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COLONIAL SEPARATISM

389

upon the little power reserved to the Crown in the Royal Charter", was Belcher's own comment.1

The Privy Council reviewed the Assembly's claims and actions in 1733, and declared that they evidently showed "that their design is to assume to themselves the executive power of the government of the said province, and has a direct tendency to throw off their dependence upon Great Britain". Yet, rather than face the issue at this juncture, the British Government yielded. The policy of laisser faire and conciliation prevailed. Belcher was allowed to accept the offer of an annual grant, and victory rested with the colonists.

The representatives, it is evident, were doggedly fighting for control of their own affairs. They had no cause to complain of the character and ability of their governors. Dudley had been a native of Massachusetts; Shute an "independent" in religion, clear-headed, and conscientious; Burnet a mild and honest man of the school of Hunter; Belcher was a Boston shopkeeper, who had acted as agent in London for the representatives' cause, and a virulent antiEpiscopalian. It was not against persons but for a principle that the New Englanders fought. They saw their goal clearly and never swerved from their course. British ministers, vowing they would ne'er consent, consented. It was an ominous precedent for the future. The uniformity of the main lines of the constitutional struggle does not imply that the colonists were unanimous in their views. There was, on the contrary, much bitter partisanship having its origin partly in the different economic conditions of the several provinces, partly in the various origins of the settlements, and partly in the action and reaction of political events in England. There was, for instance, in New York a "country party" whose interests were opposed to those of the merchants of the towns; there were the Dutch and French and inheritors of the Leislerian tradition; in New Jersey, as in South Carolina, the Anglican party was in bitter opposition to the Quakers, Dissenters, and the Proprietary party; in Maryland, Protestants opposed and oppressed Roman Catholics. If the colonies aimed at the management of their own separate affairs, they were not in the least inclined to unite either for their independence or their own defence. The idea that they were endeavouring to throw off their allegiance to the Crown was scouted by Dummer3 as fervently as by the Assembly of New York in 1741;4 whilst observers like Thomas Bannister dismissed the notion of the Plantations ever setting up for themselves as wild and unfounded. "Different schemes," he declared, "interests, notions, religions, customs and manners will for ever divide them from one another and unite them to the Crown."5 Commercial rivalry, as between New

1 C.O. 5, 898, nos. 84, 84, i, 87.

2 A.P.C., Col. I, 329–34. N.Y. Ass. Journals, 1, 792, 810. "Essay on the Trade of New England"; Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1715, no. 508.

* Dummer, J., A Defence of N.É. Charters.

York and New England, was one cause of jealousy and separatism. New Jersey, for example, which had been administered by the same governor as New York, demanded and obtained a separate governor on the grounds that the development of the province was hindered by its more opulent and powerful neighbour (1730).1 Boundary disputes provided another cause of cleavage, as between Virginia and North Carolina and Maryland, between New York and New Jersey and Connecticut, and between Maryland and Pennsylvania. Apart from the general unifying influence of language, constitutions, and political ideas inherited from the mother country, any tendency towards unity came from pressure from without, and hitherto with little effect. The colonies were as unwilling to exert themselves in self-defence as they were to unite in defending each other. Planters, engrossed in business, gave a grudging response to the demands of governors for strengthening their fortifications and militias. The pacificism of the Quakers in Pennsylvania left their neighbours unsupported; Virginia held that the British Navy was the true defence of her shores; and the Carolinas reserved their strength for combating the Spaniards in Florida and the Indians on their frontiers.

When South Carolina appealed to the northern colonies for aid against the Yamassees, the Virginians alone were persuaded by their lieutenant-governor, Colonel Spotswood, to send troops to their assistance. He, and men of vision like himself, began to urge some scheme of organised contributory defence.2 In 1728 Sir William Keith, ex-Lieutenant-Governor of Pennsylvania, proposed the imposition of a stamp tax in the Plantations in order to provide a general fund for the upkeep of a standing army and the administration and development of the colonies.3

In 1721, the Council of Trade, in order to remedy faults of administration and the evasion of laws relating to trade, quit-rents, the taking up of land, and the preservation of the woods, and also to secure co-operation in colonial defence, had suggested the appointment of a captain-general over all the colonies who should be advised by two councillors from each province. It urged that the danger of the French advance along the line of the Mississippi should be countered by building forts along the frontiers, strengthening Nova Scotia and South Carolina, and planting settlements beyond the mountains. It also approved Spotswood's plan for a fort on Lake Erie, and Burnet's scheme for occupying Niagara. Burnet had worked hard to prevent the selling to the French of goods which they resold to the Indians and thereby maintained their influence over them. To control the Indian trade, he established posts at Saratoga and Oswego (1727). The opposition of the Dutch and other merchants at Albany proved too strong, and Burnet's provisions were repealed 2 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1715, nos. 651, 389, i.

1 C.O. 5/4, nos. 44, 45; 5, 980, no. 48. C.O. 5/4, no. 37, i.

N.Y. Col. Docs. v, 591.

SCHEMES FOR DEFENCE

391 in 1729. But to the founding of Oswego the French replied by establishing themselves at Crown Point (Fort St Frederic), an encroachment on the territory of the Six Nations of Indians which secured them the control of Lake Champlain (1730). The ink was scarcely dry upon the Treaties of Utrecht ere the French began to fortify Cape Breton, to interpret the cession of Acadia as embracing only the eastern part of the peninsula, to intrigue with the Northern Indians and the Six Nations, and to complete a line of forts along the Mississippi valley, from Detroit to New Orleans (1720), connecting it with Canada.1 Plainly their guns pointed at the back of the British colonies, and their expansion barred British development westwards. Strategically the most important point along the line threatened by the French was the frontier of New York. Its defence was a vital concern for all the colonies. The key to it was held by the Six Nations. Occupying the Mohawk valley, they not only commanded the most direct communications with the western prairies, but also, by their conquests over adjacent Indian tribes, extended their influence to the Mississippi. They acted, therefore, not only as a check to French development westwards but also enabled the British fur traders to get into touch with the Indians of the Huron and Michigan region and the upper Mississippi valley. With the Six Nations, by frequent conferences and presents at Albany, "the chain of the Covenant was kept bright”, in spite of unremitting French intrigues. At the request of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Indians themselves, the sale of intoxicating liquor to them was prohibited. Too often it had been used by unscrupulous traders to cheat them of their goods and lands. The wars with the Tuscaroras and Yamassees had cleared the Carolinas of enemy Indians, and at the same time brought them into touch with the Creeks and Cherokees beyond the frontier, and the Indians in the south-west more directly under the influence of the French. Whilst Carolina controlled relations with the Indians to the south, Virginia, halfway between them and the Six Nations, was affected by both. In these circumstances it might have been expected that common interest in the loyalty of the Indians would have drawn the several governments closer together. Actually, events demonstrated their deep-seated separatism. A congress of governors at Albany in 1722, called to settle questions that had arisen over the relations of the Six Nations with the Indians of the Virginia frontier, revealed differences of opinion between New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and made it evident that there was little hope of the several governments combining in a comprehensive Indian policy.

But when at length rupture with France was clearly imminent, a conference at Albany was summoned by William Shirley, the able and energetic Governor of New England, by direction of the Council of Trade, in order to make a joint agreement with the Six Nations. 1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1712-14,nos. 295,521,522; 1714-15, pp. viii-x; cf. C.O. 5, 1093, f. 155.

Commissioners were sent from Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Connecticut (June 1754). Benjamin Franklin laid before them his "Albany plan of Union". It provided for a council which was to be elected by the colonies, with a president appointed by the Crown, and to deal with questions of Indian trade, defence, and unoccupied lands. It was accepted by all the commissioners, but by none of the colonies, for each was jealous of the surrender of power it involved.1 Two months later the Council of Trade submitted to the King a scheme for a union of the colonies for military purposes, by which each colony was to have one representative at a conference for fixing quotas of men and money, to be at the disposal of a royal commander-in-chief. This scheme too was shelved.

The objection of Quakers to the use of "carnal weapons" was always an obstacle to combined defence. When war with Spain was imminent in 1739, the Assembly in Pennsylvania refused to establish a militia or to build a fort to secure the Delaware River. Benjamin Franklin solved that difficulty by organising a volunteer militia and providing a fund for fortification by means of a lottery. Again, in 1745, the Assembly refused to take part in the attack upon Louisbourg, or to vote money for arms or ammunition for that place when taken. But it appropriated sums for buying wheat, and "other grains", which the governor interpreted as including gunpowder. A more serious situation arose in 1754. The outbreak of the French and Indian war was followed by the disaster to General Braddock. The Indians in the northern and western parts of the province immediately went over to the French. Pressure was put upon the Assembly to grant money for military purposes and to pass an act for punishing mutiny and desertion in the militia. But this was not only contrary to the principles of the Society of Friends, but also involved consideration of the methods of raising such money. It was a long-standing grievance that the proprietors, whilst deriving a large revenue from occupied lands and holding an enormous area of unsettled territory for eventual profit, paid no taxes. The Assembly, in which Quakers were in a majority of six to one, proposed to tax both, and voted £10,000. The governor's instructions prohibited him from agreeing to this. The proprietors objected to paying taxes on unoccupied lands. It was not till 1759 that a compromise was reached.2

The most successful military exploit of this period, the capture of Louisbourg in 1745, was the proud achievement of New England almost alone, but with effective help from the British Navy.3 Little had been done by the British Government to forward the settlement

1 Corresp. of W. Shirley, 11, 103-118.

2 Minutes of Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, vIII, 524 seqq.; Penns. Mag. Hist. xxIIIxxv; Shepherd, Pennsylvania, v; Sharpless, Quaker Government, 1, 252 seqq.; Smith, William, Brief State of Pennsylvania; Votes of Pennsylvania, Iv; Channing, Hist. U.S. п, 33 seqq.

3 See chap. XVIII.

NOVA SCOTIA: VIRGINIA

393

of Nova Scotia. At first, indeed, their inaction and neglect of the garrison of Annapolis Royal seemed to suggest that they were anxious to abandon it to the French. Afterwards there were long delays in sanctioning the granting of lands to settlers, partly caused by the determination to reserve 200,000 acres of timber for the Royal Navy. In the meantime the country was occupied by the original French settlers, some of whom had taken the oath of allegiance to King George. But their loyalty was more than doubtful. French agents and Jesuit missionaries worked persistently to induce them, like the inhabitants of Placentia, to transfer themselves and their cattle to Cape Breton. The keen and combative sense of the New Englanders was not slow to appreciate that Cape Breton was a direct threat, not only to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, but also to their own coast and fishery and sea-borne trade. The bitterness they felt when Louisbourg was handed back to the French (1748) was accentuated when they learned that the fortress was being rendered more formidable than ever. It was for this reason that the British Government decided to establish a naval base at Chebucto Bay in Nova Scotia, in order to secure command of the entrance to the Gulf of St Lawrence. English emigrants to the number of 2500 were sent out to found the settlement of Halifax (1749). This was the only English colony in America founded by direct government action. It prospered rapidly. Whilst the northern provinces advanced steadily along the paths of commercial and industrial progress, the growth of Virginia was that of a plantation colony. The Old Dominion was a typical royal province, and it fulfilled the ideal of the mother country by producing crops only, and consuming British manufactures. Like Maryland, its prosperity varied as the price of tobacco rose or fell. Its large trade in tobacco kept Virginia in close touch with Great Britain, and developed an aristocracy of planters who tended to monopolise the council. Lying midway between the northern and southern colonies, Virginia was necessarily of great importance both politically and strategically. This importance was enhanced by its western frontier. There the passage across the mountain barrier led directly into the Ohio basin, pointing to the Mississippi. Lieutenant-Governor Alexander Spotswood, who succeeded Colonel Nicholson in 1710, was a pioneer not only of empire against the Indians and French, but also of colonial enterprise and development. Shortly after his arrival, whilst overhauling the revenue and system of granting lands, he formed schemes for pushing beyond the mountains with the object of opening trade with the remote Indians and forming a barrier against the French. Under his direction the first ridge to the westward was explored. He learned that iron ore existed near the falls of James River. The Assembly refused to help him in working it, and 1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1713-15, passim; and 1716, no. 51. 2 Ibid. 1714-15, passim; 1717, no. 522. Spotswood, Letters, 1, 39; Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1710, no. 555.

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