THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 699 Captain Macbride was sent out to take formal possession of the islands. A blockhouse was erected and a small British garrison established (January 1766), to support which another vessel was sent out with stores. In the same year, as the result of Spanish protests against the presence of the French, Choiseul handed over Port St Louis to the Spaniards, who renamed it Port Soledad (October 1766). They appear to have held it mainly with the idea of expansion in the direction of the Magellan Straits. The presence of the English on West Falkland was apparently not yet known to them. But the existence of an English settlement somewhere in the South Seas was vaguely rumoured. The Spanish Minister of Marine accordingly instructed Don Francisco Bucarelli, the Governor of Buenos Aires, to expel any such settlement, by force if necessary, when it should be located (February 1768).1 In December 1769 a Spanish schooner, sent out to reconnoitre from Soledad, met H.M.S. Tamar (Captain Hunt) on a similar cruise from Port Egmont. Hunt ordered the Spaniard to return, and threatened to fire upon her if she continued to approach Port Egmont. The Spanish Governor of Soledad thereupon called upon the British to evacuate the island. Hunt returned the compliment, and asserted the British title by both discovery and settlement. On hearing of this incident, the Governor of Buenos Aires sent two ships with troops to Soledad, which put into Port Egmont for water (February 1770). Hunt then sailed for England, and on his arrival in June gave the British Government their first intimation of the Spanish protest. After Hunt had left, Bucarelli proceeded to put his instructions into execution. He sent from Buenos Aires an expeditionary force consisting of five frigates and sixteen hundred men to turn the British out of Port Egmont. Resistance to a force so overwhelming was out of the question. After a few shots had been fired, the British garrison capitulated (10 June 1770). The Spanish commander then removed the rudder of H.M. sloop-of-war Favourite. He thus made certain that the news of the affair should reach Madrid before it could be known in London. It was announced to the British ministers in London in a somewhat truculent tone by the Spanish ambassador, Prince de Masserano. The news of this insult to the British flag aroused intense indignation in England. Instructions were at once sent to James Harris, afterwards Earl of Malmesbury, who was acting as chargé d'affaires at Madrid, to demand in peremptory terms the restitution of the Falkland Islands and the disavowal of Bucarelli's action. A fleet was assembled at Spithead. Harris formed a very clear idea of the man he had to deal with. He saw in Grimaldi a statesman of no very 1 Angelis, Pedro de, Memoria Historica, pp. 19–27. 2 Ibid.; Harris, J., Diaries, etc. 3 Duke of Grafton, Autobiography, 1, 254. Cal. Home Office Papers, nos. 63, 64, 104-6. extraordinary talents, but dexterous in chicanery, whose principle was "never to do but what he is obliged to conform to, and not even then till he has had recourse to every kind of subterfuge".1 With such a minister it was necessary to act with great firmness and accordingly, on 28 September, Harris told him that the only way of preventing the most fatal consequences was to accept the British demands. Grimaldi replied that Spain had so little to gain and so much to lose by war, that nothing but the last necessity would drive her to it. But whilst denying that Bucarelli had received any particular instructions to dispossess the English, he admitted that he had acted agreeably to his general instructions. He presently accepted the British proposals, but Masserano was instructed to negotiate about the terms. Harris on the same day assured Lord Weymouth that there was not the least reason to doubt the sincere desire of the Spaniards for peace, "as well from their inability to support a war, as from the dread they have of its consequences". The Spanish Government, he represented, were afraid of a popular rising if the troops were removed. The army was ill-equipped and ill-disciplined. The navy, though improved by the Frenchman Gaultier, was discontented and lacked seamen, and the financial position was never worse. But if these were the views of the King and several of his ministers, there was nevertheless a strong war party among Spanish statesmen, who shared the designs of Choiseul and were eager to attack Great Britain. Among these were Conde d'Aranda and General O'Reilly. This party gradually gained the ascendancy. 3 The pride and obstinacy of Charles III were roused by British insistence that he should own himself in the wrong and throw over his governor. In the meantime Grimaldi had been seeking support from France. He reminded the Spanish ambassador in Paris of a plan concerted with Choiseul in 1766 for concentrating a force at San Domingo, and proposed that Jamaica should now be seized by a coup de main (10 September 1770). The French replies, however, were highly discouraging. Choiseul said he could do nothing. He urged Grimaldi to gain time, even if he secretly did intend to make war, for France needed at least three months for the return of her trade fleets and sailors employed in the Newfoundland fishery.* The course pursued by Choiseul is exceedingly difficult to understand. His correspondence shows that when Grimaldi was at first apologetic, and Spain, as Harris said, obviously afraid of war, he denounced him as too timid. When, later, the insistence of Great Britain began to rouse the temper of Charles, and Grimaldi himself became infected with the war spirit of Aranda, Choiseul rebuked his tone as too military. At the beginning of the incident he had shown 1 Harris, Diaries, etc. 2 Ibid. 1, 63 seqq.; Cal. H.O. Pap. nos. 242, 390, 391, 485, 492. 3 Harris, Diaries, 1, 63 seqq. 4 Aff. Étr. Esp. DLX, DLXI. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 701 that he was ready to make trouble by raising questions about the French right of fishing at Newfoundland, and the action of the British in India, who had stopped an attempt to fortify Chandernagore in contravention of the Treaty of Paris. On 7 July he had written to the French ambassador at Madrid that he had instructed the ambassador in England to present a memorial on the Chandernagore affair, demanding reparation for the insult to the French flag.1 If satisfaction were refused, France would know how to obtain it. He enquired what Spain was going to do. Charles III and Grimaldi, came the reply, were infinitely anxious for peace, because Spain needed at least two more years before she could be in a position to go to war. But now, when the Spaniards were making active naval and military preparations and the danger of a rupture increased, he expressed his dread of it, and even went so far as to suggest to Masserano that he should throw over his instructions from Madrid and act under his own pacific directions. Was he playing a double game, as has been alleged, and, whilst ostensibly striving for peace, secretly stimulating the obstinacy of Charles through the agency of the Marquis d'Ossun? Most probably he was shaken by his information of the unpreparedness of Spain, or by the sudden realisation of the strength of the opposition to himself in France. Although Grimaldi had not received the encouragement he had expected from France, the issue long hung in the balance. He continued to make offers of reparation while haggling over the terms. Much play was made over the insult offered to Spain by Captain Hunt in threatening to fire upon the Spanish schooner. When Parliament met (13 November 1770), the Government prided itself on the firmness with which it had handled the situation. Chatham, however, who had recovered his health, and the Opposition poured scorn upon its vacillation and pusillanimity. Lord Weymouth resigned in December, in response to this clamour, and was succeeded by Lord Rochford. It is to be remembered that ministers were secretive as to what was happening. Chatham was indignant with their "little policy of concealments", and denounced our utter unreadiness for the war which on both sides of the Channel was now deemed to be inevitable. Ministers hardly made a pretence of answering his questions, and he complained that his eloquence fell dead against the faded hangings on which Flemish art had portrayed the defeat of the Armada-that tapestry which, "mute as Ministers, still told more than all the Cabinet on the subject of Spain, and the manner of treating with a haughty and insidious power". The French envoy hastened to assure Choiseul that Chatham was correct 1 It was presented 26 Sept. 1770; see Col. St Paul of Ewart, Correspondence (ed. G. G. Butler), II, 98 seqq. 2 Aff. Étr. Esp. DLXI, 14 Dec. 1770; Carré, H., Le règne de Louis XV, pp. 388-90. 3 Chatham, Speeches, Nov. 1770-Feb. 1771; Johnson, Falkland's Islands; Rochford, Correspondence; Williams, B., Life of Chatham; Trevelyan, G. O., Life of C. J. Fox, p. 327. in saying that Great Britain had only twelve ships of the line ready for sea, and urged him on that account to maintain a firm attitude.1 For by the end of November the situation had hardened. Spanish pride was roused; Charles stiffened; Grimaldi predicted a riot. The crisis was suddenly and dramatically resolved by the fall of Choiseul. At last it had seemed certain that Spain was committed to war, and that the moment for which he had so long been scheming was at hand. He announced to Louis and his Council the preparations he was making for war with Great Britain. This was the occasion for which his rivals, Maupeou and Terray, had been waiting. He had made matters easier for his enemies by provoking the hostility of the King's new and low-born mistress, Madame du Barry. On 6 December Terray declared that the Treasury was empty and that French credit did not exist. Choiseul's restless intrigues against England were denounced to the King, and his insensate thirst for war, at a time when war meant financial ruin, and when by his foreign policy France was placed in a very unfavourable position upon the European chessboard. The whole affair of the Falkland Islands was said to have originated with him, and to have been encouraged by his unauthorised promises to Spain. Louis took alarm. On the 21st he insisted that the King of Spain should be urged to do his utmost to maintain peace and submit to the British terms. "My Minister wishes for war", he wrote to Charles, "but I do not."2 On 24 December Choiseul was dismissed. Spain and Great Britain remained on the brink of war. The Spanish court had already decided to refuse the British demands. In answer to the high language held by Masserano in London, Lord North despatched a courier (18 January 1771) to recall Harris from Madrid. Harris quitted the capital, but he had not gone twenty leagues before he was met by a second courier, sent off by Rochford four days later, who informed him that Spain had conceded all the British demands.4 The expedition of Bucarelli was disavowed. The British garrison was restored to Port Egmont. The King of Spain did not, however, withdraw his claim to the territory in question. The terms of the convention were bitterly attacked by Chatham and the Opposition.5 Furious at being foiled in their appeal to the country for increased naval power and territorial and commercial expansion, and aided by the invective of Junius, they pointed out that the demand for the Manila ransom had been dropped, and that the reservation of the Spanish claim to the Falkland Islands was unnecessary and unprecedented. It was moreover alleged that by a secret article or verbal assurance the Government had pledged themselves either to a speedy withdrawal or to a surrender of the 1 Aff. Étr. Angl., Corr. Pol. CDXCIV. 2 Duc de Broglie, The King's Secret, 1; Rochford, Correspondence. 3 Grafton, Autobiography, 1, 255; cf. Aff. Étr. Esp. DLXII; Angl. CDXCV. 5 L.J.; Parl. Hist. xvш, 167-8; Chatham Corr. IV, 71-2. FALL OF CHOISEUL 703 islands to the Spaniards. The despatches of Harris make it plain that there was no such article, and that the restitution was demanded and conceded by Spain without reserve. The existence of any such agreement "made directly or indirectly by H.M. Ministers", was flatly and indignantly denied by Rochford when the point was raised by M. d'Aiguillon on behalf of Spain in December 1771, and November 1773. M. de Guisnes, however, the French ambassador, asserted that some such solution was spoken of by English ministers, though without Rochford's knowledge. This may have been the origin of the rumour, or possibly it was circulated by Grimaldi, to lessen the loss of his personal credit in France, to foil the attacks made upon him by Aranda and his faction for his feeble handling of the affair, and to be used in the future.1 Whatever the truth of the rumour, Port Egmont was certainly abandoned by the British shortly afterwards (1774). But the flag was left flying and sheets of lead were affixed to the rocks on which was engraved the declaration of the sole right and property of the Crown of Great Britain to the Falkland Islands. It had, no doubt, been found that Anson had much exaggerated the fertility of the soil, which is for the most part only suitable for sheep-farming. The strategical value of the islands has been fully demonstrated of recent years. The fall of Choiseul, according to the considered opinion of Lord Shelburne, came in the nick of time to save Great Britain, distracted by American affairs, from the attack of a hostile combination. He had proofs he said, speaking six years later, that Gibraltar, Minorca, Jamaica, and the greater part of our possessions in the East and West Indies would have been among the first sacrifices that would have befallen us, but for that "miraculous interposition of Providence".2 The Falkland affair had some important results. On the one hand, it compelled a strengthening of British naval forces and was the occasion of Nelson's entering the Navy. On the other hand, it removed the most determined enemy of Great Britain from power, and it demonstrated the weakness of France and the lack of co-ordination between the members of the Family Compact.3 Thus was war, arising from French and Spanish rivalry in the colonial sphere, narrowly averted for the time being. France, under the guidance of Madame du Barry and the Triumvirate, Maupeou, Terray and Aiguillon, passed for the next few years into eclipse. The only official incidents worth mentioning in this period were the surreptitious strengthening of Dunkirk and the trespass of some 1 Harris, Diaries, 1, 77, 78; Williams, Life of Chatham, II, 272; St Paul of Ewart, Correspondence, 1, 276-91, 1, 75, 129, 133, 134; Down, W. C., "The Falkland Islands Dispute", an unpublished thesis in the University Library, Cambridge. 2 Parl. Hist. xviii, 675. 3 Cf. Hertz, G. B., British Imperialism in the eighteenth century, pp. 110-53, and Winstanley, D., Chatham and the Whig Opposition, pp. 391-6, 408-13; Goebel, J., The Struggle for the Falkland Islands. |