fleet and then blockade or observe his chief ports—an ideal impossible of attainment until after the victories of Barfleur and La Hogue (May 1692). Earlier, the French had sent out to Martinique a powerful squadron, whose efforts were foiled by the British except in Jamaica, the north of which was ravaged. The miseries of the colony were completed at midsummer by a terrible earthquake, fatal to two-thirds of Port Royal and all the forts. "Till we can fortify", came the demand, "we want five men-of-war, four or five hundred soldiers, arms and ammunition."1 These ships could not be spared; for by now the Admiralty was deluged by demands for convoys to meet the privateering methods which the French had adopted. In fact, the colonies were for a time sacrificed to commerce protection and to the generally futile efforts against the French coasts. Hence also the long delays in the equipment of Sir Francis Wheler's West India expedition, consisting of seven sail and two frigates, which did not leave Cowes Road until 9 January 1693, four months too late. Further difficulties detained Wheler two months at Barbados where the crews contracted fever. At last, on 30 March, he set sail for Martinique. After landing troops on that island he received reinforcements brought by Codrington and resolved to attack St Pierre. The delays having enabled the French to strengthen that place, it defied assailants who were half-paralysed by the fever brought from Barbados and the disaffection of the Irish troops. Wheler therefore called a council of war in which he alone advised an assault. Yielding to the majority, he re-embarked the troops (20 April). Similar councils deterred him from attacking Guadeloupe, and, as his instructions bade him leave the West Indies in May, he returned to Barbados after losing 668 men from fever. As Codrington pointed out, the failure was due, first to his not arriving before the rainy season, and secondly to his instructions, which required the capture in one month of two fortified islands which needed four times as long. Ill fortune dogged Wheler throughout. Arriving off Boston late in July, he urged Phipps to raise 400 men for an attack on Placentia, that nest of French privateers in Newfoundland, but Phipps, having prorogued the Massachusetts Assembly, pleaded inability. Consequently the fleet, still being sickly, was too weak to attack Placentia and returned to England." There the outlook was gloomy. In 1693 the loss of most of the valuable Smyrna convoy and the failure of the attack on Brest aroused furious protests. In July Liverpool merchants complained that of thirty-two ships sent to the West Indies in 1693 only four had returned. The strain told on the finances and therefore on the two services, Godolphin having to bargain with the Jews for money for urgent needs. In April 1695 Dublin bemoaned the fall in Irish trade 1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, p. 685; Clowes, W. M. L., The Royal Navy, 11, 467-9. Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1693-6, pp. 13, 79, 87, 100-2, 133. 3 Ibid. pp. 217, 237. PERILOUS SITUATION OF THE COLONIES 515 and revenue, due to the activities of French privateers.1 Worst sign of all was the incompetence of the Admiralty, as was seen in the just grievances of the seamen, and the advancement of "many of your loose gentry", who are "not bred tarpawlins", and therefore lose their ships. As to warships they are "over-built, over-gunned, and over-masted, built too broad aloft and too narrow below", besides being often foul and therefore slow. What wonder, then, that the Empire suffered? When New England and Jamaica begged for naval protection, the Admiralty replied (20 August 1694) that, of the sixty-three warships available, forty-three were by a recent Act of Parliament told off for the protection of trade. The needs of the service in the Mediterranean, where William's offensive strategy sorely hampered French efforts, disposed of nearly all the remaining twenty.3 A frequent cause of failure in the colonial expeditions being friction between the two services, the King designed a scale for sharing the prize money, and on one occasion inculcated the need of concord. Nevertheless violent discords wrecked the West India expedition of Commodore Wilmott and Colonel Lillingston. The crews sickened on the outward voyage, the conjoint operations with our Spanish allies in Hispaniola against the Port de Paix were marred by constant disputes, and trifling successes there and at Cap François, in the summer of 1695, involved so much loss and hardship that finally the weakened crews could scarcely work the ships home. Very apposite was the warning of the Agents for Jamaica that West India expeditions must arrive in the healthy season, November to March.4 Farther north, the greatest danger arose from the disunion and apathy of the British colonies, which enabled Frontenac to cow the Iroquois, capture the border forts, and harry the New England coasts, with the result that many settlers fled southwards. Even New York was in grave peril; and in November 1696 the citizens petitioned the Crown to fortify that "barrier of all the colonies in America". Requests also came to send out a viceroy who would compel union for defence. The French, clogging us in home waters by threats of invasion, now prepared to capture Boston, and then, if possible, New York. As a preliminary, they struck at the British settlements in Newfoundland, in order thence to prey on New England commerce and ruin English fisheries on the Bank. Brouillan with a warship and eight armed fishing vessels of St Malo laid waste the smaller English settlements, and, when joined by a daring Canadian seaman, 1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1693-6, p. 441. 2 Pepys Correspondence (1679–1703), ed. by J. R. Tanner, 11, 118–20, 320; Charnock, vol. 11, chap. xviii. Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1693-6, pp. 325-34; Corbett, chap. xxvii. Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1696–7, pp. 179–81, 208–10; Burchett, pp. 354-74; Lillingston, L., Reflections on Mr Burchett's Memoirs (1704), passim; Clowes, II, 492-4. * Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1696–7, pp. 189, 212; Burchett, pp. 334, 347, 353. Garneau, 1, 402-6. d'Iberville, with a small force, overwhelmed the brave defenders of St John's, which surrendered along with the remaining settlements (December 1696). The passivity of the British warships off the North American coast at this time is discreditable. But for the vain attempt of a small squadron on the Acadian coast, no sign of activity is observable. The London traders with Newfoundland petitioned Parliament for an expedition in the spring to rescue the surviving settlers and preserve the British fishing fleet of some 140 vessels, which bring home 200,000 quintals of fish.1 Similar requests came from Barnstaple, Bristol, Weymouth, Exeter, Plymouth, Bideford and Poole, Bristol demanding the annual despatch of ten warships and the fortification of St John's, Harbour Grace and Ferryland. Exeter emphasised the training in seamanship furnished by the Bank fishing, and the need of permanent settlements in Newfoundland to succour the crews.2 The mishaps overseas strengthened the Tory claims that William was wasting the strength of England in land campaigns for establishing a barrier for the Dutch against the French, whereas her true policy required vigorous concentration on maritime efforts. The recovery of Newfoundland was delayed by news of de Pointis' raiding expedition to the West Indies, in pursuit of which ViceAdmiral Neville was sent off, too late, however, to save Cartagena from capture and plunder. His arrival in those waters hurried off de Pointis and checked French privateering, but otherwise achieved little. On his way back de Pointis touched at Newfoundland, and should have been worsted by Commodore Norris's expedition, which, reaching St John's on 7 June, had begun to re-establish the British settlements. Unluckily, his land officers mistook de Pointis' squadron for another lately out of Brest and refused to leave St John's. de Pointis therefore escaped to Brest, while Norris restored the British ports.3 Our severe losses in merchantmen1 caused great discontent both at home and in the colonies, which were on the brink of ruin. The mishaps at sea often arose from the disaffection of officers, though the crews seem to have been thoroughly loyal.5 Nevertheless, the British Navy, latterly with little help from the Dutch and none from the Spaniards, had inflicted on that of France losses of warships mounting 2244 guns, while suffering losses of only 1112 guns; and its net gain during the war had been twenty sail and forty frigates." But the widespread colonies and commerce of the allies had suffered far more severely than those of France. Her main fleets (held in reserve after 1692) were still strong enough to compel the allies to retain fleet formation, which told against their efforts to check her raiding squadrons. In the colonial sphere la guerre de course was highly 1 C.J. x1, 681. 2 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1696-7, pp. 206-309. 3 Burchett, pp. 374-7; Life of Capt. S. Martin, ed. by C. Markham (N.R.S. 1895), Pp. 27-33; Life of Sir J. Leake (N.R.S. 1920), I, 90–9. 4 See Clark, G. N., The Dutch Alliance and the War against French Trade, pp. 123-8, 132-5. 5 C.J. XI, 578. • Burchett, pp. 407, 408. Charnock, II, 465. WILLIAM DAMPIER 517 effective. Further the decline in the efficiency of the French Navy has probably been exaggerated by Mahan. In 1697 it held the Mediterranean and could probably have disputed the Channel with the allied fleets, had not Louis XIV's exchequer been exhausted by multiple efforts far beyond his strength. Peace was, therefore, patched up by the Treaty of Ryswick (September 1697), which stipulated the mutual restitution of conquests and the recognition of William III as King of England. Thus ended a struggle which in 1690 threatened disruption to the kingdom and the Empire. The skilful strategy of Torrington after Beachy Head, the indecision of Tourville, and, above all, the fundamental errors of French policy saved England and her colonies from dire danger. After La Hogue, abandoning the defensive, she could by degrees take the offensive, with results which compensated for defeats in Flanders and several mishaps overseas. Some secondary results of these struggles now claim attention. War breeds privateers; and they breed buccaneers and pirates. Amidst the turmoil of war, so-called honest traders, notably slavers and logwood-cutters, after strokes of ill luck, take up the "profession of the seas", which undoubtedly has fostered smart sailing and the daring exploration of risky waters and snug retreats. Of British sailors who made trial of all these shifts, William Dampier (16521713) stands forth chief. Man-of-war's man, seaman in a West India ketch, logwood-cutter among the many Englishmen on the Moskito Coast, buccaneer, pirate and explorer, he ran the whole gamut of tropical adventure, ranging from Jamaica and Panama to Juan Fernandez, and east to Sierra Leone, the Philippines, China, New Holland and Bencoolen. Thanks to good natural gifts, an observant eye and a ready pen, he contrived, amidst all the piracies and blackguardism in which he unwillingly took part, to keep a diary recording his impressions of peoples, lands and facts of natural history. Thus he figures as a link between the times of Captain Kidd and those of Captain Cook. On his return he worked up his diary into a Voyage round the World (1697), the popularity of which induced him to write a supplement. His feline faculty for survival, and marked gifts of observation (specially notable in his Discourse of Winds) attracted the attention of the Admiralty, which accepted his offer of voyaging to New Holland and thence to New Guinea and the neighbouring islands in search of spices or other products. His voyage in the Roebuck (1699-1700) was a failure. The landfall near Shark's Bay in western. Australia was in a forbidding region (the natives are "the miserablest people in the world"), and his coastwise trip to the district he named Dampier Land brought equally small hope of gain. Thence, coasting past Timor and New Guinea, he named New Britain, but found nothing to assuage the growing discontent of his crew. Finally, his 1 Mahan, The influence of sea power upon history, pp. 192-6. 2 See Clark, G. N., chap. iii. battered ship barely reached Ascension on the return; and the venture did not encourage voyages to Terra Australis incognita. Men like Dampier kept alive the spirit of adventure and interest in the Navy, whose late services silenced all opposition to William's programme of new construction. Consequently, on the resumption of hostilities with Louis XIV and his Spanish allies, England possessed some 130 sail ready or completing for sea as against about fifty French sail, so that she was able at once to take the offensive at sea. Such action alone could meet the need of the crisis, which was not only European but world-wide. For if Louis XIV, through his grandson, now styled Philip V of Spain, controlled the policy of Madrid, he would control also the Mediterranean, wealthy domains in Italy, and the larger part of the New World. William and his Austrian, Dutch and German allies regarded the struggle mainly as one for the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. But it also involved the ownership of the new lands overseas, by the resources of which Louis would overwhelm all rivals. Therefore, in supporting "Charles III", the Habsburg claimant to the Spanish throne, the allies sought to rescue Antwerp, Ostend, Cadiz, Barcelona and half of America from the power of France, which else would threaten the Thames, close the Mediterranean, drain the wealth of America and bestride the world like a Colossus. Such was the menace which overcame the scruples of the Tories and enabled William III in his last months to rebuild the Grand Alliance and embark England in a continental war. Anne at her accession adopted his policy and rallied English and Scots around her in sentiments of loyalty, which were to be clinched by the Act of Union (1707). On the other hand, Spain, torn by internal strife and with a rotting marine and decadent army, offered a ready target to the allied efforts; and from the dash on her galleons in Vigo Bay (1702)2 to the capture of Gibraltar (1704) and of Minorca (1708) the chief blows of the British Navy fell on her. The prospects of "Charles III" in Catalonia and the accession of Portugal and Savoy to the Grand Alliance turned the naval war largely towards the Mediterranean. Control of its waters, the dominant note of William's naval strategy, now sounded forth clearly in the despatches of his great pupil, Marlborough. And for the first time the fate of lands far beyond the ocean was to be determined in that ancient womb of empire. Now, as always, France struck first at our most valued and vulnerable point, the West Indies. As has been seen, she was there at her strongest, we at our weakest. Therefore, long before the outbreak of war, she despatched under Châteaurenaut to Martinique forces which early in January 1702 consisted of forty-two warships with 1 Charnock, m, 8-10, 41. 2 Journal of Sir Geo. Rooke, ed. by O. Browning (N.R.S. 1897), pp. 227-35. |