same as to the pious affections of a regenerate man. When the glorious character of God is presented to his view, he loves and adores. He does it at once, without any influence from an act of the will. Indeed if a man in such a case should find any occasion for an act of the will to excite his love, it would prove his heart to be in a bad state. If the goodness of God and its manifold fruits are contemplated by a man of right spirit, grateful emotions will spontaneously arise. And if he turns his thoughts to the evil of sin, his abhorrence will at once be excited. In all such cases, it is the nature or quality of the object he contemplates, and not an act of his will, that excites the emotions. In other words, the affections of the heart, whether of one kind or another, do not depend on a volition as their proximate cause, but on the presentation of a fit object.*

If the principles which we have laid down are correct, it will be easy to settle the question, whether the affections are voluntary. We usually call those things voluntary, which take place in consequence of a volition, or of which a volition is the uniform and immediate antecedent. It is not common to speak of anything as voluntary, because it follows indirectly from a volition, or because an act of the will has an influence upon it through the medium of something else. By a voluntary act, Whately says, "we take a medicine which quickens the circulation of the blood: " but we do not, on that account, call the quicker circulation of the blood voluntary. "So also, though we cannot by a direct effort of volition excite or allay any emotion; we may by a voluntary act, fill the understanding with such thoughts as will" have this effect. But is it according to common usage to call such an effect voluntary? As the affections are not the immediate or direct result of volition, it is clear they are not directly voluntary. You may say they are indirectly voluntary, because a volition operates upon them and controls them indirectly. But even this indirect influence of the will is by no means essential to the excitement of the affections.

* As the practical views which occupy several pages of this Essay, together with the quotations from Whately and other writers, are, for substance, contained in the Lectures on moral agency, they are here omitted.

The affections are not generally excited in this way. For fit objects or motives are very often brought before our minds, without any volition or thought of ours. But in these very cases, the affections are of the same nature, and stand in the same relation, to the objects which excite them, as in other cases. Yet they do not result from a volition either directly or indirectly. That is, they are not excited by volition, nor are those objects which do excite them, brought before the mind by a volition. Any man who will reflect on his own past experience will find, that in instances too many to be numbered, those objects have been presented before his mind, without his choice, and not unfrequently thrust upon him contrary to his wishes, which have nevertheless elicited the deepest and strongest emotions.

On this point, are not some distinguished writers chargeable with an oversight? They allow that the affections are not excited directly by an act of the will, but by a view of fit objects, in other words, by proper motives. Still they call the affections voluntary; and they hold all the moral affections to be so,overlooking the obvious fact that, in a multitude of instances, if not generally, the objects of the affections are brought before our minds without any volition of ours, and that in such instances no act of the will has any influence on the affections in one way or another. This fact however is not to be considered as having any influence in regard to the nature of the affections.

In a former number I endeavored to show, that the affections which any one exercises in view of the various objects or motives which come before him, will be according to his disposition, character, or state of mind. There is no truth more confidently believed, or more uniformly acted upon, by men of practical wisdom, than this, and none which is capable of more satisfactory proof from Scripture and common experience. Ministers of the gospel especially, have it exemplified before them continually in the different effects which the same truths produce upon men of different habits or states of mind. But this is a truth, which most writers on mental philosophy overlook, taking it for granted, that all men are in such a state that moral considerations or motives,

if contemplated in earnest, will excite right affections.

Dr. Wardlaw, in his Lectures on Christian Ethics, has clearly shown how frequently this mistake is chargeable upon the most eminent writers on moral philosophy, and what mischievous influence it has on their reasoning. Abercrombie, also, has distinctly, though rather incidentally, recognized the principle which I have advanced, and has shown that he attaches great importance to it. He says, that "moral causes, that is, truths and motives," operate "with a uniformity similar to that with which physical agents produce their actions upon each other." But he says, "they require certain circumstances in the man on whom they are expected to act." He then mentions those circumstances. "It is necessary that a man be fully informed in regard to" the moral causes intended; "that his attention be directed to them with such a degree of intensity as shall bring him fully under their influence as statements addressed to his understanding." Here many philosophers would stop. But not so this author. He proceeds to say, that another thing is necessary in order that truths and motives, however clearly presented and however intensely considered, may produce a right effect upon a man. This necessary circumstance is, "that there be a certain healthy state of his moral feelings, for this has a most extensive influence on the due operation of moral causes." The position I maintain is, that whatever we or others may do to bring motives before us, or to direct our attention to particular objects, the emotions excited will be according to the state of the mind. The objects presented to view, and other external circumstances which may in many instances be more or less under the control of the will, are indeed a part of what may be called the complex cause of the emotions. But the influence of whatever is external, and even the influence of our intellectual perceptions and the dictates of conscience will, after all, be according to the predominant disposition or state of our mind. If a man of an impure disposition, has certain objects presented to his eye or his thoughts, either by his own voluntary act or not, will not impure feelings be excited? His willing, in those circumstances, to be free from wrong feelings and to have

right ones, will not control the movements of his heart. With such objects before him, and such a state of mind, he will have such emotions. "To the pure all things are pure; but to them that are defiled nothing is pure." Thus we see how it happens that a man is so often disappointed in regard to his own feelings.' He voluntarily turns his attention to particular objects, or puts himself in particular circumstances, because, for some reason, he wishes to have certain emotions. But instead of the emotions desired, others of a different kind arise, and he thus finds that an act of his will can have no influence to elicit affections which are contrary to the state of his heart. It may sometimes be the case, that a man of a covetous disposition, may wish and labor to acquire riches, for the purpose, among other things, of curing his covetousness, and making his feelings kind and generous. But he is disappointed. His riches, when acquired, have no effect but to increase his covetous desires. Why is this? Because his external circumstances and his own thoughts and wishes, have an influence upon him according to the character or state of his mind. This well known principle, this law of our intellectual and moral nature, is taught in the Scriptures. When Christ says, "a good tree will bear good fruit, and a corrupt tree corrupt fruit," and that it cannot be otherwise, he says it to illustrate the principle that a man's feelings and actions will be according to his mental state or character. We can, indeed, excite a great variety of affections in ourselves by the exercise of our voluntary agency in the manner above described; but they will all be consonant to our predominant disposition. Take the case of confirmed hostility to the Christian religion, such as appeared in the leading infidels of the last century. Was it in the power of the most convincing arguments or the most persuasive eloquence to produce in their hearts, while unchanged by the Holy Spirit, the affection of true love to Christ and his religion? Take the case of an inveterate miser. Can you present any motives before him which will produce in his heart a sincere affection for the word of God, and a readiness to give away his treasures to the destitute? Take the case of the wicked at the last day. Their attention will be power

fully arrested by the most excellent, glorious, and moving objects. But they will have no right feeling. Amid all the light and glory of that day, they will have no emotions but those which correspond with their sinful disposition. Satan is a moral agent of high 'intellectual powers. Now suppose he could be admitted into the heavenly world, and see all that the angels see and enjoy. What would be his feelings? They would be feelings of hatred, envy, and remorse. Whence this difference between the feelings of Satan and the feelings of Gabriel, in view of the same objects? Whence, but from their different states of mind?

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The principle which I have endeavored to illustrate, is often exemplified in the experience of sinners under awakenings of conscience. They are conscious that their affections towards divine things are sinful; and from their natural dread of misery and love of happiness, they in a sense desire such affections as God will approve, and, for the purpose of producing them, they apply themselves to a diligent and serious consideration of the character of God, the merciful interposition of the Redeemer, the holy law, and the precious blessings of salvation. But if the renewing of the Holy Spirit is withheld, they will have no right affections. Those divine objects which they contemplate, will, through their perverseness, be the occasion of exciting dislike and opposition in their hearts, and so prove a savor of death unto death." "He that loveth is born of God," and this implies, that he only who is born of God, loveth. No considerations however mighty, no motives however powerful and touching, if unaccompanied by the renewing influence of the Spirit, will ever have power to produce any right affections in unregenerate men. "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." And it is equally true, that except a man be born again, he cannot have holy affections; for the want of this is all that prevents his seeing the kingdom of God. If now we say or do anything to lead sinners to think, that any voluntary agency of theirs, or any power of excitement or persuasion which they can use with themselves, or which others can use with them, will ever bring them truly to love God, or believe in Christ, without the new creating agency