by the simple practice of kidnapping the inhabitants of the coastal districts seems too absurd to need contradiction, but as the question was put to witnesses in the parliamentary enquiry about the African trade in 1817, the persistence of the idea can be seen. Some of the dwellers on the coast undoubtedly were sold for crime or debt or when taken prisoners in war. A certain amount of kidnapping existed among the natives, but Europeans, as a general rule, could not condemn free blacks to slavery. They had to abide by native customs as to what constituted a slave and what a free man in the subtle code of the coast. Custom was a power which gave protection in West Africa as well as on English manors, and the domestic slave of the coast was by no means always the rightless creature he has been painted. The prices paid for slaves to the native dealers varied very greatly in the second half of the seventeenth century. When the Company had a monopoly of the coast the purchase price in Africa of a slave was about £3 and the sale price in the West Indies from £13 to £16,1 but at the end of the century the planters were complaining that the prices had gone up intolerably. The goods with which these sums were paid in West Africa varied to some extent during the period, though certain goods had a never failing popularity. Before the English slave trade began, the Dutch had been getting to know the mind of the West African market, and in 1600 a Dutch traveller described vessels of copper (especially basins and kettles), iron, tin, linen, serges and beads as the most valuable articles in trade.2 The Royal African Company frankly imitated the Dutch, and tried to beat them in the market they had built up. In 1677 the Committee of Goods was directed by the Court of Assistants to have certain Dutch materials copied in England.3 The Company also developed a trade in English woollen cloth, for all kinds of which, from broad cloth to serges, there was a good demand in spite of the climate. It claimed that it was also the means of introducing new manufactures into England for the express purpose of the African market, among the new materials invented expressly for this trade being "annabasses", "nicanees", "tapseils", and "brawls" made in London, and striped carpets and "boysadoes" made in Kidderminster. European merchants found the natives extremely shrewd business men, and, as the Dutch traveller who has been already quoted pointed out in something of an ag grieved tone, the natives were quick to discover and reject faulty merchandise, and in making purchases inspected them "as curiously as in Europe is done".5 1 A Clear Demonstration...that the Recovery...of Britain's share of the Trade to Africa is wholly owing to the industry, care and application of the Royal Africa Company (Brit. Mus. 8223, c. 4). • Purchas, vi, 282, "Description of Guinea", translated from the Dutch, 1600. 3 Minutes, Court of Assist., R. African Co. 21 August 1677 (P.R.O. T. 70/77). A Clear Demonstration (Brit. Mus. 8223, e. 4). Purchas, vi, 283. METHODS OF THE SLAVE TRADE 445 When the slaves had been purchased, the next concern of the Company was to despatch them to the West Indies with the greatest possible speed. Sometimes negroes were brought to the ports when there were no vessels on the coast, and even when the vessels were awaiting their cargo, delays in loading were inevitable. During these intervals the slaves were kept in the forts in the horrible quarters called by the English "the slave hole", or, more frankly by the Dutch, "the prison". There they were kept and fed at the expense of the Company till they could be put on board the vessels. Of all the barbarities of the slave trade, with the possible exception of the long forced marches down from the interior to the coast, the Atlantic crossing the "middle passage”—was without rival the worst. The object of the Company was to transport as many slaves as possible in each vessel and it succeeded to an appalling extent.1 The space allowed for each slave was the amount of deck on which he could lie at full length, and the height allowed was just sufficient for him to crawl out to go to the upper deck for fresh air and meals. Specially decked vessels were built for the trade. In these narrow decks the slaves were packed as closely as possible, and not much imagination is needed to picture the condition in rough weather. Bosman maintained that the Dutch were better than other countries in their attention to the cleanliness of the slave vessels, "the French, Portugese and English slave ships are always foul and stinking; on the contrary ours are for the most part clean and neat".2 One of the explanations of the long survival of the slave trade is that these vessels did not call with their human cargo at English ports but sailed direct for the West Indies and therefore the worst conditions of the middle passage were not generally known. Second in misery to the slaves were the sailors on the slaving vessels. They had to live in a foul atmosphere, and attend to the miserable cargo, and in addition to the danger of enemy attacks common to seventeenthcentury voyages there was the constant danger of a slave rising. When the vessels reached the West Indies the negroes were again sold and passed to the plantation owners. The percentage charged for the expenses of the Company in delivering the slaves to the West Indies does not represent a striking profit, when in addition to the expenses in Africa and on the passage in feeding the slaves, the serious risks of loss of a large part of the cargo by illness or accident is considered. The number of slaves carried by the Royal African Company to the West Indies in the late seventeenth century was about 5000 a year, each ship carrying from 120 to 700. For security against rivals the Royal African Company had to extend its holdings in Africa. It therefore built new forts and enlarged those it had received from the Royal Adventurers. By the end of the century its forts were well distributed along the coast, giving entrance to a very wide trading field, their chief centres being the Gambia and the Gold Coast. The greatest expense to the Royal African Company, and at the same time the strongest argument for its tenure of exclusive privileges, was the part it took in contest with other European Powers. The propitious conditions in which it began did not continue, for both the French and Dutch reorganised their African trade and prepared for a revival of the struggle for mastery; in 1674 a new French Company was formed, and in 1675 the Dutch Company was remodelled. Fortunately for the Royal African Company the main contest after 1674 was between the Dutch and the French. The victory went to the French, who in 1678 captured Goree and Arguin from the Dutch, and established themselves so unquestionably as the stronger power in the Senegal region that Barbot wrote in 1732 that the Dutch "have lost all their interest in these parts of Africa and all manner of trade whatsoever; unless now and then some interlopers of that nation will run the hazard of being seized, and their ships and goods confiscated by the English agent, or the commanders of the Royal African Company's ships following that trade".1 With the eclipse of the Dutch the Royal African Company became the chief rival to the French, who maintained that their capture of the Dutch posts in the Senegal region gave them a monopoly of the trade of that territory, and the English Company had thus to face determined opposition even in the Gambia where it had been trading for many years. The French Senegal Company failed because it attempted too much, but in 1684 a new Company with more compassable aims was founded, and was extremely active and hostile to the English.2 In 1688 the French attempted to capture James Fort in the Gambia from the English but failed. The situation of the English Company changed when William III came to the throne, and the ensuing war gave an opportunity for settling the Senegal dispute. An English force captured Fort St Louis and Goree in 1692, but the Company was unable to maintain a fortified post at Goree and in 1693 the French retook the island. In retaliation for the English victory in 1692 James Fort fell to the French in 1695. The war weakened both Companies seriously and by the Treaty of Ryswick the status quo ante bellum was re-established and conquests were restored. Meanwhile the Company's profits were also being affected by a conflict with interlopers in the trade. The trouble was by no means new, for within a few months of receiving its charter the Company had petitioned the Crown to order a special proclamation against the intrusion of unauthorised persons into its territory. Charles II 1 Barbot, J., Description of the Coasts of Guinea, 1732, p. 75. Stone, T. G., "The Struggle for power on the Senegal and Gambia, 1660–1713” (an unpublished thesis in the Library of the University of London). Minutes, Court of Assist., R. African Co. 20 October 1674 (P.R.O. T. 70/76). THE ROYAL AFRICAN COMPANY'S MONOPOLY 447 and James II had inclined to support the Company's claims, as a certain proportion of all prizes went into the royal exchequer, and the Company exercised its monopoly rights vigorously. Yet in spite of such discouragements interlopers continued their attacks, and with the first opportunity they asserted their claims. The moment came with the accession of William III when the Bill of Rights was interpreted as implying that all monopolies that had been granted through the exercise of the royal dispensing power were no longer of effect.1 This interpretation of the Bill was not accepted by the Royal African Company, but the contemporary attacks on the East India Company showed how far from secure those who held royal charters were. The Court of Assistants therefore attempted to get parliamentary sanction for its privileges,2 arguing that the Company had for years supported the trade, and that it would be compelled to give the trade up unless it were protected from being disturbed. In answer to this the "free traders" submitted that the West Indies would be benefited by a free and enlarged slave trade.3 From 1690 to 1697 the opposing arguments were at intervals presented to the Commons, who seemed unable to take decisive action. In 1694 they voted that forts and castles were necessary for the support of the trade, and that they could only be maintained by a joint-stock company, but no measure was passed to confirm the royal charter. In 1696 the Company again attempted to secure confirmation of its privileges, but again the "cheap slave" interest defeated it. Two years later the Company changed its tactics, as it realised that the demand of an open slave trade had become irresistible, and instead of continuing the hopeless attempt to get parliamentary confirmation of its monopoly from Barbary to the Cape of Good Hope, it offered to leave to the free traders all the coast except the Senegal and Gambia, if that region were confirmed to it. The offer aroused no enthusiastic gratitude in the hard hearts of the free traders, and caused a storm of opposition from the cloth manufacturers, who depended on the Gambia for the supply of dyewoods. The proposal, though it was rejected by the Commons, led to the passing of an Act' which provided that the whole African trade should be open to all His Majesty's subjects, the Company receiving 10 per cent. on all goods imported into Africa, to enable it to defend and maintain the forts for the protection of all traders. An additional duty varying from 5 to 10 per cent. was to be levied in the Gambia region on all exports from Africa except slaves. The Act was to last for thirteen years. From 1698 to 1713 the trade was carried on under its provisions, but from the first it worked badly. 1 Macpherson, D., Annals of Commerce, II, 569. 3 Ibid. pp. 448-56. Ibid. x1, 68, 24 January 1694; 113-29, 2 March 1694. 7 9 William III, c. 26. The Company complained that the sums it received from the duties were quite insufficient for the upkeep of the forts, and the free traders that trade derived no benefit from the Company. In the period of difficulty with the free traders the Royal African Company was not strong enough to oppose French attempts to trade in the Gambia and even James Fort was attacked and forced to capitulate in 1702,1 and the Company was unable to spare the money and arms to reconquer it and restore trade there. In this weak position the Company decided to treat with the French Company, and, as the Compagnie de Sénégal was in little better state than its rivals, a treaty for mutual assistance against disturbers of the trade was signed in 1705. It was an alliance of privileged Companies against the detested interlopers, and after its signature both Companies tried to restore their trade, but financial trouble continued to beset the English Company, and many of the forts and trading posts fell into a state of utter dilapidation, James Fort being abandoned in 1709.3 As the thirteen years of the Act of 1697 came to an end the separate traders renewed their efforts to secure the complete abolition of all restrictions. In support of their view they canvassed opinion in Parliament by means of petitions, and in the world at large through a torrent of pamphlets. On the side of the Company it was maintained that the competition of the open trade on the African coast had so greatly raised the purchase price of negroes there that instead of resulting in a lowered sale price in the West Indies, as had been hoped, the Act had had the reverse effect. On the other hand it was the planters, who might have been expected to understand their own interests, who petitioned most eagerly for an open trade in the hopes of more and cheaper negroes. The Company also declared that it performed a great national service by encouraging the woollen manufacture, but the manufacturers protested that their trade to Africa was cramped by the monopoly. Just when opinion in Parliament seemed to be so clearly in support of a free trade that the next action to be expected was a decisive pronouncement in its favour, the Company produced a new argument. In a petition to the Commons in 1710 it suggested that a strong joint-stock company would be necessary if England were to get the Spanish Asiento. No immediate action followed this petition, except the inevitable counter petition from free traders, but when the preliminaries of the Treaty of Utrecht were being negotiated, the views of the Company were allowed some consideration. By the grant of the Asiento in the Treaty of Utrecht England became the sole importer of slaves into Spanish America. The privileges of the Asiento were assigned by the Crown to the South Sea Company, whose history is dealt with elsewhere in this volume.5 The resulting 2 Labat, IV, 346. 1 Stone, ut cit. p. 185. 3 An answer to a scurrilous paper... (Brit. Mus. 8223, e. 4). 4 C.J. XVI, 275, 24 January 1710. 5 Vide supra, chap. xi. |