same; and that, in the works of the same Author, we may naturally look for traits of likeness and resemblance; that man is addressed under both dispensations; that they are carried on in the same world, being coexistent both in point of time and place; and that the same faculties must necessarily be employed in judging of the evidences, and in making use of the advantages, of natural and of revealed theology.

There is one observation, however, which it is of great importance to remember, because it will furnish us with a clue to the whole presumptive character of such a dispensation. It is this, that this supposed Revelation would, in all probability, be adapted to that state of trial and moral discipline in which we are placed by nature, and under which we are contemplated by natural religion. Since we come into the world with passions which we are obliged to restrain, and since we are surrounded with temptations which we are obliged to withstand, even for our temporal happiness and security, there is every presumptive reason to think, that, if any extraordinary

assistance in religion were afforded to man, it would be calculated to meet those peculiar exigences which arise out of such a state of moral trial and probation.

In proportion then as the example of its Author, the tenor of its doctrines, and the tendency of its threatenings and rewards, were adapted to this state of suffering and trial, in that same proportion would it correspond with the meridian of human life, and with the natural suggestions of the human mind. Every motive with which it furnished us to mortify and subdue our corrupt propensities, and to enable our reason to control our passions; every doctrine which it inculcated to humble our base, and to elevate our better inclinations, ought to be esteemed an indication of its universal connection with natural theology. Since nothing which is great, excellent, and noble can be obtained in this life, without much labour and solicitude, there would be every reason to apprehend that a Revelation would also encourage the same habits of sobriety and self-denial, of patient and persevering diligence; and since human virtues are

C

matured and elicited rather by struggles and adversities than by ease and enjoyment, we might naturally anticipate that something of the same character and disposition would be found to pervade this extraordinary dispensation.

From such considerations we might deduce, with the utmost probability, that if any Divine Revelation were afforded, it would, in many respects, agree with the constitution of nature, and correspond with the natural suggestions of our minds. And though it might not be possible to determine beforehand as to the precise nature and extent of this connection, yet, I think, the following rule might be safely laid down concerning it: "That in proportion as this "connection subsisted between things re"vealed and things natural, not only would "this Revelation become more credible in "itself, but that it would be more adapted "to the circumstances of human life, and "consequently more intimately associated "with the springs of human happiness and "virtue."

[See Notes and Illustrations, No. 5.]

SECTION VI

Is it not credible that a Revelation was given to Man at his first Creation ?*

UPON the first creation of any intelligent beings, it appears to be highly probable, if not morally certain, that God would communicate his will to them in some direct and extraordinary manner. The circumstances of a first creation seem to suppose and require such supernatural aid and advice. Since creatures in this situation would have no experience to guide them, it is every way probable to believe that their Creator would become their instructor; and more especially if they were placed in a state of trial and probation, that He would give them such cautionary assistance as might put them sufficiently on their guard. If they were created capable of religious worship, it appears also highly credible that He would instruct them concerning the manner of discharging these solemn duties. These are observations so identified with

* See Part II. Sect. 6.

reason, and so consonant to our conceptions of the divine character, that no reflecting theist can consistently question their probable truth.

Since the only objection which can be reasonably urged against a Divine Revelation, arises out of its supposed interference with some previously established course of nature, it does not appear how such an objection can be urged, prior to any course of nature being actually experienced. Unless we suppose the world to have been eternal, and the succession of creatures to have been infinite, we must at last mount up to some period when, what we now call the course of nature, could not have been known. At such a beginning of the world, this objection against a Revelation arising out of its miraculous nature could not be advanced. A miracle, according to our conceptions, is a departure from those laws of nature which are known to us only by experience.

To these deductions of reason, we may conjoin the corresponding traditions of history. It was the universal belief of the Pagan world, that the first religion was pre