10

we acquire most of our knowledge from others? Is not some portion of communicated instruction necessary to awaken our faculties? Is not our natural assent to testimony a symptom in favour of an historical Revelation? Page 7 SECT. IV. Upon what kind of evidence must a Revelation depend? Are not miracles essential to its proof? Must it not also accord with our moral sentiments? SECT. V. Is it not probable that a Revelation would, upon the whole, agree with the circumstances of mankind? Would it not appear congenial to our understandings, and suitable to our external conditions, by being adapted to a state of trial and discipline? SECT. VI. Is it not probable there was some Revelation at the first creation of man? Do not the circumstances of a new creation seem to require it? Is it consistent with our natural sentiments of God that he should create man and leave him in total ignorance of his duty?

13

19

25

SECT. VII.-Would God have created man otherwise than innocent? Would he not have been the author of evil if he had created man in his present condition? SECT. VIII. Does not the possibility of the fall necessarily arise out of man's free agency? Are not all free agents liable to similar abuses? Is this any argument against the creation of free agents?

SECT. IX.

28

Do not the contradictions which subsist in our nature between reason and passion intimate some derangement in our moral faculties? Could an innocent being feel sentiments of shame, repentance?

remorse, and

32

SECT. X. - Does not the doctrine of the fall derive some credibility from the opposition which subsists between the wishes and the circumstances of mankind? Would God have originally made mankind dissatisfied with their situations? Are not these symptoms of our being in a degraded condition? Page 35 SECT. XI. Is not the doctrine of the fall rendered probable from the numerous external ills to which we are exposed? Would God have exposed innocent beings to sickness, pains, disappointments, &c.? Do not all nations acknowledge their guilt by their cries and confessions? SECT. XII. — Are not the hereditary consequences of the fall in unison with our common observations of nature? Are not children dependent on the conduct of their parents, and subjects on that of their rulers? Is not infamy and reputation in some degree hereditary? Does not this arise out of the nature of a race?

38

41

46

SECT. XIII. Is it not probable there are other intelligent creatures in the universe besides man? Is not this rendered credible by the discoveries of modern astronomy? Is it not probable that some of these beings are evil and others good? Have not all nations held these opinions? SECT. XIV. — Is it not possible that some evil beings have tempted man to disobey his maker? Are not superior talents often perverted to the purposes of allurement to vice? Would not the consequences be very tremendous of introducing evil into an innocent nature? SECT. XV. Is it not probable that man, upon his first

may

49

creation, might be allowed to hold converse with superior beings? Does not a state of solitude seem to demand such intercourse? Might it not be requisite to bring him into a state of moral trial? Page 52 SECT. XVI. -What is the present character and situation of man? Is he not a mixed and intermediate being, partly good and partly evil? Does not the world accord with this confusion, exhibiting marks both of happiness and misery? Does not hope on the whole predominate?

55

58

SECT. XVII. - Might not man entertain some expectations of pardon on repentance? Does he wear the appearance of a hopeless outcast? Are not there many symptoms of mercy in his providential treatment? SECT. XVIII. Does it not seem probable that some extraordinary assistance would be granted to aid man in his moral difficulties? Might not this have been hoped from our natural sentiments of the Deity? 62 SECT. XIX. In what manner does it seem probable that a Revelation would be made known to us? Would it not be conveyed by impressing us with the sense of our guilt, and with the hopes of pardon on repentance? To impress these sentiments, would it not institute a sacrificial form of worship? Would it not also republish the original moral code? SECT. XX. - On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not enforce the unity and personality of the Divine Being? Would not this become expedient from the universal prevalence of idolatry? SECT. XXI. On the supposition of any Revelation,

65

68

was it not probable that some new relations of the Deity would be discovered to us? Is not this extremely credible from our ignorance of the divine nature? Page 71 SECT. XXII. — Is not the Deity made known to us in natural theology, chiefly after a relative and analogical manner? Are not all his titles as Father, Governor, &c. borrowed from earthly objects, and transferred to the Divine Being? Are not our conceptions of his moral attributes gathered from reflecting on our own minds, and afterwards transferred to the Divine Intellect? SECT. XXIII.

73

76

79

On the supposition of any Revelation, is it not probable that it would be published by some extraordinary character? Would there not be considerable reason to doubt whether any dependent creature would be equal to the task? SECT. XXIV. On the supposition of any Revelation, is it not probable that the example of its founder would be held up as a leading evidence of its truth, and a great medium of its utility? SECT. XXV. On the supposition of any Revelation, is it not probable that it would contain some doctrines relative to a sacrifice and atonement for our sins? Would it have been adapted to human wants, if it had been deficient in these doctrines? SECT. XXVI. Is not the belief of spiritual aid implied in natural as well as in revealed theology? Is it not implied in all prayers? Does it not arise out of the belief of a Providence? Do not the philosophers of antiquity assert it? SECT. XXVII. On the supposition of any Revelation,

-

82

85

90

is it not probable that it would confirm our natural sentiments respecting the immortality of the soul? Was not there great want of such confirmation? Page 88 SECT. XXVIII.- On the supposition of any Revelation, is it not probable that it would be sanctioned by the doctrines of eternal rewards and punishments? Does not this probability arise out of the connection of revelation with an unchangeable state of existence ? Could the obedience of mankind have been secured without this doctrine? SECT. XXIX. On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not in all probability contain some doctrines beyond the reach of our natural faculties? Would any religion devoid of mysteries be suited to the nature of man? SECT. XXX. On the supposition of any Revelation, would it not probably contain some positive institutions? Is a merely spiritual religion suited to human nature? SECT. XXXI. Is it not equally unphilosophical in natural and revealed theology to argue on supposition, instead of enquiring into facts? When the truth of a Revelation has been ascertained, should we not yield to its authority?

95

98

101

105

SECT. XXXII. Are not the evidences both of natural and revealed theology ultimately dependent on our belief in the Divine veracity? Is not this species of faith universally necessary in all evidence? SECT. XXXIII. Is not a Revelation delivered in an historical form, and with the sanction of a divine law, necessarily more clear and intelligible than an abstract

religion? Is not this a proof of its suitability to the