occupation of the Dutch in land defence, now yielded to the islanders undisputed maritime and therefore commercial supremacy. Further, a struggle originating in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe became in its course markedly colonial, and determined largely the future of the British nation. Canada was now outflanked by our new acquisitions, Nova Scotia and Hudson Bay; in Europe our trade communications with the Levant were safeguarded, and in Africa the hunt for slaves received a portentous stimulus. Above all, the Empire was strengthened strategically by naval bases in the Mediterranean, the first of those far-spread links which knit together the whole. Accordingly, commerce now leaped ahead, the shipping of London being double that of Amsterdam by 1739.1 Colonies, wilting in nearly a quarter of a century of semi-piratical strife, now filled out rapidly in the almost unbroken time of peace (1713–39); and wealth rapidly increased in Georgian England, prompting the will to break through the irksome restraints of Spain on West India trade. Walpole, the champion of our mercantilist and colonial policy, winked at the illicit trade in the Caribbean but sought to keep at peace with Spain until the clamour of mercantile circles compelled him reluctantly to declare war (October 1739). The First Lord, Admiral Sir Charles Wager, stated in the House of Commons that England was ill prepared for it. That was true. Naval construction lagged behind that of France and Spain both in quality and quantity, and the feeble attempts to fortify some of the West Indies left them in a weak, naked and miserable condition. Therefore, apart from Vernon's brilliant dash at Portobello and Anson's semi-predatory voyage in the Pacific, the British Navy cut a poor figure until Anson's influence at the Admiralty in and after 1745 gradually worked a salutary change. It was high time; for in March 1744 (a month after the indecisive battle off Toulon), France exchanged her guileful neutrality for open war; she had already pledged herself secretly to Spain by the second Family Compact to win back for her Gibraltar and Minorca, and blot out the new English colony of Georgia, Spain transferring to the French the Asiento and other trading privileges. Thus the trade war with Spain was linked with a complicated European war, which overtaxed the activities of mid-Georgian England and the finances of Pompadour-ridden France. In 1745 the throne of George II shook under the defeats inflicted by the Maréchal de Saxe in the Netherlands and by Prince Charles in Scotland. Yet even in that dark year, when our hold on the Mediterranean and both the Indies was weakened, a well-concerted effort wrested from the French their chief stronghold and naval base in North America. On 1 Anderson, Origins of Commerce, III, 224. 2 Temperley, H. W. V., arts. in Trans. R. Hist. Soc. Ser. m, vol. I, and in Annual Report of the American Hist. Assoc. for 1911; Hertz, G. B., Brit. Imperialism in 18th century, pp. 1-59; Parl. Hist. x, 720, XI, 223-33. THE FIRST CAPTURE OF LOUISBOURG 525 Louisbourg the French had spent about £1,000,000; that fortress guarded the St Lawrence, dominated the fisheries of the Bank and the trade route to New England, besides threatening Nova Scotia, where the British barely held Annapolis against French and Indian raids. The plan of capturing Louisbourg was suggested early in 1743 by Commodore Sir Peter Warren,1 and later by William Shirley, an English lawyer who had come to the front at Boston. Now Governor of Massachusetts, he urged the Duke of Newcastle to send naval support for a New England attack on Louisbourg, the capture of which would entail "the destruction of Canada".2 With praiseworthy energy he succeeded in inducing the New England Assemblies to raise some 4000 troops who were led by Lieut.-General Pepperell; but he failed to stir New York and other colonies to action. Meanwhile Warren, commanding the Leeward Islands squadron, received from home discretionary powers to proceed with all available ships to Nova Scotia, and despite local protests he did so with four sail, meeting later two sent from England, the most that could be spared at that crisis. Before joining the New England force off Canso in Nova Scotia, he heard of the arrival of a strong French squadron in the West Indies, but resolved to settle with Louisbourg first. That place was sealed up by thirteen New England privateers until the whole force appeared and covered the landing in a cove two miles to the south-west. The garrison being small, ill-provisioned and half mutinous, surrender was certain unless succours came. Ten French storeships and, finally, a sail of the line with powerful succours were taken by Warren's ships. The land attacks made little impression, but on the threat of forcing the harbour, the governor surrendered (16 June)3. A large French squadron, sent to recover the place in 1746, was shattered by storm and decimated by plague.4 The French squadron sent out to the West Indies did comparatively little harm.5 Meanwhile a rupture had occurred between the British and French East India Companies. Rivals in trade, they for financial reasons abstained from hostilities until after the arrival of decisive news from Europe. Already competition for a good naval base en route had produced acute tension. As a retort to the British base at Bombay, La Bourdonnais, an enterprising adventurer of St Malo, had worked hard to fortify and construct a dock at Port Louis in Île de France (now Mauritius), which became a centre of French power and commerce. After a visit to France in 1741 he returned with sealed orders in case of war. In 1742 Dupleix, formerly Governor of Chandernagore on the Hooghly, became Governor of Pondicherry and of other French settlements in India. Cherishing designs of supremacy, 1 Richmond, H. W., The Navy in the War of 1739-48, 11, 202. 2 Corresp. of Shirley, 1, 161-77. 3 Ibid. 1, 215-79; Richmond, 11, 200–16; Wood, W., The Great Fortress, pp. 1–66; Beatson, R., Naval and Mil. Memoirs (1790), 1, 260-6. Troude, Batailles navales de la France, 1, 310. 5 Richmond, vol. I, chap. x. he proceeded to fortify that city, while Fort St George at Madras was almost indefensible apart from naval support. Alarmed at its weakness the English Company sought that support from home.1 Thus, competition for a naval base and the need of naval protection helped to embroil two Companies hitherto concerned with rupees and local intrigues. In 1745 Commodore Barnett arrived off the Coromandel coast with a small squadron, which made several prizes, and was soon opposed by that of La Bourdonnais, with no decisive result. On Barnett's death, Captain Peyton took command and administered a check to the French, who withdrew under the guns of Pondicherry (June 1746). Reinforced there, they offered battle to Peyton, who, probably owing to former damages, sheered off and made for Ceylon, there hoping to guard an expected British convoy.2 This withdrawal enabled La Bourdonnais to take on board troops and a siege-train for a long-projected attack upon Madras, which surrendered on 10 September. A subsequent attack on Cuddalore failed; but Boscawen's powerful fleet from England could not retrieve the situation in the Carnatic before news of peace arrived. Sea power had there turned the scales in favour of France. Already it was clear that victory would lie with that side which possessed the better naval base near at hand. This advantage to France was far outweighed by her false strategy pursued in home waters. There the French and Spaniards had failed, even in 1745, to combine their fleets either for the invasion of England, the capture of Minorca and Gibraltar, or for triumph in the New World. Parcelling out their squadrons for secondary objects, they yielded the initiative to the Island Power. At Whitehall the initial failures were taken to heart, and in August 1746 Anson went to sea in command of a powerful Channel Fleet, which through the winter gales held the Channel Soundings and threatened Brest. A new spirit now animated the crews: The fleet was always there, tho' sometimes our poles were bare, For we always were prepared, and that was all we cared, The superiority of Spartan-trained crews over harbour-staled crews appeared in the two victories of Anson and Hawke in the Bay of Biscay (May, October 1747), which together led to the capture of twelve sail of the line, besides many merchantmen, and cut off the reinforcements destined for Canada and India. Yet, just as Madras balanced Louisbourg, so French land power, paramount in the Netherlands, balanced British naval power. Exhaustion therefore brought both sides to negotiations for peace; for the French Finance Minister said he saw hell open before him if the war lasted; and our Cabinet quailed before the financial and military crises then 1 Dodwell, H., Dupleix and Clive, pp. 6-9. 2 Richmond, ш, 190–201. Ibid. m, 82-112; Hannay, D., Short Hist. of Brit. Navy. II, 124–32. ORIGINS OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 527 imminent.1 From the deadlock emerged the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (April 1748), with its easy and obvious solution of status quo ante bellum, penalising alike the captors of Mons and Madras and the victors of Louisbourg and the Bay of Biscay. From this unsatisfying finale could come no finality. The clamours of French soldiers (bête comme la paix) and British seamen were outdone by those of New England patriots who regarded the restitution of Louisbourg to France as a bartering away of their conquest for "a petty factory in India." But the capture of Louisbourg was mainly the work of the British Navy; and to secure the Thames against invasion by restoring the Netherlands to a friendly Power (Austria) was far more important than to retain Louisbourg, which must fall at any time to a great fleet.2 Moreover, the renewal of the Asiento treaty with Spain and the demolition of the seaward defences of Dunkirk benefited and secured British commerce; while the foundation of Halifax was soon to lessen the danger from Louisbourg privateers. In reality the peace of 1748 was advantageous to England and was a tribute to the work of her Navy. Yet the next governors of Canada were encouraged by the recovery of Louisbourg to push on schemes for the reconquest of Acadia and the acquisition of the Ohio Valley. Hostilities became acute in those areas in 1754-5; but France did not deem the war to open until Boscawen's fleet attempted with partial success to intercept French reinforcements off Cape Breton Island (June 1755). She held back during eleven months of preparation and diplomatic angling, and then suddenly struck at Minorca, which, owing to the moral cowardice of Admiral Byng, she captured (June 1756). The resulting Seven Years' War differed from the wars that had preceded it. That of 1702-13, ostensibly a dynastic struggle, was in reality waged for the restoration of the balance of power; but its issue turned largely on Mediterranean strategy, and its results in the colonial sphere were immense. The war of 1739-48, originating in trade disputes, was complicated by dynastic struggles, and its colonial results were small. The Seven Years' War (the first of our great colonial wars) originated in efforts to decide the colonial disputes left undecided in 1748, while European rivalries and hatreds served only to widen and intensify it. From the first Pitt saw clearly that the great issue was in North America; for Louis XV and la Pompadour that issue was secondary; and not until too late did the one great Frenchman of that age declare that the war in America and at sea was the true war.4 The new alignment of the Powers ranged Austria and Russia with France, Prussia alone with England. The Dutch and Italian States 1 Yorke, P. C., Life of Hardwicke, vol. 1, chap. xv; Grenville Papers, 1, 74; Carré, H., Hist. de France (ed. Lavisse), vIII, 164; Broglie, Duc de, La Paix d'Aix-la-Chapelle, p. 160. * Yorke, P. C., Hardwicke, vol. I, chap. xviii; Schöll, Traités, 1, 313–16. 3 Newcastle MSS, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 33028-9, ff. 102-3, 112 seqq., 144-61, 243-71. 4 Méms. du Duc de Choiseul, p. 383. remained neutral; so did Spain until January 1762. Thus, England had to cover Hanover and the west front of Prussia-a task less arduous than that of protecting Belgian, Dutch and Italian lands in 1744-8. As France and her allies met their match in Frederick the Great and Ferdinand of Brunswick, Pitt, on coming into power in June 1757, was able to throw his chief weight into maritime and colonial enterprises. Moreover, France was burdened by the expense of distant campaigns in Germany, where successes were Pyrrhic and defeats catastrophic. As the vices of the Pompadour régime had depleted her exchequer, she could ill support vast military and naval efforts, and, as usual, her Navy suffered first.1 Across the Channel the Anson régime made for efficiency, as was seen in the launch of that paragon of ships, the Royal George (100), and the general improvement in construction. In 1756 the Navy List comprised 142 sail of the line, if fifty-gun ships be included, as against eighty-two French. But, the crews being raw or scanty, the first two campaigns lagged. Pitt's scheme of a dash at Rochefort failed owing to the reluctance of General Mordaunt to land troops betimes (September 1757); and subsequent coastal operations against St Malo, Cherbourg and St Cast probably had little effect in holding French regulars to the coasts. Sailors and soldiers alike detested these raids, the importance of which the French soon discounted. 2 The loss of Minorca has sometimes been declared beneficial because the war was to be mainly a colonial war;3 but, by increasing the difficulty of checking the Toulon fleet, it enabled that force to initiate operations in the ocean. An example was seen in the escape of a Toulon squadron to the West Indies early in 1757, where it beat Townshend's inferior force, thereafter harrying British commerce. Finally it proceeded to Louisbourg, and there reinforced the French concentration fatal to our attempt against that place in August 1757. By this time Pitt and Anson were in office (with Hardwicke as sage counsellor); but much leeway had to be made good; and up to the spring of 1758 British war efforts presented a dismal record everywhere except in India. There, as has appeared, British successes in home waters had assured the recovery of Madras; and peace was restored by the compromise of 1754 between the two Companies. But the flame kindled in Canada, passing into Europe, now spread a conflagration in southern India. In 1756-7 it flared up in Bengal. The preparations for the defence of Fort William (Calcutta) against an expected French fleet infuriated Siraj-ud-daula, Nawab of that province, who, 1 Waddington, R., La Guerre de Sept Ans, IV, 392. 2 Chatham MSS (P.R.O.), no. 85, printed in E.H.R. Oct. 1913; Corbett, J., England in the Seven Years' War, vol. I, chaps. viii-xii. 3 Ibid. 1, 135. 4 Yorke, chap. xxv. |