93. CHBE I 46 of whose assistance great hopes were held out by Martin, the former governor.1 However, storms delayed the arrival of the transports till long after the Loyalists had risen prematurely and been dispersed, and when the commanders, General Clinton and Admiral Parker, attacked Charleston (28 June), rather than come away without attempting anything, the squadron was repulsed with considerable loss, an unexpectedly unfordable creek preventing the troops from co-operating. Ultimately (1 August) the discomfited force joined Howe at New York, where he would have had them concentrated at the outset as the point of chief strategic importance.2 Howe had brought from Halifax 10,000 men. Finding Manhattan Island strongly fortified and the enemy prepared to oppose his intended landing on Long Island, he began by passing the Narrows (2 July) and landed on Staten Island almost unopposed. But August was well advanced before the arrival of the Hessians enabled him to start his attack with 25,000 men. Washington had under 20,000 men, the largest detachment being on Long Island, holding strong entrenchments at Brooklyn but in a precarious situation. With the British squadron, now under Lord Howe, the general's brother, controlling the navigable waters, its retreat was liable to be intercepted, even if the narrowness of the East River forbade ships to remain at anchor between the batteries on its banks.3 The attack began by the British landing on Long Island on 22 August. Five days later Howe attacked the wooded heights which covered the approaches to the Brooklyn lines, his main body making a wide turning movement round the American left, while his centre and left attacked in front. The outflanking movement succeeded completely and the Americans had some difficulty in regaining the lines. Some of Howe's infantry indeed pressed the retreat so closely that they were with difficulty called off from storming the lines. Howe's caution is easier to understand than to justify. Memories of Bunker's Hill probably made him reluctant to try rushing American entrenchments, but a prompt attack on defenders still disordered by retreat might well have succeeded. Certainly Howe should never have allowed Washington to withdraw his whole force across the East River on the night of 29-30 August unmolested. Adverse and unusual winds may account for the Navy's failure to profit by the defencelessness of the troops when in transit, but nothing can extenuate General Howe's lethargy, for, though warned of the move in time to catch the rear-guard, he never stirred, and Washington's temerity escaped the punishment it had merited.5 Brooklyn had cost the British under 400 casualties, the Americans 1 Corresp. of George III, 11, 266-7. 2 Howe to Germain, 24 April, C.O. v, 93. 3 Duncan, H., Journals, N.R.S. xx, 117 seqq. Howe to Germain, 9 Sept., C.O. v, 93; Rutland MSS, 1, 6. HOWE CAPTURES NEW YORK 723 over 1000 besides 1100 prisoners and thirty guns, but far more might have been achieved. Howe's subsequent operations did little to reetrieve the lost chance, although Washington offered him another golden opportunity. New York, standing at the southern end of a long and narrow island with navigable channels on both sides and the narrowest egress to the north, was indefensible against troops who might land anywhere, but again Washington held on dangerously long. After a fortnight's delay Howe passed his troops across the East River to Kipp's Bay, three miles above the city (15 September), having distracted his opponents by naval demonstrations elsewhere.1 Covered by ships' guns the landing was successfully effected, the defenders being completely surprised. To corner the 4000 men in New York Howe had only to plant himself astride the narrow island, but he waited for a second trip by his flotilla and thereby allowed them to escape with the trifling loss of 400 men and the seventy guns in the riverside batteries. Next day (16 September) a sharp action between the British light troops and an American reconnoitring party ended with the retreat of the Americans to their entrenchments on Haarlem Heights. These Howe reconnoitred but found too strong to be forced by a frontal attack, while water covered both their flanks.2 For the next three weeks he did nothing but fortify his position and write despondently to Dartmouth's successor, Germain, of the impossibility of doing anything more that year, of the improbability of Carleton approaching near enough to assist him, and of the large reinforcements, especially of warships and extra sailors for manning boats, needed for the next year's campaign. Then, however, he apparently realised that by transferring his troops by water to the country east of the Bronx River he could sever Washington's communications with Connecticut and turn his position. On 12 October the new move began, the troops passing through the dangerous Hell Gate channel.3 Valuable time was wasted by landing at a point from which no advance was possible, and when the troops finally landed (18 October) at Pell's Point and advanced slowly northward all surprise was gone: Washington had shifted his main body to White Plains, where he entrenched a strong position to bar Howe's progress. Still, the American troops were much spread out, for 3000 men were left to hold Fort Washington near King's Bridge and deny the use of the Hudson to the British, and Howe could concentrate superior numbers against the White Plains force. However, though his despatches are full of the necessity for forcing on a decisive battle, he was unaccountably unenterprising. Despite an initial success against the American right (28 October) he failed to press his advantage, and by waiting for reinforcements from New York let Washington 1 Duncan, H., Journals, N.R.S. xx, 127-9, also N.R.S. vi, 28–32. • Stuart, p. 88. 3 Ñ.R.S. xx, 131. |