correct statement.

tion, miracles are alike incredible to him who is previously assured of the constant agency of a Divine Being, and to him who believes that no such Being exists in the universe. They are equally incredible, whether related to have been wrought upon occasions the most deserving, and for purposes the most beneficial, or for no assignable end whatever, or for an end confessedly trifling or pernicious. This surely cannot be a In adjusting also the other side of the balance, the strength and weight of testimony, this author has provided an answer to every possible accumulation of historical proof, by telling us, that we are not obliged to explain how the story of the evidence arose. Now I think that we are obliged; not, perhaps, to show by positive accounts how it did, but by a probable hypothesis how it might so happen. The existence of the testimony is a phenomenon. The truth of the fact solves the phenomenon. If we reject this solution, we ought to have some other to rest in; and none even by our adversaries can be admitted, which is not consistent with the principles that regulate human affairs and human conduct at present, or which makes men then to have been a different kind of Beings from what they are now.

But the short consideration which, independently of every other, convinces me that there is no solid foundation in Mr. Hume's conclusion is the following. When a theorem is proposed to a mathematician, the first thing he does with it is to try it upon a simple case; and, if it produce a false result, he is sure that there must be some mistake in the demonstration. Now to proceed in this way with what may be called Mr. Hume's theorem. If twelve men, whose probity and good sense I had long known, should seriously and circumstantially relate to me an account of a miracle wrought before their eyes, and in which it was impossible that they should be deceived; if the governor of the country, hearing a rumor of this account, should call these men into his presence, and offer them a short proposal, either to confess the imposture, or submit to be tied up to a gibbet; if they should refuse with one voice to acknowledge that there existed any falsehood or imposture in the case; if this threat were communicated to them separately, yet with no different effect; if it was at last executed; if I myself saw them, one after another, consenting to be racked, burnt, or

strangled, rather than give up the truth of their account; still, if Mr. Hume's rule be my guide, I am not to believe them. Now, I undertake to say that there exists not a skeptic in the world who would not believe them; or who would defend such incredulity.

Instances of spurious miracles supported by strong apparent testimony undoubtedly demand examination. Mr. Hume has endeavored to fortify his argument by some examples of this kind. I hope in a proper place to show that none of them reach the strength or circumstances of the christian evidence. In these, however, consists the weight of his objection. In the principle itself I am persuaded there is none.

ANNOTATIONS.

'Mankind stood in need of a revelation.'

These words would admit of being so understood as to be open to the reply, 'Why then was it not bestowed on all mankind? But the Author shortly after explains his meaning to be merely-what must surely be admitted as nothing unreasonable only that in miracles adduced in support of revelation, there is not any such antecedent improbability as no testimony can surmount.'

I have endeavored to show, in a subsequent part of this volume, that we have good reason for regarding every individual civilized man-whether Christian, Deist, or Atheist-as himself a portion of a standing monument of what may be fairly called a 'revelation' to mankind.

'In what way can a revelation be made, but by miracles?'

It is important to keep in mind that a Miracle in the etymological sense-i.e. a mere wonder-proves nothing. It is a proof, only when it is (as it is commonly called in our Scriptures) a Sign. When any one performs something beyond human power, or foretells something undiscoverable by human sagacity, appealing to this as a sign that he is the bearer of a divine message, it is then, and then only, that this becomes. miraculous evidence.

But the practice which is but too prevalent is much to be deprecated, of applying the words 'miraculous' or 'providential' to any unusual occurrence; as if the divine providence had nothing to do with ordinary events. A great advantage is given to anti-christians by this rash and irreverent language coming from advocates who, professing pre-eminent piety, are in reality guilty of presumptuous impiety, in proclaiming (virtually) that thus saith the Lord; when the Lord hath not spoken.'

A clergyman having pointed out (in conformity with our Lord's declaration, Luke xiii.) that we are not warranted, in the absence of a distinct revelation to that effect, to speak of the late famine as a special judgment from Heaven on the sufferers, and a sign of divine wrath against the nation for extending toleration to Roman-catholics, was, for this, denounced, publicly, in print, by a brother clergyman, as denying all revelation!

Well may our religion say, 'Save me from my friends, and I fear not my enemies!'

'The force of Experience, as an objection to miracles, is founded on the presumption, either that the course of Nature is invariable,' &c.

There is a passage in the Quarterly Review (Oct., 1859), which is so much to the purpose that I have taken the liberty of extracting a portion of the substance of it.

'It would perhaps have been more clear, if the defenders of the christian miracles had used the expression of 'the nowexisting course of Nature,' or,' the ordinary course of things as now observed by us.' For, if by the course of Nature' be understood, that which is conformable to the divine appointment, then, to speak of any thing occurring that is preternatural, would be a contradiction.

'Some persons however who admit the possible, and the actual occurrence of miracles, are accustomed to speak as if they thought (though perhaps that is not really their meaning) that the Course of Nature' is something that goes on of itself; but that God has the power, which He sometimes exercises, of interrupting it; even as a man who has constructed some such

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engine as—for instance-a mill, leaves it usually to work of itself (for they forget that there is an external agency which keeps it in motion, and of which the millwright has availed himself) but which he has the power of stopping when he sees cause.

'But any one who believes in a universal divine government, and divine foreknowledge, must believe that whatever has at any time happened, must be in accordance with a pre-arranged system, though it may be a portion of that system widely different from those other portions that come under our habitual experience. It will then be a departure from the ordinary course of nature; and there may have been such an arrangement originally made that such an extraordinary event shall, when it occurs, serve as a sign, in attestation of the divine Will in some point.

This may be easily illustrated even from works of human agency. Suppose, for instance, a clock so constructed as to strike only at the hour of noon. A child might suppose, from an observation of several hours, that it was the nature of that clock to move silently; and when he heard it strike, he might account this a departure from its nature: though it would be, in fact, as much a part of the maker's original design, as any of the movements; his design having been to announce the hour of noon, and no other.

'But a similar misapprehension of the nature of the machine would be much more likely to prevail, if a clock could be so constructed as to strike only at the end of a year; or at the end of a century; supposing the maker to have kept his design from being generally known. If, at the end of the year, he dispatched, with a message from himself, certain messengers to whom he had made known the construction of the clock, and whom he had authorized to announce the striking, as an attestation of their coming from him, this would be a decisive proof of the genuineness of their message.

'Now this may serve as an illustration of the view which an intelligent believer may fairly take of miraculous evidence: namely, that the christian miracles are not-properly speaking -'violations of the Laws of Nature,' but departures from the present ordinary course of Nature, in conformity with an arrangement originally so made as to let these be signs evidencing a divine mission.

'And to pronounce boldly that no such occurrence ever did or can take place, on the ground that it has not come under our own experience, and that the strongest evidence for it is to be at once rejected unheard, is manifestly a most rash and unphilosophical procedure. If we could suppose a butterfly, which is born in the spring, and lives but two or three months, to be endowed with a certain portion of rationality (enough perhaps for a German Rationalist, or a Humite) he might lay it down as a Law of Nature, that the trees should be green, and the fields enamelled with flowers. And if some animal of a superior order assured him that formerly the trees were bare of leaves, and the fields covered with snow, he might deride this as contrary to all Experience, and to all Analogy, and a physical impossibility. And in this he would not be more unphilosophical than some who are called philosophers.'

In fact, there is a strong proof, independent of the Scripture-narratives, that something at variance with our ordinary present experience of the course of Nature as now subsisting among us-namely, a direct communication to Man from some superhuman Being-did formerly take place. The existence of civilized Man at the present day, is a standing monument

of it.

Some persons are accustomed to talk as if savages could, and sometimes did, invent for themselves, one by one, all the useful arts, and thus raise themselves to a civilized state, without any assistance from men already civilized. One may meet with fine descriptions-though altogether fanciful-of this supposed progress of men towards civilization. One man, it has been supposed, wishing to save himself the trouble of roaming through the woods in search of wild fruits and roots, would bethink himself of collecting the seeds of these, and cultivating them in a spot of ground cleared and broken up for the purpose. And finding that he could thus raise more than enough for himself, he might agree with some of his neighbors to let them have a part of the produce in exchange for some of the game and fish they might have taken. Another man, again, it has been supposed, would endeavor to save himself the labor and uncertainty of hunting, by catching some kinds of wild animals alive, and keeping them in an inclosure to breed, that he might have a supply always at hand.