and no more belongs to us, than the question, how the magnetic power can be reconciled with gravitation. If, however, any one takes upon him to assert, that the fact which I have insisted upon in regard to the affections, is inconsistent with moral agency, it will be incumbent on him to prove his assertion. And I should hope, that an attempt to do this would convince him of his mistake. Every man is most certainly chargeable with a mistake, who supposes that perfect moral agency is inconsistent with anything which we find to be a fact in the constitution of the mind. The laws of the mind are not only consistent with moral agency, but essential to it. These laws it is our object, as philosophers, to discover. And if we would be successful in our inquiries, we must proceed without shackles. We must be governed by no prepossession. We must have no such impression as this, that the affections must be governed by the will, or we cannot be moral agents. An impression like this would certainly prove an embarrassment, and would prevent an impartial regard to evidence.

The supposition, that we are more accountable for our volitions, than for our affections, is wholly unwarrantable. It rests on the assumption, that our volitions are in themselves moral acts, and that our affections are not so. But, in truth, what is there in the class of mental acts called volitions, which leads you to consider them morally good or bad, more than the other class, called the affections? Do you say volitions are more properly our own acts than the affections? But how does this appear? Are not loving and hating as much our own acts, as willing and choosing? Do we not exercise as high a degree of activity, in the former, as in the latter? Is there anything in ourselves or in others, which we more spontaneously pronounce to be right or wrong, praiseworthy or blame-worthy, than the affections? Some appear to

think, that if we only give the name of volitions, or acts of the will, to the affections, the difficulty is relieved at once. But does it alter the nature of mental acts, or make us more accountable for them, to call them by a particular name? Are not the mental acts referred to, perfectly the same when you call them affections, you call them acts of the will?

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But I must come to the chief object of the present number; which is to show, that instead of the affections being under the direct influence of the volitions, just the opposite is true, namely, that the volitions are under the influence of the affections; and that, instead of the affections deriving their moral character from any acts of the will, all acts of the will derive their moral character, so far as they have any, from the affections.

To illustrate the first of these points, I shall adduce a few examples. And if we find what the laws of the mind are in a few instances, we know what they are in all instances of the same kind.

I ask then, why does a Christian will or determine, to devote a part of his property to the cause of benevolence? And why does a pious youth choose to quit his secular business, and prepare for the ministry? And why does a Christian, when duty requires, choose to suffer persecution for the name of Christ? What is it, in each of these cases, that influences a Christian thus to will, and thus to act? Obviously he does it under the influence of his pious affections. He does it, because he loves Christ and the souls of men. This is the motive, which leads him to such a volition. It is equally evident, that a wicked man's volitions arise from his affections. Why did Judas will to betray Christ? Because he had a selfish, avaricious, resentful heart. It was fear which influenced Peter to deny his Lord. Ambition prompts a Cæsar and a Napoleon to engage in war. It is a fact perfectly familiar to us, that the particular determinations of the will, whether right or wrong, are influenced by the affections. The affections including the emotions and passions, are eminently the principles of action. Without these, how could we act at all? And without moral affections, how could we perform moral acts, or have any volitions which are of a moral nature? If the acts of the will do not flow from the affections, why may it not be, that a man who has no love to God, will choose to labor and suffer for God just as much as if he had love? And why may it not be, that a person whose heart is full of benevolence towards his fellow men, will choose to treat them, and actually treat them, with

unkindness and cruelty, just as though he had the opposite affection of hatred. If the affections do not govern the acts of the will, you can never anticipate what your voluntary conduct will be, from your knowledge of your own heart. If you are a parent, and have a strong and tender affection for your children, you cannot conclude from this, that your treatment of them will be different from what it would be, if your heart were full of spite towards them. Is it not perfectly clear, that all our expectations as to the voluntary acts of men, proceed on the principle, that their determinations and consequent actions will be influenced by their affections? And do not all our attempts to influence their determinations and acts proceed on the same principle? Do we not always endeavor to move their affections, in order to influence their determinations? The acts of the will, and the conduct resulting from them, are the natural utterance of the heart. They are the way in which the affections act themselves out. And without this efficacy of the affections, there is no conceivable way in which we can put forth acts of will. If any man will watch the operations of his own mind, and attend to those maxims of practical wisdom which flow from experience and observation, he will find abundant evidence of the principle, that the affections govern the acts of the will. Whatever external objects are presented before us, our affections are the real ultimate motives, which influence us in our volitions. That we have a motive or reason for our choices, is implied in the fact, that we are rational; as it will be seen on a moment's reflection, that our willing anything without a motive, (if such an absurdity can be conceived of,) would imply the want of rationality. This subject is treated particularly by Edwards in his treatise on the Will; and his main position in opposition to the notion of a self-determining power of the will, is supported by arguments, unanswered, and unanswerable. The principle which I maintain, is clearly implied in our moral and accountable agency. For we could never regard a volition, which should take place without any motive, as either morally good or evil. An essential condition of a moral act would be wanting. If you require proof of this, I

produce the fact, that there never was a moral agent, whose will was self-determined in the sense above suggested. And that this is a fact, I show by appealing to every man's experience and consciousness. If you deny the fact, I shall require you to produce some instance, in which a moral agent put forth a volition, or determination of will, without any motive. And if you should produce yourself, as the moral agent who has done this; I should regret that you think so meanly of yourself, and should do you the honor to say, you are mistaken.

If it is necessary to consider this matter further, I would ask the reader, whether he would think it a desirable thing to be able to put forth acts of will which should be wholly uninfluenced by the affections. Would you regard it as a privilege to will and to do what is contrary to every affection and disposition of your heart? Would it gratify you to be so constituted that, while all your affections move towards God, and delightfully rest in him, your will might put forth choices in opposition to him, and so lead you to open disobedience? Such might be the result, if your will should break loose from the control of the affections, and put forth its acts in some other way. What distraction would be so dreadful as this? To reduce man to such a condition, his rational and moral constitution must have an unheard of shock. Happily for us, our intellectual and spiritual constitution is secured against such a calamity as this, by the appointment and ever-present agency of the being who made us.

The other point mentioned above, namely, that the character of every volition depends on the character of the affection from which it proceeds, is equally evident. If our volitions are the result of a moral affection, we necessarily consider them of a moral nature, whatever may be the outward object acting on the mind. For the outward object can get access to the will and influence its acts, only through the affections. It is the affection which comes in contact with the will, and determines the character of its acts. If the affection which prompts the volitions, is right, they are right, that is relatively; and a relative rightness is all they can have. If the affection is wrong, the volitions flowing

from it are also wrong. And when I speak of volitions in this way, as flowing from the affections, I mean to include the mental and bodily acts which are connected with the volitions, and which are, on that account, called voluntary. And on the other hand, when I speak of these mental and bodily acts, I mean to speak of them as implying a volition, and as resulting directly from it.

The principle which I here advance, that the character of our volitions is according to the character of our affections, is nothing different from the common maxim, that our conduct is right or wrong according to our motives. For the motives of our conduct ultimately consist in the affections. This principle is acted upon continually and instinctively, whether men judge of their own conduct, or that of others. You see a man contribute to a charitable object. You immediately approve of the act. You say it is a good deed. Why? Because it appears to spring from a good motive, that is, a benevolent affection. But if you find that the action, which appeared so benevolent, really proceeded from a selfish, base motive; you change your mind as to the action, and as to the choice of the will to perform it. You cannot but judge of these according to the inward motive that prompted them; or, to speak more exactly, you cannot but judge of the person according to the affection which he exhibits in his conduct. Take another case. Suppose your first impression is, that a man wills and acts from a bad motive. You accordingly feel disapprobation. But if you afterwards discover that you made a mistake, and that his motive was good, you at once change your mind as to the character of the volition and act, or rather, as to the character of the man.

The judgment which we form in such a case, is founded on the immutable principles of our intelligent and moral nature. We cannot judge our own volitions, or the volitions of others, to be either praise-worthy or blame-worthy, without referring to the governing motive. Every sentiment of approval or disapproval in regard to the acts of the will looks ultimately to the inward motive from which they spring. The Scripture confirms the truth of this position, when it represents love to be the whole of what is