THE CONNECTION OF NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. PART THE FIRST. THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION IN GENERAL. SECTION I. Is not a Divine Revelation possible?* THAT God can communicate his will in any manner which he deems most advantageous to mankind, must be admitted by all who acknowledge his existence as a wise, independent, and Almighty Intelligence. The Creator of our faculties can impart know B ledge to us in any way which appears most proper and desirable to himself. This is a proposition so plain and obvious, that it may be said to be intuitively evident. And that the supposition of a Revelation is not merely an abstract possibility, but a conception which has frequently occurred to the human mind, is plain, from the numerous pretences which have been made in the different ages of the world, to a direct communication with Heaven. Had there been any thing absurd, or even very remote, in the supposition of its possibility, it would not have been professed by impostors in religion, nor by legislators, to conciliate obedience to their authority. There would have been no success to have been hoped from claims which were altogether repugnant to reason, and which had no connection with the principles of the human mind. But if we have this perception of the possibility of a Revelation, it will follow that we are capable of receiving proofs of its reality, that upon an inferior degree of evidence we ought to allow of its probability, and that upon a higher degree of our assent. evidence we ought to allow of its certainty. For whatever supposition we can apprehend as possible, i. e. which does not involve a contradiction, or exceed the range of our understandings, may be laid before us with such evidence as ought to command There are some propositions of which we can form no opinion beyond that of their necessary truth; such as the Eternity of the First Cause, and the incommunicable attributes of God. These lie beyond the limits of our understandings, we are therefore impressed with the belief of their necessary existence. But whatever appears to us to be possible, may be shown, by proper and adequate evidence, to be either probable or certain; and, according to our convictions of the evidence, we shall lie under an obligation to proportion our as sent. [See Notes and Illustrations, No. 1.] SECTION II. Is not a Divine Revelation desirable? THE possibility of a Revelation being granted, it is our next enquiry whether it be important and desirable that it should be true; for it would be a strong presumption against its probability, if we could discover nothing to recommend it in this respect, to the hopes and wants and wishes of the human mind. But that it is desirable a weak, frail, and fallible creature, like man, should be taught and instructed by the All-wise and Almighty Creator, and that some communications should subsist between God and our rational faculties, this is as plain a truth as any which can be laid before the human understanding. "Since no one pretends," as Paley remarks, "that even under the Christian Revelation we have too much light, or any degree of assurance which is superfluous," it must be admitted, whether we believe in a Revelation or no, that it would be highly beneficial and advantageous to mankind, if some communications of this kind should take place between heaven and earth. This sentiment, if it were not self-apparent, might be supported by many appeals to the expressed wishes of the ancient philosophers. But when it is considered that the whole constitution of human nature is the workmanship of a wise and benevolent mind, it deserves our reflection, whether this extreme desirableness of supernatural assistance may not, in some degree, import its probability; at least, whether upon the acknowledged principles of rational theism, we ought not afterwards to be disposed to listen to any evidence which might be offered in its favour. It is from intimations of a similar kind in nature, that we are often led to form our opinions concerning. final causes; particularly concerning the ends and objects of our own faculties. Thus in natural theology we argue from many of the contrivances of nature, to the end and purpose for which they were designed. If then we apply the same reason- |