SUPERIORITY OF THE ENGLISH NAVY 117 there were at the earlier date 16,306. This growth, coming after the experience gained in Atlantic voyages, was in fast, sound, weatherly ships, which provided an invaluable reserve in days when a merchantman could readily become a "ship of force", and a merchant seaman a man-of-war's man. Still more marked was the superiority of the English Navy. It was indeed the only force which possessed long experience of the heavilygunned sailing ship. During the Religious Wars the French Navy greatly declined. As for Spain and the Italian States, they still trusted mainly to the galley, their victory of Lepanto over the Turk (1571) having confirmed their faith in a swarm of light, oar-propelled craft, whose offensive strength lay in bow-fire and ramming. Italian seamen, it is true, had invented the sea-going galleon; but they and the Spaniards used it little for war, preferring the galleasse, a large but lightly built galleon which could be propelled by sweeps. All their craft were poor sea boats, pitching and rolling heavily in a seaway. As regards tactics the Spaniards were still in the galley stage, trusting less to cannonade than to boarding, for which their towering fore and aft castles were well adapted. On the other hand, English shipwrights, under the tutelage of Sir Richard Hawkins, had evolved a sea-going warship, independent of oars, carrying three masts and fore and aft castles of only moderate height, able therefore to sail near to the wind, and to choose their position for the broadside fire in which lay their chief strength. In short, while the Spanish ship was a castellated structure adapted for boarding, the typical English ship was a swiftly moving engine, able to elude the enemy's boarding tactics and crush him by gunnery. It is true that Hawkins in 1593 pronounced in favour of the highpooped ship, as mounting more guns and "overtopping and subjecting the enemy". But Raleigh's experiments in shipbuilding led him to endorse the Spanish proverb Grande Navio grande fatiga; and he recommended a handy, strong-built, fast ship, able to work her guns in all weathers.1 This became the English type, embodied in the Revenge (40). An undated report by a Spanish captain, Luis Cabreta (probably of 1586 or 1587), warns Philip not to trust in his galleys-"they may be of some little use, perhaps, in the Mediterranean but they are of small importance elsewhere". He then advises the building of "12 or 15 ships of the newly invented vessels" (probably of the English type), whereupon "Your Majesty will be the indisputable lord of the sea at all times", though now, through lack of ships, seamen and gunners, the Spanish coasts are liable to insult.2 Subsequent events sounded the death-knell of the galley, at least in the open, Captain 1 Raleigh, Sir W., Observations on the Navy and Sea-Service (Lond. 1650), pp. 2–4; Oppenheim, M., Administration of Royal Navy, pp. 126-34. * Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 28,420. Thomas Fenner declaring in May 1587 that twelve English warships could dispose of all the 150 galleys of Spain.1 The superiority of English guns and gunnery was also very marked.2 A vital factor in sea power is sea-endurance, that is, ability of ships to ride out gales, and of crews to retain health and efficiency. Herein, according to Admiral Sir William Monson, Elizabeth's Navy marvellously excelled; for, though very rarely in harbour and operating continually on the Spanish coasts or in the Indies, "abiding and enduring the fury of all winds and weather", yet in eighteen years of war, it lost only one ship, the Revenge, and that one thrown away only by the obstinacy of Sir Richard Grenville. This excellence Monson ascribed less to the ships than to the shipmen, trained as they were by constant battling with our stormy seas, whereas of the Spaniards only the "Biscainers" underwent the like salutary rigours in their annual fishing voyages to Newfoundland.4 From the reign of King John the kings of England claimed the sovereignty of the adjacent seas and in sign of it required alien ships to lower their topsails and often to submit to search. Elizabeth, however, claimed no exclusive right over these seas or ownership of the fisheries, such as the early Stuarts were to advance. In fact, she disallowed the idea of possession of the seas and oceans; for "the use of the sea and air is common to all; neither can any title to the ocean belong to any people or private man". On these grounds, while maintaining the national policy in home waters, she encouraged her subjects to break down the oceanic monopoly of Spain,5 which barred the way to enterprise and colonisation in habitable regions. To do so was the necessary preliminary to the founding of the Empire. Success at sea requires not only good crews and good ships, but a sound naval policy. This arises naturally from islanders' experience of their advantages, needs and dangers. The quintessence of English policy is found in this central thought of the little poem The Libel of English Policy (1430)— Kepe then the sea that is the wall of England: The obverse of that truth was set forth about 1570 by John Montgomery in a pamphlet which described the sea as a highway for England's enemies unless she held it firmly; but if she did, it was the best of frontiers. As for our warships, he praises them as the best in the world, and urges the need of forty of them, with as many large merchantmen. Disclaiming the notion of completely commanding the sea, he declares that such a fleet would prevent invasion, and to 1 Monson's Tracts, 1, 144-6; The Spanish War, 1585-7 (Navy Records Society, 1898), p. 140. 2 Cal. St. Pap. Foreign, XXI, pt 1, pp. 58, 518. 3 Monson's Tracts, п, 263. Ibid. 11, 66-9. 5 See chapter vi: also Fulton, T. W., The Sovereignty of the Sea, chaps. i-iii. THE RUPTURE WITH SPAIN, 1585 119 this end advises the stationing of it in three parts, off Scotland, in the Channel and off Ireland.1 This parcelling out of the fleet in three parts, each acting on the defensive, of course sins against the elements of naval strategy. Luckily, by the testing time of 1588, Drake had come to sounder conclusions. His raids on the Spanish Indies in 1571, 1574 and 1585 had proved the sovereign worth of surprise in warfare, and surprise involved a sudden offensive. Monson blamed him for evacuating his chief conquest, Cartagena, in 1585; but to hold it would commit England to a defensive campaign in the West Indies; and this Drake wished to avoid. To drain away Spain's overseas wealth by a succession of sudden blows, while not oneself offering any colonial hostages to fortune, was surely sound sense until the great issue with her was fought out in home waters. Not until then could England safely venture upon a colonial empire. The radical difference between her and her rivals-Spaniards and Portuguese-was that they attempted too much overseas too early in their maritime development; she adapted her colonial policy to the existing naval means. Elizabeth and Philip drifted into hostilities, perhaps unwillingly, for both made pacific proposals, and neither ever issued a declaration of war. Nevertheless, war came as the result of the intrusion of Englishmen into Philip's preserves and his reprisals, also of his help to Elizabeth's Catholic malcontents, especially in Ireland from 1579 onwards, and her support of his Dutch rebels. This last step was strongly recommended by her ablest statesman, Walsingham, who discerned the weakness of Spain in the division of her forces2 and urged the traditional English policy of opposing the subjection of the Dutch and Flemish coasts by any great conquering Power. By a sure instinct the islanders have always looked closely to the protection of their east coast, so easily invaded from the harbours of Flanders. This instinct, arising out of imperious naval considerations, has prompted English action at all grave crises from the Battle of Sluys (1340) to that of Jutland (1916), and it probably induced Elizabeth and Walsingham to challenge Philip at his most vulnerable point. For them to allow Spain, swollen with the spoils of the Indies, to remain master of the coasts opposite the mouths of the Thames and Humber, would be to consign England for ever to insignificance. Equally impossible was it for Philip to allow English seamen always to threaten, and often to seize, his reinforcements proceeding by sea to the Netherlands. Thus the crucial step in England's development was reached in March 1585, when Walsingham induced the oft-wavering Queen to accord open support to the Dutch. Resolving to drive a hard bargain with "rebels”, she required as pledges the ports of Flushing and Brill in return for the despatch of 4000 troops. During the haggling over these terms Antwerp fell to Parma's veteran army-a disaster that proved lastingly prejudicial to English naval interests. The bargain, 1 Corbett, 1, 344-8. 2 Cal. St. Pap. Foreign, XXI, pt 1, p. 286. however, was struck, and Elizabeth secured "the cautionary towns", Flushing and Brill, which gave some measure of control over the North Sea.1 Speedily Philip retorted by seizing all English and French merchantmen in his Biscay ports, selecting their crews to fill out the imposing but hollow fabric of his Armada.' Thenceforth, despite sundry pacific shifts and turns, in which Elizabeth excelled him, he prepared for open war. He might well expect to overbear the little Power which contested his claim to world-empire. He counted on active help from the almost triumphant Catholic League in France and expected that all the Irish, most Scots, and from one-third to one-half of the English would join him after a landing.3 On the other hand Elizabeth's aid to the Dutch, albeit tardy, embarrassed the Spaniards in that quarter; for the nimble Dutch squadrons, supported from England, often intercepted the succours from Spain. Another weak spot in Spain's armour was Lisbon, where the people were ready to rise for Don Antonio, the Portuguese claimant, whenever Elizabeth could send a squadron with him on board. She also assisted Henry of Navarre and the Huguenots against the Catholic League; and, by stirring up the Turks to prepare a great fleet of galleys, threatened Philip's rear in the Mediterranean. Such was her success that the Pope privately confessed his preference for the heretic over the saint. Moreover, while England was nearly self-sufficing, Philip's unwieldy empire depended on the gold and silver of the Indies. As the Venetian ambassador at Madrid remarked: "Should the flota (from the Indies) fall into Drake's hands, that would mean the ruin of half Spain, as indeed will happen if the fleet does not arrive this year; for they say that a mere delay will cause the failure of many merchants in Seville".4 Englishmen, however, had to face grave economic difficulties. The sudden cessation of trade with Spain, as also with Germany, owing to her occupation of towns on the Lower Rhine, brought many merchants to the verge of ruin. Accordingly, in November 1586 Mendoza recommended Philip to station a force of galleys in the Straits of Gibraltar for the interception of English trade with the Levant and the Barbary States, whereupon "they will be driven into a corner without any commerce or navigation". Nothing, apparently, came of this plan of commercial strangulation, which recalls that of Philippe le Bel in 1297 and foreshadows the continental system of Napoleon. The enemies of England have adopted the scheme only as a last resort, when direct attack has failed; and in 1586 Philip was confident of conquest. Even in this first encounter Spain and England pursued diverse 1 Read, C., Walsingham and the Policy of Elizabeth, vol. I, chap. xiii; Edmundson, G., Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1600-50, chap. i; Fugger News Letters (2nd series), nos. 190, 195, 196. Cal. St. Pap. Venetian, 1581-91, no. 275. Laughton, J. K., Defeat of the Spanish Armada (N.R.S.), п, 19. 4 Cal. St. Pap. Venetian, 1581-91, no. 524. ENGLISH AND SPANISH NAVAL STRATEGY 121 war policies destined profoundly to influence their overseas development. While Philip prepared systematically and slowly to crush Elizabeth by sheer mass, her seamen retorted by a swift rapier thrust. In April 1587, with twenty-five sail, mostly small, Drake dashed into Cadiz, routed the Spanish galleys, destroyed two great ships and thirtyone small ones, and brought off four provision ships, thus spreading panic1 and paralysing the Armada for that year. Next, discerning safety for England only by acting vigorously on the enemy's coast, he occupied Sagres Castle, near Cape St Vincent, so as to separate the south Spanish fleets from those of Lisbon and the Biscay ports. But Elizabeth, always prone to half measures, ordered him home. Her sailors, however, still clung to the offensive, even the cautious Lord High Admiral, Howard of Effingham, pointing out in mid-June that at no point in home seas could a fleet guard these islands, and that we must meet and defeat the enemy in his own waters.2 This statement marks the official acceptance of that offensive strategy which has assured the safety of England and her Empire at many crises. If Howard and Drake had not been driven back by a sou'wester, the decisive battle of the war would have been fought off the north-west of Spain early in July 1588. On the other hand Philip and his commander, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, had not grasped the sine quâ non of a successful invasion, viz. thoroughly to beat the defending navy. Philip ordered the Duke to make straight for the English Channel so as to join off "Cape Margate” Parma's transports conveying the Dunkirk army from the Flemish ports to the mouth of the Thames. If the English fleet approached, he might assail it; but, preferably, he should keep his force intact in order to guard the transports. This entirely military view of the problem governed the details of the expedition, the soldiers always flouting and dictating to the seamen, or even turning them out of their quarters and leaving them shelterless.3 Acting in this spirit, Medina Sidonia with about 120 ships let slip the golden opportunity of defeating the smaller English force as it struggled painfully out of Plymouth to gain the western or windward position (20 July). Now, as always, his preoccupation, to get in touch with Parma at Dunkirk, condemned him to defensive tactics which played into the hands of Howard and Drake. Speedily the defenders were encouraged by the arrival of volunteer ships, which (says Hakluyt) "with one accord came flocking thither as unto a set field, where immortal fame and glory was to be attained". Even when the wind swung to the north, off Portland, the Spaniards failed to attack, and the nimbler defenders, once more gaining the weather gauge, resumed the offensive with such effect that at nightfall the 1 Cal. St. Pap. Foreign, XXI, pt 1, pp. 335, 493; 2 Laughton, J. K., Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 1, 196, 200. 3 Duro, F., La Armada Invencibile, п, 469. ▲ Hakluyt, п, 386. |