and feelings, while he witnessed the events which took place on that memorable occasion. Perhaps he sympathized with the weeping friends, and was filled with astonishment at that omnipotent word which raised Lazarus from the dead. But whatever his thoughts and feelings might be, the real character of Judas was the same as at other times. He had an avaricious disposition. He might indeed have had, at the time, no thought of money, and no exercise of covetousness. Still he had a disposition or propensity to love money. The proof of this is, as soon as circumstances varied, and the thought of money arose in his mind, he had the same covetous desire, as before. Who can suppose that the character of that miser, or, which is the same thing, his propensity to love money, ceased, because his mind was, for a time, occupied with other things? The character of John was different. He had no such disposition to love money. If he had been tempted as Judas was, the temptation would have met with an opposite disposition, and would have been repelled with abhorrence.

Suppose another case. A man in prison has been long practised in stealing. His solitary confinement at night, his employment by day, and the religious instructions he receives, produce an apparent change, so that he weeps at the remembrance of his crimes, and resolves never to steal again. But the change is only apparent. There is no real alteration in his moral character. Now what is more common in such a case, than to say, he has in reality the same disposition, as formerly; and he will act it out, and make it manifest, as soon as tempting circumstances occur. The thing here intended by dispostion, is plainly something distinct from the present exercise of the mind.

Take the example of a decided Christian, whose mind is occupied with a mathematical demonstration, or engrossed with the reasoning and eloquence of a distinguished statesman, and whose thoughts are, for the time, wholly withdrawn from the subject of religion. We are accustomed to say, that whatever the present thoughts and feelings of such a man may be, he

has a fixed dispostion to love God, or an habitual principle of piety; and that there is no need of a change in his disposition, or governing moral principle, in order to excite his love, his heart being renewed, and prepared to love, as soon as the object is seen. In this he differs essentially from an unregenerate man, whose enmity will be excited by a clear view of the divine character, and who, on that very account, is generally considered as having a disposition opposed to God, although he may not now have any conscious exercises of enmity.

Take the case of affectionate parents, who have now no thought of a beloved absent child, and of course no exercise of affection towards him. But they have what is called a disposition to love their child, a principle of parental affection. In this respect, they differ widely from those parents who are "without natural affection." They may all agree in this, that they are now wholly occupied with other subjects, and have no present thought or feeling respecting their children. But there is an essential difference in character. These parents have a kind, affectionate disposition; but those have not. If you doubt this, you may soon have your doubt removed. Let the parents first mentioned see their child returned from a long absence, or receive a letter from him, and their hearts instantly overflow with emotions of love and joy; while the other parents, in like circumstances, are unmoved.

There are two men, one of whom has always shown himself to be mild and gentle, the other, irascible and violent. What is more common than to say of the first, he has a mild temper, a disposition to bear affronts and injuries with meekness, or, that he is inclined to feelings of gentleness and kindness; and of the other, that he has an irritable temper, or a propensity to be angry and violent? And we say these things of them without respect to any present exercises which indicate what their disposition is. The existence of the particular disposition which is attributed to them, is, I admit, inferred from past exercises of it; but the disposition is believed and declared to exist, when there are no exercises of it. It is indeed spoken of with relation to

future exercises, and as the ground of them; for when we predicate a disposition of any one, we do it on the supposition that he will have certain feelings hereafter, if circumstances occur which are suited to excite them.

Suppose one example more. There are two judges, one of whom we say has a corrupt disposition, a principle of selfishness, and is inclined to take bribes; and the other of whom we say has a firm principle of honesty and honor, an integrity of heart, an uprightness of disposition, which no temptation can turn aside. And yet these two judges may now be engaged in business which gives no exercise to their moral principles, and may for the present exhibit characters equally spotless and fair. There is, however, an obvious and important difference even now, lying not in present action, either corporeal or mental, but in what we call disposition, or moral principle.

The various cases here mentioned, together with the ideas commonly entertained and the language commonly employed respecting them, lead to the following conclusions.

I. That the disposition, inclination, character, or principle, is discoverable in no other way than by the actions which flow from it. This is true of the attributes of the mind universally. Nothing which belongs to the mind, not one of its faculties, and not even its existence, is ever known to us in any other way, than as it is developed by action. A spiritual agent must indeed exist, with all his essential attributes, in order to action. But how can such existence and attributes be known to others of the same nature, or even to himself, except by mental action? God, who creates the mind and all its powers, does indeed perfectly know them, without waiting for any disclosure to be made by action. But this is one of God's prerogatives. We are capable of nothing like it.

II. The fact, that the disposition of the mind is known only as it is developed by action, is certainly no proof that it does not exist previously to action. It is never made an argument that the mind itself, or any one of its essential attributes, does not exist, that there is no way in which we can be conscious of its existence,

except by its operations? Will any one deny that Milton, and Pascal, really had minds, and superior mental powers, before they exhibited them in action, because their minds and their mental powers could not then be known, even to themselves? It will be admitted, that what a man does, and what he acquires, are to be considered only as developing, strengthening, and improving the faculties which he previously possessed, not as originating them. Why is not this equally true in regard to the disposition or inclination of the mind? What should we think of one who should deny that the mind of a human being has within itself a disposition or tendency to the exercise of compassion or parental love, because the time has not yet come for its exercise ?

III. It is a truth commonly believed and acted upon, that the particular feelings and actions of a man are connected with his disposition, or the character of his mind, and result from it as consequences. I would now limit the proposition to those feelings and actions which occur as a matter of course. Such feelings and actions, I maintain, are connected with a man's disposition, and result from it as consequences. Judas's treatment of Christ plainly resulted as a consequence from his covetous and dishonest disposition. Peter's conduct in the judgment-hall doubtless resulted from the rashness and violence of temper, or the fear of suffering, which were natural to him, and which he had not yet completely overcome. The first emotions of pity, or of parental love, which arise in the mind of a man, are always regarded as resulting from his natural disposition. Saul of Tarsus, in his unrenewed state, had a proud, self-righteous, and violent disposition, and from this, in the circumstances in which he was placed, flowed his feelings and conduct towards Christians. Paul, the regenerate man, the penitent believer, had another disposition, a disposition to love and obey Christ, to compassionate the souls of sinners, and to labor and suffer for their good; and from this holy disposition resulted his feelings and conduct as an Apostle. And after his holy disposition was known to himself and others, it was natural for him and them to conclude that, in

all ordinary circumstances, such would be his feelings and conduct. Whatever may be said of certain extraordinary cases, this connection of our feelings and actions with our previous disposition must be considered as a fact in all common cases; and especially in those cases where particular feelings and actions may be anticipated as a matter of course.

I do not, however, mean by these remarks to imply that the disposition or propensity of our mind is the only cause of our feelings and actions. For this disposition, without the influence of outward motives, that is, without the influence of circumstances suited to call it forth, would never produce the effects referred to. The feelings and actions must be regarded as effects flowing from the combined influence of the dispositions of the mind, and of all the circumstances which bear upon them. So that when we say, a man's disposition is such as will cause these or those particular feelings, and lead to these or those actions, the meaning must be, that such a disposition will have such an influence when the appropriate circumstances occur.

A man

Let me here advert, in few words, to a very obvious distinction between what we call powers or faculties of mind, and what we call disposition. The mental faculties which belong to a man qualify him to act in various ways, but do not account for his acting in any one particular way, rather than others. possessed of distinguished intellectual faculties, may be an eminent statesman, or merchant, or a minister of the gospel, or highwayman, or pirate. He is able to excel in anything which he undertakes. But from his ability to do so many things, we cannot infer that he will do any one particular thing, rather than another. I name to you a young man of brilliant talents, and I ask you what course a young man of such talents, under the influence of auspicious circumstances, will be likely to pursue. You say, you cannot tell, unless you know something of his disposition, or the tendency of his mind. Here is the distinction I have in view. By his powers or faculties, a man is made able to pursue many different courses, right and wrong. His disposition leads him to pursue one particular course, rather than another. Hazael had