in describing the improbability of miracles, he suppresses all those circumstances of extenuation, which result from our knowledge of the existence, power, and disposition of the Deity, his concern in the creation, the end answered by the miracle, the importance of that end, and its subserviency to the plan pursued in the work of nature. As Mr. Hume has reprefented the question, miracles are alike incredible to him who is previously assured of the constant agency of a divine Being, and to him who believes that no fuch being exists in the universe. They are equally incredible, whether related to have been wrought upon occasions the most deserving, and for purposes the most beneficial, or for no affignable end whatever, or for an end confessedly trifling or pernicious. This surely cannot be a correct statement. In adjusting also the other side of the balance, the strength and weight of testimony, this author has provided an answer to every poffible accumulation of historical proof by telling us, that we are not obliged to explain how the story or the evidence arofe, arose. Now I think that we are obliged; not, perhaps, to shew by positive accounts how it did, but by a probable hypothesis how it might so happen. The existence of the testimony is a phenomenon. The truth of the fact solves the phenomenon. If we reject this solution, we ought to have some other to rest in; and none even by our adversaries can be admitted, which is not consistent with the principles that regulate human affairs and human conduct at present, or which makes men then to have been a different kind of beings from what they are now. But the short confideration which, independently of every other, convinces me that there is no folid foundation in Mr. Hume's conclusion is the following. When a theorem is proposed to a mathematician, the first thing he does with it is to try it upon a simple cafe; and, if it produce a false result, he is sure that there must be some mistake in the demonftration. Now to proceed in this way with what may be called Mr. Hume's Hume's theorem. If twelve men, whose probity and good sense I had long known, should seriously and circumftantially relate to me an account of a miracle wrought before their eyes, and in which it was impoffible that they should be deceived; if the governor of the country, hearing a rumour of this account, should call these men into his prefence, and offer them a short proposal, either to confefs the imposture, or fubmit to be tied up to a gibbet; if they should refuse with one voice to acknowledge that there existed any falsehood or imposture in the cafe; if this threat were communicated to them separately, yet with no different effect; if it was at last executed; if I myfelf faw them, one after another, confenting to be racked, burnt, or strangled, rather than give up the truth of their account; still, if Mr. Hume's rule be my guide, I am not to believe them. Now, I undertake to say that there exists not a sceptic in the world who would not believe them; or who would defend such incredulity. Instances of spurious miracles supported by ftrong apparent teftimony undoubtedly demand examination. Mr. Hume has endeavoured to fortify his argument by fome examples of this kind. I hope in a proper place to shew that none of them reach the strength or circumstances of the Christian evidence. In these, however, confifts the weight of his objection. In the principle itself I am perfuaded there is none. PART |