The Marine Workers' Affiliation of the Port of New York Benjamin M. Squires 840 Book Reviews and Notices The Traffic Field (Sorrell), 895.-STOWELL'S The Journeymen Tailors' Union of America, A Study in THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, LONDON AND EDINBURGH 895 The Journal of Political Economy is published monthly, except in August and September, by the University of Chicago at the University of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. ¶The subscription price is $3.00 per year; the price of single copies is 35 cents. 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Entered as second-class matter, January 16, 1893, at the Post-office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on July 15, 1918. In answer to the universal question being asked by employers, "How can labor be made more efficient and more contented ?" it would be an easy matter to analyze traditional practices in the handling of labor, to point out their defects, and to outline a comprehensive program of numerous specific modifications designed to eliminate the most glaring defects. Such a course of action would involve a survey of all jobs in the plant with the view of eliminating in so far as possible all disagreeable and fatiguing conditions; re-rating of jobs in accordance with skill, agreeableness of work, and responsibility; careful job analyses to determine the qualifications needed to fill each job; careful hiring of workmen by specialists in order to obtain men especially qualified for each job; careful instruction and follow-up of new men, transfer of those proving to be misfits, maintenance of individual efficiency records, and systematic promotion of men in accordance with merit; careful training of foremen in methods of handling men; creation of a real opportunity for men to present their grievances, preferably to a committee composed entirely of workers or perhaps of representatives of the management and workers; abandonment of the piece-rate cutting system; and many other specific reforms. Desirable and important as are many of these, does a program of specific reforms in managerial practices, even though it may be comprehensive, go to the heart of the problem of labor administration? Is the problem of the reform of the management of labor simply a problem of eliminating certain practices in the handling of men which are productive of inefficiency or discontent and substituting other specific practices which foster efficiency and good will? The need for reform in the administration of labor, even viewed as we are viewing it, from the point of view of employers, it should, be noted, was not created by the recent extraordinary labor situation. It existed for decades before the war. For years the fundamental labor policies of employers had been at variance with their self-interest, although employers as a whole remained oblivious to the conflict, even after the "scientific managers" had called attention to the situation in most emphatic and convincing terms. It was within five years of the outbreak of the war that the movement to reform labor administration became widespread, and the war itself, with its scarcity of labor, its abolition of labor docility, and its high labor costs, was required to force on the attention of employers in general the serious shortcomings in their customary methods of handling men.' The pursuit by employers for years of labor policies so distinctly at variance with their interests indicates that there is A summary of the principal characteristics of the traditional methods of handling labor illustrates the sharp conflict between these methods and the interest of the enterprises. The traditional management of labor had two principal characteristics: crudity and reliance upon drive methods as a means of increasing output. Its crudity is illustrated by disregard of obvious fundamentals of labor efficiency, such as: 1. The fact that different jobs require different qualifications and that different men have different qualifications, and therefore each man must be carefully selected with reference to the job for which he is hired. 2. The fact that the quantity which can be produced depends upon the methods which are used and that the ordinary worker is incapable of determining the best and easiest method. 3. The fact that output may be greatly increased if the workers, instead of being left to train themselves or to be trained by non-experts, are given systematic instruction by experts. 4. The effect of physical conditions of work-light, heat, and air-upon working more to the problem of the administration of labor than the mere correction of specific defects in prevailing methods of handling men. Why did the employers fail to adapt their labor policies to the obvious interests of their enterprises? Granting that by reforms, methods of labor administration can be made to correspond closely with what is now employers' self-interest, what assurance is there that, as new situations arise requiring modifications of or additions to policies, the causes which led employers to disregard their true interests in the past will not prevent adjustment of labor policies to the new situations? The fundamental problem in the reform of labor administration from the employers' standpoint seems to be the provision of means by which employers will be kept informed of what their true interests in regard to labor are and by which their labor policies will be kept constantly adjusted to their real interests. capacity; and particularly the disregard of the fatigue factor and failure to study it and to take measures to reduce it. 5. The fact that prospect of advancement on the basis of merit along a definite and clearly perceived road is an incentive. 6. The fact that aggrieved men tend to withhold their best, and that a drive policy is not powerful enough to prevent them from withholding it. 7. The fact that workers are capable of contributing numerous valuable ideas for improvement of processes and product, and will do so if properly approached. 8. The fact that men can be induced to respond to liberal and considerate treatment by giving better service, instead of simply taking advantage of it. The traditional method of making workers more productive was to push and drive them, to demand more of them, put pressure on them, rather than to assist them to develop their proficiency and to reward them for putting forth their best effort. The threat of discharge, the pace-setter, the cut piece-rate, bonuses to foremen and gang bosses based on the output of their men, were the typical instruments of this system of management. In some instances, especially in sweated industries and in industries where immigrants, women, or children were largely employed, the drive system succeeded in greatly speeding up production. Taking the country as a whole, however, the effect of the drive system seems to have been the opposite of what was intended, for it was largely responsible for a tacit conspiracy among workers to restrict output. This deliberate restriction of output, which was largely a result of the piece-rate cutting policy, was almost universal, and resulted in the output of most shops being far below what the workmen could easily accomplish. Not only did the drive system of management result on the whole in limitation rather than in increase of output, but it was a most potent cause of antagonism between workers and management. The basic principal of the system, that the workers could be coerced into giving the largest output of which they were capable without |