officers could be made, but a man were unable to come into the 'erritorial could not handle a large number of scheme in the same way as those of mounted troops at a rapid pace with- Great Britain it was the more necessary out experience. It was a matter which for the right hon. Gentleman to give some could only be mastered by practice, hint of what the fate of these forces was and the sense of what ought to be to be. He desired first of all to touch done ought to come to a command- on the Militia, because that was a question ing officer as an instinct. Any mis- that had caused a great deal of excitemen take in warfare might mean great dis- in Ireland, and he spoke on behalf of a aster when committed within the range number of gentlemen who were heartily of rapid-firing guns. Therefore, Yeomanry desirous of putting these Irish forces on officers should have a training which a permanent sound footing. If the scheme enabled them to take part in active was carried out in the way in which the warfare and they could not be trained at right hon. Gentleman wished it carried out, once. In three years a man who no matter what criticisms were made by on joining the regiment could not shoot those with whom he sa, or whether their and who rode indifferently became ideas were embraced or not, or whether an efficient shot and a very fair rider, what they desired was brought into the and it required a still longer period scheme or not, they would endeavour to to make him an expert officer. Another make the scheme, when it appeared in the point which arose was the difficulty of light of day, as successful as possible. training men for sentry duty. It was He hoped, therefore, that their criticisms very difficult to get them not to act would at all events receive considera ion. upon their own initiative, but if in Undoubtedly the gravest and most importactual warfare they did not obey ant situation was pictured by the Leader orders exactly sentries might cause of the Opposition who, with his usual great disaster to an army. acumen, went straight to the point when membered a case in which man he implied that the real difficulties lay in was allowed to pass, and when he ques- the fact that the right hon. Gentleman tioned the sentry and asked “Why did was substituting for the system of Militia, you allow the man to pass?" he replied Yeomanry, and Volunteers, which were "Oh, he said, he was a friend of yours, three channels for providing a fighting and I thought you would like to see him." force, one channel for the sime purpose. It was only after many years that efficient His right hon. friend brought them down officers and men could be made, and he to the bed-rock of discussion when he thought that under the proposed con- pointed out that in providing any new ditions the efficiency of the force would Army schemes they must start with not be kept up. He urged the Secretary the assumption that at all events it of State before he reorganised the forces to have a thoroughly well thought-out plan prepared and not hastily do anything which might injure the Army.

He re

a

*CAPTAIN CRAIG (Down E.) asked for some more details of the scheme as it affected Ireland. The right hon. Gentleman had fully and fairly explained the effect on the Militia, Yeomanry, Volunteers, and Artillery of Great Britain, but had so far been unable to satisfy those who were at the present time in Ireland looking anxiously for some explanation of what was to happen, first of all, to the Militia, and, secondly, to those two grand corps, the North of Ireland Imperial Yeomanry and the Sou h of Ireland Imperial Yeomanry. If without any Volunteers in Ireland the Yeomanry and Militia Mr. Meysey-Thompson.

was possible for such a war to break
out as to necessitate the employ
ment of not only
not only the whole of
the Regular but also of the Auxiliary
Forces. Because the problem that hey
had to come back to after all was, when
the Regulars and the Reserves had been
sent to the front, had the Government
taken the trouble to find out what they
could do to help the country in such a
time of need. He regretted that the right
hon. Gentleman and his advisers had not
begun at the bottom of the tree instead
of the top, and faced this problem fairly
and squarely. He left the Regular officers
in the House to deal with the Regular
Forces and would turn his attention to
the Auxiliary forces, which they desired to
bring up to the highest pitch of perfection.

The right hon. Gentleman had sacrificed (ary Forces which were sent out to their the Militia, and they had practically assistance. He did not say this in any heard the last of a force of which its factious spirit, or because he had in mind officers had been extremely proud. The any particular case, but undoubtedly right hon. Gentleman in his memorandum stated that these time honoured regiments must disappear

"It had been found they were quite inefficient to take the field against European troops."

He also found that the old constitutional force

"Had driftedinto a position in which its main purpose in time of peace is to furnish troops for the line, and that it must be released before it can regain the position in the Regular Army to which it is entitled by its great traditions."

at the beginning of the war a large number of the senior officers, who had not seen active service before, looked with a not particularly favourable eye upon the Volunteers, and a good deal of mischief resulted. These officers should have had trained into them the feeling that though a man may be by profession a soldier he should receive and treat on terms of equality those who volunteered to go out and assis: the Regular Army. Now was the time to do this, for if they waited they would have a

He would like to know what the new generation of officers growing right hon. Gentleman meant by the expression" released." He was afraid the responsibility for the decadence of nine regiments of Militia was to be placed upon those inspecting officers who came year after year to the training grounds, returned to their headquar ers and gave in favourable Reports. He asked the right hon. Gentleman to call for the private and confidential Reports of the generals who took part in the late war. He remembered the colonels of three regiments the 3rd Royal Scots, the 4th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and the Royal Irish Rifles-saying they had the most flattering accounts of the way in which the Militia served in South Africa. The letters stated that no Regular regiments could have done beer the work they had to do. The blame for the state of part of the Militia did not rest herefore with the officers, who had striven their hardest to make their regiments a success, and who, if the inspecting officers had only pointed out the faults they noticed, would have done all they could to bring them up to modern requirements. His next point was with regard to the relations between the officers of the Regular Army and the officers of the Auxiliary Forces. He felt most strongly on this matter and drew the attention of the right hon. Gentleman to it last year when he entered on his term of responsible office. Now, while the memory of the South African war was fresh, steps should be taken to impress on the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army the duty of welcoming more heartily than they did on the last occasion the Auxili

up without a personal recollection of the war and the usefulness of the Auxiliary Forces. It could be done through the text books handed to the youngest recruit in the barrack-room, or the officer still at the University. The Red-book had many useless pages, occupied with instructions how to salute, and how to hold the rifle in one position or another. It would be well if those were cut away, and in their stead officers reminded that they were the trustees of the great Volunteer Army of the Empire, and that they were to take under their care not only the men of the Regular Army who had been trained for years and made a profession of the Service, but also those who had at all events done their very best at a time of necessity when the nation asked them. He spoke with some knowledge of the matter, for he had the unique experience of having passed through all the ranks, having been a cadet at school, a Volunteer, a Militia officer, a Yeomanry officer, and of having served for a short time on the staff in South Africa. The Government had taken undue risk in swamping first the Militia, then the Yeomanry and then the vast number of Volunteers. It was all very well in time of peace to say that they would all be embodied and work as a unit together, but it was absolutely useless on the outbreak of war. He could see that utter confusion would take place if it were true as the Under-Secretary for the Colonies had said that the new force would be merely for the defence of the soil. He thought the soil was never in very great danger, and even if

with some be a

should have the old 12-pounder Horse Artillery gun he hoped such a scheme would not be carried out, because after. all that weapon could only be described as a pop-gun as compared with the latest pattern guns. This was a large force and it looked well on paper, but he would ask the Secretary for War seriously to consider the matter before he carried out

he was convinced that national senti- | would, of course, supply the brigade ment was opposed to compulsion as ammunition columns, but he did not regarded military service in any understand what was exactly meant form whatever. In the second place, when the right hon. Gentleman mentioned he saw no reason why this scheme, the park. There must always be a base modification, should not depot where the troops disembarked, and very great success. He said as progress was made a field park at some modification, because he did think rail head. He should like to know that, as regarded the artillery, modifica- would the base depot and field park be tion was necessary. It was proposed to manned by officers and men from the have seventy-two batteries of field Special Contingent. With regard to the artillery in the Field Force, and artillery of the territorial Army he these were provided with ammunition gathered that there would be fourteen columns; he understood that there was batteries of Horse Artillery, 126 batteries. a surplus of thirty-three batteries of Field Artillery, twenty-eight Howitzer of six guns. The right hon. Gentle- batteries, and fourteen heavy batteries. man proposed to put those batteries If it was proposed in regard to fourteen on the four-gun basis, and he supposed batteries of Horse Artillery that they that the surplus sixty-six eighteenpounder guns would be put in store and used on mobilisation to make up the four-gun batteries to six-gun batteries. He would suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that he should not put any guns in store, but that all those 198 guns should be available with which to form batteries. On four-gun a basis that would give very nearly fifty his scheme for the creation of this great batteries, and of that number of batteries artillery force. The Duke of Norfolk's why should not a certain number, officered Commission which inquired into the and manned by Regulars, be used as Militia and Volunteer Forces reported that a stiffening for the territorial Army? they had heard and considered evidence He thought that suggestion was worthy of in regard to both the Militia and Volunthe right hon. Gentleman's consideration. teers and their conclusion was With regard to brigade ammunition without a large amount of expenditure columns he understood that the right and a large number of officers and men' hon. Gentleman had not yet decided from the Regular Army it would be usewhether he would have them manned less to attempt to form field batteries in with the Special Contingent officers either of those forces. He thought it and men or not, for the reason that would be quite right to try an experiment they came into the zone of fire. Al- with Volunteer Field Artillery, but the though it might be strictly accurate to great difficulty he foresaw was obtaining say that these brigade ammunition competent commanding officers for those columns came into the fire zone, he would batteries. If they could get retired Regular like to point out, that as a rule they officers to command those batteries he transferred their ammunition to the saw no reason why they should not be a battery waggon line under cover. In success, but officers of the necessary the Field Artillery Training Manual for experience willing to command such last year, it stated that if the waggon batteries were not very plentiful. line was in an exposed position the empty would like to give one or two reasons waggons should, if possible, be withdrawn why he thought difficulties would arise. under cover, to refill from the ammuni- The commanding officer of a Volunteer tion column. He saw no reason why battery had to understand no only the they should not be manned by Special technical side of artillery work but also Contingent officers and men even if horsemastership. However well-trained they had temporarily to replace batteries might be, unless the horses casualties in the firing line from them. were properly looked after, the guns The divisional ammunition columns might not be able to come into action

that

He