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present Estimates was to fall away from
that standard, and in that he was sup-
ported by the Leader of the Opposition.
He had listened with a little astonishment |
to the contention that we should main-
tain the two-Power standard without

any reference to the conditions of the
international situation. Up to the time
when the two-Power standard began to
find acceptance we had been content
with
a naval strength that exceeded
that of France by 50 per cent. What
made the change to the two-Power
standard necessary? He thought that
no one disputed the fact that we adopted
that standard because of the alliance

between France and Russia which
was supposed, and perhaps rightly sup-
posed, to be hostile to the interests of
this country. It was held to be possible
and even probable that we might be|
engaged in a war with the combined
forces of these two Powers, and he
did not dispute that we were justi-
fied in preparing to meet that
combination. But that condition of
things no longer existed. Russia
had lost her fleet and, absorbed by her
internal troubles, had ceased for the
moment to be a factor in the interna-
tional situation. Nor was that all. By
the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 all
outstanding differences between the two
countries had been amicably settled.
What justification then was there in the

altered circumstances of our time for the

continued maintenance of the two-Power
standard? Even, however, on the as-
sumption that the two-Power standard
was still necessary, he contended that
our power at this moment was enor-
mously in excess of that standard. He
thought that he could prove
by every test usually adopted in
measuring the relative strength of fleets.
He took, first, the test of expenditure.
From a Return presented to this House
last week, it appeared that the expendi-
ture of the United Kingdom in 1905-6
£33,252,500; that of France,
£12,747,963, and that of Germany
£11,424,850, making for the two Powers
£24,172,813. That meant that we ex-
pended some £9,000,000 in excess of the
two Powers.

was

appendix of the Return he would find that a very large reduction had to be made as to the expenditure.

*MR. MURRAY MACDONALD said he quite agreed that a reduction had to be made. but against it allowance had to be made for the fact that we got greater value for our expenditure than French or Germans. It seemed to him therefore that in respect of expenditure standard. He took, next, the test of we were not very far from a three-Power manning. Last year we had 129,000 men; France, according to a memorandum recently circulated by Lord Brassey from which he took his figures, had 52,000, and Germany 42,000. That gave us an excess in men of 35,000 over the two-Power standard. The third test was the comparative number of firstclass battleships. the life of a battleship at fifteen years. Experts estimated He therefore started from the year 1892, and he found that excluding the "Montagu," which was wrecked, and the Dreadnought" which was not commissioned when the last Dilke Return was presented we had since that year built forty-three first-class battleships. France had built ten and Germany fifteen, making a total for the two Powers of twenty-five ships. We therefore exceeded the numbers of the two Powers by eighteen, the excess being by itself German Navy in this class of ship. He greater than the whole power of the might add that during the same period the United States had built fourteen

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first-class battleships, and adding that

to the numbers of France and Germany we had this a superiority of four ships over the three Powers combined. But there was another test which indicated in an the relative superiority of our strength. even more striking way Since the Russo-Japanese war he believed that experts had agreed that displacement was a legitimate measure of fighting efficiency when applied to ships of found from the Dilke Return that since even date. Accepting that view, he 1892 we had built thirty-two first-class battleships of 14,000 tons and over, while France had built none, Germany none, and the United States had built only two. Measured by this test therefore our strength was out of all proportion to

MR. BELLAIRS (Lynn Regis) said that if the hon. Member would turn to the Mr. Murray Macdonald.

had

let them know what those risks were. Against such risks they would all be ready and eager to bear any burden, however heavy it might be. He had now laid his case in support of a reduction of the present Naval Estimates before the House. He had been at some pains in the comparison he had just given to the House to show how vastly greater our strength was as compared with the strength of Germany. He had done that because he knew that many among them feared that Germany was strengthening herself for a war with

us.

our requirements and in excess of a again what justification there was for two, or even a three-Power standard. the maintenance of a naval force But he would go a step further. involving such an enormous expendiHe had already said that we ture of the resources of the nation built forty-three first-class battleships as the present Estimates proposed. If since 1892. Their aggregate tonnage was we were maintaining this standard to 615,250 tons; the aggregate tonnage of meet risks which did not now exist but the ten French ships was 116,717 tons, which might conceivably arise at some inand of the fifteen German ships 174,959 definite future time, he held that we were tons, making a total for the two Powers of scandalously wasting the resources of the 291,676 tons. Our strength exceeded nation. If on the other hand we were that of the two Navies combined by maintaining it to meet real risks-risks 319,574 tons. Nor was that all. The that were foreseen and could be measured fourteen battleships of the United States had an aggregate tonnage of 166,933, and if they added this to the aggregate tonnage of France and Germany they got a total tonnage for the three Powers of 458,609 tons. Our strength thus exceeded the strength of the three Powers by 152,641 tons, an excess not far short of the whole strength of the German Navy in first-class battleships. He turned next to consider our strength in cruisers, upon which we had to rely in case of war for the attack and defence of commerce. We withdrew in 1904 all armoured cruisers built before 1899, and since that year we had launched and equipped twenty-eight vessels of this class, and dating from the same year France had launched and equipped thirteen, Germany five, and the United States five. We therefore in this class of ship exceeded the threePower standard by five. In tonnage we exceeded the three Powers by 82,947 tons, which was not far shor of double the whole strength of the German Navy in this class of ship. There again our strength was equal not to a two, or a three or a four-Power but a five-Power standard. Of protected cruisers of the first class we had twenty-one, France had seven, Germany none, and the United States three. And if we measured our strength in this class by tonnage it was not far short of a nine-Power standard. In second-class protected cruisers we were both in numbers and tonnage considerably in excess of a three-Power standard. He regretted to weary the House with so many figures, but he thought they had enabled him to prove that even on the assumption that the state of our relations with foreign Powers justified us in maintaining a two-Power standard, our naval strength was far in excess of our requirements. He asked

He wished to express his own opinion that such a fear was absolutely groundless. France was also strengthening her navy, but that did not excite any alarm in us. She was strengthening herself not against us but against Germany. Germany on the other hand, so long as she adhered to the policy she pursued when she imposed upon France the terms of peace which brought the war of 1870 to a conclusion, burdened herself with the necessity of being prepared at any moment for a renewal of that war. And so long as Germany laboured under that disability he put it to any man of common sense whether the statesmen of that country could be guilty of any greater folly than the pursuance of a policy that could lead to a conflict with this country. It was not to our interest that such a conflict should be brought about. It could not be to the interest of Germany. But he would go a step further. Even if the fears to which he had alluded were well grounded, he would still maintain that it would be wise on our part to retrench expenditure. There were two methods of preparing a people to bear the trials and burdens of war if war should come. The one, which was generally adop ́ed on the Continent,

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was to subordinate every interest of Russell, of Mr. Disraeli, and of Mr. Gladthe community to the interest of main- stone. It was an opinion they repeatedly taining establishments so equipped as to expressed when opposing demands for an be able to come into action at their increase of armaments of the same full strength at any moment. To character as those of which so much had secure that great object tax was been heard in recent years. It was an added to tax and debt to debt till opinion which they prevailed upon this even in a time of profound peace the House to accept against the opinions of people became subjected to some of the experts and panicmongers of their day. worst evils of war. There had been in He could only express his regret that the the last century repeated instances in Government had not thought it well to which the impoverishment of the sub- pursue the policy which was the tradijects under these exactions had proved to tional policy of this country up to the last have been a far more serious menace to the fifteen years. He felt this regret stability of the State than any to which so strongly that if no one else would it had ever been exposed from the attack do it he would move a reduction of foreign foes. That was one method on Vote A and Vote 8 of the Estiof preparing a people to bear the burden mates. He had a duty to perform of war. It was a method pursued to this to his constituents, who returned him day by continental Powers and a method to secure a real reduction in expendiwhich we ourselves had been pursuing ture; and if necessary he would divide during the last few years. The second the House upon the question. method was to reduce armaments in time of peace and to use their energies *MR. BRACE (Glamorganshire, S.) said and resources in promoting the wel- that Labour Members were just as fare of the great body of the people, in anxious as any other hon. Members of the increasing their loyalty to the State, House to retain a Navy of that chartheir confidence in it, and their affection acter which would be a sure defence of for it. One thing was certain, we could our shores and commerce. He regretted not at the same time do this and follow that the reduction had been so small, the example of the continental Powers in however, because he was persuaded a their expenditure on armaments. Of the greater reduction could be safely made two great assets upon which we should and that it would be more in consonhave to rely in case of war surely a ance with the best interests of the nation. strong spirited people eager to support Could they not have a clear definition of its Government in case of emergency what was a two-Power standard, of was better than a great Navy maintained what number of vessels of each particular at the cost of the real welfare of the people. class constituted a two-Power standard. Supposing Germany reduced her arma- so that everybody could understand it? ments for the purpose of strengthening the If it was once understood where the twolife of her people, would her position among Power standard commenced and where the nations of the world be lowered? it finished, we could build up our Navy Would any other nation be more likely to or reduce it as other countries extended undertake an aggressive attack upon or reduced their fleets. It had been her? Suppose we reduced our expen- clearly demonstrated by one hon. Memditure on armaments for the express ber, by figures, that our Navy was not purpose of improving the education of only of a two-Power, but in some cases our people, of mending the weak places of a four-Power standard, and speaking in our social structure, of strengthen- for the workers of this country he thought ing our energies and our staying power, the time had come when a substantial should we then lose caste among reduction should be made. He prothe great nations of the world? No. tested against any Members suggesting And he based his opinion not on his that they were greater friends of the Navy own authority but on the authority of than the Labour Members. Everyone not the least patriotic, not the least in the House was a friend of the Navy. far-seeing or the least manly of our states- It was because he was a friend of the men of the last century. It was the Navy that he ventured to say that it had opinion of Sir Robert Peel, of Loid John | now reached such a point that it was. Mr. Murray Macdonald.

possible to have the reduction which there would not be full appreciation of the many in the country desired. He fact that there was a taxpayers' side of noticed from the figures on page 8 of the question as well as the side which had the Estimates that, as compared with been spoken of by the hon. Members above 1904, we had a fighting force over and the Gangway. He accepted the twoabove that of 1904 which would Power standard, he accepted the definition practically be equal to an increase of it as given by the Prime Miniter and of half-a-dozen of a particular class of the ex-Prime Minister, and it seemed to new battle ships, cruisers or destroyers, him that they ought to go into the Conowing to the larger proportion of ships ference at The Hague with the distinct available. That ought to have some understanding that the two-Power stanweight with the Government. He rose dard should be our basis so far as our particularly to express his regret at Government was concerned, on condition the comparative smallness of the that other nations did not infringe the reduction in the Estimates, be- margin of difference in our comparative cause he saw no hope of passing those positions, and that, with this condition measures of social reform which the agreed to, we should then be prepared House had unanimously decided on to reduce our armaments. So long as but could not undertake owing to that two-Power standard was accepted the shortness of money. Only last we should be able to arrange everything session the House agreed on the between the nations of the world, and to desirability of an old-age pension remove from the shoulders of the peoples scheme, and the right hon. Gentleman of the respective countries the appalling the Chancellor of the Exchequer had burden of armaments which had made to declare that because of want of funds, it imposible to obtain social reforms. It not of want of sympathy, he was seemed to him that when other nations unable to promise to bring in a Bill. took into consideration the fact that we Therefore it seemed to him that unless could build war vessels much more they were prepared to put on increased cheaply and much more quickly than they taxation or to reduce the expenditure could, they would not enter into competiof the two great spending departments tion with us, but would regard as fair and of the State it was hopeless to expect reasonable our proposal as to a two-Power any great measure of social reform. He standard. He ventured respectfully to was prepared to face the logical position, express regret that there was not a much and it was because he believed that, more substantial decrease in the Estitaking everything into consideration for mates, because, in his judgment, it could the national welfare, they could safely safely be done, and until it was done, they agree to a larger and more sub- would not get those social reforms on to stantial reduction than £500,000, or the Statute-book of which the labouring £1,500,000, or £2,000,000, that he respect- clases stood so much in need. fully protested against a greater decrease not having been provided for. Of what value was the Japanese alliance to us unless it was going to assist us in reducing the cost of our own fighting machine? We had accepted serious obligations and responsibilities under that alliance, yet we were to have no benefit in the form of reduced expenditure. He contented himself with entering his protest. He would not commit himself until he had heard the complete discussion, as to whether he would vote for the Motion which the hon. Member for Lynn Regis had on the Paper. It seemd to him that unless they brought some kind of pressure to bear on the House and the Government

*MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON expressed the hope that they would be allowed to go into Committee formally, and promised that there should be other opportunities of discussion.

*MR. BELLAIRS (Lynn Regis), in submitting a Motion to the effect that the House affirmed its adherence to the twoPower standard of naval strength, as defined by successive Cabinets to mean that the annual shipbuilding programme should be so framed as to give the British Navy a margin of superiority over the two strongest naval powers in armoured ships and cruisers, said this was a distinct Motion which he intended to move, and

the House when he said the two-Power standard applied to France and Russia only and was never intended to be applied to other Powers. The declaration made from both Front Benches had undoubtedly been that the two-Power standard applied to the two strongest Powers in the world. In 1889, Lord George Hamilton, then First Lord of the Admiralty, said

"The paramount idea underlying the utterances of those who in previous years have held my position and that of Prime Minister... has been that our establishment should be on such a scale that it should at least be equal to the naval strength of any two other countries. . . . No amount of foresight or calculation can anticipate naval combinations and naval movements. For the purpose of have a considerable margin of reserve." meeting such unexpected blows we should

therefore he could not agree to the right hon. Gentleman's request to allow it to lapse. The right hon. Baronet the Member for the Forest of Dean had referred to certain views of his, but as he intended to confine his observations to the Motion, he would deal with the right hon. Baronet's remarks when they got into Committee. The justification of the Motion lay in the discussion they had heard. Some had supported and some had opposed the two-Power standard. He wanted to sift out what really was the opinion of the House, and what should be the future policy of the country. He did not think if they looked to the terms of the Motion that any apology for it was needed. The two-Power standard had existed now for some eighteen years; it was undoubtedly the Monroe doctrine of this country; it was the minimum That view of Lord George Hamilton was standard, and we were not prepared in practically embodied in the Resolution any way to go below it. We might go which he now submitted. But he had an above it, and the Secretary to the Ad- equally strong declaration from the present miralty had pointed out that we might, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who said that in future, have to go beyond the three- the two-Power standard must be taken to Power standard; at any rate, the two- apply to any two Powers which had the Power standard was the minimum. The largest navies. That was an emphatic latter part of the right hon. Baronet's declaration which applied to the two speech had shown the tremendous danger strongest Powers. Lord Selborne and to which this country was exposed. He Lord Goschen had made declarations had drawn a moving picture of the destruc- on exactly similar lines, and they had tion of ships by mines, and there was the both occupied the important post of case of two battleships of the Japanese First Lord of the Admiralty. The destroyed in that way in a single day. standard which had existed for eighteen Therein lay the necessity for a substan- years was practically the sheet anchor tial margin of naval strength. There had of British diplomacy. The two-Power been several references in the debate to standard undoubtedly brought our negothe statement of the Prime Minister on tiations to a triumphant conclusion at July 27th as to the two-Power standard. the time of the Fashoda crisis, and it He was asked with regard to it, whether undoubtedly saved this country from a he had communicated his views to the great European combination during the Board of Admiralty, and the answer was South African War. If they were willing that they were quite aware of his views. to maintain the two-Power standard, he The question of the two-Power standard was quite convinced that they would was in a somewhat unsatisfactory state, carry his Motion unanimously. and therefore it ought to be elucidated two-Power standard had won bloodless still further. Our thirty-two battleships victories in diplomacy, but he was afraid were scattered in four different fleets; that it, like generals who won bloodless the German fleet of sixteen battleships victories, did not receive the laurels was concentrated in one mass, and the fleet which were its due and that the tenof the United States in another mass of six- dency was to render it mere lip homage. teen battleships; and this combination of The practical outcome of adherence to fully commissioned ships in his opinion the " Blue Water School" was that we was the stronger of the two. The Secre- had de ermined to take up disarmament tary to the Admiralty had rather misled in the first instance. They were assisted

† See (4) Debates, clxii., 114-117. Mr. Bellairs.

The

in that process by the loss of the "Montagu," and by the decision to put out of

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