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NEW ERA OF NATIONAL POLICY AND EXPANSION 509 primarily for the discovery of a passage into the South Sea, but also for trading in furs and minerals in "Prince Rupert's Land". It was "to have the sole trade and commerce of and to all the seas, bays, straits, creeks, rivers and sounds in whatsoever latitude they shall be that lie within the entrance of the streight commonly called Hudson's Streights together with all neighbouring lands not possessed by any Christian prince".1 The first decade of Charles II's reign, when King and people were still united, witnessed by far the greatest colonial acquisitions yet effected; but the miserable schism which followed well nigh wrecked the whole fabric of empire. Very significant was the fate of Tangier. In 1680 Parliament refused the annual vote for its maintenance because "the supplies sent thither have been in great measure made up of Popish officers and soldiers"." England's Mediterranean watch-tower was, therefore, abandoned; and its ruin lay as a sign of the paralysing disunion of King and people. The Rock of Gibraltar was soon to be the symbol of a reunion, fruitful not only in Mediterranean, but also in oceanic and imperial strategy.

The accession of William, Prince of Orange, to the throne opened up a new era of national policy and expansion, for he allied the British Isles with the Protestant and Maritime Powers against the threatening might of Louis XIV, thus inaugurating the series of wars with the "natural enemy" which reached their climax at Trafalgar and Waterloo. At the start of the race for empire, France had advantages in her absolute monarchy, then at the height of splendour; in her matchless army; and in her navy, now rivalling those of England and Holland combined. Spain seemed decadent, Italy was a mere mosaic, Germany a prey to disunion, while the Dutch were past the zenith of their energy, and the British Isles felt the troubles of a disputed succession. Thus, with foresight and discretion, Louis XIV should have dominated both the Old World and the New. But, like land power, sea power possesses no infallible magic: its successful working depends chiefly on sound judgment; and here le grand monarque was lacking. A long career of success had nurtured his besetting political sin, grandiosity, and its progeny, diffuseness of aim. William, on the contrary, trained to Dutch economy of effort, made the utmost use of his far scantier resources, saw when to strike, and then struck hard. At once the contrast was startling. While the legions of France devastated the Palatinate and her Navy lay idle, William with an Anglo-Dutch fleet made for Torbay and achieved a bloodless Revolution in England. Next, while he was gaining over allies, the exacting policy of Versailles drove Spain and other Powers into his arms. The higher strategy of the ensuing war (1689-97) also called for clear thinking; and here William's choice of aims was simple and

1 Schooling, W., The Hudson's Bay Co., chap. i.

2 C.J. x, 665; Tanner, J. R., Cat. of the Pepysian MSS (N.R.S.), rv, 558.

For details see Powley, E. B., The English Navy in the Revolution of 1688, chaps. ii-v.

telling. Louis, on the contrary, toyed with many schemes, whereas prudence counselled concentration either on the continental or the maritime war; that is, either on Amsterdam and Cologne, or on London, Dublin and New York. Fortunately for his neighbours, he attempted all five enterprises. Therefore, while gaining initial successes in all quarters (save that the New York design withered for lack of ships and men) he could nowhere push them home. True, in 1690, the French fleets gained off the Irish coast and Beachy Head victories which promised triumph to the Jacobite cause, yet the skilful retreat of Torrington and his retention of a "fleet in being" off the Essex coast thwarted the threatened invasion of England;1 while William, crossing the Irish Sea with an adequate army under light escort, scattered James II's forces and drove him from Ireland. Thus, by the end of 1690 the unity of the British Isles was restoredan essential preliminary to the establishment of naval supremacy and colonial security. James having strengthened the Navy and well stocked the dockyards, 100 sail of the line were ready, or completing for sea in that year.2

Meanwhile, the British Empire had been in grave danger, alike through internal dissensions and French aggressions. That William appreciated the crisis appears in an Order in Council (2 May 1689) planning the fortification of St John's as a sure base for our Newfoundland fishermen, and operations against the adjoining French ports in Newfoundland, which became nests of privateers in war time. The importance attached to the West Indies appears in his order to despatch a fleet to the Leeward Isles; "for the party superior at sea in those parts will probably prevail on land". Before the departure of this force (March 1690), bad news poured in from all quarters. The Hudson's Bay Company bemoaned the destruction of its forts by the French Canadians, who flaunted their design of capturing New York, fortifying its harbour and dominating America by sea and land. Never was there a better opportunity; for the disputed succession in England increased the spirit of dissidence in the Plantations. The rabble of New York deposed the governor, and the Bostonians—a "giddy and enraged mob"-imprisoned theirs, besides capturing the King's guardship. Governor Randolph from the common gaol smuggled to England a warning letter (29 May) that the French were everywhere encroaching, while the Jesuit fathers were winning over some of our Iroquois allies with tales of the 4000 Canadians ready to descend on the weak and distracted English. By the end of July Massachusetts had lost its fisheries and the frontier forts.

1 Colomb, P. H., Naval Warfare, pp. 110-22; Thursfield, J. R., Nelson and other Naval Studies, pp. 113-6.

2 Camden Society, XLVI, 26-36; Burchett, J., Transactions at Sea, 1688-97 (1703), pp. 3-19; Lavisse, Hist. de France, vol. vIII, chap. ii; Charnock, J., Naval Architecture, vol. II, chap. xvi. 3 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1689–92, pp. 22, 32.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR NORTH AMERICA From the middle and southern colonies came reports scarcely less gloomy. All the coast settlements beg for naval succours, even Virginia and Maryland declaring that frigates are their best protection.1 The merchants trading to New York set forth that the French, if not stoutly opposed, will capture that city "which is the centre of all the American colonies", make it a privateering centre and overrun all the mainland colonies, "which will be the ruin of our West India islands". To avert this disaster they urge the fortifying of New York. Nothing so far-seeing appears in the proceedings of the colonial Assemblies, whose mutual rivalries sapped every effort. Yet at that time Count Frontenac, returning to the scene of his former triumphs in Canada, was maturing a plan for a double attack on New York by sea, as also by land down the Champlain-Hudson rift. Insufficient support from France and the inherent difficulty of coordinating the two expeditions marred the project; but with the aid of Indian allies he organised frontier raids which terrorised New England and New York. If his object was to pin their militia to frontier defence while he prepared a blow at New York or Boston, he failed; for the Indian outrages aroused a resolve to procure assistance from England, and by means of her fleet strike at Quebec, their militia meanwhile threatening Montreal. As supremacy in North America depended on sea power, the New Englanders sent home requests for help, they themselves undertaking to supply 500 troops with transports. Meanwhile the militia (which on paper numbered 13,279 men) would attack Montreal and Quebec by way of Lake Champlain.3

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The plan was the first of several which were tried without success until the year 1759. The same causes of failure generally appear: the reluctance of the colonies to send their quotas; desertions, delays, and quarrels as to leadership; the slowness of the Home Government to supply ships and troops, and dislocation between the maritime and land expeditions; for the former, sailing by a devious route for Quebec, was completely out of touch with the latter, aimed directly by land at Montreal; whereas the French defenders, acting on interior lines and on a fine waterway, could rally promptly at either place. In this first effort, a Boston adventurer, Sir William Phipps, collected there a force of eight vessels and 446 volunteers, with which he reduced Port Royal in Acadia (11 May 1690), but this success was soon reversed by a single French warship, which carried off the English governor. Meanwhile with a larger force of five armed ships and twenty-nine unarmed transports, manned by New Englanders, Phipps prepared to ascend the St Lawrence, while 2000 men 1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 45-7, 66, 82, 101, 389.

2 Lorin, H., Le Comte de Frontenac, pp. 356-62; Osgood, H. L., The American Colonies in the 18th Century, vol. 1, chap. iii; Garneau, H., Hist. du Canada (5th edn, 1913), pp. 379–82. Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 240-1, 261.

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Guttridge, G. H., Colonial Policy of Willian III, pp. 103–6, 184.

advanced on Montreal by the Hudson-Richelieu route. The latter effort miscarried owing to smallpox and transport difficulties; and Phipps, though reaching Quebec with ease, there failed still more egregiously, his men finally rushing to the boats and abandoning their cannon and stores (21 October). Thereafter, storms completed their discomfiture, the venture altogether costing the Boston "undertakers" £50,000.1 This conclusion is characteristic of the age. Men, money and resources being very limited, each side sought to harry the other in order to spread out and thin the opposing forces. Neither could strike heavily both by sea and land; and the interdependence of the naval and military efforts, important even at the time of Wolfe, is the paramount factor at the time of Phipps. In 1690, iar more than in 1759, these young communities, in war as in peace, depended absolutely on the mother countries, without whose help their sparrings were almost puerile.

Similar scenes of sporadic indecisive warfare occurred in the West Indies. As the Greeks had long ago discovered, an extensive archipelago inclines men to raiding habits, which demoralise commerce and degrade warfare. Rich islets invite assault, and are the despair of their defenders. Even a weak frigate squadron overpowered isle after isle before the motherland could effectively intervene. A fleet decided everything. Further the British strategic position there was weak, our Leeward Islands, from St Christopher on the north-west to Barbados on the south-east, having no good harbour or naval base, while the French base, Fort Royal in Martinique, occupied a central position, whence even a great fleet, after shelter and repairs, could run down before the constant easterly trade winds and overpower either those islands or Jamaica. That island, again, had at Port Royal no adequate protection or docking facilities, and lay to leeward of the many French ports in the western half of Hispaniola (San Domingo), whence raiders easily swooped down on a coast hard to defend. What wonder that the colonists sent home bitter complaints? The merchants of Jamaica beg for three frigates, good sailers, to ply to windward and protect the coasts and the trade. St Christopher is in a worse case; for there the strong Irish element defiantly holds to King James and joins the numerous French settlers. The Irish in Nevis and Montserrat are also turbulent. Antigua, the seat of government of the Leeward Isles, complains of neglect; for during three years it has seen not a frigate "to protect from pilfering pickeroons"; it begs for a squadron "to turn our mourning into joy". Even the populous and wealthy island of Barbados lives under a cloud. "If (writes home the governor on 30 May 1689) you could spare me a few men of war, I could, with the men I could raise here, capture the French Islands"; but the French "make their greatest advantage

1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1689–92, pp. 338, 368, 376, 415; Parkman, F., Frontenac, chap. xiii; Garneau, pp. 385-91; Osgood, 1, 87-92.

OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES

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by surprise". Others point out that if we take Guadeloupe and Martinique the French fleet will soon be helpless; but this enterprise demands a large naval and military force from England. Instead there comes a French fleet, which, landing troops in St Christopher, devastates all the British portion, whereupon Count de Blénac, Governor of Martinique, threatens to sweep bare all the British islands.1 Sickness, however, soon thins the French crews, and palsies their efforts.

Not until May 1690 did the long-expected British expedition under Captain Wright reach Barbados. With his nine vessels and a few armed merchantmen, he soon set sail for St Christopher, there effecting a junction with the local forces commanded by Codrington, Governor of the Leeward Islands. Alike in thought and action Codrington stands forth as the ablest leader in the West Indieswitness his despatch of 1 March 1690: "Had we a fleet to make us masters of the sea, 2000 soldiers from England would amply suffice to make us so on land in all the French islands, if Barbados be ordered to help us, as she is in a position to do....A fleet and suitable instructions to the Governors would suffice to drive the French out of America, and I heartily hope this war may see it done".2 Landing his men secretly in a cove near Basse Terre, the capital of St Christopher, Codrington took the French lines in reverse; then, constructing a battery on Brimstone Hill, overpowered their chief fort, and with naval assistance compelled the French and Irish to surrender (July 1690). These were shipped away to French islands; whereupon he reinstated most of the former British inhabitants. Marie Galante and St Eustatius were also reduced. Next he urged Jamaica and Barbados to seize the present opportunity and with united forces drive the French from all their islands. But the Jamaicans were too scared by French raids and by a negro rising, and Barbados by fears of one, to send reinforcements.3 Sickness and lack of provisions hampered the fleet, which effected nothing of note. After the hurricane months, Codrington urged an attack on Guadeloupe or Martinique, adding, "I shall try to pick up a month's subsistence for it [the fleet] even if we should half starve ourselves". Again, after the failure of the attack on Guadeloupe, he wrote: "All turns on mastery of the sea. If we have it, our islands are safe, however thinly peopled; if the French have it, we cannot, after the recent mortality, raise enough men in all the islands to hold one of them".5

This maxim was applicable to the naval war as a whole. For while the French controlled the English Channel, the allied fleets could not prevent them from sending out expeditions at will. The only effective defence of all the colonies was to beat the enemy's main

CHBE I

1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 27, 49, 65, 73, 79, 85, 95, 113.
2 Ibid. pp. 113, 121, 147, 229.
3 Ibid. pp. 291, 303-5, 316.
• Ibid. pp. 327, 369.
Ibid. pp. 536-40.

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