but a mighty machine.

It would be a dis

play of merely physical force; it would afford no exercise for these moral attributes, which are so infinitely superior in grandeur and dignity to all other excellence.

[See Notes and Illustrations, No. 8.]

SECTION IX.

Does not the Struggle which subsists in our Nature between Reason and Passion, inti

mate some Derangement in our moral Faculties ? *

EVERY man is conscious that he has a notion of duty inherent in his nature; that is, he feels an obligation to follow his reason rather than his passions. If this principle of duty were able to hold the chief command, then, I think, it might be pronounced in its natural and rightful station; but though we retain the perception of its legitimate and essential superiority, yet by some strange anomaly, we generally yield our obedience to what we know to be secondary and inferior. Thus force becomes superior to law, and we live from day to day under the worst species of domestic tyranny.

Now this anomaly can hardly be accounted for without supposing some unna

* See Part II. Sect. 8.

tural derangement in our moral constitutions. If our passions acted only a subordinate part, they would be extremely useful, perhaps essentially necessary to our present existence. Or if their subjection were attended with only a certain degree of difficulty, it might be explained from our having been placed in a state of trial and of moral probation. But when this difficulty has arisen to such a height as to render us almost incapable of restraining their violence, then it would appear as if our nature itself had suffered some violent convulsion. It looks like the involuntary motions of a paralytic; the will does not act in unison with the understanding, and the conscience protests against the illegality of that force which is paramount to reason.

But besides this singular phænomenon, we may observe, that we are capable of entertaining sentiments of remorse, and self-condemnation, and of penitential sorrow. Now these are feelings which seem plainly to indicate a kind of derangement in our moral constitutions. Would it have been possible for a creature to repent of

D

being in that situation in which God had originally placed him? Could the pangs of remorse and penitential sorrow, have found any place in the breast of an unspoilt and. innocent being?

There is one observation, which of itself might powerfully intimate, that mankind was at present in a degraded and unnatural situation-the universal prevalence of polytheism and idolatry amongst heathen nations, in opposition to the best dictates of reason and nature. Can any theist believe, that God would have originally created mankind with such dubious opinions respecting the divine unity?

[See Notes and Illustrations, No. 9.]

SECTION X.

Does not the Supposition of our Fall from Innocence, derive some Credibility from the Contradictions which subsist between the Wishes and the Circumstances of Mankind ? *

66

THE greatness and the misery of man,' says Pascal, being alike conspicuous, it is necessary the true religion should declare that he contains within himself some noble principle of greatness, and at the same time some profound source of misery. For the true religion cannot answer its character otherwise than by searching our nature to the bottom, so as perfectly to explain all that is great, and all that is miserable in it; together with the reason of the one and of the other."

If we apply this striking observation to those feelings of contempt and dissatisfaction which wise and virtuous men have so generally expressed for the enjoyments of

* See Part II. Sect. 8.