"

up reconstructing, and, to a large extent, the replacement of old tonnage. None of the Royal Sovereign" class were to have any more repairs executed on them, and his information was that they were not to carry more than four mechanics on board. The policy of the Admiralty would be perfectly justified if they were willing to replace the old tonnage, but it could only be justified on that ground. The point where the Admiralty sham came in in this case was that they counted all these old ships as efficient, though they were not repairing or reconstructing them. They were not justified in doing that, whereas foreigners who did repair old ships by a systematic policy were justified in counting old ships. Sir Wm. White went on to say

"The writer's conclusion from independent investigation, is that the official estimate for the annual expenditure on repairs, maintenance and sea stores for the existing Fleet is considerably less than the amount which ought to be provided."

a

When that statement was made, hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite expressed their view of it by bursting into laughter. On getting back to the Board of Admiralty the right hon. Gentleman might have learned that it was a distinguished Member of that Board who engineered the scare of 1904. It was that distinguished man's letters which were read at Navy League Committee meetings and hawked about in the House of Commons, and while the right hon. Gentleman thought the Admiralty was having a fling at someone else he was entirely mistaken. The distinguished Admiral who got that portion of the Fleet increased to thirteen battleships was the First Sea Lord, and since then he had wisely reduced it. The Secretary to the Admiralty in his speech also

said

"The other Fleets are not reduced in the

moment.

Therein lay the strongest condemnation of the Admiralty policy in regard to repairs. He found that the capital value of the Fleet had gone up since April, and therefore a larger amount for repairs, maintenance, stores, etc., was required. A larger amount in proportion to that opinion of the Admiralty advisers below the strength proper to the situation at the present increase had not been provided since then, so that the criticism which he had quoted was still equally applicable. A Labour Member had drawn attention to a passage in Lord Tweedmouth's Memorandum which showed that larger number of ships were under repair in 1904 than was the case to-day. That, in his opinion, afforded one of the strongest condeinnations of the present policy. If repairs were neglected, naturally there would be fewer ships under repair. In 1902 and 1903 the Admiralty were carrying out a systematic policy of reconstructing ships. It was that policy of reconstructing and repairing ships for the purpose of increasing their fighting efficiency which was being neglected at the present moment. It would have been only straightforward if the First Lord had pointed out that at the time referred to the Belleville boiler crisis was at its height, and that naturally a large number of vessels were under repair. That was a reason which did not

He wished to point out to the House that there was no certainty that they might not have to send battleships out to the Far East again, and therefore they must have a margin beyond the thirtytwo in commission ready to go and do the work required. Just the other day after the Liberal Government came into office they had to despatch a Fleet of battleships and cruisers to coerce Turkey. Such things were constantly recurring in connection with the Empire. There was no certainty that we would not require a Fleet outside our Home and Mediterranean waters. In his speech the right hon. Gentleman also referred to the

sea time of the Home Fleet. He could

not profess to be well informed on that subject, but he understood that the battleships of the Home Fleet were never took sights by any chance, because they at sea at night. The navigators never were always in sight of land. That was not sea training, and the result was a

loss in the training and efficiency of the officers. In February last year he ventured to forecast that the upshot would be that the number of collisions and groundings would go up. Since then no less than ten battleships had been in collision or grounded. We lost the services for a time of the "Dominion" and the "Commonwealth," and we lost the "Montagu" which was wrecked on the rocks. He

six to four, and yet for the purpose of exercising at signalling by searchlights during the daytime and wireless telegraphy practice the consensus of opinion was that six was the right number and that it could not be done properly with less. In the House of Lords it had been shown that last month a ship under repair, the "Dominion," was the only battle. ship in home waters. Lord Tweedmouth answered that by saying that the Fleets but he forgot to mention that it would were only three days sail from home, take them another two days to coal at Dover. They were told that these changes increased the instant readiness

maintained that we must have more battleships. He wished to refer to the way in which the battleships were distributed. Therein lay the strongest condemnation of the Admiralty policy in regard to repairs. We must have more battleships. At present we had sixty-three battleships all told, and of those forty-seven battleships, five armoured cruisers, seven were unarmoured over a portion of the water line, and therefore a source

of weakness in view of the fact that France and Germany had no battleships with unarmoured water lines. Two ships of that total were building, and nine the Secretary of the Admiralty had acknowledged as obsolete and set aside The Admiralty had also set aside, or were about to do so, thirteen upon which no further repairs were to be executed, so that left us with a total of thirty-nine. The "Dominion" and Commonwealth

as of no further use.

66

were under repair, and that brought the total down to thirty-seven. Four other battleships were also under repair, and thus they came down to thirtythree, of which thirty-two were in full commission. He did not think that that was a state of affairs which should be regarded by the House as at all desirable. They might come to the state of affairs when the Prime Minister Walpole, then Member for King's Lynn, was wrangling with the First Lord of the Admiralty of the day as to whether the battleship "Salisbury" should be sent out to the West Indies or not. He wished to point out a criticism which had not yet been made with regard to distribution. Three out of our four fleets consisted of only six battleships, whilst every naval officer acknowledged that in order to give a proper tactical training it was necessary to have a minimum of eight vessels in the Fleat, the most desirable number being, in his opinion, twelve. The armoured cruisers attached to the fleets were reduced from Mr. Bellairs.

for war.

Last December there were

thirteen unarmoured cruisers and also Only two big ships could get out at a destroyers locked up in Chatham Basin. tide, and it would take a week to get them all out. In reply to a letter of his in the Morning Post he had had several indignant protests from naval officers saying that they could not be got out of had also been told that the Channel the basin in less than a fortnight. They Fleet could be reinforced by the Home Fleet, but he remembered that the most experienced Admiral this country had had since the time of Nelson had said that in his opinion no worse policy could be pursued than that the Channe Fleet should be dependent for reinforce

ments on other fleets.

SIR GILBERT PARKER (Gravesend) said that it was the custom to deprecate criticism of the Admiralty by any one who was not a naval expert; but he thought that everyone in the House should, from a certain standpoint, be an expert so far as what might be called the co-ordination of sea-power with war strength was concerned. That was to say that no ordinary lay Member of the House ought to consider himself entitled to criticise on such questions as the strategical distribution of the fleets; but they ought to be able to offer an opinion as to how the policy put forward by the representatives of the Admiralty affected the wished to put forward one or two points country and the Empire at large. He which he thought were worth consideration. They were not suggested from any standpoint of petty criticism, but from

considerations which had exercised more | Member behind him had cited the case minds than his own after the recent of the "Victorious," which had been sent explanation of the right hon. Gentleman. to sea utterly unfit as a striking force For instance, the Secretary of the Ad- in time of war. He asked the Secretary miralty stated a short time ago that the to the Admiralty whether he considered Home Fleet would have sea-training equal the ships of the Home Fleet were equito about 70 per cent. of that of a sea- valent to ships in full commission and going fleet, and that the sea-time of our would be useful as a striking force at Fleet as a whole stood to that of a the outbreak of a war. His hon. friend certain foreign Navy as 3.25 to one. A the Member for Fareham, who spoke on question was asked of the Secretary to behalf of the Opposition, had pointed out the Admiralty as to the amount of by suggestion as well as by illustration coal used by the fleets of different that the Home Fleet, though having a nations, but the right hon. Gentleman full complement of crews and all stores deprecated any inquiry into that par- on board, would still not be equal ticular phase of the problem. But it to a sea-going fleet and could not possibly bore upon the question of the training be as effective in time of war as ships in which our Home Fleet received and the full commission. He thought the Secreamount of time that that Fleet should be tary to the Admiralty would do well at sea in order to make it efficient as a to clear up doubts which existed in striking force. In 1905-6 the estimated the minds of many of them as to the cost of coaling the British Fleet was power and effectiveness of the Home £1,261,000, and of the German Fleet Fleet. The point raised by the hon. £676,083. The German Fleet was about Member who had just spoken was one-third of the strength of the British well worthy of consideration. The hon. Fleet, and the sum spent in coaling Member had suggested that although one half. If that coal was not spent we had withdrawn our Fleet from the in manœuvres at sea, how was it spent? China Sea, it was possible that we The fact was that Germany differed from might have to send a fleet there at any England absolutely in her policy regard- moment. At the present time, as it ing the training of her Fleet. Ger- happened, Japan cared for us in that many believed that the policy pursued sea and bore the burden of our interest in regard to our Home Fleet was not there. But at the same time we had a wise policy. She believed that every not been able to reduce out Fleet by a ship she had should be in full com- single ship in consequence of Japan's mission, capable of being sent to sea as protecting our common interests. But a striking force at any moment. If supposing war broke out to-morrow and the figures which he had quoted were to be we had to send to the East a number of relied upon at all, they showed that ships, we should have to detach them some explanation was due from the from the Atlantic or the Mediterranean Secretary to the Admiralty as to the Squadrons, or from the Home Fleet. effectiveness of the Home Fleet. In In that case, if at the present time we 1900 Germany took the strongest ex- were supposed to have sufficient ception to the policy of England, that the strength in those waters, what would Reserve Fleet was a fleet which could be be our position if we withdrew a number relied upon as sufficiently powerful in of ships to go to Eastern waters to protect the event of the outbreak of war to our interests there? A good many hon. act as a striking force. The Admiralty, Members seemed to think that we were both in the past and now through its in an era of comparative peace, and representatives in Parliament, had taken because that was so we ought to reduce a different view. It was not for him the Navy. A statement made by M. to suggest that that policy was not a Clemenceau in this connection was very good one, since both the last and the interesting. He said, on 17th October, present Governments were committed to that no peace was possible without it; but the Committee ought to have a strength. When, he added, he came clear explanation from the Secretary into office he believed that all to the Admiralty as to the policy in the European nations were at one regard to the Home Fleet. The hon. in their desire for peace, but almost

immediately, without any provocation too great, he thought the effect upon other on their part, a storm of calumny nations would not be what we desired. broke over their heads and they It was only the strongest nation at the had to ask themselves "Are we pro- height of her shipbuilding power and at pared?" He did not think the era the moment when she was supreme in of peace was upon us, and anybody regard to her Navy which could properly who took into contemplation the state come before the other nations and say— of Europe could not think so. As to to "We are prepared to limit our proJapan and Russia, he did not think gramme if you are prepared to limit the state of things had changed, although at present Japan had the predominance of power. There was some friction the other day between Japan and the United States, not enough to lead to a war, but from lesser incidents war had arisen. There was also danger of disturbance in Austria and some other parts of Europe, and so long as there was danger of war it was not sufficient if this country had less than a preponderating power over the two-Power standard. There was nothing occult in that twoPower standard and it could be easily understood. It meant that we must be equal to any two Powers in the world with a margin of 10 per cent. over. Hon. Members seemed to think and Ministers to suggest that, because amiable relations were subsisting between England and other nations, therefore we need not increase our strength; but if he remembered aright there were no unamiable relations existing between this country and other countries in 1894. All the same, however, the Liberal Government then in power, because we had three battleships building and Germany six, projected a programme of seven battleships, six cruisers, and other vessels. Since then both Parties had been responsible, and our policy had been to go on from strength to strength, and we had accepted the two-Power standard in order to maintain our position as a great sea Power and to meet the progress made by other Powers. That was a policy which we could adopt and define without being in the least out of sympathy with a desire for the friendliest relations. If we went to The Hague Conference saying that we were reducing our Navy we should go upon an absolutely false basis, because it was only the strongest nation with the largest Navy that could properly make any such request to the other nations there assembled. If we said that we were reducing the expenditure upon the Navy because the burden was Sir Gilbert Parker.

yours." If the Prime Minister went into The Hague Conference under present circumstances, however much we might desire to decrease armaments, we were not likely to achieve our object. No one would suggest that the attempt ought not to be made, but he thought we were not yet sufficiently in the temperate zone of international candour and sympathy to secure its success. Nations were proverbially selfish, and this nation, so far as its relations with its Colonies throughout the world were concerned, ought in its own interests and theirs to be selfish. If we laid our cards upon the table when we were at the greatest of our strength our prospect of success would be greater than if we reduced our force. If our cards were withheld on the other hand, it was perfectly well known how we stood in regard to naval power as compared with other countries. If in our great strength, however, we laid our cards upon the table foreign nations would know that this nation was prepared to bear the greatest burden that could be laid upon it, and if necessary to load itself with the greatest National Debt possible to carry out the duties imposed upon it by its Empire. If we went in that spirit we were much more likely to receive favourable consideration in European affairs than if we went in anything like a spirit of timidity or uncertainty as to the intention of this country to keep itself in the position it had occupied since the days of Napoleon. We must be safe; if we were not there was no doubt we should be sorry for it. He thought they ought to have some more explicit information as to the distribution of the Home Fleet than they had yet had. The right hon. Gentleman said that certain first-class battleships of a new type were to be retained in the Home Fleet, but if any ships of the seagoing fleets, such as the Atlantic or Mediterranean, were withdrawn for repairs their place was to be taken by these first

class battleships. That would weaken | for active service or to stand beside the the Home Fleet which the right hon. Atlantic or the Mediterranean Fleet in Gentleman had represented as sufficient, the attacks to be made on the enemy. It but not too sufficient, for our needs in was with great modesty that he put time of difficulty. It was not always these points to the right hon. Gentleman. easy to define a time of difficulty, and it was hardly possible that there could be any European naval war without our being drawn into it. Prince Hohenloe in his memoirs stated that on two occasions in his experience when Europe was on the verge of war, if war had broken out England would have been brought in. He took it that the Home Fleet should be just as able to strike to-morrow as she would be to strike a year from now if a European war broke out. Lord Portsmouth, speaking in another place, inquired who would expect that the Home Fleet would be required to go to war merely on the receipt of a telegram, or who would expect that the declaration of war would fall like a bolt from the blue? In other words, he meant that it must be preceded by strained relations with the country involved. But that did not always follow. Everyone knew that in such cases there might be diplomatic negotiations for a number of months and then war suddenly ensue. What had happened before was likely to occur again. But our Home Fleet could not go to war to-morrow. The third division of the Fleet would only perform services, coaling and so on, to the main Fleet. The second division, with nucleus crews, might be able to go to sea in the course of twenty-four hours, but they would have had no experience under their officers or of manoeuvring for any period of time, without which no ship could possibly be an effective striking item of a fleet of war. The Atlantic Fleet, the Channel Fleet, and the Mediterranean Fleet could war to-morrow, but the Home Fleet, was not in the same position. If the right hon. Gentleman told the Committee that our strength was so great that the Home Fleet need not be in perfect training, or perfectly ready, they would accept that assurance. But, as had been pointed out, if war broke out we should not have six months in which to make ready the Home Fleet. The blow would be struck at once, and the impact would be tremendous. The blow would be struck long before the ships of the Home Fleet could be ready

go to

*MR. MURRAY MACDONALD (Falkirk Burghs) said the right hon. Member for Dover had stated that we ought to adhere inflexibly to the two-Power standard. Did the right hon. Gentleman mean by that what was really a two-Power standard, or the two-Power standard with a margin, which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition on a former occasion suggested should be the measure of our strength? He (Mr. Macdonald) desired to move to reduce the Vote by 8,000 men. He believed the strength of the two next most powerful navies in the world was 96,000 men, and it was proposed by this Estimate to vote 128,000. We had, therefore, an excess of 34,000. That was in fact an excess that made our strength equal to a three-Power standard. Was that necessary? He would repeat the question he put on а previous occasion-what was there in the international situation to justify the maintenance of such an enormous establishment as was proposed in the present Estimates? If his right hon. friend would satisfy him on that point he would most heartily support the proposals of the Estimate. It was the boast of the Party opposite that during the last few years of their administration they had pursued a policy of peace which had resulted in a more peaceable outlook for this country than had been enjoyed for the last forty years. He believed the present Government continued to pursue that policy. But though the policy was admirable and though the country as a whole must be grateful to those who had been responsible for it, it had not had the consequences which the country was entitled to expect should follow from it. What was the use of our policy, of our diplomacy, or of our cordial understandings if they were to have no effect in reducing our enormous establishments. He maintained that, by our present expenditure, we depriving peace of all its advantages and anticipating the energies of war whenever they might be required. He

were