BUTE AND PITT 489 to disagree with Pitt. He resembled him in haughtiness and theatricality of manner, but had little knowledge either of diplomacy or of war. When differences appeared early in 1761, Pitt did not disguise his contempt for Bute's inexperience. Pitt might have modified some of his views on the peace, or deferred to some of the King's wishes; he could not bring himself to defer to those of the King's instrument. Bute, who did not lack a certain shrewdness, did not wish to attack a minister idolised by the people and successful in the conduct of a great war. He wanted, indeed, if he could, to use Pitt, and not to expel him from the Cabinet. But he prepared for a possible struggle, by demonstrating that he was the real dispenser of royal favours. He got Henley made Chancellor early in 1761; he promoted George Grenville, whose financial gifts made him suspect Pitt's war policy, and kept him informed of all important business. Bute next dismissed Legge, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for differing from him over an election, and replaced him by Lord Barrington, an avowed tool of the Crown. Finally, in March, he persuaded Lord Holdernesse to resign the seals of the Secretary of State, which he himself assumed. Pitt, who was now to share the direction of foreign policy with Bute, actually did not hear of the proposed appointment until it was too late to oppose it. And in this very month diplomacy became of supreme importance. For France began to negotiate for peace. The military events of 1761 had an important effect on its diplomacy. Early in the year, and in spite of Newcastle, Pitt had sent an expedition to Belleisle, and the failure of the first attack and the delay in the final capture (it only fell on 7 June), gravely affected British diplomacy. An attack on Mauritius also failed, but these failures were balanced by a success in Germany, and by captures of Dominica in the West Indies and of Pondicherry, the last French stronghold in India. The British Cabinet were encouraged to hold their heads high in the critical days of July. Apart from Pitt, the Cabinet were generally for peace, and largely on financial grounds. As far back as 9 April 1760, Newcastle wrote: "Mr Pitt flew into a violent passion at my saying we could not carry on the war another year; [he said] that that was the way to make peace impracticable and to encourage our enemy".1 But Newcastle was supported by Hardwicke, and by the military and naval advisers, Lords Ligonier and Anson, who favoured concessions to France because they did not think that England could fight a Franco-Spanish combination. Bute and the King for a time mediated between Pitt and Newcastle, but neither George III nor his adviser had any real experience of diplomacy and war, or the insight or capacity to form a correct judgment on either. It is probable that no British minister realised either the strength or the weakness of Choiseul's position. Though dependent on the favour of Louis XV and La Pompadour, he had also appealed for 1 Yorke, Hardwicke, m, 244. support to the French public, and could not consent to humiliating terms. Moreover, he was hampered by two allies, one actual, Austria, one potential, Spain. Austria wanted to continue the war; Choiseul wanted to make a separate peace with England. Spain was likely to join in the war if England's peace terms did not satisfy France. Hence, though willing to offer terms, Choiseul was not negotiating like a really beaten enemy. For, if the war continued, he was likely to have a new ally. Late in March 1761, Choiseul, through the Russian ambassador in England, suggested the assembling of a European peace congress at Augsburg. This was to be preceded by the conclusion of a separate peace between France and England. The basis of that peace was to be the uti possidetis, i.e. the territory actually held by each Power at a certain date. But the dates were to vary with each theatre of war, so that operations, already en train, might have a chance of being completed. Choiseul proposed that the date for Europe should be I May, that for the West Indies and Africa 1 July, and that for the East Indies 1 September. But these detailed dates, together with the question of compensation for surrender of territory, were to be matter for negotiation. The British Government replied by accepting in principle both the peace congress and the separate negotiation, but demurred as to the proposed dates at which hostilities should cease. I Choiseul at once changed his tone and refused to alter the dates. Pitt, who hoped soon to capture Belleisle and, therefore, to have a further card in his hand, induced the Cabinet on 27 April to reject Choiseul's dates, and to refuse to fix new ones until Belleisle fell. It was, however, agreed to receive a French negotiator (Bussy) in London and to send a British one (Hans Stanley) to Paris. The instructions to Stanley were decided in a Cabinet meeting of 13 May. Pitt was unable to persuade his colleagues to take a definite decision as to what was to happen to her German allies, some of whose territory was in French hands. All they would say was that Choiseul was to be informed that England would not desert the King of Prussia. Bussy's mission to England is a matter of much mystery; in days past he had earned English gold for revealing French secrets.1 He seems to have been conciliatory to Newcastle, but unbending towards Pitt, and to have tried to sow dissension between the two parties in the Cabinet. At any rate Choiseul proved more conciliatory in France. After the fall of Belleisle (7 June) the British Cabinet fixed the uti possidetis date in Europe as 16 June, informed Choiseul that peace must be signed by 1 August, and upon terms to be considered as final, apart from what happened at Augsburg. These suggestions were never really considered, for they crossed a proposal made by Choiseul on 17 June. He proposed to get over the 1 Waddington, Renversement des Alliances, p. 101; Yorke, Hardwicke, ш, 128. CHOISEUL'S NEGOTIATION 491 difficulty of the dates by specifying the terms. He would restore Minorca to England in exchange for Guadeloupe, Marie Galante and Goree. He would cede Canada with new boundaries, but what they were is not easy to see.1 If we may judge from his memorial of 15 July, he wished to interpose a neutral belt between Louisiana, the Great Lakes and the Ohio. He desired to retain, though not to fortify, Cape Breton Island (i.e. to maintain France's fishing rights in the St Lawrence), and also to keep fishing rights off Newfoundland. He offered to surrender her conquests from the German allies of England. These terms were probably sincere, though Choiseul wanted not a lasting peace but a truce, in which he could reorganise French resources. On 24 June, the British Cabinet all agreed to reject the claims for redefining the boundaries of Canada and for restoring to France Cape Breton or the fishing of the St Lawrence. Opinion was divided over the Newfoundland fisheries. The Newcastle party (including Halifax, the colonial expert) wished to concede the French demands; Pitt and Temple to reject them. Bute (and the King) wished to negotiate further and see if France would yield. Pitt seems to have criticised this not wholly unstatesmanlike idea with undue asperity, and thus perhaps provoked their opposition. He drafted a reply to Choiseul (accepted by the Cabinet on 26 June) demanding all Canada, and stating that France could not enjoy her rights to the Newfoundland fisheries under the Treaty of Utrecht without substantial compensation to England. Guadeloupe and Marie Galante would be restored only if the territory of England's German allies was immediately evacuated. Senegal and Goree were to be ceded to England and Dunkirk was to be dismantled according to the conditions of Utrecht. Choiseul seems to have been sincerely convinced that he could not make peace without "saving face" by extorting some British concession over Dunkirk, and without obtaining at least a partial concession over the fisheries. He still pleaded for Cape Breton, but this may have been a way of bidding higher for Newfoundland. His reply of the 15th which reached England on 20 July demanded a share in the Newfoundland fisheries and Cape Breton Island as well. He added ominously that, while he would surrender the French conquests from the German allies of England, he must except those of the King of Prussia. He could not restore these last without the consent and knowledge of Austria, and in a private memorial he intimated that she would not surrender them. More ominous still, he sent a private memorial to England advising her to end her disputes with Spain, and "agree to invite" Spain "to guarantee" the new treaty. This last step seems to have been a grave departure from 1 The wording is "une fixation des limites du Canada dans la partie de l'Ohio déterminée par les eaux pendantes". P.R.O., Chatham MSS, vol. LXXXV. diplomatic etiquette, against which Spain had already been warned. The British reply was decided upon on 24 July, after the news of the fall of Pondicherry, of the capture of Dominica and of Ferdinand's victory at Vellinghausen reached England. It declared both private memorials inadmissible. In other respects the British answer, sent on the 25th but known by the date of its reception as the "ultimatum of 29 July", was a stiff one. It declined again to permit the French rights of fishery in the St Lawrence or to restore Cape Breton. It demanded the demolition of the fortifications of Dunkirk in return for a French share in the fisheries of Newfoundland. It declined to draw any distinction between the King of Prussia and England's other German allies. It demanded the restoration of Minorca by France in return for the British restitution of Guadeloupe and Belleisle. On receiving this reply on 29 July, Choiseul decided to continue the war. But, though no longer sincere in his desire for peace, he tried to prolong the negotiations to prevent any English attacks that year. On 15 August he achieved his great masterpiece, and signed the third Pacte de Famille with Spain. He engaged to support Spanish interests and Spain promised to come into the war with all possible speed. Ten days before the signature of the Pacte de Famille, Choiseul delivered to Pitt what was afterwards known as the "French ultimatum of 5 August". He demanded French fishing rights and an island in the St Lawrence and the erection of a barrier territory formed by neutral Indian tribes in the hinterland between Louisiana and Canada. In the West Indies he demanded St Lucia and the restoration to France of Guadeloupe and Marie Galante. On the coast of West Africa he demanded the return of Senegal. But he refused to restore Minorca or to evacuate the territories of the King of Prussia. Pitt returned a strong answer on 16 August. There was, however, some justification for this attitude, for Bussy, in presenting the "French ultimatum", stated that the British one of "29 July" "betrays the aversion of the Court of London for peace". He warmly deprecated Pitt's refusal to receive the Spanish memorial, and said that refusal would draw closer the bonds between the French and the Spanish Bourbons. But the stiff attitude of Pitt, which Bute and the King had hitherto upheld, now aroused their fears and provoked a reaction. Bute did not even yet wish to expel Pitt, but to outvote him. Feelings had already ruled high in the Cabinet, Pitt had thumped the table, and said he would not "take a cobbled draft". Now, on 17 August, he was outvoted and obliged to transmit a very conciliatory communication to France. England now offered a share in the fishing rights of the St Lawrence and Newfoundland, together with the isle of St Pierre. For the strict provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht regarding Dunkirk were now substituted the milder ones of Aix-la-Chapelle. These concessions were made just after the Pacte de Famille had PITT'S LAST COUNCIL 493 been signed. Stanley's communication was dated 1 September. As Choiseul gave an unsatisfactory reply, the Cabinet ordered Stanley to return to England (15 September). On 18 September Pitt summoned the Cabinet to take an even more important decision. He proposed to anticipate the danger of a union of the Bourbons by demanding explanations of Spain and by attacking her if they were not satisfactory. He had pierced to the heart of the situation and divined that France would not make because Spain was ready to make war. Pitt knew more of the SpanishFrench designs than any other Cabinet minister, for his naval and colonial despatches proved that Spain was conspicuously unfriendly to British trade in America. peace Apart from this, his evidence, though not good in a court of law, was good enough. The private memorial of Choiseul referring to Spain was gravely suspicious. For Pitt now knew that it had been made with the full approval of Spain, which had been warned against such joint diplomatic action in 1760, and Bussy's remarks in presenting the ultimatum of 5 August were menacing. More than one intercepted diplomatic despatch roused suspicions as to Choiseul's conduct at the end of July. Another established the existence of the Pacte de Famille; Pitt did not indeed know all the terms, and could not prove, though he shrewdly guessed, that Spain had pledged herself to make war with France against England. But it did not need much penetration to see that a secret agreement of this kind, signed after Choiseul had stiffened his terms, must have been of this nature. But only Lord Temple supported Pitt's views on "preventive war". On 21 September the King refused to receive a paper signed by Pitt and Temple giving the views of the 18th, and the Cabinet decided to await further news from Stanley. This marked the final stage, for Bute had at length determined to abandon Pitt as he would not give up his scheme of "preventive war". The last meeting was on 2 October. In after days Pitt spoke of it as "a trembling council". All were against Pitt and Temple, but from different motives. Newcastle and Hardwicke were influenced partly by a belief that strong action might produce the union they feared, and partly by the belief (encouraged by Anson and Ligonier) that England could not fight both Spain and France with success. Bute seems to have refused to believe that the peace he desired would be endangered. We have broken snatches of what Pitt said: "I have in my bag so much matter as I think would be criminal matter against any Secretary of State who lets it sleep in his office. [It is] the highest indignity that ever was offered to the Crown of England. As to the safety of the public, 'tis the worst species of war [for Spain] to abet France with her full weight, [to] cover her trade and lend her money and abet France in negotiation. You are now at war with the House of Bourbon. You are prepared and she is not". He |