319 FRENCH AGGRESSION AND WARS ON LAND autocrat of France that prejudice against naval warfare which showed itself in his omission to fulfil his many promises to honour the new naval arsenals with a visit.1 Not until 1680 was he astonished at Dunkirk, as Bismarck in his old age at Hamburg.2 Louvois, rather than Colbert, stood first in Louis' favour, and aggression on the eastern frontier rather than overseas occupied the royal mind. That France, which had defied Europe in a war of aggression, continued her encroachments in time of peace, lent additional weight to the third great consequence of the war, the rise of William of Orange. The Protestant prince, scion of a great German house, who had saved Holland, who protected the neighbouring provinces of Spain, and whose marriage with Mary of York (1677) gave him great significance in England, seemed to be marked out more clearly year by year as the predestined champion of Europe against France. William's attitude towards colonies and commerce was therefore a historical factor of high importance. It may be safely said that while no Dutch statesman could ignore the ocean, and least of all he who had advocated a national flight to the East Indies to escape from servitude to France, William was throughout his life compelled to think first in terms of Europe. His personal preference, like that of Louis, was for the land, and he lacked interest in other continents. Thus the loss of the directing mind of Colbert on the one side was not accentuated by the gain upon the other of a statesman with great designs of empire. The Dutch people continued to follow those instincts and appetites which had made their overseas position, but they were denied the interference of their only statesman who was strong enough to interfere. The expansion of England under the later Stuarts likewise owed little to political direction. Charles II, it is true, took an interest in such matters; James was a gold hunter and a keen seaman; Clarendon understood the importance of Plantations; Shaftesbury wrote ably on colonial questions; and the Committee of Trade was not always, as the Dutch ambassador sneered, composed of men wholly ignorant of it. But if it cannot be maintained that, from 1664 to 1678, England was steered by a man or body aiming steadily at power overseas, still less can this be said of the tumultuous and tragic years which culminated in the Revolution. Of them in general the words were true which Burnet applied to the passive acceptance of the bombardment of Genoa in 1684: "We were now pursuing other designs, from which it was resolved that nothing from beyond sea should divert us". England had profited by four years of neutrality and French favour to acquire a great carrying-trade, but Parliament 1 Clément, Lettres de Colbert, VII, p. xlvii. * Lavisse, Histoire de France, vII, ii, 263; Bülow, Prince von, Imperial Germany, p. 127. * Evelyn, Diary, 5 February 1657. • Burnet, p. 384. forced the abandonment of Tangier, while James did not hesitate to trample on prosperous Virginia. Between the Peace of Nymegen and the outbreak of a general European war in 1689, therefore, commercial and colonial rivalry played a secondary part as compared with the constitutional convulsions of England and the assertion of autocracy by France. While Charles was struggling with the Protestant extremists about Exclusion, Louis was annexing one German city after another in what is known as the "war in peace". His capture of Luxemburg, for example, though primarily defensive, was esteemed to make the French masters of all the Netherlands, to give them entrance into Germany, and to open the way to universal monarchy.1 Yet England did not move, and in 1684 the Emperor sanctioned for twenty years many of the so-called réunions. Not until the oppression of the Huguenots and of the Piedmontese Protestants had seemed to denote "an universal design to destroy all that would not go to mass throughout Europe", did the English, the Dutch and other Protestant peoples feel that a new effort must be made. The brutal treatment of Genoa and the brutal treatment of the Pope helped to unite Powers of both religions in William's League of Augsburg (1686). The English Revolution and Louis' attempt to restore the Catholic James II by force expanded this league into the Grand Alliance, which from 1689 to 1697 arrayed Europe with unprecedented unanimity in the defence of her liberties against aggressive France. 2 The menace to Europe was the greater in that France could now employ for aggression the strength which she owed to Colbert. Colbert himself had died in 1683, after witnessing the failure of many of his schemes and the loss of his prime influence with the King. Neither his own dejection at the last nor the manifest error of some of his ideas should disguise the importance of his contribution to colonial and commercial France. His improvement of communications, establishment of free ports and reduction of the rate of interest at home qualified his country to compete with foreign producers. No less important was the improved status which he gained for French merchants, thus opening their calling to men of gentle birth. His fleet could not but make a powerful bid for supremacy at sea and might well become irresistible. With its support, the imposing empire of France beyond the seas and the considerable machinery of companies devised for its exploitation must play a great part in history. In France, moreover, where either the people needed the initiative of the Crown or were prevented by its obtrusive activity from developing initiative of their own, Colbert's stream of decrees and subsidies had produced an appreciable harvest. "Venetian glass, Brussels lace, the stocking industry, fine cloth of Louviers, of Sédan, of Abbeville, common cloth of Elbeuf, Caudebec hats, Tours 1 Evelyn, Diary, 26 May 1684. 2 Ibid. 5 May 1686. STRUGGLE BETWEEN FRANCE AND EUROPE 321 and Lyons silks, tapestry of la Savonnerie, of Beauvais, of Aubusson, the perfecting of clock-making, the cultivation of madder, various products of iron, of steel, of leather, of clay”—all these owed their development to him.1 The war (1688-97), whose beginning was marked by a short-lived French ascendancy at sea, produced many colonial and commercial fluctuations and disasters, while in India English progress was crowned by the foundation of the station which soon became Calcutta. In America, King William's war compelled the several colonies to take counsel together for defence against the French. At home, the new pre-eminence of Parliament within the constitution found expression in the formation and pervasive activity of a Board of Trade. Captures and conquests were made by both sides on and beyond the seas, yet on the whole both the war and the peace were conspicuous for the unqualified predominance of Europe. The keynote of the Treaty of Ryswick indeed was mutual restitution. The chief colonial nations, the French on one side and the Spaniards, the Dutch and the English on the other, settled their differences without the exchange of territories overseas. French rule was recognised in Nova Scotia, and France recovered Pondicherry from the Dutch. Almost a decade of war, none the less, had developed British sea power, which rested on a commercial marine, and British colonies, which represented a genuine migration, in contrast with their respective French competitors, which depended upon the authority and the initiative of the Crown. Seven years had passed since the death of Colbert's son, as brilliant as his father had been obscure, the Seignelay who had developed the maritime ambitions carefully inculcated from his birth. His country had again won laurels upon the land, while the attendant exhaustion and expense rendered her incapable of reverting immediately to Colbert's policy overseas. Louis, indeed, might hope that the approaching dissolution of the Spanish empire would compensate France for every sacrifice, but the studied moderation of his peace terms could no longer regain him the reputation forfeited in 1672 and in the 'eighties. He must enter the competition handicapped by the settled distrust of Europe and by the firm establishment in England of a Protestant dynasty represented by his lifelong foe. The truce between France and Europe concluded in 1697 lasted in fact for little less than four years. These were of necessity filled with negotiations and preparations for disposing of the Spanish empire. When Mexico and Peru were at stake, it was idle to expect statesmen to absorb themselves in St Christopher or Curaçoa, while even from the trader's point of view, Spain or Naples might well surpass any conceivable gain outside of Europe. A further key to the history is 1 Chéruel, A., De l'administration de Louis XIV (1661–1672) d'après les mémoires inédits d'Ormesson, p. 94. 2 Cf. Corbett, J. S., England in the Mediterranean, 1603-1713, п, 188, etc. CHBEI 21 furnished by William's belief that France and Austria had a secret understanding, that a new religious war was imminent, and that the Protestants would be no match for their opponents. Louis, on the other hand, credited him with the same autocratic control of policy that he himself enjoyed, and surmised that he might seize the Spanish possessions in the Indies, or acquire them by the Emperor's connivance. In his sincere endeavours after world-peace, however, William could by no means count upon the English. He was in reality, men declared, king in Holland but no more than stadholder in England. "One would say”, he complained to Heinsius, "either that this island is the only thing on the face of the earth, or that it has nothing to do with the rest of the world."4 The facts of his position compelled him to negotiate only for such terms as seemed to his Dutch confidants and to himself likely to please an ungrateful and uninstructed nation. In these conditions, the record of the bargaining between Louis and William which resulted in the secret Partition Treaties of 1698 and 1700 throws an unwonted light upon colonial and commercial questions. For the first time since 1664, these took a leading share in determining the policy of States. The Indies, the Mediterranean trade, and the mastery of the sea were avowed as prime interests of France and England, whose kings bent all their minds to find a formula which they could defend against the Emperor, Spain and the rest of Europe. England, speaking through the mouths of Dutchmen for Holland also, naturally placed trade in the forefront, and regarded "places' only as they might give the necessary security for trade. The continuance of her Mediterranean trade and the development of trade with the West Indies called for Ceuta, Oran, Gibraltar, Port Mahon, perhaps all Minorca, and Havana or some equivalent. Louis argued that to share the Indies in any way with the Dutch and English would be to take the whole from Spain, that Port Mahon would make them masters of the Mediterranean, and that a demand for Gibraltar would affront Spain even more. He was, however, plainly warned by his ambassador in London that the English conceived that their commerce would be ruined if the Indies and Cadiz fell to France, and that William would be able to draw the last penny from their pocket for war in such a cause.' War, moreover, would result in the seizure of the chief Spanish ports in America by the Dutch and English. These considerations largely determined the provisions of the treaty of 1698. Spain, the Indies and the Spanish Netherlands were assigned to a Bavarian prince from whom both parties had much to 6 1 Grimblot, P. (ed.), Letters of William III and Louis XIV, 1697-1700, 1, 131. 2 Ibid. 1, 249 and 274. 3 Ward, A. W., Great Britain and Hanover, p. 3. 5 Ibid. 1, 344. Ibid. 1, 449 4 Grimblot, Letters, 1, 184. 7 Ibid. 1, 508. 8 Ibid. 11, 55. THE PARTITION TREATIES 323 hope and little to fear, while Louis counted on acquiring the trade of Spain by annexing Guipuzcoa, and that of all the Mediterranean by annexing Sicily, Naples and the Tuscan ports. William rightly judged that this Partition Treaty, concluded without the knowledge of the English or Spaniards, and with cynical indifference to dynastic titles and to both the pride and the good government of Spain, would cause "an amazing emotion" when it became known. And when, within a few months, the Bavarian died, the opprobrium seemed to have been incurred in vain. "We are in no small labyrinth, and may it please God to help us out of it", was his dry comment.1 Despite the protests of Spain, however, Louis and William were soon hatching new treaties for the succession to her two and twenty crowns. Colonial questions, perhaps still more the memory of colonial wrongs done by the Dutch, told against their adoption of the King of Portugal as the Spanish heir. Had the sea power of France become what Colbert and his son designed, Louis would hardly have acquiesced in the assignment of Spain, the Indies and the Netherlands to the Habsburg House. The acquisition of Lorraine as well as Naples, Sicily and the Tuscan ports, all promised by the treaty of March 1700, seemed so profitable to France, however, that when the throne of Spain fell vacant in November, the English ambassador in Paris expected him to hold firm. William likewise entertained little doubt that the Emperor would prefer a treaty which gave him much, to a will which gave him nothing. Within a few days, however, Louis had decided to break his word, and to take the risk of war-the war, as it proved, which was almost to fill the remainder of his days and to prepare and predict the triumph of England overseas. In this momentous decision, commerce and colonies weighed heavily with the French. "There might be some hope", the diplomatic Torcy contended, "that the Indies would be of no small assistance" if it were necessary to defend the will by force. The chancellor dared to argue that extension in Flanders was trivial by comparison with the union of two great monarchies-a union which would enrich France by the commerce of the Indies and enable France and Spain to set the pace in Europe. The Dauphin, at the council, and Madame de Maintenon, whom the King regarded as the embodiment of tranquil wisdom, were on the same side. The Dutch and English, William declared to Heinsius, were faced with ruin." To save Belgium, indeed, they had consented in the Partition Treaties to yield the Mediterranean to France. Belgium would now turn Bourbon, and there was but a faint hope that Naples and Sicily, by declaring for the Emperor, might save the Mediterranean. It would be but natural if Louis added Portugal to Spain, and set about 2 Ibid. 11, 283. 1 Grimblot, II, 152, 163, 255. 3 Ibid. II, 452, 453; Ranke, L. von, History of England, v, 238. Ibid. 11, 477. |