Page images
PDF
EPUB

conscientious, and doing injury to the fair dealer. (7.) Justice requires strict uprightness in the dealings of trade; and, therefore, forbids the employment of fraudulent methods of weighing and measuring, the exposure of false samples, false representations respecting the value of articles, availing oneself of the ignorance of the purchaser to obtain more than the marketable value, the concealment of the known defects of the commodity, &c.-On several of these subdivisions, some very important and interesting information may be derived from Paley's Moral Philosophy.

3. Justice forbids all injury to the reputation of others.' A good name is so essential to a person's usefulness, comfort, and interests, that whatever unjustly deprives him of it, is utterly inconsistent with justice. And though no one has a right to reputation for qualities which he does not possess, yet all needless, and still more all malicious, endeavours to lower it, and the encouragement of others in such endeavours, should be avoided, as inconsistent with the grand rule of Christian equity, and with the dictates of benevolence, and likely to affect that degree of reputation to which the individual has a right. We owe to others great caution in forming and expressing unfavourable judgments of their conduct and character. Cases do, indeed, often occur, in which it is useful, or even necessary, to state our opinions of others; for the moral warning, for instance, of the young and inexperienced: justice then requires that we do it in such a way as shall convey a correct idea, and not lead others to form judgments beyond the truth. It is scarcely necessary to add, that all those injurious statements and insinuations respecting the character, accomplishments, or circumstances of others, which are equally unnecessary and unfounded, whether proceeding from motives of malevolence, or from that thoughtlessness which so often produces as much mischief as malignity itself, are in direct opposition to the principles of justice as well as to those of benevolence,

A

4. Every one has a right to freedom of thought, and to worship God after the dictates of his conscience; and, therefore, justice forbids every thing which prevents or restrains the exercise of those rights. It is forbidden by justice, (as well as by wisdom, piety, and benevolence,) to inflict any pains or penalties upon those who adopt and profess religious opinions different from our own, on account of those opinions and, in like manner, justice, &c. forbid us to employ any of those minor species of persecution, which tend to make it a hardship to follow the dictates of conscience.

5. Justice requires the fulfilment of our promises. By a promise, we excite an expectation in the mind of another respecting our future conduct. In proportion to the confidence he places in us, will he act upon this expectation; and cases continually occur, where it influences the plans of life. In less important cases, and, indeed, in all where promises are trusted, they do excite expectations, the non-fulfilment of which is, in different degrees, injurious to the individual, but unjust in all. Where a promise is expressed in clear and explicit terms, (as every promise should be,) it is to be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense, just as any well-informed person, knowing the situation of the parties, would interpret it. Where it is attended with ambiguity, the question should be, what expectations the promiser intentionally, or at least knowingly, excited in the mind of the person to whom he made it.

[ocr errors]

Great caution should be used in making promises; they should not be made unnecessarily or thoughtlessly. And it is an important direction of moral prudence, that we make as few promises as possible.--If we make them without the intention of fulfilling them, we are guilty of a breach of truth, as well as of faithfulness. They should, as much as possible, be conditional only. Where an unconditional promise is once made, we are bound by justice to fulfil it, if we can without an actual violation of duty: and where we

[ocr errors]

have placed ourselves under such obligation, nothing short of a voluntary release by the individual to whom, or for whose benefit, it was made, can annul it.-If expectations are intentionally and knowingly excited by our actions, we are under the same obligation.

6. Where we have committed injury of any kind, whether respecting the interests, the feelings, or the moral worth of others, justice requires that we do all in our power to repair it.

CHAP. XX.

REGULATION OF SOCIAL CONDUCT,

Continued.

Principle of Christian Equity-Regulation of Charity-Education of the Poor-Common Intercourses of Life--Duties arising from the Domestic Relations-Filial Duty-Obedience to the Laws-Benevolence should be influenced, supported, and guided by Religious Principle. Conclusion.

II. In order to ascertain what justice really requires in any particular case, and to produce in our minds a steady constant sense of what is fit and equitable, it is an excellent and highly important rule, to place ourselves in the several situations of the persons concerned, and inquire what we should ourselves then desire and expect from them.

This rule is so comprehensive, that as far as respects the social duties, it may be called the sum and substance of Christian Morality. Its real object clearly is, not to define or describe justice; but to give such a criterion of social duty, as may counteract the impressions of selfishness. We seldon need fear lest we should carry our imaginary substitution t too great a length: our only danger is, lest we should not go far enough; lest we should admit of exceptions to this prin

ciple, which, if circumstances had been real, would have had no place.

This rule of duty, says Dr. Reid," comprehends every rule of justice, without exception. It comprehends all the relative duties, arising either from the more permanent relations of parent and child, of master and servant, of magistrate and subject, of husband and wife; or from the more transient relations of rich and poor, of buyer and seller, of debtor and creditor, of benefactor and beneficiary, of friend and enemy. It comprehends every duty of charity and humanity, and even of courtesy and good manners." "He who acts invariably by this rule, will never deviate from the principle of his duty, but from an error of judgment. And, as he feels the obligation that he and all men are under, to use the best means in his power to have his judgment well-informed in matters of duty, his errors will only be such as are invincible." (Active Powers, Ess. v. ch. 1.)

In order to apply this rule according to the obvious intention of the great Christian Lawgiver, we are (1.) to consider, what we should wish done to us, if we were in the place of the other person, and at the same time were possessed of all the knowledge which we ourselves actually possess, respecting the object under consideration. For instance, suppose a

child requests from a parent, a gratification which the parent knows would, in some way or other, be injurious to him: is the parent to grant his request, because, if in the child's place, he would himself wish to be so gratified? The answer is clear and so in similar instances. The fact is, in all such cases we are to consider, not merely what we might wish, if so far in the situation of another, as to have all his foolish desires and his ignorance or misguided opinions; but what we should desire, with all the means of knowledge which we actually possess, and with all the views we have of the reasonableness of the objects of desire, when not ourselves under the influence of passion or interest. The rule is not so much designed to teach us what is just and right, as to enable us to see and

« PreviousContinue »