1005 in Prisons, Reformatory and Industrial Schools, and Inebriate Reformatories," presented by Mr. Herbert Samuel; to be read a second time upon Monday next, and to be printed. [Bill 100.] BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY). Ordered, That the Proceedings on the Business of Supply, if under discussion at Eleven o'clock this night, be not interrupted under the Standing Order (Sittings of the House), notwithstanding anything in Standing Order No. 15. (Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.) SUPPLY [2nd ALLOTTED DAY]. Considered in Committee. (In the Committee.) on that important point also. He wished, [Mr. EMMOTT (Oldham) in the Chair.] of thumb was something which every one NAVY ESTIMATES, 1907-8. 1. Motion made, and Question proposed, "That 128,000 officers, seamen, and boys be employed for the Sea and Coast Guard Services for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1908, including 18,595 Royal Marines." MR. WYNDHAM (Dover) said that the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary to the Admiralty on Tuesday last had gone some way towards dispelling the doubts which had been most legitimately entertained in the country upon some aspects of the Government's naval policy during last autumn and the early winter. But some doubts still remained, and it was with those he wished to deal that afternoon. on the He did not propose to touch financial aspect of the right hon. Gentleman's policy. It was believed that the amount of repairs at present in hand had not been adequately dealt with, and he hoped the Government would reassure the Committee on that important point. It was said not only that one effect of the present policy of laying up a number of ships was to increase the amount of repairs that had to be done, but that greater difficulty was found now than heretofore in getting repairs expediIt was not for tiously carried out. him to speak on matters of technical detail, but he hoped the Government would be able to reassure the Committee could understand, and therein lay its strength. The Secretary to the Admiralty thought it necessary-he himself thought it was unnecessary and inexpedient-to indulge in retrospect; he said he remembered a time when the twoPower standard was applied to two specified Powers, and by that phrase suggested that there had been some change in policy. But the two Powers which at any rate had in recent years been taken were the two Powers which at the time happened to be the greatest Powers, and the two-Power standard as universally accepted meant that this country must have a margin of naval strength above If that historical and beyond the naval strength of such two other Powers. retrospect was a mistake, surely it was a greater mistake for the right hon. Gentleman to indulge in certain academic speculations, as that there were conceivable circumstances in which we might have a lower standard, qualifying this by adding a higher that there were imaginable circumstances we might have in which But such speculations cast standard. doubt upon our policy, the whole virtue of which depended on its being continuous and intelligible. Hon. Members who read the foreign Press would discover that debates in this House which occupied five or six hours were compressed into a paragraph of five or six lines, and such were which reported, speculations, were thus thrust into undue prominence and gave the incorrect impression abroad that our policy was variable and could not with any useful result underdepended on on circumstance and upon take in the House. What they had to our diplomatic relations with the great believe was that no Government and no European States. That nullified a great Board of Admiralty would so far betray deal of the value which we had derived their trust in matters which were confor many years and might continue fidential as to depart from the intelligent to derive by speaking steadfastly of the carrying out of a policy so devised. two-Power standard. Why had that More than that the Committee could not policy been adopted by both Parties? It do. Some hon. Members following the line was because they believed that it secured of the Secretary to the Admiralty thought the first condition of European peace. it was a mistake to attach so much The first condition of European peace importance to this rigid rule of thumb, was repose of mind among our people at and that the two-Power standard home and the people of other countries must depend upon the diplomatic situaabroad. In order to have that repose tion. That was putting the cart before the they must have nothing to cast doubt on horse. It would be truer to say that the two-Power standard policy. They the amount of confidence we inspired in must say nothing, Heaven forbid that our friends and the amount of respect we they should do anything, to shake the instilled into those we could not yet call confidence of our friends abroad; but our friends depended upon the mainfriendship between nations sprang, he tenance of the two-Power standard-a thought, very largely from generous standard which ought to be certainly sentiment, from mutual admiration of continuous and easily understood. They each other's characteristics. We admired all knew that the Government could not the French for many things, and he hoped take the House and the country fully that the French admired us for some of into confidence; but they also knew the our national qualities. He thought they startling revelations that were made by admired us for our doggedness of purpose Lord Rosebery some years ago about in carrying out any kind of under- diplomatic relations which had always standing which our honour seemed to been discussed in diplomatic terms when approve. If our friends were ever to we were on the verge of war. The right have doubt-even if the doubts were hon. Gentleman claimed that the reasons illegitimate that all Parties in the State for the strategical disposition of the Fleets were not absolutely wedded to the policy ought not to be asked for or given; but of the two-Power standard as defined and the important factor in the problem was understood, we should have done some- that the people of this country were thing unwittingly, but disastrously, to entitled to repose in the belief that their shake their confidence, and with their Navy was and would remain equal to the confidence, the basis of European peace. two-Power standard. That being so, what was the use in speculating about the diplomatic situation in the future? It was better to stick to the two-Power standard in a plain British sense, and state it in plain British prose, so that all might know what we meant and intended to do. MR. MENZIES (Lanarkshire, S.): The right hon. Gentleman has talked a great deal about the two-Power standard. I would like to ask him what is the twoPower standard? MR. WYNDHAM said if the hon. Member had favoured him with his attention he would have noticed that he gave a definition of the two-Power standard. It was that the naval strength of this country should be at least equal to the strength of any other two Powers. He deprecated the arguments which had been used in the debate by persons not in the confidence of the Admiralty, namely, arguments based on a comparison of tonnage. That was the business of the Government and the Board of Admiralty. It was business which they Mr. Wyndham. MAJOR SEELY (Liverpool, Abercromby) asked if the right hon. Gentleman meant a European two-Power standard, or a world two-Power standard? MR. WYNDHAM said he thought it was far better to adhere to the term "two-Power standard." Each individual could judge for himself without being an expert. If they went beyond that they at once began to lose or at any rate to nullify in a great degree the advantage we derived from adhering simply to a two-Power standard. The speech of the Secretary to the Admiralty was a temperate speech. But it contained one unmeasured phrase about the rancorous Press campaign which had raged against the Home Fleet, a phrase in which there was an undeserved censure on the Press. The Board of Admiralty themselves, instead of following precedent and issuing a Parliamentary Paper, sent to the Press last October a document in which the Home Fleet was mentioned for the first time, thereby inviting the newspapers to discuss their policy; and that document was couched in language so vague that no one could understand it until the Secretary to the Admiralty had made his speech. Why was not that Paper circulated in the House? He did not pretend they were naval experts; but he did assert that the function of the House was to act as a jury, and, therefore, no more information should be withheld from their knowledge than was necessary in order to safeguard vital interests. The Secretary to the Admiralty had said the Admiralty should not be asked the reasons for the strategical distribution of the Fleet. But there had been a striking change-some thought a mistaken change -in the non-strategical distribution of the Fleet, as to which some explanation was desirable. As the right hon. Gentleman had reminded the Committee, our seagoing Fleet was open to criticism; it was largely composed of obsolete vessels, inadequately distributed over the globe, and behind that there was an absolutely inefficient reserve. When the late Government left office there was a sea-going line of thirty-two battleships-ships always at sea-and there was a reserve of fourteen battleships with nucleus crews. all forty-six battleships. In the new non-strategical distribution of the Fleet there were in the Mediterranean six battleships instead of eight, in the Atlantic six battleships instead of eight, in the Channel fourteen battleships instead of sixteen, or altogether twenty-six seagoing battleships instead of thirty-two. It might be said that the Nore division of six battleships ought properly to be added to the first sea-going line. Some doubts had been expressed by naval experts as to whether those battleships could really be described as fully sea-going; but admitting that they might be counted in the seagoing line, they brought up that line to thirty-two battleships. That left to the In reserve only seven battleships. Excluding the Nore division from the first line there were twenty-six battleships in the seagoing line and thirteen battleships in the reserve. Altogether there was a total of thirty-nine battleships, or a reduction of seven since the time of the late Government. That was so great a change and had attracted so much attention that he would have supposed the Secretary to the Admiralty would devote a considerable part of his speech to explaining and justifying it. But all the right hon. Gentleman had said was that he was told that in 1904 the Admiralty came to the conclusion that the strength of the sea-going Fleet was greater than strategical interests required, a hearsay statement which the hon. Member for the Fareham Division, who was on the Board of Admiralty in 1904, at once repudiated. If the Government claimed that the sea-going ships were still thirty-two, what was the object of the statement? If the sea-going ships were only twenty-six, some better justification of the change than this hearsay statement ought to be given. There seemed to be some colour for saying that this did not represent the considered policy, either of the Government or of the Admiralty. He remembered something being sent to the Press about officers being too long at sea. *THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Mr. EDMUND ROBERTSON, Dundee) said that the only Paper of that kind which he remembered being sent to the Press was a Board Minute addressed to the Fleet. MR. WYNDHAM inquired if it was not addressed to the House. *MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON replied in the negative. It was an Admiralty Minute addressed to the Fleet. MR. WYNDHAM said he regretted that the Paper was not given to the House. In that document they were given another reason for the change, not a strategic reason, viz., that sailors got stale if they were kept too long at sea. First the Admiralty stated that for strategical reasons the Fleet should be reduced; then that there were as many ships as ever in the first line'; and finally they referred to a document in which they said it was not for a strategical reason | serious, criticism which had been directed at all, but that the change was based against the general policy of the Admiralty upon the interests of officers and sailors from high and authoritative quarters. who got stale if they were kept too Those criticisms, whether just or unjust, long at sea. These conflicting reasons sound or unsound, wise or unwise, were justified all the doubts entertained in inspired, he believed, not by any petty the autumn and all the criticism in the personal motives, but by a sincere desire Press which the right hon. Gentleman had to maintain the best interests and tradicalled "rancorous." If the right hon. tions of the British Navy, and they were Gentleman thought that any portion of entirely distinct from those sensational the Press ought to stand up and make the paragraphs and headlines which were amende honourable to him in a white sheet their regular fare during the autumn. with a candle in its hands, then he. who The attempt was then made to prejudice associated himself with their criticism, public opinion and bring to discredit upon ought to stand in a white sheet too; but the Board of Admiralty, and through he declined to do so. He expressed what that Board upon the present Government, he felt then, what he felt now, and what and it was partially successful, because he would continue to feel until far more the statements and allegations fell upon explanation was given of this change. ears not unwilling or unready to think the worst of the present Government, and to believe that in their desire to effect economy they would make reductions even at the expense of the efficiency of the British Navy. He had taken the trouble to investigate the various charges, and in only one solitary instance had he found the charge substantiated by the facts. That one instance was the relegation of the "Royal Sovereign" class into a special reserve. The hon. Member for King's Lynn, in the lecture which he addressed to the Government on Tuesday, seemed to think that any stick was good enough with which to chastise the Government. He blamed them for having placed the "Royal Sovereign" class in the special reserve, and then said it would be murder or next to murder to send those ships into the fighting line and expose them to the newer vessels *MR. BEAUCHAMP (Suffolk, Lowestoft) thought that everybody inside or outside the House who took an interest in naval affairs would be glad that they had got outside the domain of fiction into the region of fact. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dover objected to the phrase which was used by the Secretary to the Admiralty when he said that the Press campaign in the autumn was a 66 rancorous one. He entirely endorsed the phrase of the Secretary to the Admiralty. He considered that that campaign was discreditable both to those who engineered it and to those who carried it on. The object of it, so far as he had been able to judge, was to cast discredit upon the present Board of Admiralty. MR. EDMUND ROBERTSON: And of any Continental country. One of the last. MR. BEAUCHAMP said the object more especially was to cast discredit upon the brilliant and distinguished officer and capable organiser, Sir John Fisher, who held the position of First Sea Lord. Nobody who knew the work which had been done by the present First Sea Lord would have the hardihood to deny his great ability, his inexhaustible energy, and his indomitable industry. He had infused new life and vigour into the conduct of the Department. When he alluded to the Press campaign he did not refer to more sober, and therefore perhaps more Mr. Wywiham. the strongest allegations made was with regard to the Home Fleet. It was said that it was to be formed by denuding the Channel, Atlantic, and Mediterranean Fleets or squadrons, was to be only partially manned, and only to go out for exercise once, twice, or perhaps. three times in a year. They now had the facts. The portion of the Home Fleet stationed at the Nore was to consist of six first-class battleships and six armoured cruisers, all of which were to be fully manned, and they were to go out frequently for exercise in the North Sea. Instead of a reduction in the fighting efficiency of the British Navy he thought its fighting efficiency had been thoroughly *SIR CHARLES DILKE (Gloucestershire, Forest of Dean) said he had expressly stated that the danger had arisen chiefly in the last two years and more particularly in the last year. maintained and the strategical position our vessels were captured during the had been enormously improved. There first weeks of a war it was quite easy was one thing, however, which rather to understand that there would be a disappointed him, and that was that serious panic in this country. It must there was no provision, with the exception be remembered that that took place when of one unarmoured cruiser, for adding to the attacking fleet was vastly inferior to the number of our cruisers. He was very the protecting fleet and that it took place much struck by what the right hon. within a limited area. But if that area Baronet the Member for the Forest of was extended, as it would be in the case Dean said about the question of an attack of actual warfare, and we had to extend or a possible attack upon our commerce. protection to all our trade from Canada, He thought the right hon. Baronet's view America, the Argentine, Australia, the was that the probability was that we far East, and through the Mediterranean, should not have much to fear in it led to the inevitable conclusion that future with regard to such an attack. we required more cruisers and commerce The right hon. Baronet's opinion protectors. Then with regard to the must always have, especially upon docking of our ships. In his opinion the this subject, very great weight with present system was uneconomical and every Member of the House, but this did not tend to efficiency. At the present view was not the view entertained by time a vessel was docked only once a the members of the Royal Commission. year. The result was that its bottom became foul, the disadvantage of which was that it required a greater expenditure of coal, and there was a greater amount of wear and tear of the machinery and boilers, to enable it to get up necessary speed. In time of war our system had not only this economic disadvantage, but also stategical and tactical disadvantages. The vessel longest out of dock lagged behind when at full speed, which was a tactical disadvantage in manoeuvring and a strategical disadvantage when taking up a position. Owing to having to burn more coal in order to increase their speed the radius of action of such vessels was reduced. If we docked our vessels more frequently, though there would be an increase in the expenditure for docking, such expenditure would be made up and more than made up by the reduced consumption of coal. One of the leading firms of shipowners of this country had found it necessary, and he presumed therefore economical, to dock their vessels three times a year. Speaking of the adoption in the new vessels of turbine engines, he said that, though they possessed great advantages, he was not quite certain that they had sufficient knowledge to render it absolutely certain that those advantages were not out-balanced by the disadvantages of placing such engines in battleships. He understood that battleships did not manoeuvre so easily or so quickly with turbine as they did with reciprocating engines, and he suggested that that was *MR. BEAUCHAMP said that might be so, but he doubted whether the view of the right hon. Baronet was held by the Admiralty. One of the objects of the recent manœuvres was to test the arrangements for the protection of our ships of commerce. The result of those manoeuvres must necessarily have been somewhat inconclusive because of their narrow area; they were rendered more so by want of co-operation on the part of shipowners. But the Admiralty were not to blame for that. The shipowners were asked to co-operate with the Admiralty and every provision was made that they should not suffer loss, as they were to be paid demurrage for any time they lost and every precaution was taken to protect them in regard to loss of ship or cargo. He could not but lament the lack of public spirit on the part of the shipowners. What was the result? In the first few days of the manoeuvres no less than 55 per cent. of the merchant vessels and those representing merchant vessels were captured. The umpires pointed out that that would not have taken place if there had been a larger number engaged, but even if the percentage had been 25-if 25 per cent. of |