GREAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE AFTER UTRECHT 359 doubled the importance of Hanover, that to keep them George became the accomplice of Russia and even of Denmark and Prussia, his detested neighbours, and that no consideration for Britain would induce him to let them go. To draw or drive us into open war with Sweden for the aggrandisement of Russia was indeed beyond his power. But he contrived that in 1715 a British fleet aided Charles's enemies after the season for trade was over; he convinced the Swedes that a North German prince upon the throne of Britain could never be their friend; he brought it about that, early in 1717, southwestern Sweden was reported “chock full of troops", with fleets preparing for a descent on Scotland, and he uselessly embroiled Britain with Russia for a period that surpassed his life. Britain, insecure at home, was thus unprofitably involved in the northern struggle at the moment when the renewal of the general war was threatened by a sudden aggression on the part of Spain. To the rulers of Spain the Peace of Utrecht was a settlement achieved without consulting the laws of God or man,1 and one which had left behind it the seeds of endless wars.2 To the rulers of Britain it was "the indelible reproach of the age",3 a settlement which confounded the characters of victors and vanquished, which prompted ministers to that legal indictment of its contrivers which Walpole took five hours to read. As at the same time the regency in France, our hereditary enemy, was the particular object of Spanish detestation, it was not unnatural that the two countries moved towards an entente. In 1716 the Convention of Madrid so expanded the treaty of commerce, which they had concluded at Utrecht, that the treaty of 1667 regained its force and the subjects of each country enjoyed most-favourednation status in the other.4 British hostility to the Utrecht terms, however, was in the main to those regarding France; Spanish, to those regarding Italy. That Italy should be delivered over to the Emperor seemed to Britain advantageous; but to the Italian rulers of Spain, intolerable. Hence when, in May 1716, peace-seeking Britain made her defensive alliance with the Emperor, Spain construed it as almost a declaration of war against herself. The Triple Alliance (January 1717) between all the commercial Powers increased her indignation. To break with Britain, France and Holland would be to renounce the Indies. But neither this peril nor the victorious progress of Eugène could deter her from striving to re-enter Italy by force. In the autumn of 1717, the Emperor's island of Sardinia was seized by an expeditionary force from Spain. While the expedition was in progress, Eugène won his crowning victory at Belgrade, but without the aid of a naval Power he could not reconquer an island. Britain as the Emperor's ally was 1 Alberoni, cit. Head, Fallen Stuarts, p. 188. • Alberoni, Lettres intimes, p. 306, and p. 161. • Coxe, Marlborough, III, 334, citing with approval Pitt to Keene. thus challenged to uphold the Utrecht settlement against Spanish attack. She naturally endeavoured to end the war between Spain and the Emperor without herself taking part in it and without sacrificing her new alliance with France. Spain, on the other hand, rejected every plan for an accommodation, and sought on all sides for allies. The Jacobites, the Swedes, the Turks and the Russians might be hoped for, but the most attractive possibility lay in France. There the Regent was morally as isolated in his union with Britain as was Louis Napoleon in a later age. Until their deepest feelings are aroused, the British set gain above sentiment, knowing that through Parliament they can veto an alliance if they think it worth their while. The French had neither consolation, and those who desired the succession of Philip to their throne were now strengthened by the general anti-Austrian opinion. While France remained doubtful, Spain found an active ally for her adventure in the ruler of Savoy, whose Utrecht acquisitions in Italy the Emperor was determined to possess. In 1718 the Spaniards seized on Sicily with the support of the inhabitants and the enthusiastic co-operation of their Savoyard King, eager to exchange them for Sardinia. With Europe, north and south alike, full of firebrand powers, wise action on the part of Britain, of the Emperor, and, above all, of France was essential to avert a conflagration. Thanks largely to British diplomacy, in this case assisted by Hanoverian, the danger passed as rapidly as it had arisen. Resisting all clamour, the Regent stood firm by his engagements. The Emperor made with the Turks a peace (July 1718) which set free an overwhelming force for the defence of Italy. He was even induced to join with the Sea Powers and France in a great Quadruple Alliance (August 1718) to defend the settlement of Europe. His reward came without delay, for in August Byng destroyed the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro, and in November the Savoyard yielded Sicily at the price of Sardinia and the confirmation of his royal title. This prince, "whose politics were always unsearchable and always so superior to those of all other potentates", was admitted to the Quadruple Alliance and thus further fettered Spain. Rather than relinquish her Italian hopes, however, Spain attempted to kindle a world-wide war. The Jacobites, the Swedes and the Russians should be hurled at Britain or Hanover; British trade with the Spanish Empire should be plundered; Britain should be involved; and, to gain the French alliance, the regent should be overthrown. No single portion of this great scheme prospered, save the seizure of British merchant ships and goods. The French were stirred by the Spanish plot into greater energy and actually invaded Spain. Britain armed furiously and countered the Spanish negotia 1 Leclercq, H., Histoire de la Régence pendant la minorité de Louis XV, п, 19 seqq. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NORTHERN SETTLEMENT 361 tions with success. The accidental death of Charles XII (December 1718) removed the most incalculable danger to her peace. The new Armada never reached her shores. A Spanish landing failed to rouse the Highlands. British troops joined in the invasion of Spain and captured Vigo. Alberoni returned for ever to his native land, and, early in 1720, Spain followed her recreant ally into the Quadruple Alliance. At the same time the infinitely complex politics of the North seemed to be taking a clearer form. In the Baltic region, however, Britain, hampered by Hanover, had played a poorer part than on the continent and in the Mediterranean, and was emerging with a less reward. Her Baltic problem had been to secure a general peace on terms which should be both fair to Sweden and defensible against the sinister and victorious Peter. It was complicated by the facts that Bremen and Verden must be secured for Hanover; that Prussia, which hated Hanover, must have Stettin; that Denmark subordinated everything to her revenge;1 that the Saxon King of Poland was hopelessly untrustworthy; and that the King of Prussia was filled with an abiding terror of the Tsar. In general the complaint made earlier by Goertz was to prove well-founded, that “If...the Swedes must give up everything that the insatiable greed of their neighbours demanded, they would not...be sure of their shirts".2 The death of Charles and the execution of his minister, however, had left no Swedish champion to contend with fate, and British diplomacy, which had found in Russia the chief hindrance to a settlement, was aided by the fact that, next to Denmark, Russia was the greatest bugbear of the Swede. Lavish bribery and the expectation of British naval help and of a strong coalition to coerce Russia procured Bremen and Verden for Hanover (July 1719) and for Prussia the region of Stettin (August 1719). At the same time, with infinite pains, the choleric and timid King of Prussia was brought into harmony with Hanover and into opposition to the Tsar. Britain now hoped that with the aid of France, Prussia, the Emperor and the King of Poland, Russia might be forced to concede a righteous and abiding peace. This would leave her Petersburg and the window towards the west, but would restore to Sweden Finland and those provinces south of the Gulf of Finland which were at once the granary of Stockholm and the chief centre of British trade. In February 1720, Britain, Prussia and Sweden were in line, and it seemed probable that Denmark would be coerced into concluding peace. To have thus stemmed, even for a time, the advancing tide of Muscovy, would have brilliantly crowned a series of services to Europe which had already made the first years of the Hanoverian dynasty remarkable, and which must have strengthened its hold upon the British people. 1 Cf. Chance, J. F., British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689-1789 (III. Denmark), pp. 51 seqq. Chance, Northern War, p. 179. 2 Now, however, in the words of an eighteenth-century historian, "We are to enter upon the year 1720; a year remarkable beyond any other...for extraordinary and romantic projects, proposals and undertakings, both private and national". France was convulsively awakening from the spell cast over her by the financier Law, while in Britain the speculative fever was running a swifter course. The achievements both at home and abroad of British statesmen during the last six years saved the Hanoverians when the South Sea Bubble burst, but our prestige inevitably suffered. It became impossible to find allies to combat Russia, and inconvenient to pay for the necessary aid to Sweden. Denmark, which had claimed so many provinces that the Swedish revenues would have fallen from eight to three million crowns, 2 was brought to reason, but when the twenty years of northern war were closed at Nystad (August 1721) Russia had had her way. "Since the child is dead," wrote our ambassador, "I shall wash my hands, change raiment, and eat and drink as David did of old. "3 But it could not be denied that our enemy had won for his country a commanding position on the Baltic, great influence with Prussia and the Poles, and an association with the Emperor which endured for many years. Britain must now fear the growth of a great Russian navy, and only her American Plantations saved her from a fatal dependence upon Russia for her naval stores.4 The year 1720 remained memorable no less for personal than for national changes. The Stuarts gained a new heir and a new hope by the birth of Prince Charles at Rome. At the same time their Hanoverian rivals closed their ranks by a family reconciliation which was duly notified to foreign courts. In the future George II the King possessed an heir as stupid as has ever reigned in England, while Caroline, Princess of Wales, was to become her ablest Queen. Her the King merely termed a she-devil, but for the Prince he shared the feelings of His Russian Majesty, who slew his son, and of His Prussian Majesty, who proposed to follow that example. In London, however, a royal father could only break off intercourse, and even this was now formally resumed. Most important of all, the nation had turned to Walpole, for whom the South Sea Bubble inaugurated a ministry of more than twenty years. 5 Walpole's great merit lay in applying to public affairs a clear vision, a cool head, and an energy which no volume of business could exhaust. "We have one minister", wrote Hervey, "that does everything with the same ease and tranquillity as if he was doing nothing. In contrast to many outstanding figures of his time, he "was not one of those projecting, systematical, great geniuses who are always 1 Anderson (written before 1763). Chance, Northern War, p. 388. Cf. Albion, op. cit. pp. 160 and 240 seqq. 5 Lord Orford's Reminiscences (London, 1818), p. 28. 3 Ibid. p. 467. • To Horace Walpole, Oct. 1735. Cf. Coxe, Walpole, ш, 299. WALPOLE AND HIS MINISTRY 363 thinking in theory and are above common practice".1 No man could solve a problem more surely, nor see more clearly what men were. Unhappily he was devoid of interest in what they might become. In diplomacy he had had no training, and lacked even the common accomplishment of French. Foreign affairs were not his province, though, being “absolutely the helm of government”,2 he could never fail to influence their conduct, and in a crisis he was apt by sheer competence to take the lead. As a financier, he disliked expense, though he paid liberally for secret service; as a materialist, he thought the enrichment of the people the supreme blessing; as a good Georgian and a good fellow, he was for a quiet life and the benefit of time. All his instincts therefore impelled him to prolong the entente with France, and to postpone the realisation of the dream of Louis XIV, a family accord between France and Spain. Such an accord would have clipped the wings of Britain on the continent, in the Mediterranean and above all in the New World, while French and Spanish commerce would have prospered. For more than a decade fortune favoured him. The Bourbons remained blind to their mutual profit; the Pyrenees were not abolished; and men enquired of Walpole what he had done to God Almighty to make Him so much his friend.3 During the first twelve years of Walpole's power (1721-32), and thanks in no small degree to his exertions, striking events both in British and in continental history were rare. At home and abroad, however, the seeds of trouble remained alive. In Britain, none the less, each quiet year added strength to the House of Hanover, and lessened, in England and in Scotland alike, the attraction of the Stuart line. On the continent, and in the wider world, an artificial equilibrium prevailed, of which the instability could only become more evident with the lapse of time. Wearied and shaken by the wars of Louis XIV and by the collapse of the great schemes of Law, counterbalanced as always by the power of Austria, France was now paralysed by the King's minority and by feuds within the House of Bourbon. With time she must recover, must perceive her false position as the antagonist of Spain, must throw off the hampering entente with Britain, and contend with her for the commercial and colonial prizes of the world. To gain time, the British Government was slow to take up the challenge implied in French encroachments in the backwoods of America. In 1720 the important pass of Niagara was seized, and in the early 'thirties Crown Point and Ticonderoga founded, but the latent threat to our remote possessions upon the mainland was ignored. The regency, equally bent on quiet, disclosed Jacobite plots to the British and contributed to the pacification of Spain. 1 Hervey, Memoirs, 1, 24. ? Count Broglio to the King of France (1724), cit. Coxe, Walpole, п, 302. |