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LA FRANCE ÉQUINOXIALE

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against Great Britain. Meanwhile negotiations for opening the door of the Spanish Indies to the products of France resulted in the reduction of the duties on goods exported from Spain to America (1765). As such exports were mainly French in origin, France benefited by being thus enabled to undersell the British contraband goods which had hitherto commanded the market.1 Jamaica was the chief centre of the British interloping trade with the Spanish colonies. From that emporium were shipped the cargoes which British interlopers ran to the Spanish West Indies and the Gulf of Mexico. From Havana, too, they continued to conduct with Vera Cruz a contraband trade which the brief British occupation of that port had enabled them to establish. To Panama, to Louisiana and the Bay of Honduras British goods found their way and, with the connivance of the Portuguese, even to Uruguay and Buenos Aires. For the energy and individuality of British manufacturers and shippers enabled them to compete successfully with the Spanish merchants who, hampered at every step by formalities and taxes, were compelled to ship their goods by slow flotas and convoyed galleons.2

Grand as were the ideas of Choiseul and great as were his reforms, it was really in vain for him to fortify and enlarge ports, or to set up Chambers of Commerce and Agriculture for the colonies, so long as the stream of population, weakened by the loss of the Huguenots and diffused over too large an area, was fed only by soldiers, missionaries, and the riff-raff of the towns, shipped off against their will by order of the State and forbidden to return. A glaring instance of political and strategical ideas thus ignoring practical provision for gradual colonisation was furnished at this time by the disaster of Kourou. For now that Canada had gone the way of Nova Scotia, Choiseul's eager and scheming brain had set in motion a daring design intended to retrieve that loss. Out of the colonies remaining to France in the West Indies and Guiana, he proposed to create a new colonial empire, La France Equinoxiale, in the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indies. In conjunction with his Spanish allies he hoped thereby to develop a market for French goods in Spanish America and to destroy British trade with the South. His attempt to plant a strong colony in French Guiana (Valley of Kourou and Cayenne) was the logical outcome of this far-seeing scheme. The district had been surveyed by his agents in the preceding year. Now shipload after shipload of French settlers, drawn from Nova Scotia and Louisbourg, and reinforced by the sweepings of France and the Mediterranean ports, was sent thither. Unhappily, the colonists were dumped upon a barren, fever-stricken coast, without shelter or adequate preparation for their reception. An epidemic broke out. Within a year, of 9000 colonists 3000 were dead; presently, hardly one remained (June 1 Blart, L., Rapports de la France et de l'Espagne, p. 7.

Rousseau, F., Règne de Charles III, t. n.

CHBE I

44

1763-4).1 Two years later another attempt to colonise the country was made and with Choiseul's support a company was formed for that purpose. But this second attempt proved only less expensive in lives and money than the first.

Thus Choiseul's fine conception of calling in the South of America to redress the balance of the North ended in disaster, and the grand idea of La France Equinoxiale went the way of that of La France Septentrionale. The loss of so many settlers and thirty million livres was bad enough. But still worse for France, perhaps, at this critical era of overseas development, was the paralysing influence which such losses and failures were bound to exert upon French colonial enterprise. One instance of this may be found in the refusal of official encouragement which helped to render abortive an attempt to colonise Madagascar made by the Comte de Maudave in 1768.

These were but the last of a long series of disasters, military and financial, which had befallen France overseas. Yet these very disasters would seem to have opened up a new and remarkable era of prosperity for her remaining colonies in the western hemisphere. All the energy and trade which had been absorbed by Canada and Louisiana were now directed to the West India islands. The golden age of the French West Indies began. For a time it seemed that the French would drive the British out of the sugar trade. They were greatly helped by the large smuggling trade carried on by the British American colonies. Aided by the Spanish alliance and the reduction of restrictions upon colonial trade, the prosperity of San Domingo, "the Pearl of the Antilles", advanced at a prodigious rate. By 1788 it had absorbed two-thirds of the whole foreign trade of France. It was estimated that the total value of the French West Indian trade in 1766 was one hundred million livres, as against sixty-six for the British trade, twenty-four for the Dutch and ten for the Spanish.2

Martinique, the seat of government of the French Windward Islands, remained the chief market and shipping station. Rodney had pointed out the great strategic value of the island he had captured, since it lay in the centre of the crescent formed by the Caribbee Islands, its arch to windward. This happy situation, its numerous harbours, safe roads and fertility of soil gave it, in his opinion, the preference over all the other islands. It was calculated that, if occupied by the British, its production of sugar could be more than doubled within a few years. It had, however, suffered severely from the British maritime supremacy during the Seven Years' War, and had not recovered from the disastrous bankruptcy which followed upon the huge commercial speculations of the Jesuits. Its commercial

1 See D'Aubigny, E., Choiseul et la France d'outre-mer; Marcus, W., Choiseul und die Katastrophe am Kourouflusse.

2 Raynal, G., Hist. philosophique...des établissements...dans les deux Indes.

3 Rodney to Grenville, Grenville Papers, II, 10.

THE FRENCH WEST INDIES

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supremacy, indeed, was now eclipsed both by San Domingo and by its neighbour in the Windward group, Guadeloupe. The latter, since it lay to leeward, was of less importance strategically than Martinique, but four years of British occupation, during which 40,000 negroes had been imported, had enormously increased the productivity of this fine and fertile island.1 So profitable, indeed, had it already become, that it had been argued that it might be wiser to retain it rather than Canada at the Peace of Paris, more especially as the threat of the French in Canada would help to remind the colonists of their debt to the British Empire. Apart, then, from the comparative decline of Martinique, the French, as the issue of their long-drawn out rivalry with the British in the West Indies, held at this period a position of commercial supremacy. It was a supremacy which slowly but surely waned, and was destined to receive at the close a crushing blow from Rodney.

3

When Bute retired in April 1763, his successor, George Grenville, was soon made aware of the incessant activity with which Choiseul and Grimaldi were intriguing to recover lost possessions. Settlement of points arising out of the treaty was avoided. Among the questions thus kept open by France were those of the demolition of the seaward fortifications of Dunkirk, the liquidation of the bills of credit issued by the French in Canada, and the payment of the sum due for the maintenance of French prisoners of war. The latter point was pressed by Grenville in July 1764, as a test of France's intentions to fulfil the stipulations of the treaty. At this juncture, a French squadron had, under Comte d'Estaing, seized Turk's Island, which was claimed and partly settled by the English. Grenville decided to deal with this and the other matters in dispute with France "by firm and temperate measures, before the fire is lighted in so many parts, and fed with so much fuel, as to make it impossible to extinguish it". Reinforcements were ordered to the West Indies and "preparatory orders" were got ready to be sent to Admiral Burnaby in those parts. The French refused to recall Estaing, but Grenville's firmness compelled them to disavow his action and to promise reparation for damages (August-September 1764). At this very moment Choiseul's agents were investigating the military position in America and reporting that the British troops were so few and scattered as to be of little account, whilst the colonies refused to take steps to protect themselves.5 And at the same time despatches from Lord Rochford, the British ambassador at Madrid, were revealing traces of a plot, concocted by the ministers of the Family Compact, to burn the dockyards of Portsmouth and Plymouth (September 1764 and 25 February 1765).

1 Rodney to Grenville, Grenville Papers, II, 11, 12.

2 See Grant, W. L., "Canada versus Guadeloupe", Am. H.R., July 1912, pp. 735 seqq. 3 Grenville Papers, II, 380, 409-12. 4 Ibid. 11, 418-38.

Bancroft, G., Hist. U.S. m, 28; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, 11, 3-5. * Printed by Coxe, W., Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings of Spain, III, 298.

Similar firmness shown by Grenville in dealing with Spain resulted in a similar conclusion to an incident in the Bay of Honduras. There the vagueness of the treaty induced frequent violation of Spanish territory by British settlers, who pushed their contraband trade into the interior, even as far as Mexico. Acting upon instructions from home, the Governor of Yucatan and Commandant of Bacalar endeavoured to curb this trade and expelled British settlers from those points on the coast which were deemed beyond the limits indicated by the treaty. They ordered them to retire from Rio Hondo, and to confine themselves to the right bank of Rio Nuevo and Rio Wallis. By these aggressions 500 settlers lost their homes and property worth £27,000.1 Vigorous remonstrances were made by the British Government, and pressed in spite of military demonstrations by Spain. At last an order was obtained for restoring the settlers and censuring the Spanish officers concerned, but demands for punishment and reparation were dropped. During these negotiations Grimaldi, instigated by Choiseul, almost caused a rupture with Portugal by delay in restoring Sacramento, complaints as to contraband trade with Buenos Aires and Paraguay, and disputes as to the limits of the two colonies. The Marquis de Pombal, the Portuguese minister, appealed to Great Britain for the assistance due to Portugal from her ally. The British Government warned Spain that any attack upon the dominions of an ally would be accepted as a declaration of war. Rochford bluntly told the Spanish chargé d'affaires that he knew Spain wished to conquer Brazil, but England would not permit it. As a matter of fact Choiseul had prepared an expedition against Brazil in October 1762, instructing the admiral to capture Rio de Janeiro at all costs. Béliardi, in discussing with him the advantages of a war with Portugal, urged the necessity of first conquering Brazil, lest the King of Portugal should take refuge there and presently make himself master of South America and hand over its trade to the English. Choiseul remarked that he thought the Portuguese were more ready to march to Madrid than the Spaniards to Lisbon. Taken in conjunction with Choiseul's plan of campaign outlined in the previous year, one may suppose that these incidents were intended as a combination of moves in the tentative opening of a game which could be pressed or abandoned according to the energy or weakness displayed by the British ministry, or the success or failure of the dockyard plot intended to paralyse the British Navy.

Grenville was less successful in his attempt to secure the payment

1 Coxe, m, 297.

2 Grenville Papers, II, 409-12; Rochford to Halifax, quoted by Coxe, m, 299 seqq.; Renaut, F., Le Pacte de Famille, etc.

a Coxe, III, 306; Aff. Étr. Espagne, DLXXIV, 14 Nov. 1774. Arch. Nat. Minute of letter by Choiseul, 19 Oct. 1762. Bibl. Nat. MSS Français, 10 FFO (4), pp. 106-17.

Cf. Rochford to Halifax, 12 Nov. 1764; Coxe, III, 306.

THE MANILA RANSOM

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of the Manila ransom. When the capital of the Philippine Islands had surrendered to Colonel Draper, the archbishop-governor purchased the exemption of private property from plunder by a payment of two million dollars in cash and of two more in bills drawn upon the Spanish Treasury. These bills Spanish ministers flatly refused to honour. The archbishop, Grimaldi declared, might as well have agreed to deliver up the city of Madrid. In subsequent negotiations it was urged that the agreement had been extorted by force, and broken by some looting previous to the capitulation.1

The circumstances which led to Grenville's imposition of the Stamp Act were in large measure due to our rivalry with France and Spain in the colonial sphere. For the burden of the British taxpayer, which it was meant to relieve, had been incurred by the previous war, and the maintenance of a standing army, towards which it was intended that the colonies should thereby contribute, was rendered necessary by the hostility of France. That hostility was traced in the intrigues of Choiseul's agents with the Indians, whose murderous rising in 1763-4 was partly due to their influence.2 It was generally believed, too, that France would soon endeavour to regain Canada, and would be aided by her former subjects. The possessions in the West Indies, which Bute had allowed her to retain in spite of Chatham's warnings, rendered the American colonies strategically of vital importance both for defence and attack. This is not mere theorising, for Choiseul explained to Louis in 1769 how Martinique and Guadeloupe had been prepared as bases of supplies and operations. It would have been plainly unwise, then, not to keep British troops in readiness in the continental colonies, and to rely for protection upon the hazardous arrival of transports from England. Resistance to the Stamp Act was fomented by Choiseul's agents in America, and the spirit of rebellion largely kept alive by them after its repeal by the Rockingham ministry. The successful issue of the revolt of the American colonies was rendered possible, first by supplies of money and munitions from France and Spain, and finally by naval and military aid without which it must have collapsed.

Pitt's resignation in 1761 had been hailed in France as equivalent to two victories. His return to power in 1766 had an equal and opposite effect. "Their panic", Horace Walpole observed, "at the mention of Mr Pitt's name is not to be described."4 Choiseul, after repairing the losses of the navy and reforming the army, had now resumed the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The two protagonists of French and British imperialism were soon at grips. Pitt, who now took the title of the Earl of Chatham, was under no illusion as to the enmity of the House of Bourbon and the ambitious 1 Coxe, ш, 272, 307; Lord Mahon, Hist. of Eng. v, 57; Annual Register, Statement by Sir W. Draper.

2 Vide supra, p. 637.

3

Diderot, Correspondance, n, 80.

Walpole to Sir H. Mann, 23 July 1766; cf. Macaulay, Essay on Chatham.

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