The philosophy of the mind is the knowledge and scientific description of man, considered as intelligent and moral. A careful attention to this point will frequently be of use in preserving us from confusion and mistake. Suppose we are perplexed in our inquiries respecting the nature and operations of the intellectual or moral faculties; the perplexity may often be removed by shifting our language and our mode of investigation, and making our inquiries relate to man himself, or to his mind, which is indeed himself, considered as intelligent and moral. The question in the more proper and exact form, is not, how does such and such a faculty act; but how does man act; or how does the mind act? What we call the faculties of the mind, are not so many different agents. There is only one agent, the mind. And when it is said, there are different intellectual and moral powers or faculties in the mind, the meaning is, that the mind itself acts in different ways, and so makes it manifest that it has power to act thus. It is in this way, that we come to consider the mind as possessed of different powers or faculties. But this point is of radical importance in mental science, and must be treated more at large.

To every one who carefully investigates the subject, it must be evident, that we are led to attribute different faculties to the mind, from the different classes of mental operations of which we are conscious. We perceive that certain acts of the mind have, in some respect, a resemblance to each other. The resemblance may be greater or less. For example; my mind recalls what is past. I have an idea of what I was acquainted with last year, or many years ago. The things recollected may, as to their own nature, and as to the times and circumstances in which they took place, be different; and the acts of the mind relative to them may in various respects be different, may be strong or weak, pleasant or painful. In one respect, however, they are alike. They relate to what is past. With reference to this point of resemblance, this common relation, I give them a common name, recollection. To express each of these acts, I say, I recollect, I remember. The word relates to them all equally in that particu

lar respect in which they are alike. The difference which exists among these acts of the mind in other respects, must be expressed in other ways. This word, recollection, or remembrance, expresses these mental acts only in that one respect, in which they have a common resemblance. After thus classifying these mental acts, which I denote by the word recollection, I take one step more; that is, I attribute them to a particular faculty of the mind; or I refer them to my mind, as possessing a power or faculty to perform them. In other words, I refer them to my mind, which I find to be so constituted, or to have such power, that it puts forth acts of recollection. To this power or faculty I give the name of memory; still ascribing the power and all its acts to myself. I say, I have the power or faculty to recollect. And as I find that I perform acts of recollection permanently, I speak of this faculty as permanent, and regard it as an essential attribute of my mind, and of other minds like my own.

I shall give one more example of this process in classifying our mental acts. I am conscious of certain actings or feelings of my mind towards others, which I call affections; and I give this general name to them, whether they have the nature of attachment, or aversion, and to whatever objects they relate. I do this, because, how different soever they may be in other respects, they all agree in this, that they are feelings of the mind or heart towards particular objects. With reference to this point of resemblance, I give them a common name, affections or emotions. And regarding myself as the agent, I ascribe to myself a power to exercise these affections. Or, if I regard myself as the subject of them, I consider myself as capable or susceptible of them. In this way I come to speak of myself as having a power, faculty, or capacity for the exercise of affections. And the word affection, which generally denotes the emotion of the mind, may be used, as it sometimes has been, to denote also the mental faculty. But this faculty has more frequently been called the will, or heart.

But the objects of science and the purposes of life cannot be accomplished, without making other and more particular classifica

tions of those operations of the mind, which are called affections. If we should stop with a classification so general as this; how could we intelligibly point out the various kinds of emotions included in this large class? In what way could we make a distinction between love and hatred, desire and aversion, and other feelings which differ from each other? While conscious of a great difference, we should have no word to express it, but should be obliged to give all our affections the same name.

There is, then, an obvious necessity of making a more particular classification of these acts of the mind, and of having words appropriated to each of the classes. This brings us to the different kinds or species, included under the general head above given. The process here is the same as in forming the general class. We notice those emotions which imply attachment to an object, or complacency in it; and with reference to this point of resemblance, we call them love. We notice other emotions of an opposite nature, and call them dislike or hatred.

But we have occasion to go still further. Even those affections which are included under the name of love, are found to differ, in some important respects, from each other. If then we would be exact and definite in our discourse, and express just what we mean, we must make still more particular classifications. There is a set of feelings, called love, which aim at the welfare of intelligent beings, without regard to their moral character. To this set of feelings we give the name of benevolence. There is another class of feelings, which directly relate to the character of their object, and imply delight in it. These we call complacency. Some of the affections have such a relation to moral objects, as God, his law, and his government, that we may properly call them moral or religious affections, retaining the general term, and marking the class by a particular epithet. Or we may include them under a name which is more common in religious discourse, and call them piety or holiness. Again; affections arise in our minds towards our natural relations; and these we call natural affections. These again we divide into parental, filial, and conjugal affections; and of the parental we make two classes, the

paternal and maternal. Affections which regard money as their object, we denominate avarice; those which regard honor or promotion as their object, we denominate ambition; and those which regard the welfare of our country as their object, patriotism. On the same principles we form various other classes of affections. I have given these examples for the purpose of showing how we proceed in classifying the mental operations, in giving names to the different classes, in referring them to the mind as the agent, and in ascribing to that agent a power or faculty adapted to such operations.

. After proceeding thus far in the consideration of this subject, we can very readily detect the fallacy of what certain writers advance; namely, that the mind must have just so many faculties, and that they cannot be either more or less. They might, with equal propriety, say, the vegetable world must have just so many kinds of vegetables, and the mineral world, just so many kinds of minerals; and that they cannot be either more or less; and that air and water must have just so many powers, principles, or elements, and that these powers or elements cannot be either more or less. But who asserts anything like this in the physical sciences? Further improvement in these sciences has rendered it necessary that the classifications formerly made, should be multiplied. If any important facts are newly discovered, they must have a name. In some cases it may be, that certain facts or relations of facts have been observed, but have not been deemed of such consequence, as to require a particular and discriminating word to be applied to them; but in consequence of the progress of knowledge, it may be found necessary, for the purpose of reasoning correctly, and guarding against mistake, that those facts or relations should be carefully noticed, and marked with an appropriate word. In other cases, things heretofore classed together and denoted by a common term, may, in some important respects, be dissimilar; and this dissimilarity may lead to a new classification, which will of course be marked by a new name. And a further investigation of the subject may show that a still further classification is called for, in order that our language may be

perfectly definite, and our reasoning freed from all uncertainty and confusion.

What has now been said of the natural sciences, is eminently true of the mind. Let any one begin by noticing a class of mental operations which have a common resemblance; call them thoughts, or ideas, and refer them to a faculty of the mind, which he denominates understanding or intellect. Let him proceed to another large class, which he calls emotions, feelings, volitions, etc. and refer them, if he pleases, to a power of the mind, to which he gives the general name of will. Let him comprehend all the mental operations in these two classes, and refer them to the understand ing and will, as the all-comprehensive powers of the mind. But it will not be long before he will find this classification far too general for the purposes of science, or even of common discourse. The operations or states of the mind are so various, that he cannot sufficiently designate them by these general terms; and of course, he will have occasion to form various subordinate classes, and to distinguish them by particular terms. This process of classifying ought to proceed just as far as we discover new and more particular relations and differences of mental phenomena, and have occasion accurately to express them, either for the purposes of science or of common life. And the number of classes formed will, of necessity, be multiplied, in proportion to the advances we make in an exact knowledge of the mind. Accordingly, we are never authorized to affirm, that the classification of mental operations has proceeded to its utmost limits. Suppose we discover some new relations of our mental acts; or suppose it becomes necessary to take more particular notice of certain relations, which have before been known, though but slightly considered. Either of these circumstances will lead us to form a new class of mental phenomena, and to refer that class to a power of the mind, designated by a new name.

It should, then, be kept in view, that the classes which we form of mental acts, and the mental faculties to which we refer them, are to be multiplied more or less, according to the state of our knowledge, and as convenience requires. No other limits can be set to classification.