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evident principles: A trick not to be learned out of Ariftotle's Organon. The application is fo eafy, that I need not make it.

PART II.

Concerning the properties of the rule of faith; and whether they agree folely to oral tradition.

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SECT. I.

verly between us to its clear and true state, that fo we might not quarrel in the dark, and dispute about we know not what, I come now to grapple more closely with his book. And the main foundations of his dif courfe may be reduced to these three heads.

1. That the effential properties of fuch a way and means as can with certainty and fecurity convey down to us the doctrine of Christ, belong folely to oral tradition. This he endeavours to prove in his five first discourses.

2. That it is impoffible that this way of oral tradition fhould fail. And this he pretends to prove in his four laft difcourfes.

3. That oral tradition hath been generally reputed by Christians in all ages the fole way and means of conveying down to them the doctrine of Chrift. And this he attempts to fhew in his laft chapter, which he calls, The confent of authority to the fubftance of his foregoing difcourfes. If he make good thefe three things, he hath acquitted himself well in his undertaking: but whether he hath made them good or not, is now to be examined.

§ 2. First, Whether the effential properties of fuch a way and means as can with certainty and fecurity convey down to us the knowledge of Chrift's doctrine, belong folely to oral tradition ?

The true way to meafure the effential properties of this or that means, is, by confidering its fufficiency for its end: for whatfoever is neceffary to make any means

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fufficient for the obtaining of its end, is to be reputed an effential property of that means, and nothing elfe. Now, because the end we are fpeaking of is the conveyance of the knowledge of Chrift's doctrine to all those who are concerned to know it, in fuch a manner as they may be fufficiently certain and fecure, that it hath recei ved no change or corruption from what it was when it was first delivered; from hence it appears, that the means to this end must have these two properties: 1. It must be fufficiently plain and intelligible; 2. It must be fufficiently certain to us; that is, fuch as we may be fully fatisfied concerning it, that it hath received no corruption or alteration. If it have these two conditions, it is fufficient for its end: but if it want either of them, it must necessarily fall fhort of its end: for if it be not plain and intelligible, it cannot convey this doctrine to our knowledge; if it be not certain, we cannot be affured, that that doctrine which it brings down to us for the doctrine of Chrift, is really fuch.

§3. I know he affigns more properties of this means, which he calls the rule of faith; but upon examination it will appear, that they either fall in with these two, or do not at all belong to it. As,

1ft, That "it must be plain and felf-evident to all, 66 as to its existence," p. 11. Nothing can be more frivolous than to make this a property of any thing; because whofoever inquires into the properties of a thing, is fuppofed to be already fatisfied that the thing is.

2dly, That it be "evidenceable as to its ruling 41 power," p. 11.; that is, as he explains himself, "that "men be capable of knowing that it deferves to be re"lied on as a rule," p. 3. By which he muft either understand the certainty of it; and then it falls in with the second property I mentioned, and is the fame with the fixth which he lays down or elfe he means more generally, that it is the property of a rule, that men be capable of knowing that it hath the properties of a rule; for I understand not how a man can know, that any thing deferves to be relied on as a rule, otherwise than by knowing it hath the properties of a rule, that is, that it is fufficient for its end. But at this rate a man may multiply the properties of things without end, if the eVOL. III. vidence

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vidence of a thing, as to its existence, be one property; and then, that we be capable of knowing that it is such a thing, be another.

$4. 3dly, That it be "apt to fettle and justify un"doubting perfons," p. 12. What he means here by fettling undoubting perfons, I am not able, on the fudden, to comprehend; because I understand not what unfettles a man befides doubting: for if a man be but so well fatisfied about any thing as to have no doubt concerning it, I do not eafily apprehend how he can be settled better; that is, how his mind can be more at reft than not to doubt. But if by undoubting perfons he means those who do not doubt for the prefent, but afterwards may doubt, then I perceive what he means by apt to fettle undoubting perfons, viz. apt to fettle perfons when they do doubt, that is, when they are not undoubting perfons. As for juftifying undoubting perfons, if he means, that whofoever fecurely relies on this rule, ought of right to be acquitted, as acting rationally in fo doing; this is plainly confequent upon the two properties I have laid down: for if the means of conveying Chrift's doctrine be fufficiently plain and certain, every man that relies upon it is juftified in fo doing, because he trufts a means which is fufficient for its end.

$5. 4thly, That it be "apt to fatisfy fully the moft fceptical diffenters and rational doubters," p. 12. For its aptitude to fatisfy rational doubters, that plainly follows from the fufficient certainty of it; but why it should be a neceffary property of a rule of faith, to be apt to fatisfy the moft fceptical diffenter, I can no more divine, than I can why he should call a diffenter fceptical, which are repugnant terms: for a fceptick is one who neither affents to any thing, nor diffents; but is in a perpetual fufpenfe, because he looks upon every opinion as balanced by a contrary opinion of equal probability, without any inclination of the scales either way. But if by the moft fceptical diffenter he means only a fceptick, one that doth not believe the doctrine of Christ, nor any thing elfe, then I would fain know what that is which in reason is apt fully to fatisfy fuch a perfon. If any thing will, fure a demonftration will: but there is no aptitude at all in a demonftration, to fatisfy him who

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who doubts, whether there be any fuch thing as a demonftration, and likewife queftions the certainty of all thofe principles from whence any conclufion can be demonftrated. And those who are moft fceptical, profefs to doubt of all this.

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$6. 5thly, That it be " apt to convince the most "obftinate and acute adverfary," p. II. 12. If the rule be plain and certain, the most acute adverfary may be convinced by it if he will; that is, if he be not obstinate : but if he be obftinate, that is, fuch a one as will not be convinced, but will perlift in his error, in defpite of all evidence that can be offered him, then I must profess, that I do not know any kind of evidence that is apt to convince that man who will not be convinced by any reafon that can be propounded to him. And that he ought not to have expected this from any rule of faith, though never fo felf-evident, he might have learned from the fame author, in whom he may find his chief properties of the rule of faith, if he had but had the patience to have confidered his explication of them: I mean, Dr. Holden; who lays down the fecond property of the rule of faith, or, as he calls it, the means whereby we come to the "knowledge of revealed truth," in thefe words, (Analyf. fid. l. 1. c. 3.): "Another (viz. condition of this 66 means, &c.) is, That it be apt of its own nature to "afford the greatest, true, and rational certainty, to "all men, without exception, to whom the knowledge "of it fhall come; provided they be furnished with the "faculty of reason, and have their minds purified from "all paffion and luft, which do (as he tells us, cap. 6.) "often hinder the most fagacious perfons from under"ftanding the most evident and manifeft truth." Now, I fuppofe obftinacy to be the effect of paffion and lust.

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If Mr. S. mean, that the rule of faith must be apt to conquer obstinacy, and make men lay it afide, I cannot understand this neither; unless he mean, that the rule of faith must be a cudgel, which the traditionary church have been good at, and may use it again when occafion ferves for none but they have a title to it upon a church-account; as Mr. S. tells us, corol. 1o. But, fetting aside this, I do not know any thing else that is apt to conquer obftinacy: not the clearest reason, or the strongest

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ftrongest demonstration; for that, I am fure, is no ways fitted to combat a wilful and unreasonable humour with any probability of fuccefs. And if any one doubt of this, if he will but make trial, he may eafily be convinced, by experience, how unapt obftinate perfons are to be convinced by reafon. I do not know any thing that ever carried greater evidence than the doctrine of Christ, preached by himself and his Apoftles to the obftinate Jews, and confirmed by multitudes of unquestionable miracles; and yet we do not find, by the fuccefs of it, that it was fo very apt to convince thofe that were obftinate. And no man can judge of the aptitude of a means to an end, otherwife than by the ufual and frequent fuccefs of it when it is applied. Nor do I think, that the doctrine of the gofpel was ever intended for that purpofe. God hath provided no remedy for the wilful and perverfe; but he hath done that which is fufficient for the fatisfying and winning over of thofe who are teachable, and willing to learn. And such a difpofition fuppofeth a man to have laid aside both fcepticism and obitinacy.

$7. 6thly, That it be "certain in itself," p. 12. 7ibly, That it be "abfolutely afcertainable to us, p. 12.

Thefe two are comprehended in the fecond property' I laid down; fo that I have nothing to fay against them, but that the last looks very like a contradiction, "abfolutely afcertainable to us;" which is to fay," with refpect to us, without refpect to us;" for abfolutely feems to exclude refpect, and to us implies it.

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Having thus fhewn, that the feven properties he mentions are either coincident with thofe two I have laid down, or confequent upon them, or abfurd and impertinent; it remains, that the true properties of a rule of faith are those two which I first named, and no more.

SECT. H. That the properties of a rule of faith belong to fcripture.

1. Et us now fee how he endeavours to fhew, that thefe properties agree folely to oral tradition. He tells us, there are but two pretenders to this title of

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